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period under review. The thesis is therefore concerned with how British merchants 
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Introduction 
British Private Trade Networks in the Arabian Seas, c.1680 – c.1760 
 
This thesis explores the networks of British private trade in the Arabian Seas during 
the first half of the eighteenth century. Despite long-standing interest in the subject of 
East Indian private trade, few studies have focused on how it operated in the 
westward ‘segment’ of the Indian Ocean trading world that encompassed the west 
coast of India, the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea.
1
 As well as attending to a branch of 
European commerce in a hitherto neglected area, this thesis stresses the regional 
complexity of private trade and foregrounds a new perspective on this element of 
British East Indian commerce. Although operating alongside and within the 
Honourable East India Company’s structures, the private trade system in the Arabian 
Seas was fundamentally mediated through social networks and inter-personal ties. 
These were often global in scope, but were also bound and shaped by factors unique 
to this particular Indian Ocean region. 
This introduction firstly provides an overview of the argument, aims and 
approach of the thesis. It discusses the existing literature on private trade and 
establishes the rationale for a fresh approach to the subject. It also considers recent 
work in related areas that has influenced the direction and focus of the thesis, drawing 
attention to a number of themes that feature throughout the five principal chapters. 
                                                     
1
 The Arabian Seas have been conceptualised both as an element of a wider Indian Ocean trading 
world, and also as a distinct economic and cultural zone that can be studied in its own right. See Om 
Prakash, ‘The Trading World of the Indian Ocean: Some Defining Features’, in Om Prakash (ed.), The 
Trading World of the Indian Ocean, 1500-1800 (New Delhi, 2012), p. 24 and R.J. Barendse’s volume, 
The Arabian Seas, 1640-1700 (Leiden, 1998). 
 2 
 
The final sections situate this study chronologically, discuss the source material 
consulted, and describe the content of each of the chapters. 
 
British Private Trade in the Indian Ocean – A Historiographical Overview 
 
 
As part of the large body of research centred on European trade in the early modern 
Indian Ocean world, much of which has explored the activities of chartered 
companies, historians have also highlighted the extent and significance of private 
trade. Private trade was practiced by most European merchants, forming far-reaching 
and vibrant commercial networks by the last quarter of the seventeenth century.
2
 
British private trade has received the most scholarly attention, and has been studied as 
an important branch of Indian Ocean commerce in its own right.
3
 Over the course of 
the eighteenth century, British merchants grew to form probably the largest single 
group of Europeans engaging in private trade.
4
 A detailed picture of the extent, scope 
and mechanics of their business networks, from the late seventeenth through to the 
                                                     
2
 Om Prakash, ‘From Hostility to Collaboration: European Corporate Enterprise and Private Trade in 
the Bay of Bengal, 1500-1800’, in Om Prakash, Bullion for Goods: European and Indian Merchants in 
the Indian Ocean Trade, 1500-1800 (New Delhi, 2004), p. 136. As well as research dedicated to 
specific East India companies, a number of edited volumes have attempted to explore European Indian 
Ocean trade in comparative perspective, building in discussions of private trade. See for instance 
Leonard Blussé and Femme Gaastra (eds), Companies and Trade: Essays on Overseas Trading 
Companies during the Ancien Regime (Leiden, 1981); the collected works of Om Prakash, European 
Commercial Expansion in Early Modern Asia (Aldershot, 1997) and Sushil Chaudhury and Michel 
Morineau (eds), Merchants, Companies and Trade: Europe and Asia in the Early Modern Era 
(Cambridge, 1999). Holden Furber’s, Rival Empires of Trade in the Orient, 1600-1800 (Minneapolis; 
London, 1976) is an earlier influential example of a resolutely comparative approach. 
3
 Ian Bruce Watson usefully defines the concept of ‘private trade’ as a portmanteau term ‘delimiting all 
the trade with the East Indies, and within the East Indies, not conducted for the Company’s benefit’. It 
covers several differing commercial systems and channels of trade incorporating ‘free merchants’ and 
‘interlopers’ as well as Company employees. See Ian Bruce Watson, Foundation for Empire: English 
Private Trade in India 1659-1760 (New Delhi, 1980), p. 61. This thesis focuses on the private trade of 
East India Company servants.  
4
 Furber, Rival Empires, pp. 272-275. 
 3 
 
end of the eighteenth century, was delineated through the pioneering work of Holden 
Furber, Ian Bruce Watson and P.J. Marshall.
5
 This work emphasised the extent to 
which private trade played a central role in transforming the Indian Ocean economy 
and supporting the East India Company’s commercial hegemony from the middle of 
the eighteenth century. More recent work has moved away from this focus on Empire 
however, to stress that private trade was conducted through an independent merchant 
network. Søren Mentz characterised private traders as part of an English commercial 
network, whose success was based on the exchange of capital between London and 
India.
6
 Other scholars have similarly emphasised that the private trade system 
operated within, and formed an important part of, a global economy in the eighteenth-
century.
7
 
Although private trade emerged immediately following the Company’s entry 
into the Asian trading world, it grew into a substantial commercial network from the 
last quarter of the seventeenth century. The Honourable East India Company 
monopolised the trade of Asian goods to Europe. But a series of decrees issued from 
the 1660s granted permission to its own servants, mariners and free merchants to 
engage in intra-Asian trade.
8
 The Company effectively withdrew from the ‘country 
                                                     
5
 Furber, Rival Empires, P.J. Marshall, East Indian Fortunes: The British in Bengal in the Eighteenth 
Century (Oxford, 1976), Watson, Foundation for Empire. 
6
 Søren Mentz, The English Gentleman Merchant at Work; Madras and the City of London, 1660-1740 
(Copenhagen, 2005). 
7
 Emily Erikson and Peter Bearman, ‘Malfeasance and the Foundations for Global Trade: The 
Structure of English Trade in the East Indies, 1601-1833’, American Journal of Sociology, 112/1 
(2006), pp. 195-230; Om Prakash, ‘English Private Trade in the Western Indian Ocean, 1720-1740’, 
JESHO, 50/2-3 (2007), pp. 215-234. 
8
 Søren Mentz provides a very concise description of this: ‘In 1665 the EIC abandoned Asian country 
trade, legalized private trade, and encouraged the servants to concentrate their activities in the Indian 
Ocean. In the century that followed, private trade expanded and British merchants emerged as the most 
successful Western traders in the Indian Ocean, surpassing not only the declining VOC, but also 
 4 
 
trade’, and legally permitted their servants to conduct business between Asian port-
cities on their own accounts, alongside their role as Company servants.
9
 In formal 
terms, the right to trade privately was extended in 1675 to ‘any commodity … to any 
port or places in the East Indies to the northward of the equator, except to Tonkin and 
Formosa’. Although certain commodities remained under Company control and 
others were subject to restrictions, the Company’s jurisdiction over private trade 
throughout Asia was rather minimal. Private fortunes became ‘increasingly visible 
perquisites’ of Company service.10 East India Company employees resident in the 
factories established across the Indian Ocean world freely engaged in intra-Asian 
trade throughout the eighteenth century. 
Allowing private trade provided benefits for the Company as well as its 
servants. Despite the dangers inherent in sailing to Asia to trade, the potential to 
cultivate a fortune, or a ‘competency’ (enough money to be able to return home to 
live out a comfortable life as a gentleman) through trading in the East Indies was 
attractive to many young merchants and aspiring traders. The Company could 
therefore offer low salaries but never be short of a supply of potential servants.
11
 The 
                                                                                                                                                       
rivalling Asian commercial groups.’ Mentz, ‘European Private Trade in the Indian Ocean, 1500-1800’ 
in Om Prakash (ed.), The Trading World of the Indian Ocean, 1500-1800 (New Delhi, 2012), p. 500.  
9
 This did not, of course, mean that Dutch merchants did not operate in trade on their own accounts by 
flouting the rules of their employers. Nevertheless, according to Om Prakash, the British were the most 
important group of European private traders in the eighteenth-century Indian Ocean. Om Prakash, 
European Commercial Enterprise in Pre-Colonial India (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 88-90 and Idem., 
‘From Hostility to Collaboration’, p. 146.  
10
 Nicholas Dirks, The Scandal of Empire: India and the Creation of Imperial Britain (Cambridge, 
Mass.; London, 2006), pp. 38-39. 
11
 The salaries paid out to the Company’s merchants during the eighteenth century were modest, 
ranging from £10 to £15 per year for a writer (the lowest rank within the factory system) to up to £500 
per year for a governor or factory chief. Approximate salaries for factors were around £20 while a 
more senior merchant could earn about £40 annually. By way of comparison, a labourer in London 
could perhaps earn as much as £25 per year in 1700, whilst by mid-century a high ranking clergyman 
could expect a salary of £100 and a lawyer could earn nearly £200. J. N. Sarkar, Private Traders in 
 5 
 
private trade privilege even went some way to ensuring loyalty to the Company’s 
service, as progressing through the ranks of the factory system often led to further 
lucrative opportunities.
12
 However, although private trade had the potential to 
facilitate the acquisition of sizeable fortunes, few men actually returned home to 
England as ‘men of means’, able to enjoy the fruits of their labours in Asia.13 
The growth and success of British private trade across the Indian Ocean world 
has also been seen as inextricably intertwined with the East India Company’s move 
from ‘trade to dominion’ in the second half of the eighteenth century. 14  Holden 
Furber was the first to argue that it was the commercial aggressiveness and 
entrepreneurship of private traders that helped the British gain a competitive 
advantage in the Indian Ocean over other commercial powers. For Furber, growing 
private trade was also one of the catalysts for a widespread ‘commercial revolution’ 
that fundamentally altered the balance of power between different polities in the mid 
eighteenth-century Indian Ocean.
15
 The British undoubtedly came to dominate major 
trade routes across this maritime sphere.
16
 One consequence of this expansion, 
according to many scholars, was the coming of empire. 
Similarly, in a number of key works, P.J. Marshall comprehensively 
articulated the importance of Company servants’ private intra-Asian trade for 
                                                                                                                                                       
Medieval India: British and Indian (Calcutta, 1991), p. 12; Kirstin Olsen, Daily Life in Eighteenth-
Century England (Westport; London, 1999), pp. 140-145. 
12
 See Santhi Hejeebu, ‘Contract Enforcement in the English East India Company’, Journal of 
Economic History, 65/2 (2005), pp. 496-523. 
13
 Tillman W. Nechtman, Nabobs: Empire and Identity in Eighteenth-Century Britain (Cambridge, 
2010), p. 70; Anthony Farrington, Trading Places: The East India Company and Asia, 1600-1834 
(London, 2002), p. 76.  
14
 Erikson and Bearman, ‘Malfeasance and the Foundations for Global Trade’, p. 198. 
15
 Holden Furber, John Company at Work: A Study of European Expansion in India in the Late 
Eighteenth Century (Cambridge, Mass.; London, 1948), pp. 161-163.  
16
 Kenneth McPherson, The Indian Ocean: A History of People and the Sea (2nd edn, Delhi; Oxford, 
1998), p. 208.  
 6 
 
drawing the British into imperial expansion in mid eighteenth-century Bengal. East 
Indian Fortunes in particular stands as a critical study within the canon of research on 
private trade. Marshall argued in this work that despite periods of uncertainty and 
frequent bankruptcy, the eighteenth century was largely a period of growth for the 
British private ‘sector’ based at Calcutta. The success of this trade (measured mainly 
using levels of remittances back to London and shipping records) meant that British 
merchants came to have immense leverage in Bengali politics. As commercial 
hegemony mutated into full-blown political control, the connections and alliances 
formed between Company men, senior Indian merchants and local rulers via private 
trade further extended British influence in the region.
17
 Other historians agree that 
private merchants critically undermined the stability of Indian regional states and 
therefore had a direct impact on the Company’s territorial expansion in eighteenth-
century India.
18
 
Elizabeth Saxe’s thesis Fortune’s Tangled Web and Ian Bruce Watson’s study 
Foundation for Empire both extend the ideas of Furber and Marshall back into the 
seventeenth century, arguing that the seeds of these colonial developments related to 
private trade had a much longer genealogy. Watson’s volume is particularly 
significant due to the great detail provided on the mechanics and operation of private 
trade, across the entire Indian Ocean world in the pre-colonial era. As the very title of 
the book suggests, however, Watson fundamentally sees this period after 1660 as one 
in which the expansion and success of private trade came to have a great effect on 
                                                     
17
 P.J. Marshall, East Indian Fortunes: The British in Bengal in the Eighteenth Century (Oxford, 
1976). 
18
 Seema Alavi, The Eighteenth Century in India (New Delhi, 2002), p. 23. 
 7 
 
later imperial domination.
19
 His interest lay in delimiting the impact of British 
merchants’ private trade, particularly as regards their relationship with Indian traders. 
Saxe similarly argued that even in the period before 1717, private trade played a 
critical role in the process by which the Company was eventually able to benefit from 
Mughal decline and rise to a prominent position in India.
20
 
This research has concentrated predominantly on the eastern Indian seaboard; 
especially on the Coromandel Coast and Bengal. Seeking to investigate the 
connection between private trade and imperial processes, historians have 
understandably concentrated on the two main centres of British trade in India, and the 
parts of Asia where the Company’s empire first developed. However, scholars have 
also explored how private trade in the western Indian Ocean world had similar 
repercussions. Lakshmi Subramanian and Pamela Nightingale emphasised how the 
growth of the sector in the eighteenth century intersected with the development of 
British political and commercial control in west India.
21
 This part of the subcontinent 
underwent a major transformation in the mid eighteenth-century. Although not 
always directly dealing with private traders as Marshall and Watson do, Ashin Das 
Gupta and Subramanian both demonstrated that the decline of long-standing Gujarati 
maritime centres like Surat was accompanied by the rise of British private trade. This 
ultimately led to an alternative British-dominated trading order in this period, centred 
                                                     
19
 Elizabeth Saxe, Fortune’s Tangled Web: Trading Networks of English Entrepreneurs in Eastern 
India (Ph.D. thesis, Yale University, 1979); Watson, Foundation for Empire, p. xi. 
20
 Saxe, Tangled Web, pp. ii, 9-11, 325. 
21
 Lakshmi Subramanian, Indigenous Capital and Imperial Expansion: Bombay, Surat and the West 
Coast (Delhi, 1996) and Pamela Nightingale, Trade and Empire in Western India, 1784-1806 
(Cambridge, 1970). 
 8 
 
on the Company town of Bombay.
22
 Pamela Nightingale also argued that private 
trade was vital for the western Indian territorial gains of the Company, in a later part 
of the eighteenth century. 
In recent years, fresh perspectives on private trade have emerged that move 
away from this concentration on Empire. The 2005 volume by Søren Mentz, The 
English Gentleman Merchant at Work, examines the activities of private traders 
based at Madras between 1660 and 1740, boldly offering new ways of thinking about 
this commercial group. It imagines merchants in India not solely as products of an 
Asian trading world but as a constituent element of a global mercantile community, 
linked inextricably with transnational commercial processes.
23
 Mentz demonstrates 
the independence and robust nature of private trade at Madras in the pre-colonial era, 
placing the focus of his discussion resolutely on connections between Company men 
and free merchants with the City of London.  
These connections were mediated through the diamond trade and other 
financial mechanisms that provided the capital necessary for the development of 
private trade. Indebted to scholarship linking the ‘imperial’ with the domestic sphere, 
as well as P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins’ concept of ‘gentlemanly capitalism’, Mentz 
asserts that private trade should be seen as a sophisticated global network that relied 
on this English capital just as much as India-based financing. It was not just a part of 
a plural Indian Ocean world but in effect part of an English ‘diaspora’. Moreover, he 
argues that the focus purely on private trade’s relationship to later imperial 
developments is a major shortcoming of previous approaches to private trade. In 
                                                     
22
 See Ashin Das Gupta, Indian Merchants and the Decline of Surat, c.1700-1750 (Weisbaden, 1979). 
23
 Mentz, English Gentleman Merchant. 
 9 
 
many ways, it has obscured the independent dynamics of this merchant group and 
precluded situating it within a global commercial milieu.
24
 Other recent research has 
characterised private trade in a similar way. A 2006 article by Emily Erikson and 
Peter Bearman describes the British private trade system as a multifaceted merchant 
network, situated within an emerging global economy.
25
 Employing innovative 
network visualisation techniques, Erikson and Bearman trace the activities of East 
India Company captains’ private trade in the Indian Ocean using shipping records. 
Although this research is not centred on East India Company servants specifically, it 
emphasises the critical role of private trade in forming new transnational economic 
ties and its role in the development of a global economy.
26
 One exception to the 
eastward orientation of much existing work is a recent article by Om Prakash. This 
also argues that British private trade activity was a central part of the process by 
which the economy of the Indian Ocean was drawn irrevocably into a global 
economy; as well as highlighting the robust nature of the British private trade 
network based on the west coast of India between 1720 and 1740.
27
 
Notwithstanding the continuing interest in private trade, almost no work has 
looked systematically at British private commerce in the western Indian Ocean world 
before circa 1740. Despite the importance of recent work, and the research of 
                                                     
24
 Mentz states that ‘Historians have found it more interesting to describe this process of conquest 
rather than the slow and continuous building up of the private English trading sector in the period prior 
to the assumption of power.’ Ibid., p. 38. 
25
 Erikson and Bearman, ‘Malfeasance and the Foundations for Global Trade’, pp. 195-230. 
26
 Atlanticist Lauren Benton has also echoed this view, arguing that ‘Changing our vantage point and 
looking west and east from India, we might see seventeenth-century English traders as assisting the 
expansion of Gujarat and, later, Bengal merchants’ markets through the global circulation of textiles.’ 
Lauren Benton, ‘The British Atlantic in Global Context’ in David Armitage and Michael Braddick 
(eds), The British Atlantic World, 1500-1800 (2nd
 
edn, Basingstoke, 2009), p. 276.  
27
 Prakash, ‘English Private Trade’. 
 10 
 
Prakash, Das Gupta, Subramanian and Nightingale, key aspects of private trade in 
this part of the Indian Ocean world remain to be explored.  
There are a number of reasons for the lack of detailed research in this area, 
however. Historians have generally remained sceptical about the scope and 
significance of private trade west of the subcontinent during the first half of the 
eighteenth century. This is perhaps not difficult to account for considering that the 
trade of the East India Company itself was oriented towards Madras and Calcutta, at 
least in terms of the volume and value of exports to Europe.
28
 The extent and 
profitability of private trade emanating from the Company’s settlements in the 
western Indian Ocean was undoubtedly inferior to that anchored in the Coromandel 
Coast or the Bay of Bengal areas. Ultimately, historians seem to have been less 
interested in exploring private trade in the west because of its smaller volume and the 
fact that its growth was undoubtedly much slower than on the Coromandel Coast or 
in Bengal.
29
 In both these latter areas during the eighteenth century, private trade 
constituted a wide-ranging and highly developed system that could be extremely 
profitable for the merchants involved. In Bengal, unlike on the west coast, Company 
servants and free merchants operated on a considerable scale in India’s internal trade 
                                                     
28
 K.N. Chaudhuri has highlighted for instance that in the early eighteenth century the Company’s west 
coast trade suffered relative to the development of Calcutta and Madras. Calcutta, founded in the 
1690s, rose quickly to prominence in terms of its share of exports to England. Bengal’s share of the 
total Asian imports of the Company, stood at forty-two per cent in 1698-1700 and increased to sixty-
six per cent by 1738-1740. Later in the century, Bengal accounted for as much as seventy-eight per 
cent of total Indian procurement, the remainder being divided between Madras and Bombay in a ratio 
of 2:1. Bengal dwarfed the other two key regions by virtue of the fact that it was the principal supplier 
of textiles and raw silk; key goods that oiled the wheels of the Company’s global commerce. See K.N. 
Chaudhuri, The Trading World of Asia and the English East India Company, 1660-1760 (Cambridge, 
1978), pp. 98, 296. For this regional shift for textile imports into Britain specifically, see Dietmar 
Rothermund, ‘The Changing Pattern of British Trade in Indian Textiles, 1701-1757’, in Sushil 
Chaudhury and Michel Morineau (eds), Merchants, Companies and Trade: Europe and Asia in the 
Early Modern Era (Cambridge, 1999), p. 276. 
29
 Prakash, European Commercial Enterprise, p. 252. 
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too.
30
 In more general terms, research under the rubric of ‘Indian Ocean studies’ is 
frequently oriented more to the Bay of Bengal and the eastern part of the Ocean.
31
  
Historians of trade in maritime Asia generally agree that of the two segments 
bordering peninsula India – the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal – ‘the Bay was 
probably more important in terms of the volume and value of trade’.32  
These factors have led scholars to concentrate more readily on the latter 
region when exploring British trade and European commercial enterprise during the 
early modern period. Existing work on private trade similarly fails to fully 
acknowledge the significance of the Arabian Seas. Undoubtedly, private trade in the 
western part of the Indian Ocean was not as extensive or profitable as that further 
east. Yet, this should not preclude its examination. In fact, it is important to integrate 
the story of private trade in this region with what is already known about British East 
Indian trade elsewhere. Recent research has certainly challenged the more traditional 
approach to private trade by building in a focus on the global. It has also raised a 
number of questions for historians of British private trade, but these have not, as yet, 
been tackled by new work.
33
 This thesis feeds into this recent literature, but also 
challenges it through drawing attention to a neglected part of the Indian Ocean, and 
by highlighting the ways in which the development and character of this ostensibly 
global system was affected by regional context. 
 
                                                     
30
 P.J. Marshall, ‘The British in India: Trade to Dominion, 1700-1765’, in Marshall (ed.), The Oxford 
History of the British Empire Vol II: The Eighteenth Century (Oxford, 1998), pp. 493-494. 
31
 Barbara Watson Andaya, ‘Oceans Unbounded: Traversing Asia Across “Area Studies”’, Journal of 
Asian Studies 65/4 (2006), pp. 669-690.  
32
 Prakash, ‘From Hostility to Collaboration’, pp. 135-137.  
33
 Mentz has reiterated his central ideas in a recent article. See Mentz, ‘European Private Trade’. 
 12 
 
Thesis Outline 
 
This thesis highlights the extent to which British merchants operated within, and were 
constrained by, both regional and global networks of trade and commercial 
association. The unusual constellation of economic and political factors within the 
world of the Arabian Seas affected British private trade in significant ways in the pre-
colonial period: the region was a ‘contested sphere’ and political turmoil, piracy and 
commercial competition placed constraints on the successful operation of British 
commerce.
34
 Private trade here was not as extensive or profitable as the network 
centred on Calcutta or Madras, and personal fortunes were more difficult to acquire. 
The pre-colonial era cannot simply be seen as a period marked solely by the uniform 
development and growth of private commerce. Since British commercial hegemony 
was in no way assured or inevitable until late in the eighteenth century, it is also 
problematic to link private trade to imperial and territorial expansion in the context of 
the western Indian Ocean.  
Company servants were to some extent able to overcome the exigencies of 
trading in the intra-Asian world. Søren Mentz argues that metropolitan capital 
provided a key way this was achieved. By contrast, this thesis stresses how merchants 
employed a multivalent strategy in order to engage in the country trade. The 
importance of capital exchange between London and India is another difficult notion 
to maintain for the western Indian Ocean world: remittance levels from Bombay 
                                                     
34
 I am grateful to Robert J. Blyth for allowing me to borrow the term ‘contested sphere’, which he 
used in a paper at ‘The Mighty and Vast Sea: Britain and the Indian Ocean World’ conference at the 
National Maritime Museum in 2010. He applied it the nineteenth-century western Indian Ocean, but I 
believe it also usefully captures the state of the region in the preceding century. 
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appear to have been much lower than those from Madras, and Indian rather than 
British capital remained central to the operation of private trade. Those merchants 
that were successful naturally relied to some extent on operating within a global 
commercial structure and exploited connections with Britain to support their personal 
business. At the same time, their networks of correspondents stationed in other Asian 
port towns, their close relationships with local merchants, and their ability to operate 
strategically (and sometimes illicitly) within the East India Company’s factory 
system, were critical. Exploring private trade in the Arabian Seas during the pre-
colonial period therefore serves to complicate the prevailing understanding of how 
this significant part of British East Indian commerce was organised and carried out. 
Private trade here functioned in a distinctive way compared to other spheres of the 
Indian Ocean, and operated in much more challenging circumstances than those 
prevalent on the eastern seaboard and in the Bay of Bengal. Focusing on this 
particular context in light of existing work draws attention to the regional complexity 
of private trade and the fact that British East Indian commerce did not operate 
uniformly across Asia. 
In addition, this thesis characterises private trade as an interconnected 
mercantile system underpinned by social ties and the circulation of correspondence. It 
is vital to explore how merchants served each other’s private trade in order to build 
commercial relationships, how letters were critical for establishing ties of trust and 
how friendships with senior merchants could prove indispensable for private trade. 
This study therefore views British private trade networks through a social as well as 
an economic lens; emphasising the inter-personal connections at work within a 
 14 
 
complex, transnational commercial structure. Private trade has never been approached 
in this specific way, and doing so allows for a fuller and more nuanced understanding 
of this significant eighteenth-century commercial system to come into view.  
Existing work has mostly concentrated on shipping movements, institutional 
architecture and financial mechanisms. Scholars of private trade have also too readily 
focused on the broad impact of the private trade system, rather than uncovering the 
worlds of the individual merchants and collectives that formed part of it. These 
elements are of course important but privileging them has diverted focus away from 
the individuals that were at the heart of private trade networks. This thesis views them 
not simply as ‘faceless facilitators’ but as a ‘social reality’. 35  Privileging inter-
personal ties and focusing in detail on specific merchants and their connections in a 
particular segment of the Indian Ocean world, allows for a clear view of how 
Company servants actually formed complex trade networks that simultaneously 
formed part of a local economy and global commercial circuits. 
The theoretical position and methodological approach of this thesis is 
informed by a number of inter-linked historiographical developments. It is heavily 
influenced by recent research that emphasises the importance of inter-personal 
connections and social networks within early modern trade. Understandings of just 
how early modern maritime merchants operated have shifted in recent years, in the 
wake of attendant developments in global history, Atlantic history, Indian Ocean 
studies, imperial history and the growth of research employing a ‘networked’ 
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 Sanjay Subrahmanyam, ‘Introduction’, in Subrahmanyam (ed.), Merchant Networks in the Early 
Modern World (Aldershot, 1996), p. xiii. 
 15 
 
approach to early modern trade. Aspects of this work connect neatly to private trade, 
as explored in the following sections. 
 
Early Modern Mercantile Trade and the Atlantic World 
 
 
The study of merchant networks has emerged as a key sub-field within world history 
and global history.
36
 Scholars across different disciplines and working on different 
geographical areas have increasingly highlighted the role that traders played in 
forging global links during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Merchants 
have come to be recognised as transnational citizens and men ‘between worlds’, 
fashioning commercial connections as part of an emerging global economy by linking 
producers and consumers in Europe, Africa, Asia and the Americas.
37
 
In the past two decades, scholarship centred on the Atlantic Ocean has had an 
important impact on the study of early modern maritime trade and merchant networks 
globally. Growing out of early American history and British Imperial history, 
Atlantic history as a distinct field of study rests on the important work of Bernard 
                                                     
36
 This is summed up well by the fact that the theme of the eighteenth annual World History 
Association Conference in 2009 was ‘Merchants and Missionaries in World History’. The sessions 
brought together scholars working on merchant activity in global perspective and included sessions on 
trade and traders in China, Africa, America and Europe. For information see 
http://www.thewha.org/annual_conference_archive.php. Other similar conferences have followed and 
the study of merchant networks in comparative perspective remains a vibrant area of international 
scholarship, particularly where the early modern world is concerned. As a further example, the 
MARPROF (Merchant accounting and profits in Europe and the Americas, 1750-1800) network based 
in Paris is an on-going project that seeks to investigate and explore merchant practice in more detail 
and increase understanding of the strategies employed in early modern trade. See http://marprof.univ-
paris1.fr/ . 
37
 As Adelman and Aron write, merchants ‘adopted public roles to market private goods for personal 
gains; they procured exotic epicures abroad for sumptuous tastes at home; they served at the hither 
edge of empires to service the needs of conquerors and conquered alike’. Jeremy Adelman and 
Stephen Aron, Trading Cultures: The Worlds of Western Merchants: Essays on Authority, Objectivity 
and Evidence (Turnhout, 2001), p. 2. See also Pierre Gervais, ‘Neither Imperial nor Atlantic: A 
Merchant Perspective on International Trade in the Eighteenth Century’, History of European Ideas, 
34 (2008), p. 465. 
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Bailyn, David Cressy, Jacob Price, Ian Steele and others who in their studies of trade, 
migration, labour systems and communications, stressed the interconnectedness of an 
‘Atlantic world’.38 A defining characteristic of this body of work is a concentration 
on web-like structures, ‘created by the free circulation of goods, people and ideas 
across national boundaries’.39  Coclanis asserts that historians working within this 
sub-field have therefore decidedly moved away from ‘centres’ and cores, preferring 
margins, interstices and peripheries.
40
 Because of this, the emphasis of this 
scholarship is not only on the ocean as a space in itself, but on the linkages between 
peoples, places, and activities; on boundary-crossing, interpenetration and sub-
structures.
41
  
Merchants have, not surprisingly, been seen as key actors within this 
interconnected world. Historians of eighteenth-century trade have contributed a great 
deal to excavating the actual mechanics of mercantile associations, especially by 
emphasising that business fundamentally depended on a series of interlocking 
networks and inter-personal connections.
42
 These were mediated through merchants’ 
shared origins, kinship, ethnicity, friendship, and patronage. Behind every merchant 
                                                     
38
 Peter A. Coclanis, ‘Introduction’ in P.A. Coclanis (ed.), The Atlantic Economy During the 
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: Organization, Operation, Practice and Personnel (Columbia, 
2005), p. xi. See also Bernard Bailyn, Voyagers to the West: A Passage in the Peopling of America on 
the Eve of the Revolution (New York, 1986); David Cressy, Coming Over: Migration and 
Communication Between England and New England in the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge, 1987); 
Jacob M. Price, Capital and Credit in British Overseas Trade: The View From the Chesapeake, 1700-
1776 (Cambridge, Mass.; London, 1980) and I.K.  Steele, The English Atlantic, 1675-1740: An 
Exploration of Communication and Community (New York, 1986).  
39
 Gervais, ‘Neither Imperial nor Atlantic’,  p. 465.  
40
 Coclanis, ‘Introduction’, p. xiii. 
41
 David Hancock, ‘“An Undiscovered Ocean of Commerce Laid Open”: India, Wine and the 
Emerging Atlantic Economy’ in H.V. Bowen, Margarette Lincoln and Nigel Rigby (eds), The Worlds 
of the East India Company (Woodbridge, 2002), p. 154.  
42
 See for instance, Jacob M. Price, ‘What Did Merchants Do? Reflections on British Overseas Trade, 
1660-1790’, Journal of Economic History, 49/2 (1989), esp. p. 277. 
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was a matrix of people that kept trade functioning and every trader was reliant on the 
strength of this structure.
43
 It is hard to understand ‘merchant communities’ without 
taking into account the ‘overlapping network of diverse relations’ within them, 
including relations between family members, factors, subsidiaries and brokers.
44
 
Personal relationships, when functioning well or without complication, helped 
mitigate the risks of long-distance trade.
45
 Using the term ‘network’ and privileging 
the network form as a key analytical tool shifts the point of view from the individual 
trader to these complex collectives.
46
 
Partly connected to this emphasis on close-knit networks, recent scholarship 
on early modern merchants has also underlined the extent to which they were 
embedded in geographically and culturally specific contexts.
47
 Merchants were rooted 
in the local as well as the global, even those working in maritime spheres. Seas and 
oceans can undoubtedly be construed as ‘global’ arenas, but also contain a 
multiplicity of spaces, and distinct sub-regions.
48
 Recent sea and ocean-based 
approaches to history have offered novel perspectives on economic, cultural and 
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 Adelman and Aron, Trading Cultures, pp. 2-3.  
44
 Frédéric Mauro, ‘Merchant Communities, 1350-1750’, in James D. Tracy (ed.), The Rise of 
Merchant Empires: Long-Distance Trade in the Early Modern World, 1350-1750, (Cambridge, 1990), 
p. 283. 
45
 David Hancock, ‘The Trouble with Networks: Managing the Scots’ Early Modern Madeira Trade’, 
Business History Review, 79/3 (2005), p. 479.  
46
 Ibid., p. 473.  
47
 Adelman and Aron, Trading Cultures, p.1. Tijl Vanneste’s monograph Global Trade and Merchant 
Networks: Eighteenth-Century Diamond Merchants (London, 2011) is an excellent recent example of 
work focused on global merchant networks that nevertheless emphasises the importance of 
embeddedness within specific social environments and localities. 
48
 Benton, ‘The British Atlantic in a Global Context’, p. 272.  
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biological exchanges in the past, with renewed emphasis on how maritime worlds 
mediate between the local and the global.
49
 
 
Networks and Network Theory 
 
 
Network theory has significantly influenced this body of work. Using the terminology 
of networks to describe early modern trade is far from new: Fernand Braudel saw 
individual merchants or agents as nodal points located at different points within a 
circuit or group of circuits, for instance. He was fascinated by the ways in which 
Mediterranean merchants connected, cooperated and communicated with each other 
to ensure the prosperity of trade.
50
 Historians have since been attracted to networks as 
the analytical tools have developed, and have extended Braudel’s concepts to capture 
the complex structures and relationships inherent in early modern commerce.
51
 In 
recent years, network approaches have come resolutely to the forefront of 
scholarship. 
Proponents of Atlantic history have been keen advocates of network-based 
approaches, particularly David Hancock. He has offered his own definition of a 
network: ‘any collection of actors … that pursue repeated, enduring exchange 
relations with one another and, at the same time, lack a legitimate organizational 
                                                     
49
 David Lambert, Luciana Martins and Miles Ogborn, ‘Currents, Visions and Voyages, Historical 
Geographies of the Sea’, Journal of Historical Geography, 32/3 (2006), pp. 488. See also J.H. Bentley, 
‘Sea and Ocean Basins as Frameworks of Historical Analysis’, Geographical Review, 89 (1999), pp. 
215-224. 
50
 Cited from Bhaswati Bhattacharya et al, ‘Spatial and Temporal Continuities of Merchant Networks 
in South Asia and the Indian Ocean (1500-2000)’, JESHO, 50/2-3 (2007), p. 95.  
51
 Diogo Ramada Curto and Anthony Molho, ‘Introduction’ in Diogo R. Curto and Anthony Molho 
(eds), Commercial Networks in the Early Modern World, European University Institute Working 
Paper, HEC No. 2002/2 (2002), pp. 3-6. 
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authority to arbitrate and resolve disputes that may arise during the exchange 
relationships’.52 Hancock has argued that the advantage of employing the idea of 
networks in the context of early modern trade is that it places the focus on its inter-
connected, web-like nature, and the reciprocal and inter-dependent business of 
merchants.
53
 Francesca Trivellato has similarly emphasised the fact that using 
networks provides a useful view of the working of reciprocity, but also places the 
focus on how merchants constructed their identities.
54
 
Social Network Analysis (SNA) has provided some important methodological 
and terminological tools for historians such as Hancock to engage with network 
theory in this context. SNA as a distinct research perspective is based on the 
assumption of the importance of relationships among interacting units. The unit of 
analysis here is not the individual per se, but an entity consisting of a collection of 
individuals and the linkages between them. Fundamentally, Social Network Analysts 
view networks as structures that provide opportunities for, or constraints upon, 
individual action. Wasserman and Faust argue that SNA provides more than an 
appealing vocabulary or metaphor for discussing social and economic relationships. 
Indeed, they view it as a means of defining social concepts and a theoretical 
alternative to the concept of independent social actors.
55
 Advanced social network 
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 David Hancock, Oceans of Wine: Madeira and the Emergence of American Trade and Taste (New 
Haven; London, 2009), p. xxi. 
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 See Hancock, ‘The Trouble with Networks’, pp. 467-492, esp. pp. 473-479.  
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analysis often relies on quantitative measurement of network structures and 
increasingly involves mapping networks with sophisticated visualisation software.
56
 
Historians are drawing on this sociological work to develop ever more 
sophisticated ways of using networks to describe and explain early modern trade. 
Network literature has tended to say a lot more about the general effects of networks 
than about the factors that generate, sustain and reproduce them. Another common 
critique of such work is that the terminology of networks is often employed 
imprecisely.
57
 Recent research into eighteenth-century mercantile trade has, therefore, 
attempted to push the boundaries of network theory by thinking in more specific 
terms, and in much more detail about the character and features of particular 
networks. Moving away from privileging network models as inherently ‘positive’ and 
efficient, some recent approaches have focused on the ways in which networks can 
function improperly or even disintegrate altogether. Hancock argues that those 
historians who utilise the terminology of networking tend to celebrate networks as 
flexible and egalitarian, at least compared to managerial forms of organisation. Yet, 
networks did not always function well. Conducting trade within such structures was 
difficult, and it required constant attention to multiple relationships and continual 
rejuvenation of the whole to do so properly.
58
 Moreover, success for one merchant 
could come at the expense of another. Arguably, networks where things did not run 
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smoothly, where there were problems or failures, are more revealing of the relations 
behind early modern trade than those that functioned efficiently.
59
 
Scholars of business history and organisation have been at the forefront of 
work that seeks to complicate and problematise prevailing understandings of 
networks in the context of early modern trade. They emphasise the importance of 
particular sub-structures within large networks and the relations they involve, as well 
as linear relationships.
60
 A recent article by Haggerty and Haggerty analyses 
historical merchant networks in this way. It is not enough to state that a network 
exists, they argue, but important to interrogate aspects of its operation. The most 
important nodal points, the ‘thickest’ and ‘thinnest’ ties and the changing 
composition of the network over time also need to be examined. This piece also 
makes use of network visualisation software to effectively map the network of an 
eighteenth-century Atlantic merchant, arguing that visualisation reveals these nuances 
with greater clarity.
61
 
 
Indian Ocean Networks 
 
 
This use of networks has also been applied, albeit perhaps to a less developed degree, 
to Indian Ocean trade. Scholars of the Indian Ocean world have been slower to adopt 
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some of the sophisticated methodological and terminological tools employed by 
Atlanticists. However, since Markus Vink identified in a 2007 article in the Journal 
of Global History that there were many areas of Indian Ocean history that could be 
fruitfully explored using the kinds of perspectives employed by Atlanticists, his call 
seems to have been answered. Recent research has fruitfully employed the kind of 
‘process geographies’ Vink highlights.62 In the last few years, work within the field 
of ‘Indian Ocean studies’ has focused on the religious, commercial, and social 
linkages that criss-crossed from coast to coast for example, looking not just at Asian 
networks, but those formed by Europeans too. Scholarship exploring Indian Ocean 
trade has moved towards topics closely resembling those from Atlantic studies, 
focusing on web-like circulations, links and flows across boundaries, and the factors 
that upheld them.
63
 
New perspectives have also been foregrounded in research specifically 
focused on Indian Ocean merchant networks.
64
 Both the edited volume by Edward 
Alpers and Himanshu Prabha Ray, and the special issue of the Journal of the 
Economic and Social History of the Orient in 2007, showcased new approaches to the 
study of Indian Ocean merchant networks and a renewed emphasis on inter-regional 
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connection and border crossing.
65
 Again, ‘networks’ are strongly invoked in this 
scholarship. The ‘Introduction’ to the special issue underscores the networked 
character of the merchants’ organisations that stretched across the ‘fixed or fluid, 
closed or porous boundaries of cultures, societies and states’. 66  From a cultural 
studies perspective too, Indian Ocean scholars have also been drawn to networks in 
order to explore the ways in which economic relations were socially constructed, how 
markets were embedded, and how the traditional tools of economic analysis are 
inadequate to illuminate human stories across the early modern Indian Ocean.
67
 
More generally, Claude Markovits’ work on Indian merchants has also 
contributed a great deal to the use of network-based approaches in early modern 
trade. He provides perhaps the most lucid, succinct and developed definition of a 
merchant network in this context. Markovits conceptualises a network as a ‘structure 
through which goods, credit, capital and men circulate regularly across a given space 
which can vary enormously in terms of both size and accessibility’. His networks 
‘generally consists of a centre, a locality or cluster of localities where capital is 
raised, and where capitalists have their main place of residence, and of dispersed 
colonies of merchants and commercial employees which keep close links with the 
network centre’. Between the network centre and the dispersed colonies, ‘goods, but 
also men (and sometimes women), credit and information circulate. While goods may 
also circulate widely outside the network (otherwise there would not be any 
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exchange), men, credit and information circulate almost exclusively within it. Most 
crucial is probably the circulation of information.’68 Markovits’ definition does not 
focus on the need for an ‘organising authority’ as David Hancock’s does but 
importantly recognises the different types of exchange relationship at play, and the 
centrality of information exchange. 
Network-based approaches can be fruitfully applied to British private trade 
and this thesis draws a great deal from the insights of this body of work. It similarly 
attempts to focus on specifics; not to employ the term network imprecisely but to 
focus on particular collectives of merchants, certain important dyadic and triadic 
relationships and how they fitted in with broader interconnected structures of private 
trade. The value of conceptualising Arabian Seas private trade in such a way is that it 
helps to adequately explain and illustrate just how British merchants operated in a 
challenging commercial sphere, marked by unstable markets and constraints on the 
operation of commerce. It also allows a clearer focus on reciprocal relationships and 
the way in which merchants were able to operate partly outside of the structure of the 
Company, yet also take advantage of it when necessary. The East India Company’s 
servants in the Indian Ocean pursued ‘enduring exchange relations’ with each other, 
conducted through circulations of correspondence. They organised their private trade 
through exchanging information, organising ventures, transferring capital and credit, 
transporting goods and building ties of trust. 
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Early Modern Mercantile Trade and Institutions 
 
 
Alongside research on networks, this thesis is also informed by work that is 
concerned with the relationship between ‘institutions’ and early modern trade. As 
well as identifying and exploring the structures within which early modern commerce 
operated, this body of literature has attempted to excavate the specific processes that 
allowed trade networks to function. The question of just how European merchants – 
globally dispersed and working with imperfect information in an era of developing 
and semi-formal commercial structures – engaged in successful trade, has been 
attended to in detail by the ‘New Institutional Economics’ (NIE) school. Although 
now established for some decades, research associated with the NIE has continued to 
contribute immeasurably to investigating the formation and operation of merchant 
networks.
69
 
Directly relevant to this present study, practitioners of the NIE have mainly 
explored the relationship between institutional change and economic activity, often 
demonstrating that commercial ‘institutions’ facilitated exchange between merchants 
through decreasing transaction costs and generally aiding the progress of trade.
70
 
Institutions have been defined as social and legal humanly devised constraints that 
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structure political, economic and social interaction. They are seen as significant in 
reducing uncertainty in exchange relations: by lowering information and transaction 
costs, securing property rights and providing incentives for contract fulfilment, 
developed institutions precipitated successful trade.
71
 The NIE has contributed to 
understandings of late medieval and early modern trade by emphasising how these 
evolving institutions promoted commercial relations between merchants who under 
uncertain conditions would have been less likely to trust each other.
72
 It has also been 
particularly concerned with how this institutional development affected the ‘rise of 
the West’. Much of Douglass North’s research has argued that, with regard to trade, 
European institutional innovations began as early as the late Middle Ages with the 
introduction of bills of exchange, new accounting procedures, insurance services and 
other mechanisms that increased the mobility of capital. States, rather than merchant 
collectives, were better able to introduce these innovations. They ensured the long-
term continuity and success of European mercantile systems and, ultimately, played a 
crucial role in bringing about the rise of the west.
73
 
Economic sociology offers a different approach to the New Institutional 
Economics, based on the role of social relations in economic processes. Economic 
sociologists tend to see economic behaviour as driven by social norms. Here, the 
work of Mark Granovetter is particularly crucial and it has become extremely 
influential in a variety of disciplines beyond economic history. Granovetter argued 
that (economic) actors are always ‘embedded’ within concrete and on-going systems 
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of social relations. In contrast to the ‘under-socialised’ approach to human action in 
the economic sphere of the NIE school, which tends to emphasise the value of 
impersonal arrangements, the embeddedness argument stresses that the pursuit of 
economic goals goes hand in hand with the pursuit of non-economic ones.
74
 As 
Xabier Lamikiz recently argued, the New Institutional Economics approach is a 
strictly rational understanding of commercial cooperation, as it assumes that self-
interested individuals only cooperate when it is economically advantageous to do 
so.
75
 There were frequently other factors acting on the decisions made by merchants 
and traders, however, beyond the pursuit of profit. Social networks influence 
behaviour in the economic sphere by demarcating certain transactional practices and 
behaviours as normative. The ‘rules’ of a network can also enforce particular 
practices and provide a structure that uses sanctions to punish behaviour that does not 
adhere to the norms of the network.
76
 
Avner Greif’s work has done much to specifically delineate the relationship 
between institutions, social structure, and long-distance mercantile trade. Although 
aligning himself with the NIE, Greif employed a modified definition of institutions in 
his research, seeing them as more than just rules that constrain, but as an entire 
system of rules, beliefs, norms and organisations that worked together to regulate 
behaviour. His research focused on non-European merchants, specifically Maghribi 
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traders in the late medieval world, and emphasised the degree to which, in the 
absence of effective legal institutions, they relied on collective relationships to 
maintain a robust, and exclusive, commercial network. Here, trade relied on social 
and inter-personal ties.
77
 For example, associations within the ‘coalition’ of 
merchants built partly through a common religious-ethnic origin, facilitated the 
efficient exchange of information. Just as importantly, informal ‘sanctions’ against 
members of the network who cheated others went some way to ensuring the security 
of transactions. The pervasive structure of trust provided incentives for members of 
the coalition to act responsibly, in order to ensure long-term gains. This reduced the 
potential short-term gains of dishonest behaviour.
78
 The Maghribis implemented an 
informal, group-based, multilateral punishment mechanism to enforce long-distance 
trade agreements. 
Greif’s work has certainly been extremely influential for reinforcing the value 
and importance of ‘social capital’ for exchange and trade in past societies. Grief’s 
approach is also important as it again stresses the degree to which social relations and 
societal context underpin trade and economic growth. However, he also makes a 
sharp distinction between these ‘pre-modern’, non-European systems and what later 
followed. Greif ultimately concurs with North about the connection between 
‘modern’ institutions and growth. Although the structure of the Maghribi network 
was remarkable, the fact that it was ‘constrained’ by shared heritage and ingrained 
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cultural norms, hindered its development. The ‘rise of the west’ still relied on the fact 
that early modern European traders and states, such as the Genoese, were able to 
develop efficient, sophisticated, formal institutions to secure property rights and the 
security of trade, to a degree that was impossible under a system such as that used by 
the Maghribis, rooted in a collectivist rather than individualist cultural belief 
system.
79
 
 Greif is not without his critics. His conclusions have been recently challenged 
by Jeremy Edwards and Sheilagh Ogilvie, who have argued that Maghribi traders 
‘based their agency agreements on legal as well as informal mechanisms’.80 They did 
form ‘coalitions’, but these were much less clearly defined and exclusive than Greif 
proposed. Furthermore, they found little evidence for Greif’s ideas about the role of 
threats in deterring private-regarding behaviour. They believe that the Maghribi 
traders must have had ‘other mechanisms for enforcing agency agreements which did 
not rely on collective ostracisms inside a closed coalition’.81 In contrast to Greif then, 
Edwards and Ogilvie emphasised the similarities between merchant collectives across 
the late medieval world: the Maghribis’ use of social ties in mercantile relationships 
was no different to merchants in Genoa, Florence, Germany and the Netherlands. 
Crucially, most long-distance trading groups, they conclude, successfully managed 
agency relationships and trade using a variegated array of institutions – informal, 
quasi-formal and legal. These mechanisms were often employed in tandem to 
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reinforce each other’s effectiveness.82 Connected to this, Magee and Thompson have 
recently argued for the enduring importance of social familiarity in economic life, 
‘even in the efficient, impersonal markets of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries’. Social networks, they argue, were not just a ‘crucial stage of organisation 
on the way to the development of modern, well-functioning states and markets’ but 
continued to operate alongside institutions even in the modern period.
83
 The 
relevance of this debate for this thesis is that it draws attention to the murky division 
between pre-modern inter-personal commercial associations, and more ‘modern’, 
institutional ones. 
 This thesis focuses on the ways in which British trading arrangements 
mediated through inter-personal ties continued to operate actively alongside formal 
economic institutions in the Indian Ocean world, such as the chartered companies and 
their attendant mechanisms. Private trade during the eighteenth century was reliant on 
management through more informal, social constellations. These worked alongside, 
and were intertwined with, the corporate, legal and institutional processes that 
emerged in that period. Correspondence, and the way that pledges of trust and mutual 
confidence were transmitted through it, was especially important. 
 
Britain’s Indian Ocean World and Imperial History 
 
 
In a sub-field much more closely linked to the topic of this thesis, British imperial 
history has also become increasingly concerned with social and cultural elements 
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within commercial networks. In recent years, scholarly interest in the British Empire 
has continued to grow, particularly with regard to how imperial history intersects 
with ‘domestic’, regional, transnational and global histories.84 The development of 
the ‘New Imperial History’ has also raised new questions by emphasising the 
importance of colonialism’s cultural connections. As a result, scholars have come to 
conceptualise imperial structures in new ways. Similarly to historians of trade in the 
Atlantic and Indian Ocean worlds, British imperial historians have increasingly 
engaged with ‘networks of empire’ and described how colonial trade was reliant on 
inter-personal ties. 
A range of imperial processes are now viewed in terms of webs or networks. 
Natasha Glaisyer explored the series of interlocking circuits through which 
knowledge was exchanged, trust was negotiated, goods were traded and people 
travelled in the British Empire.
85
 Networks have also been invoked by those seeking 
to transform more traditional approaches to imperial history. Practitioners of the 
‘New Imperial History’, such as Kathleen Wilson, have argued for the employment  
of ‘microhistories of empire’s reach’, that entail thinking about the ‘transoceanic 
networks of everyday life, cutting across the boundaries of nation and of “public” and 
“private”, through which the traffic in people, goods and ideas were concretized and 
sustained’.86 For a later period, Magee and Thompson also argued that the British 
Empire can be usefully conceived as a species of ‘global networking’. Networks, they 
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argue, provide a useful way of looking at long-distance connections over time and 
also helps to see the empire as what it really was: ‘not just the preserve of the official 
mind in Whitehall, but as an interconnected zone constituted by multiple points of 
contact and complex circuits of exchange’.87  
Scholars have also used networks to explore the ‘geographies of empire’. This 
approach, pioneered by historical geographers such as Miles Ogborn, focuses on 
tracking particular sites, connections or movements in imperial history, allowing a 
range of competing and contradictory relationships to come into view. Critically, this 
avoids totalising accounts of empire by allowing due weight to be given to individual 
actions in forming webs of global connections.
88
 Such an approach connects well 
with research specifically on trade, as it has frequently focused on small-scale sites 
like trading posts, cities and mercantile offices. The global connections formed by 
merchants, natural philosophers and others in pursuit of knowledge or profit are also 
an important element within this body of work.
89
 
Connected with this, research related to colonial commercial networks has 
emphasised that they were mediated and organised in ways that went beyond the 
purely economic. Scholars have focused on the fact that they were social 
constellations, reliant on inter-personal ties, networks of trust, kinship and friendship 
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for their successful operation. Natasha Glaisyer’s recent work, for instance, privileges 
an approach that seeks to ‘de-economize’ economic history by looking at the value 
and importance of social and cultural ties for British commercial networks in the 
colonial era. She has argued that an appreciation of culture as a part of an approach to 
economic history can result in the ‘re-positioning of subjects in wider contexts and 
the re-evaluation, rejuvenation and reappraisal of whole debates’.90 
Similarly, for an earlier period, Alison Games has focused on the ways in 
which English merchants abroad were in no way liberated from the webs of personal 
relations that shaped business connections in the early modern period.
91
 For Games, 
this highlights that ‘early modern globalisation’ was fundamentally about people, not 
inanimate forces. She emphasises that the English trading empire can be fruitfully 
seen as a structure that was built on personal connections; built ‘on the ground’ and 
not just constructed and shaped at the Imperial centre.
92
 A swathe of recent research 
on British early modern trade globally has also emphasised the importance of inter-
personal connections and networks across multiple different spheres of ‘Britain’s 
Oceanic Empire’.93 
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This thesis likewise excavates the specific ways in which British merchants in 
the western Indian Ocean region organised their private trade through forging 
multivalent links with other merchants, mediated through correspondence circuits. 
British private trade depended on complex communication and correspondence 
channels to carry commercial information, uphold personal reputations, transmit 
goods and form business partnerships in this period. It entailed the services of 
Company colleagues and other independent merchants in disparate parts of the 
globe.
94
 
 
Chronology 
 
 
This thesis covers the period between roughly 1680 and 1760, concentrating 
predominantly on the years 1700 to 1740. Most scholars of private trade have seen 
these decades as a critical period for the development of this element of East Indian 
commerce. Yet, no existing work is focused specifically on British private trade in the 
western Indian Ocean during the period before the 1750s. 
This period was a critical era of transition in the western Indian Ocean world 
that deserves to be studied in its own right. During the early eighteenth century, the 
polities bordering the Arabian Seas underwent tremendous political and economic 
change. Numerous revolutions and regime changes in Persia, the Yemen and on the 
subcontinent had profound consequences for a number of communities and also 
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greatly affected trade. At the same time, this region was being drawn into a truly 
global economy like never before.
95
 Although mercantile trade networks across this 
maritime sphere had operated for millennia, the scale, scope and character of these 
networks altered dramatically during this period. Currents of Indian Ocean trade 
came to intersect with those of Europe in a much more direct way. European traders 
brought with them different settlement patterns, new shipping methods and large 
financial resources.
96
 Even before the mid-eighteenth century, the ‘Indo-European’ 
commercial encounter during this period had undoubtedly significant and wide-
ranging implications for the structure of trade and politics in the region. Europeans 
used the ‘projection of standardisation and rationalisation of practices and 
knowledge’ as a form of control.97 The process by which ‘Government policy and 
technological advances combined to undercut millennia-old indigenous activities’ had 
begun.
98
 
At the same time however, scholars have also highlighted that the existing 
structure of Indian Ocean trade remained largely intact. They have emphasised the 
resilience of Asian mercantile activity despite the growth of European trade in the 
eighteenth century.
99
 This is particularly true of Gujarat, an area where recent 
research has suggested a robust and sophisticated Indian merchant community 
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remained active and vibrant until the very end of the eighteenth century.
100
 The first 
half of the 1700s was a period in which East India Company servants operating in the 
country trade faced profound political and economic challenges, and remained reliant 
on these long-standing trade networks and the services of Indian merchants for their 
private activities. This thesis is concerned with exploring the development of British 
private trade within this transitional, pre-colonial context. 
 
Source Material 
 
 
There are significant problems with the availability of primary material for studying 
British private trade in the Indian Ocean. Indeed, to some extent any exploration of 
mercantile life in the eighteenth century has to overcome problems with sources.
101
 
For European private trade in Asia specifically, P.J. Marshall and others have 
highlighted the innumerable difficulties accessing extensive and reliable material. 
Consulting the papers of merchants and Company servants is vital, but the material 
requires ‘tenacity to assemble’. Merchants were understandably disinclined to reveal 
details of their private trade to their employers, and the Company’s factory records 
tend not to dwell on private trade in detail.
102
 Although copiously describing the 
operations of the Company itself, few series in the India Office Records specifically 
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focus on private commerce, let alone that in the more peripheral western Indian 
Ocean world. 
Despite these constraints, significant collections of primary material that offer 
surprising insights into private trade can be gleaned from a variety of other archives. 
The papers of East India Company employees who were well connected to the trading 
world of the Arabian Seas undoubtedly provide the most useful sources for this 
thesis. Extensive accounts of trade in journals, ledgers and cash books, as well as 
bodies of correspondence are available. Most prominently, this study makes use of 
the many relevant collections of merchants’ papers available in the Chancery Masters 
records of the National Archives. Material submitted as evidence in legal proceedings 
between East India merchants can reveal a great deal about private trade. Often, this 
material was not specific to the details of a particular case; and entire merchants’ 
books and extensive collections of correspondence from servants resident in Bombay, 
Surat, Mocha and the Malabar Coast factories were submitted to Chancery.
103
  
The India Office Private Papers collections also contain significant materials 
related to the subject of private trade in the western Indian Ocean, including the 
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invaluable papers of Robert Cowan.
104
 If read carefully, moreover, the Company’s 
own records provide much more extensive information than first anticipated on 
private trade, as well as offering vast amounts of information on the Company’s 
commerce in Bombay, Surat, the Malabar Coast, and to a lesser extent, Mocha and 
Persia. Several volumes in the Home Miscellaneous collections (such as Robert 
Adams’ letter book in H/37) are particularly useful in this regard.105 
This thesis makes use of a number of different kinds of sources, although 
mainly employs private correspondence. The letters of merchants draw attention to 
the sort of personal and social connections critical for excavating the workings of the 
private trade system. They detail the experiences and business dealings of particular 
individuals and reveal much about the mechanics of private trade in the early 
eighteenth century Arabian Seas. They also reveal a great deal about how merchants 
presented themselves, and conveyed self-images of being upstanding traders, 
competent merchants, and gentlemen. This self-presentation was critical for 
merchants’ business: a trustworthy reputation was imperative for all merchants in 
eighteenth-century trade. Letters played a significant role in the creation and 
transmission of these images.
106
 Throughout the thesis, printed primary material, 
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travel narratives and newspaper sources, many of which are now available online, are 
employed to contextualise the individual stories revealed through private papers.
107
 
 
Thesis Structure and Chapter Plan 
 
 
Each chapter of this study explores a different aspect of this branch of British private 
trade in Asia. The first three chapters look closely at how regional configurations and 
contexts impacted on private trade of Company servants based in factories on India’s 
west coast and in the Middle East. These factories acted as ‘nodal points’ for private 
trade networks in the region. Chapter One provides a broad overview of the structure 
of Company trade and private trade on the west coast of India between c.1680 and 
c.1760, focusing especially on the period between 1690 and 1740. Using Company 
records, private letters, and drawing together secondary literature on the region, it 
explores the changing contours of private trade in the Arabian Seas over this critical 
period. It ultimately argues that, in contrast to the regions of Bengal and the 
Coromandel Coast, the private trade of merchants at Bombay and Surat experienced 
little success until the later 1720s and the 1730s. The change in fortune was a result 
of both local and global factors, and the rise of the city of Bombay as a key nodal 
point for Indian Ocean trade. Private traders also employed innovative strategies to 
overcome the exigencies of trading in the volatile context of the Arabian Seas. 
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Chapter Two details the activities through which Company servants attempted 
to cultivate private fortunes in this milieu. It looks at key individuals based in the 
western Indian Ocean world who were able to develop successful private trades, and 
the mechanisms through which this was achieved. It explores the voyages of 
Company servants to myriad destinations across maritime Asia; the element of 
private trade that has received the most attention from scholars. The chapter also 
explores the more quotidian auxiliary activities engaged in by Company merchants to 
keep private trade operations running smoothly. It emphasises that diversity was key: 
participation in the ‘country trade’ relied on forging connections with other merchants 
not just through ventures, but also through lending, and the provision of legal and 
business services. 
The next chapter focuses on a particularly significant commercial channel for 
private trade on the west coast of India – that between the subcontinent and the 
Middle East – and again attends not just to the trade of commodities but on the 
reciprocal services provided by merchants and agents. Despite the fact that the trade 
routes to Persia and Mocha were the main avenues plied by private traders operating 
out of Bombay, Surat and the west coast during the eighteenth century, little is known 
about this private trade westward. Similarly, the factories of the Persian Gulf and Red 
Sea region have received little attention from scholars of the Company. This chapter 
explores both Company and private trade at these locales, focusing on the British 
factories at Bandar ‘Abbas and Mocha, in order to shed light on the history of 
maritime commerce in west Asia as well as detailing a critical aspect of western 
Indian Ocean private trade. It again emphasises the high degree to which British 
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private trade operated in a highly volatile context, shaped by particular regional 
factors. 
The two later chapters look further at the inter-personal associations and flows 
of correspondence that upheld private trade and connected British merchants with 
wider commercial networks. Chapter Four attends to one aspect of private trade’s 
global reach, looking at the vitally important role of links back to Britain for 
Company servants. It looks at the exchange of goods and the transfer of capital, but 
particularly highlights the significance of metropolitan connections beyond financial 
and commodity ties. Informal and personal domestic connections played a critical 
role in the careers of East India Company merchants in the Arabian Sea area. Via 
varying epistolary languages, letters to and from home acted as a mechanism through 
which private business was carried out, credit was exchanged, and reputations were 
made and upheld. 
The final chapter focuses on the inescapable reality that eighteenth-century 
East Indian fortunes were made not just through patient, diligent and legal trade, but 
also through exploiting the East India Company’s resources and making full use of 
the freedom provided by the Company’s management structure. Moments of 
corruption, fraud and malfeasance amongst the East India Company’s servants have 
been relatively understudied in the existing literature, but were critically related to 
private trade. Because of the difficulty in maintaining employee control from London, 
but also because numerous private ties cut across the Company’s hierarchy, private 
trade often involved practices that flouted employment covenants. Many high-ranking 
members of the Company’s Asian factories systematically attempted to boost their 
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personal wealth through exploiting their position within the Company. This chapter 
looks closely at episodes of malfeasance in the western Indian Ocean context and 
how these intersected with private trade. It again emphasises the importance of inter-
personal networks for this element of private activity. 
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Chapter One 
The East India Company and British Private Trade at Bombay and 
Surat 
 
 
 
As part of the trading world of the Indian Ocean, multifaceted networks of mercantile 
trade in the Arabian Seas have existed since antiquity.
1
 The port towns of the Persian 
Gulf, Red Sea and western Indian coast have frequently been characterised as part of 
a distinct economic and cultural unit, intimately bound together through trade and 
migration for millennia.
2
 Historians of early modern Asian trade have seen this area 
as making up one of three ‘segments’ or circuits of a broader, interconnected Indian 
Ocean, as well as emphasising its regional cohesiveness.
3
 Over the course of the 
sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, networks of trade in the Arabian Seas 
underwent profound change. This was precipitated not only by political developments 
                                                     
1
 Rainer Buschmann provides a succinct and useful overview of Indian Ocean trade from before the 
Common Era through to the early modern period, and discusses the longevity of commercial 
connections across the Arabian Seas. Rainer F. Buschmann, Oceans in World History (New York, 
2007), pp. 14-36. 
2
 Rene Barendse’s work strongly emphasises this notion of the Arabian Seas as a coherent sphere that 
can be employed as a distinct geographic unit of analysis. The use of the plural ‘seas’ refers to the 
Persian Gulf, Red Sea and Arabian Sea itself as part of the same system. See R.J. Barendse, The 
Arabian Seas, 1640-1700 (Leiden, 1998); Idem., ‘Trade and State in the Arabian Seas: A Survey from 
the Fifteenth to the Eighteenth Centuries’, Journal of World History, 11/2 (2000), pp. 173-225; Idem., 
The Arabian Seas, 1700-1763 (Leiden; Boston, 2009). 
3
 Om Prakash, ‘The Trading World of the Indian Ocean: Some Defining Features in Prakash (ed.), The 
Trading World of the Indian Ocean, 1500-1800 (New Delhi, 2012), pp. 12-13 and Erik Gilbert, 
‘Coastal East Africa and the Western Indian Ocean: Long Distance Trade, Empire and Regional 
Unity’, The History Teacher, 36/1 (2002), p. 12. Although scholars have ruminated over whether the 
‘Arabian Sea/s’ is the most appropriate moniker for this part of maritime Asia (Michael Pearson has 
suggested the term ‘Afrasian Sea’ for instance, so as not to neglect the significance of the East African 
coast; whilst Reeves et al employed a division between ‘Northern’ and ‘Western’ Indian Ocean 
sectors), it has remained the predominant descriptor. See Pearson, Indian Ocean, pp. 13-14 and Peter 
Reeves, Frank Broeze and Kenneth McPherson (eds), Ports and Port Cities as Places of Social 
Interaction in the Indian Ocean Region: A Preliminary Historical Bibliography (Nedlands, W.A., 
1981), p. 6. 
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in India, Persia and on the Arabian Peninsula, but also by the appearance of European 
shipping in Asian waters.  
Building on long-standing and highly developed trade routes and commercial 
infrastructure, European merchants came to establish a notable presence in the region 
from the seventeenth century, connecting the ports of the Arabian Seas with 
prominent centres of trade worldwide. The arrival of the Europeans hastened 
increasing demand for goods produced in the hinterlands on both sides of this 
maritime sphere. Gujarat and Maharashtra’s gateways to the sea functioned as the 
nodal points through which sought-after Indian commodities and manufactured goods 
were disseminated to Europe and beyond. Mocha in the Yemen became the centre of 
the world coffee market, and Bandar ‘Abbas grew into a port city of international 
renown for the trade in Persian luxury goods. By the end of the 1600s, the region was 
fully drawn into a wider system, underpinned by global flows of goods, 
correspondence, bills of exchange and bullion.
4
 
The emergence and growth of European trade had profound consequences for 
both economic and political structures within the western Indian Ocean region. The 
Portuguese introduction of the cartaze system of passes played a key role in 
disrupting existing systems of trade.
5
 A century later, the English and Dutch East 
India companies, partly using military and naval strength and through establishing 
trading posts in strategic locations, became major players in Arabian Seas trade. Both 
companies founded factories at the great Mughal emporium of Surat in the early years 
                                                     
4
 Barendse, Arabian Seas, pp. 5-8. 
5
 Luis Filipe F.R. Thomaz, ‘Portuguese Control Over the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal: A 
Comparative Study’, in Om Prakash and Denys Lombard (eds), Commerce and Culture in the Bay of 
Bengal, 1500-1800 (New Delhi, 1999), pp. 120-124. 
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of the seventeenth century. Fortified trading posts down the Malabar Coast, factories 
in Persia and on the Arabian Peninsula followed. The structure of English trade in the 
region was also supported by the acquisition of the islands of Bombay. They became 
the first of the East India Company’s territorial possessions following their transfer 
from the Crown in 1668. The Honourable Company attempted to extend their 
jurisdiction in the Arabian Seas from this point on and Bombay grew into a major 
nodal point for all Indian Ocean trade. It eventually came to surpass Surat as the 
primary locale for maritime trade west of the subcontinent.   
Because of these developments, historians have often assumed that European 
commerce displaced Asian merchants from key trade routes in this region during the 
eighteenth century.
6
 Ashin Das Gupta famously argued for the decline of Indian 
mercantile trade in the face of expanding European commerce between 1700 and 
1750. This notion has become an important one within Indian Ocean historiography. 
The period between the turn of the eighteenth century through to the concrete 
establishment of British territorial control in India has commonly been seen as a 
period of stagnation, decline and the erosion of Indian merchants’ trade in contrast to 
their seventeenth-century ‘golden age’.7  This was manifest in the western Indian 
Ocean region at Surat in particular, where the East India Company swiftly and 
                                                     
6
 Søren Mentz, ‘European Private Trade in the Indian Ocean, 1500-1800’ in Om Prakash (ed.), The 
Trading World of the Indian Ocean, 1500-1800 (New Delhi, 2012), pp. 489-490. 
7
 Phillip D. Curtin, Cross-cultural Trade in World History (Cambridge, 1984), p. 157; Om Prakash, 
‘From Hostility to Collaboration: European Corporate Enterprise and Private Trade in the Bay of 
Bengal, 1500-1800’, in Om Prakash, Bullion for Goods: European and Indian Merchants in the Indian 
Ocean Trade, 1500-1800 (New Delhi, 2004), p. 157 and Ashin Das Gupta, ‘Indian Merchants and the 
Trade in the Indian Ocean, c.1500-1750’ in Tapan Raychaudhuri and Irfan Habib, The Cambridge 
Economic History of India, Vol. 1: c.1200-c.1750 (Cambridge, 1982), p. 432. 
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smoothly subordinated Indian merchants and artisans, and came to control this major 
centre of trade by 1759.
8
 
Yet, Asian merchants remained dominant in the carrying trade of the Arabian 
Seas throughout this period. During the eighteenth century, the position of the 
European companies continued to rely on both collaborating and competing with 
Asian traders, and cultivating strategic relations with local ruling powers. Although 
European traders eventually became integrated into Indian political structures and 
economic frameworks, for nearly two centuries the presence of the chartered 
companies complemented an already extensive, complex and plural network of Indian 
Ocean trade. Das Gupta in fact stressed that the Dutch and the English were unable to 
compete with Indian traders on the most important and lucrative routes in the Arabian 
Seas. Between 1600 and at least 1750, the European ship would have been ‘a rare 
sight’ in these waters.9  
More recent work on the Arabian Seas goes even further than Das Gupta and 
suggests that Indian merchants were trading competitively and effectively right up 
until the end of the eighteenth century. This is partly connected to the fact that, in the 
last two decades, scholars have resolutely overturned the notion that this period was 
not simply one of anarchy and economic decline in Indian history.
10
 Historians have 
                                                     
8
 See Niels Steensgaard, ‘The Indian Ocean Network and the Emerging World-Economy, c. 1500-
1750’ in Satish Chandra (ed.), The Indian Ocean: Explorations in History, Commerce and Politics 
(New Delhi, 1987), pp. 146-147 for one example of the more traditional view of the subordination of 
Surat’s trade to the British, and Rudrangshu Mukherjee and Lakshmi Subramanian, ‘Introduction’ in 
Rudrangshu Mukherjee and Lakshmi Subramanian (eds), Politics and Trade in the Indian Ocean 
World: Essays in Honour of Ashin Das Gupta (New edn; Oxford, 2003) for a newer perspective. 
9
 Ashin Das Gupta, ‘Gujarati Merchants and the Red Sea Trade’ in Blair B. Kling and M.N. Pearson 
(eds), The Age of Partnership: Europeans in Asia Before Dominion (Honolulu, 1979), p. 124. 
10
 P.J. Marshall, ‘Introduction’, in P.J. Marshall (ed.), The Eighteenth Century in Indian History: 
Evolution or Revolution (Oxford, 2003), pp. 1-49 and Peter Robb, A History of India (2nd edn, 
Basingstoke, 2011), p. 108. 
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certainly emphasised the resilience of western India’s maritime economy and trade; 
they have considered the waning of Indian mercantile trade based at Surat to be a 
much more protracted, complex and multi-faceted process than previously 
presumed.
11
 According to Ghulam Nadri, the European presence in Gujarat did not 
cause any fundamental change in its political economy until at least the end of the 
century: although the capture of Surat Castle in 1759 signalled a change in the 
relationship between the East India Company and the Mughal Empire, Nadri argues 
that Surat’s experience should not be taken as indicative of Gujarat’s wider economic 
health. While Surat remained an important centre of British trade, especially private 
trade, concrete British hegemony did not arrive until later in the century.
12
 Gujarati 
merchants were also able to remain competitive throughout this period. 
In addition, the activities of all the East India companies active in the western 
Indian Ocean region were hampered by an unstable political and economic climate in 
the decades following 1680. With regard to English trade specifically, several of the 
Company’s factories in Persia and western India maintained a precarious existence 
thanks to crippling expenses, volatile markets, political problems, rampant piracy, 
Maratha power, and on-going conflicts with the Portuguese and Dutch. Such a 
situation endured until at least the 1740s. The East India Company’s operations in 
                                                     
11
 Lakshmi Subramanian, ‘Power and the Weave: Weavers, Merchants and Rulers in Eighteenth 
Century Surat’ in Rudrangshu Mukherjee and Lakshmi Subramanian, Politics and Trade in the Indian 
Ocean World: Essays in Honour of Ashin Das Gupta (Delhi; Oxford, 1998), p. 54; Lakshmi 
Subramanian, ‘Merchants in Transit: Risk-Sharing Strategies in the Indian Ocean’ in Himanshu P. Ray 
and Edward A. Alpers (eds.), Cross-Currents and Community Networks: The History of the Indian 
Ocean World (New Delhi, 2007), p. 264. For excellent examples of  the re-appraisal of Gujarat’s 
economy and trade in this period see Pedro Machado, ‘Gujarati Indian Merchant Networks in 
Mozambique, 1777-c.1830’, (Ph.D. thesis, SOAS, University of London, 2005), and Ghulam Nadri’s 
more recent study, Eighteenth-Century Gujarat: The Dynamics of its Political Economy (Leiden, 
2009).  
12
 Ghulam Nadri, ‘The Trading World of Indian Ocean Merchants in Pre-Colonial Gujarat, 1600-
1750’, in Prakash, Trading World, pp. 218-219. 
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other regions of Asia faced similar structural difficulties of course, but the sheer 
capriciousness that characterised British trade in the Arabian Seas during the first half 
of the eighteenth century is remarkable. These factors, combined with the continued 
resilience of Asian merchant shipping, formed the context for both Company and 
private trade for much of the period under review. 
This chapter explores British trade in the Arabian Seas during the pre-colonial 
era, concentrating predominantly on the years between 1690 and 1740. It provides an 
overview of how British trade networks fitted within a plural, diverse and contested 
system, and sets the scene for later chapters focused on specific elements of private 
trade in this region. It highlights the numerous constraints on the profitable operation 
of all branches of British trade: the shifting political and economic context that 
greatly affected the fortunes of the East India Company and the private trade of its 
servants. In the Arabian Seas, private trade was worked out within, and operated 
under, a challenging framework that shaped it in unique ways. As such, this chapter 
argues for the significance of regional factors in the development and character of 
British private trade, and for its differentiation across the Indian Ocean world. 
For the pre-colonial period, existing work has focused on private trade in 
Madras and Calcutta, the pre-eminent centres of British trade in India. They were 
profitable arenas of commerce where lucrative commercial opportunities were more 
readily available than on the west coast.
13
 The major studies of private trade by Ian 
                                                     
13
 Undoubtedly too, this focus relates to the volume and success of trade. In the case of the import of 
Asian goods to London, it was Bengal that quickly became the dominant region in the eighteenth 
century. Bengal’s share of the total Asian imports of the Company stood at forty-two per cent in 1698-
1700 and had increased to sixty-six per cent by 1738-1740. Later in the century, Bengal accounted for 
as much as seventy-eight per cent of the total Indian procurement, the remainder being divided 
between Madras and Bombay in a ratio of two to one. Bengal dwarfed the other two key regions by 
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Watson and Peter Marshall both emphasised the close connection between the 
success and growth of British private trade with the establishment of the Company’s 
commercial hegemony and imperial power in the later eighteenth century.
14
 A largely 
positive view of the operation of English private trade in the pre-colonial period is 
also a feature of more recent work. Emily Erikson and Peter Bearman stressed in a 
2006 article that the private trade system generally flourished between 1680 and 
1760. British merchants linked together disparate regional markets in the Indian 
Ocean to an unprecedented degree, and in turn connected them to an emerging global 
economy.
15
 Again taking a broadly transnational approach, Søren Mentz’s study of 
Madras private trade between 1680 and 1740 argued for the need to place this 
element of English commerce within an early ‘imperial’ system. According to Mentz, 
English merchants were able to overcome the exigencies of East Indian trade by 
taking advantage of ‘metropolitan connections’. This private network flourished as 
early as the 1690s. Mentz’s work contended that studies of private trade had hitherto 
been overly preoccupied with the intra-Asian context, obscuring the ways in which 
English merchants operated as a successful, independent ‘trade diaspora’.16 
Whilst this focus rightly stresses elements of the global character of East 
Indian trade, it too readily dismisses the role of the Asian context in shaping British 
                                                                                                                                                       
virtue of the fact that it was the principal supplier of textiles and raw silk; key goods that oiled the 
wheels of the Company’s global commerce. Om Prakash, European Commercial Enterprise in Pre-
Colonial India (Cambridge, 1998), p. 240.  
14
 Ian Bruce Watson’s Foundation for Empire: English Private Trade in India 1659-1760 (New Delhi, 
1980) drew a close relationship between the development of Empire and the private business of 
Company servants. Although Watson’s volume is a geographically wide-ranging survey, he does not 
delve prominently into west coast private trade after 1700.  
15
 Emily Erikson and Peter Bearman, ‘Malfeasance and the Foundations for Global Trade: The 
Structure of English Trade in the East Indies, 1601-1833’, American Journal of Sociology, 112/1 
(2006), pp. 201-202. 
16
 See Søren Mentz, The English Gentleman Merchant at Work: Madras and the City of London 1660-
1740 (Copenhagen, 2005). 
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private commerce; both in times of buoyancy and turmoil. The notion of a robust and 
largely successful merchant network, as described by Mentz and much existing 
private trade scholarship, is much harder to maintain for the western Indian Ocean 
world. Private trade in the Arabian Seas region during the early eighteenth century 
was frequently marked by crisis and unprofitability. For the majority of the period 
between 1680 and 1760, private fortunes were extremely difficult to cultivate in this 
volatile arena of trade. Eventually, merchants were able to cultivate substantial 
commercial concerns, but only much later in the eighteenth century than was the case 
further east, during the 1720s and 1730s. This chapter will discuss the reasons behind 
the brisk progress of private British trade in the second half of the period under 
review, as well as the factors behind the earlier volatile decades. It argues that the 
greater success and profitability of British trade on the west coast from the 1720s can 
be explained by looking at how both the Company and private traders were able to 
take advantage of local developments and operate within a shifting context. It looks at 
some of the specific reasons why Bombay was able to flourish at the expense of 
Mughal Surat, and suggests how Company servants were able to take advantage of 
their employer’s growing jurisdictional authority in the region.  
The chapter focuses predominantly on the port towns of Surat and Bombay, 
the main centres of English commercial operations in the region from the later 
seventeenth century, and pre-eminent nodal points for Indian Ocean trade in the 
eighteenth century. It broadly explores the changing fortunes of Company trade 
between 1680 and circa 1760, before moving on to consider the private trade of 
Company servants in this context. It employs a number of different types of primary 
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material throughout, including the correspondence of the East India Company, the 
letters of its servants, and contemporary travel narratives. The first part concentrates 
on Company trade at Surat during the early eighteenth century, a period that has been 
generally seen as one of decline for the city’s trade. Before and during Bombay’s 
emergence as a prime locale for Arabian Sea trade in the eighteenth century, it was 
this city that stood as the leading centre of East India Company operations in the 
region. Indeed, Surat was perhaps the pre-eminent western Indian Ocean port for all 
maritime trade in the period up until the 1700s and remained a significant centre of 
British trade in later decades. 
 
I – The Decline of Surat 
 
 
By the time English merchants settled at Surat in the early seventeenth century, the 
city had maintained multilateral commercial connections across Asia for centuries 
and was one of the most important trading centres in the Indian Ocean.
 17
  The city 
was, according to one contemporary writer, ‘the greatest Mart in the Indies’ and 
handled ‘as great a trade as any City in Asia’.18 Surat quickly became a prominent 
locale for English East Indian commerce, with its connections to west Asia holding 
particular importance. By the eighteenth century, Charles Lockyer  recounted that 
English ships travelling from Persia to Surat were often so laden with pearls and other 
treasures that he considered them to be the richest vessels ‘on that side of the 
                                                     
17
 K.N. Chaudhuri, The Trading World of Asia and the English East India Company, 1660-1760 
(Cambridge, 1978), p. 197; Farhat Hasan, ‘The Mughal Port Cities of Surat and Hugli’, in Lakshmi 
Subramanian (ed.), Ports, Towns, Cities: A Historical Tour of the Indian Littoral (Mumbai, 2008), pp. 
79-82; Steensgaard, ‘The Indian Ocean Network’, p. 138. 
18
 Anon. (R.B.), The English Acquisitions in Guinea & East-India (London, 1708), p. 149.  
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globe’.19 The English were just one element of a plural mercantile community in the 
city. Merchants of all nations came to trade at Surat, including ‘The Moors, Banians, 
Armenians, Arabs, and Jews’, all of whom drove ‘a much more considerable trade … 
than the Europeans’ in the eighteenth century.20 
 Yet, the period between 1680 and the middle of the eighteenth century was 
marked by stagnant trade, political conflict, and economic restructuring at Surat. 
Commercial growth was slow throughout this time, and the prosperity of one of the 
greatest marts in Asia declined sharply during the first decades of the eighteenth 
century. As early as 1699 in fact, the ‘New’ English East India Company entertained 
the idea of not maintaining the Old Company’s base at Surat at all. One letter back to 
London stressed that ‘The Old Company for 20 years past have given out that their 
Trade to Suratt, has been a loosing trade to them which gives us very little 
encouragement to drive it high’. They considered that ‘a Settlement in the Country of 
Deccan & to the Southward upon that Coast may … be more advantageous to us … 
since we can have in a manner all Sorts of Cloth there cheaper & be at less 
expences’.21 
 The shifting composition of East India Company imports of Asian goods 
also points to the waning of Surat’s pre-eminence. According to Chaudhuri, until 
1700, Surat and Madras between them supplied sixty to eighty per cent of all 
Company imports into London, with the balance very evenly divided between the 
                                                     
19
 Jacques Savary des Brûlons, The Universal dictionary of trade and commerce, translated from the 
French of the celebrated Monsieur Savary by Malachy Postlethwayt Esq. (2nd
 
edn, Vol. 1, London, 
1757), p. 433.  
20
 Taken from Ibid., p. 434. 
21
 British Library [BL], India Office Records [IOR], E/3/94, p. 133, Surat general letter, 30 December 
1699. 
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two. He wrote that ‘From the beginning of the eighteenth century, however, the 
Company’s trade with western India suffered a series of severe disruptions, though in 
normal years [its share of imports] was still just over 20 per cent. The decline sets in 
after 1715 and it was only in very exceptional and prosperous times that the share of 
Surat ever rose beyond 15 per cent.’22 Bombay eventually superseded Surat as the 
Company’s headquarters on the west coast of India and rose to become a major centre 
of global maritime trade. Bombay’s rise to prominence was also, according to Ashin 
Das Gupta, fundamentally intertwined with the sharp decline of Surat’s long-distance 
commerce.
23
 
The correspondence of the Company and its servants reveals some of the 
detail of the severe disruptions that affected Surat’s trade during the middle decades 
of the eighteenth century. The city suffered from both deep-seated problems within 
her internal political order and also troubles in Persia, due to the close commercial 
connections between the two areas. These had an impact on British commercial 
fortunes as well as those of Asian merchants. The letters of Company servants 
frequently referred to political turmoil as a major factor behind stagnant trade, and the 
exigencies of conflict were particularly keenly felt in the 1720s and 30s. Bombay 
merchant Robert Cowan wrote in 1723 that trade was ‘never known so Scarce at 
Surat, large quantitys of goods of all Sorts lye there for want of purchases’. Cowan 
blamed the ‘verry Dull’ trade on the west coast of India on the fact that the ‘Persian 
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 Chaudhuri, Trading World, p. 98.  
23
 Sanjay Subrahmanyam, ‘Introduction: The Indian Ocean World and Ashin Das Gupta’, in Ashin Das 
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Empire is tore to pieces’.24 Almost a decade later, James Hope, merchant at Surat, 
informed one correspondent that his business had been disrupted due to the ‘Troubles 
in this City, the merchants having turned out the Governour by force of arms, after 27 
days Fighting’.25 1732 was described in one later contemporary account as the year in 
which ‘the epoch of declention of the Surat trade’ began. A number of ‘disorders, 
broils, and confusions’ came after this date, from which ‘the English were not exempt 
from their share of suffering’.26 
The East India Company’s Directors increasingly came to emphasise that 
Bombay should be made the main seat of trade on the west coast. They hoped to 
create an independent British centre in the region, avoiding the troubles at Surat and 
the perceived restrictions placed on them by the government there. The Bombay 
general letter of January 1733 stated that, notwithstanding the present tranquillity at 
Surat, ‘the late troubles have damag’d trade’ and were it not for ‘troublesome 
neighbours’ they hoped that as the commerce of Surat declined, ‘that of Bombay will 
encrease’.27 
During this time, English trade at Surat was also greatly affected by European 
piracy. Problems in this regard arose not from plunder itself, but from the ways in 
which it affected Company relations with Asian merchants and rulers. Piracy did not 
just disrupt trade on the high seas and affect the transit of goods, but led to wider 
political, diplomatic and institutional conflict. The Surat government were acutely 
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 BL, IOR Neg 11606-36: ‘The Papers of Sir Robert Cowan: Correspondence and account books of 
Sir Robert Cowan, free merchant at Bombay 1719, Chief of the Factory at Goa 1720, Chief at Mocha 
1724, Governor of Bombay 1729-34’ [hereafter ‘Cowan Papers’], Reel 11606, D/654/B1/1A, Robert 
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 BL, IOR P/416/112, p. 227, case of Moses v Hope, 1732. 
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 ‘Account of Bombay and Surat in the East Indies’, London Magazine, 28 (October, 1759), p. 604. 
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 BL, IOR E/4/450, p. 440, Bombay general letter, January 1733. 
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concerned about the effect European piracy had on the trade of the town’s merchants, 
which severely affected their relationship with the English. One incident involved 
two Mughal ships, one of which was carrying hajji back from Mecca via Mocha, that 
were captured by English pirates in 1695. The Company’s chief and council at Surat 
were seized by the Mughal authorities in response, prompting a diplomatic crisis.
28
 
William Mildmay wrote home to his father in 1698 that relations with the native 
merchants at Surat were in a poor state, the English ‘having been threatened to be cutt 
in pieces … by reason of the Pyrates (most of wch are English & so it is their villainy 
laid at our dore)’. A Mocha ship ‘of a very great value’ had been taken, causing 
Surat’s merchants to turn against the English. ‘[W]e are forced to keep watch day and 
night & cannot goe into the streets without meeting with affronts & abuses’, Mildmay 
wrote.
29
 The arrival of the Bombay governor, Sir John Gayer, failed to settle the 
affair: he too was imprisoned, and remained confined at Surat for a number of 
years.
30
 This incident also led to prolonged restrictions on the trade of all Europeans 
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and a proclamation by the authorities at Surat that none of the inhabitants of the town 
should trade with either the English, Dutch or French, or serve them in any way.
31
 
The city’s internal order remained in crisis over the ensuing decades. In 1741, 
the Court of Directors emphasised their belief that ‘Without some speedy alteration in 
the Government of Surat … the Trade of that city must Dwindle to Nothing’.32 By the 
1750s, the state of Surat was such that merchant Charles Waters described how trade 
was ‘dwindling daily’ from the oppressive conduct of the city’s officials, and that 
British credit was ‘little regarded by that Government’.33 By this time, the East India 
Company had actually become major players in Surat, and they were eventually fully 
integrated into the city’s political order. The Company took over Surat Castle in 
1759, securing the top military responsibility in the city and naval jurisdiction over 
the port. This was undoubtedly an important moment in the history of western India. 
The Mughal representative in the city effectively became subordinate to British 
officials from this point onwards, and the Company used their new status as qiladar 
to extend their political and commercial rights.
34
 
By contrast, several miles southward, the period after 1720 witnessed the 
significant growth of Bombay’s trade. The process of the decline of Surat and the 
ensuing rise of Bombay was a gradual and evolving one however, marked by uneven 
development, and involving the intertwined histories of the two ports. Bombay too 
was beset by problems from the earliest days of Company trade there, from which it 
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took decades to recover. The development of the port as a centre of trade, and the 
growth of the East India Company’s commerce, was deeply affected by numerous 
political, economic and environmental difficulties from the late seventeenth century. 
These persisted well into the 1700s. Om Prakash in fact argues that the island’s long 
struggle to supplant its rich northern rival Surat lasted well beyond 1759 and was in 
fact not fully completed until the end of the century. Certainly, for some time after the 
1750s, ship-owners preferred to discharge their cargo at Surat rather than Bombay, 
where better prices and speedier sales could still be achieved.
35
  
 
II – The Rise of Bombay 
 
Bombay was made the headquarters of English trade in western India as early as the 
1680s. A sovereign territory, Bombay sat at the top of a tree of ‘subordinate’ factories 
– Surat, Tellicherry, Anjengo, Broach, Cambay, Karwar, Bandar ‘Abbas, Isfahan, 
Calicut and Mocha – ‘to all which the General sendeth governors, councils, factors, 
writers; and ships from England, as likewise of the country built, he dispatcheth to 
these distant places and receiveth them from thence’. 36  The hierarchy of the 
Company’s factory at Bombay was headed by a governor, who was assisted by 
multiple Council members, including a deputy who was usually the chief of the Surat 
factory. Beyond the Council positions, Company roles included ‘the treasurer, 
storekeeper, warehousekeeper, purser marine, secretary and accomptant, physician 
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and doctor, under which are other offices, as steward, butler, clerk of the market, 
which … are generally bestowed upon the factors and writers belonging to the Fort, 
whereof there are not a few’.37 This workforce oversaw the development of the port-
city’s trade and attempted to spearhead the growth of the East India Company’s 
commerce in the region.  
As the seventeenth century came to a close, the port town had established 
itself as a significant locale for trade in the Arabian Seas. Sixty years later, like Surat 
before it, Bombay had grown into a thriving international marketplace, well-
populated by merchants from all corners of the globe. By the time Robert Stevens 
wrote his ‘general guide’ to East India Trade in 1766, he could list swathes of goods 
that could be procured at Bombay from China, Europe, the Middle East and both 
coasts of India, categorising it as a truly global port city.
38
 Yet despite great hopes for 
the settlement in its formative years, and the East India Company Directors’ 
optimism that it would effectively replace Surat, Bombay showed few signs of 
becoming a great entrepôt during its first decades as a Company town. The 
commercial pre-eminence of Bombay was slow in coming, and for many years 
growth was sluggish. Percival Griffiths abruptly suggested that the west coast in the 
period between 1660 and 1750 ‘calls for little comment’ due to the Company’s on-
going struggles against ‘anarchy in the countryside … the dislocation of the 
economy’ and ‘the depredations of Malabar pirates’. 39  The governorships of 
Oxenden, Rolt, Child and Gayer that spanned the last two decades of the seventeenth 
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century and the first years of the eighteenth century at Bombay were indelibly marked 
by ‘internal and external troubles of no mean magnitude’.40  The structure of the 
Company’s government was also undermined by the infamous Keigwin’s Rebellion 
in 1683 that handed undisputed authority of the settlement to Captain Richard 
Keigwin of the Bombay Militia.
41
 Perhaps more seriously for British trade in the 
Arabian Seas, however, were the problems posed by continuing conflict with the 
Mughal Empire and the Marathas. 
Political turmoil on land and violence at sea significantly affected British 
Bombay. Like Surat, Bombay and its environs were surrounded by powerful political 
entities: conflict with the Mughal Empire, the Marathas, European pirates and other 
companies undoubtedly affected the position of English trade over the course of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. From early in the period under review, relations 
between the English and Indian powers were frequently stretched. Prakash writes that 
the 1670s and 1680s witnessed a fairly sharp deterioration in the relationship between 
the Company and the Mughal authorities. Policies developed by a faction within East 
India House led by Josia Child, keen to support armed trading through the acquisition 
and fortification of settlements, contributed to the outbreak of naval warfare on the 
west coast in 1686 – the famous ‘Child’s War’. The outcome was disastrous for the 
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Company and Bombay’s infrastructure was badly damaged.42 The Siddi Admiral (the 
sea-lord tributary to the Mughal Emperor) attacked Bombay, and the Company’s 
effects were seized at both Surat and Bombay.
43
 Eventually the Company were 
compelled to sue for peace on ‘humiliating terms’ although they were permitted to 
resume their former trade.
44
 
When Sir Nicholas Waite succeeded to the Bombay governorship in 1704 he 
actually tried to persuade the Company to send his son – who was then about to 
embark on a Company career – to Bengal rather than Bombay. He described the latter 
as ‘a place of mortality, without shipping or as yet trade’. Bombay was considered as 
very much an ailing settlement by contemporaries at this time, and seen as a financial 
burden on the Company. There were actually very few covenanted servants 
overseeing the operations of the factory and the on-going dissensions between the 
Old and New Companies compounded the problems stemming from local conflict. 
Foster summarised that between William Aislabie’s time as governor up until the 
arrival of Charles Boone as chief factor in 1715, the island was continually ‘menaced 
by European and Indian enemies’ with the progress of trade hampered by an 
impoverished treasury and internal disagreements.
45
 When Boone succeeded to the 
Governorship, the population of Bombay had dwindled to just sixteen thousand 
according to one estimate.
46
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Senior Company men, in their personal correspondence between Bombay and 
London continued to emphasise the poor state of trade in the town as the century 
progressed. In multiple letters between the governor of Bombay William Phipps and 
Thomas Woolley, the East India Company’s secretary, Bombay’s meagre trade was a 
common theme. Phipps wrote, ‘It is undoubtedly very unpleasant to the Gentlemen at 
home to think to drive a trade to so much disadvantage as they do, and have so long 
done to this Coast without any appearing hopes of its growing better’. He believed 
that the ‘miserable condition this place is reduced to, & [the] neglect the Company 
shews to their trade on this side India’ meant there was no post in the region that the 
Company could offer him that was worth his acceptance.
47
 
As with Surat, the Company continued to be plagued by maritime violence in 
the vicinity of Bombay throughout the early eighteenth century. Contemporary 
accounts emphasised the dangers of piracy in the waters of the Arabian Sea in this 
period, and emphasised its impact on British trade. Conflict between the Company 
and Kanhoji Angre, the Admiral of the Maratha fleet, posed the most serious 
challenge to the growth of British trade. In the early part of the eighteenth century, 
Angre effectively possessed a ‘piratical empire extending from Goa to Bombay’.48 
Bombay, Surat and the Malabar factories were deeply affected by the actions of his 
fleet until the final defeat of the Angre dynasty in the 1750s. The letters of the 
Bombay Council to the Company in London were replete with complaints about the 
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‘Savage Pyrates’.49 Even though by 1715, a ‘Peace with Conajee Angria’ had been 
settled, the Bombay Council still deemed it ‘necessary to have a Navall force to 
prevent his doing mischief at Bombay’. 50  Problems returned soon after and the 
‘Angria situation’ was so bad by 1718 that governor Boone warned the Company’s 
secretary that if they were ‘not able to suppress him by a good supply of seamen The 
Settlement on this Coast will shortly be ruined and the Island so crampt in its Trade 
that twill not be worth the keeping’.51  
Angre established a series of strongholds on the western Indian coast that 
overlooked the main arteries of British private trade. Although by the summer of 
1729 Robert Cowan informed James MacRae, the governor at Fort St. George, that 
‘Our troublesome neighbour Angria is lately dead … ‘Tis to be hoped we shan’t in 
haste meet with so resolute and active an enemy at Sea as he was’; his empire was 
very much preserved by his descendants.
52
 Continuing problems precipitated a 
violent response from the Company. Returned Company servant Robert Adams wrote 
to Henry Rumbold in London in the 1730s that, ‘I hope your voyage to Suratt 
answered your expectation & that you escaped Angria whose growing power has putt 
the Company into a humour to check his insolence’. Adams described how the 
Company ‘fitted out a ship as a Man a Warr & gave Capt. Massie the Command of 
her & of all the Bombay Gallys, Groabs etc. with orders to seeke & destroy’. Adams 
declared to his Bombay correspondent that he hoped for success in this endeavour 
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and anticipated that ‘by that meanes your trade may flourish & voyage[s] up that 
Coast [will be] made less hazardous’.53 The frequency with which Company men 
spoke of Angre’s activities in their correspondence suggests the seriousness of the 
challenge that piracy posed to the operation of British trade.
54
 
However, these episodes should not be seen as a simple story of piracy 
frustrating European commerce by praying on its shipping, as Derek Elliott has 
recently argued.
55
 There are subtle and nuanced issues here of local polities 
challenging the broader maritime jurisdiction of the British in the case of the Angres. 
Indeed, in recent years, a swathe of work has emphasised the fluidity of the term 
‘pirate’ in the context of early modern trade and politics. Lauren Benton has argued 
that piracy should be seen in relation to maritime law and that piratical identity was 
very much a European legal construct, in both the Atlantic and Indian Ocean 
worlds.
56
 Somewhat differently, and with a specifically Indian Ocean focus, Lakshmi 
Subramanian demonstrated how piracy was actually a product of colonial economic 
relations.
57
 Similarly, Simon Layton has recently described how the British conceived 
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of and branded piracy in the Indian Ocean during the eighteenth century as 
‘backward’ and politically illegitimate, as part of attempts to extend their maritime 
jurisdiction.
58
 In reality then, as Elliott has also suggested, the Angre dynasty can be 
usefully seen not as pirates at all, but as an arm of the Maratha confederacy, who 
attempted to exercise sovereignty and were often able to effectively challenge the 
British position in western India. Indeed, at times the British attempted to deal with 
Angre on ‘equal’ terms, using treaties and diplomatic negotiations. Episodes of 
‘piracy’ certainly had a dramatic effect on British commerce in this period, but they 
also draw attention to the fundamentally precarious position of the Company in pre-
colonial India.
59
  
More broadly, the Marathas and other South Indian territorial powers also 
challenged the smooth operation of British commerce during the eighteenth century. 
The proximity of the west coast factories to Maratha territory, and their dependence 
on that territory for food and fuel, drew the British into uneasy relations with the 
Marathas.
60
 Throughout the period, Maratha raids threatened the security of travelling 
down the west Indian coast on numerous occasions. ‘The passage from hence to Goa 
by Land is now become very Precarious from the Morattas having posted themselves 
in several parts of the Sundy Rajahs Country adjacent to that place’  complained 
Thomas Purnell as late as 1740, with ‘all persons … examined if they carry letters or 
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anything of Bulk about them’.61 The Malabar Coast settlements, lying even closer to 
Maratha territory, suffered just as acutely as Bombay during the first half of the 
eighteenth century and were blighted by strained relations with the ‘country powers’. 
A general letter from Bombay in January 1733 commented that the country about 
Anjengo was in ‘an unsettled condition, the Kings of Quiloan and Calliquiloan 
having kindled a War with the King of Travencore’.62 Again, similarly to many of the 
Company’s factories in the region, such was the cost of conflict that expenses 
threatened to swamp income. The Directors regularly urged factors to introduce 
measures to reduce costs. Tellicherry, the centre of the Company’s pepper trade, did 
not remain financially self-sufficient throughout the period either. Despite some 
limited periods of stability the factory remained in an ‘unsettled state’ for decades, 
again affected by relations with nearby polities.
63
 
As well as Indian powers, the Company was unsurprisingly engaged in on-
going competition with the Portuguese and Dutch at this time. Uneasy relations with 
other European traders frequently erupted into conflict both at sea and at settlements 
on the west coast of India, damaging British trade. As the pre-eminent European 
commercial body for much of the seventeenth century, it was the Dutch who 
remained a significant threat to the Company and her trade in the Arabian Seas. In the 
eighteenth century too, ‘Dutch ships, heavily armed, were ever on the look-out for 
stray English vessels’ claimed W.H. Coates.64 From their factory at Calicut on the 
Malabar Coast, the VOC were heavily involved in the pepper trade, which 
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undoubtedly led to conflict with the Company. In 1720, the Tellicherry factors wrote 
to the Company in London to tell of the continuing problems there, not only with the 
‘country powers’ but also ‘at Callicut with the Dutch’. A plan for the British to settle 
at ‘Eddicure in the King of Puniture’s country, 3 or 4 miles to the Northward of 
Chittoa’ in order to block the Dutch advance, as much as ensuring a hold on another 
pepper producing area, was also conceived.
65
  
Private correspondence between Robert Adams, chief factor at Tellicherry, 
and Company Director Edward Harrison also suggested that conflict with both the 
Portuguese and Dutch was liable to disrupt trade and revealed the Company’s 
difficulties facing their rivals. Harrison wrote to Adams in February 1719 that he was 
‘sensible of all the ill consequences that must attend the Dutch proceedings on your 
Coast and have done all I can to Spurr the Company on to prevent them’. However, 
even though Bombay had resolved to support its subordinate factories in their 
endeavours against the Dutch, Harrison felt that the Governor’s powers were so 
‘cramp’d for want of Men and Mony that I don’t see he [will] be able to hold you up 
against the Strength of Batavia’.66 A later letter from Harrison to Adams in March 
1723 lamented that ‘the hostilitys at Bombay with the Portuguese will involve your 
Country Trade in many difficultys, and deprive you of all reparation for the mischief 
formerly done to you in particular’.67 
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IIa - Bombay’s Company Servants  
 
 
Exploring the changing composition of the East India Company’s workforce at 
Bombay sheds further light on the progress of the city’s trade in the eighteenth 
century. The Company certainly expended large reserves of capital and labour 
attempting to secure its trade on the west coast in light of the exactions discussed 
above. The resources needed to defend factories against local political powers and to 
ensure the security of trade in the region led to high expenditure that was not 
compensated by commercial revenues. The Directors complained frequently to all 
their factories in the western Indian Ocean area about high expense levels throughout 
the eighteenth century, in an attempt to narrow this discrepancy. Even in the years 
when the Bombay establishment broke even, the losses on the subordinate factories 
often ensured the Company lost money on the Bombay Presidency accounts as a 
whole.
68
 In light of this, the Directors routinely emphasised their wish for 
economising measures to be implemented and personnel numbers to be cut. They 
were clearly not prepared to let any employees continue to reside at their settlements 
if they were perceived as surplus to requirements and they urged their Councils to 
reduce servant numbers at frequent intervals. The Company wrote in their general 
letter to Surat and Bombay in 1703 that ‘If there should be any [servants] not so 
entertained [conducting the Company’s business] & are willing to continue in India 
                                                     
68
 Ibid., ‘Copy of several paragraphs in the Company’s general letter to Bombay’, 4 June 1703. See 
also the Company’s correspondence in BL, IOR E/4/449, pp. 14, 75 and 208. 
 68 
 
as Free Merchants or come home you may Pmitt them to do when our Affaires don’t 
require their further employment.’69  
The Court of Directors took into consideration various factors when deciding 
on the distribution of new servants. Mortality rates, the political situation and levels 
of trade all had to be accounted for.
70
 Considering Bombay’s situation in the 
eighteenth century it is reasonable to assume that the town’s share of new servants 
was small. It was certainly the opinion of the Company’s men in Bombay that they 
were routinely undersupplied with new factors. Rather than agreeing to reduce the 
size of the factory, they argued that shortages of servants could actually threaten how 
effectively Company business could be carried out.
71
 They declared that they could 
not ‘with safety proceed in any business but what is unavoidable having but six 
Covenant Servants on the Island’ in 1706. 72  The situation had seemingly not 
improved by 1715 either, when the Council emphasised their belief that with so few 
servants at Bombay and subordinate factories, they ‘shall be in Streights’ if men were 
not supplied by the next shipping.
73
 
 The number of Company servants employed at Bombay and the subordinate 
factories between 1712 and 1752, as recorded in the Company’s personnel lists, 
undoubtedly fluctuated dramatically, as can be seen in Table One below. The number 
of new servants recorded, as displayed in Table Two, also varied and would have 
naturally been affected by mortality rates at Bombay as well as recruitment levels in 
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London. The overall number of servants dropped to a low level in certain years, but 
despite the frequent complaints from the Bombay Council about the numbers of men 
at their disposal, the western Presidency appears to have been relatively well-staffed. 
The number of factors at the Company’s settlements in western India were healthy in 
comparison to the Company’s other centres of trade. 74  According to a report 
commissioned in September 1709, at Bombay there were fifty five persons either 
stationed there or about to arrive, with sixteen more factors sent out from London that 
year. This compares to sixty at Fort St. George, with ten due to arrive and forty-two 
in the Bay of Bengal, with thirteen due to arrive.
75
 The figures also compared 
favourably with Søren Mentz’s estimates for Madras at the beginning of the 
eighteenth century, where there was thought to be around 150 Englishmen, one 
quarter of whom were Company servants.
76
 The numbers of new Company servants 
sent out or transferred to Bombay naturally fluctuated, but there were periods of 
consistency, particularly between 1717 and 1723.
77
 Yet, with Bombay being regarded 
as an unfavourable location to be sent by for budding merchants hoping to make their 
way in East Indian trade, the calibre of new Company servants could not be 
guaranteed.  Merchant Robert Cowan commented in a letter to John Gould in London 
in October 1723 that ‘if I am to judge of the other coast by us here I am sure the 
Company’s affaires want such hands, most of the Company’s servants in India come 
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out very young with little education or knowledge of the [world] and are more 
obliged to a Robust constitution than any other merit for the preferrmt.’78 
 
Table One – Covenanted Servants at Bombay, 1712-1752. 
 
Year 
Number of 
Covenanted Servants 
Year 
Number of 
Covenanted Servants 
1712 42 1733 43 
1713 50 1734 43 
1714 No record in this series 1735 46 
1715 30 1736 41 
1716 21 1737 42 
1717 31 1738 45 
1718 42 1739 43 
1719 44 1740 39 
1720 No record in this series 1741 35 
1721 40 1742 41 
1722 36 1743 52 
1723 40 1744 50 
1724 40 1745 47 
1725 30 1746 35 
1726 34 1747 41 
1727 38 1748 40 
1728 39 1749 32 
1729 34 1750 35 
1730 28 1751 42 
1731 40 1752 39 
1732 37  
 
Source: Bombay personnel lists, BL, IOR O/6/37. 
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Table Two – New Servants at Bombay, 1715-1752. 
 
Year 
Number of 
Covenanted Servants 
Year 
Number of 
Covenanted Servants 
1715 7 1734 3 
1716 1 1735 7 
1717 14 1736 0 
1718 16 1737 1 
1719 12 1738 9 
1720 0 1739 4 
1721 13 1740 3 
1722 10 1741 2 
1723 12 1742 10 
1724 3 1743 14 
1725 2 1744 14 
1726 8 1745 6 
1727 3 1746 1 
1728 6 1747 9 
1729 4 1748 0 
1730 0 1749 3 
1731 10 1750 10 
1732 4 1751 13 
1733 12 1752 7 
 
Source: Bombay personnel lists, BL, IOR O/6/37. 
 
Moreover, these figures say nothing of the living standards of the British population 
in Bombay. According to contemporary observers and later historians, Bombay’s 
climate was pernicious, and exerted additional pressure on the smooth operation of 
Company business. During the eighteenth century, not only was Bombay seen as a 
settlement where few private trading opportunities were available, but was also 
viewed as a dangerously ‘unhealthy’ area. The town even compared unfavourably to 
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other European settlements in India and the climate of the region adversely affected 
the health of the British population more than anywhere else in the East Indies. 
A notably common explanation for Bombay’s woes was the supposedly 
unhealthy ‘airs’ in the town that discouraged merchants to settle there. The malarial 
swamps that surrounded the city – which did not begin to be reclaimed until 1721 – 
created a ‘naturally damp and enervating’ atmosphere that caused illness and disease. 
Fatal diseases were common, especially following the monsoon rains.
79
 One account 
dating from the beginning of the eighteenth century warned that ‘The months of 
September and October, which follow the Rains, are very pernicious to Europeans at 
Bombay; and more of them generally die at that Time, than during all the rest of the 
Year; because the excessive Quantities of Earthly Vapours infects the Air, 
occasioning such a faint Sultry Heat, that very few can resist the feverish Effect 
thereof on the Spirits, or recover from the pestilential Fevers and Fluxes that ensue. 
Almost all Wounds and Contusions, at Such Times, prove mortal.’80 
Other observers connected the health of the British population to their own 
‘loose living’ however. John Ovington in his Voyage to Surat famously described 
Bombay in the late seventeenth century as a place little better than a ‘charnel-house’ 
where the putrid airs acted on men whose constitutions were already damaged by 
drink and debauchery.
81
 In one letter to the Directors in the early eighteenth century, 
the Company’s servants at Surat similarly connected the health of merchants in 
Bombay to their way of life. ‘Although the island may have the name in Europe of 
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being unwholesome’, they wrote, ‘it is no such thing really … when men come new 
out, drink punch toddy and country beer, besides that are disordered and tumble on 
damp ground it cannot be expected but diseases must be contracted’.82 A number of 
other contemporary accounts also discussed the problems of overindulgence amongst 
Company men.
83
 The servants were nevertheless undoubtedly affected by the climate. 
Robert Cowan declared to one of his correspondents in 1728 that when he eventually 
returned home to England, he would carry with him ‘a crazy and broken constitution’ 
from his years in Bombay.
84
 
Compounding this however, the Company apparently failed to provide 
adequate quarters to house its servants who were unfortunate enough to serve at 
Bombay. Mariner Isaac Pyke provided a damning assessment of the state of the 
Company’s workforce following his visit in 1709. He opined that so many at Bombay 
were ‘in a Miserable needy & beggarly condition not halfe able to maintain 
themselves but live in Hospitality together. I mean that 5 or 6 lye in one Room & if 
any has a Room to himselfe tis not easey to guess how mean & sorry a hole it is’. He 
continued that ‘This is a very sad truth & I wish it may be Considered for tis a very 
easey to amend it by building up a few good Lodging Rooms there being halfe of 
those down that were standing when I last was here & doing this with allowing every 
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body to sell provisions freely’. Pyke believed that such changes would ‘make 
Bombay much better’.85  
Existing work attests to the extremely high mortality amongst the British 
population in other centres of trade in India, particularly Calcutta.
86
 Yet, the 
connection contemporaries made between Bombay’s climate and the poor state of its 
trade is unusual. In the early decades of the eighteenth century, the Company’s 
Council at Bombay certainly blamed this general ‘unhealthyness’ on the island for its 
commercial problems and the ‘Want of Money’ there.87 Merchants were not attracted 
there because of it, and the Company’s Council struggled to keep personnel numbers 
up to a workable level because of the high death rate. Historians have echoed these 
contemporary accounts of the climate too: Pamela Nightingale commented that for 
British merchants, an early death or disappointed hopes were the most common ends 
to a Company career at Bombay during the eighteenth century.
88
 George McGilvary 
has also recently classed Bombay as ‘always the unhealthiest Presidency’ where very 
few children born of the British population survived.
89
 
On the whole, as Bombay historian Stephen Edwardes stated, the letters and 
documents of the last quarter of the seventeenth and opening years of the eighteenth 
constantly portray the anxiety felt both by the Court of Directors and the Bombay 
Council over the poor situation of west coast trade.
90
 The lowly status of Bombay 
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raises the question of why the Company decided to keep the islands maintained as a 
pre-eminent settlement at all, especially as they rarely hesitated to abandon 
establishments altogether if profits were poor. Indeed, leaving Bombay completely 
was considered on numerous occasions in the early eighteenth century. Even the 
advantages afforded by its location, such as the excellent natural harbour, were 
eroded by tremendous expenses that ate perilously into any revenues from trade and 
customs collection. One later eighteenth-century writer believed that ‘the great 
expence attending this settlement has hitherto counterbalanced [any] advantages; the 
profits arising from the territory, and the great trade carried on, not being equal to the 
amount of that expence’.91 Such a view of Bombay and indeed, the western Indian 
possessions of the Company more generally, was maintained by later historians. 
According to Percival Spear, Bombay simply ‘did not pay’. He argued that it was 
purely the excellent harbour (and later the role of the dockyard) that caused the 
Company to suffer its annual loss on the settlement.
92
 
Many of Bombay’s subordinate factories were in a similar position. K.N. 
Chaudhuri’s explanation for the maintenance of many of the factories in the region 
rests on the need to compete with other European powers. He persuasively argued 
that one of the only reasons for keeping the pepper settlements of Malabar, the 
Gombroon factory and Bombay, was the fear that ‘if these settlements were given up 
others would tend the vineyard which the Company had planted’.93 Were it not for 
the danger inherent in handing the initiative to the other European traders on the west 
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coast, the Company’s commercial structure in the region could have been 
systematically dismantled. 
The purpose of the concluding section of this chapter is to discuss how the 
private trade of British merchants on the west coast fitted within this exigent context. 
Clearly, the situation of East India Company trade as a whole between 1680 and 1760 
adversely affected the private trade of its servants. Yet, despite deep-seated problems 
across the region, an active private trade can still be discerned, particularly in the 
latter half of this period, supported by Bombay’s rise. Although the process followed 
an uneven trajectory, Bombay eventually rose to become one of the prominent centres 
of world trade despite the difficulties experienced by the Company. Attempts to 
improve the position of their trade on the west coast, especially encouraging the 
development of Bombay’s infrastructure and trading facilities throughout the middle 
third of the eighteenth century, went some way to sowing the seeds of the town’s 
future prosperity. The changes undoubtedly played a part in the development of 
Company servants’ private business. Surat too remained an important locale for 
British private trade, even after 1730, as the Company extended their trading rights in 
the Mughal port. Critically however, it appears that senior Company servants were at 
the forefront of private trade, and it was only a relatively small group of merchants 
who were able to operate successfully. 
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III – The Development of Private Trade and Bombay’s ‘Subdued Prosperity’ 
 
 
As early as the last quarter of the seventeenth century, a significant English private 
trade network formed on the west coast of India, based at Surat. Before the period of 
turmoil, external conflict and competition from Bombay, senior Company servants at 
the port carved out profitable commercial ventures. In his Voyage to Surat in 1689, 
John Ovington wrote that ‘A few years here has rais’d several of the Presidents to 
Plentiful Estates, who besides their salaries which is 300 per annum and several 
advantages by the Ships, are permitted a free Trade to all parts of the East. This is 
indulg’d likewise to all Company servants to what station soever, which is a favour 
attended with considerable Benefit, suits well with the freedom of an English subject, 
and is a profitable Blessing’.94 In his extensive study of English private trade, Ian 
Bruce Watson also described how merchants holding senior positions in the 
Company hierarchy dominated private trade across the Arabian Seas. The group at 
Surat included George Oxenden, Gerald Aungier and John Child, each President 
between the 1660s and the 1680s. With the two ships he owned, Oxenden carried a 
vigorous freight trade to Persia. He reportedly turned a debt of 50,000 rupees into an 
estate worth 300,000 rupees at his death. Eventually, Aungier and associates owned 
as many as five vessels, while John Child reportedly left his wife £100,000.
95
 For 
much of the half century after this however, the exigencies of trade in the Arabian 
Sea region provided complex, difficult and sometimes insurmountable problems for 
private business. Company employees struggled to accumulate large private reserves, 
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regardless of their position in the factory, and especially relative to their counterparts 
at Madras and Calcutta.   
Although Charles Boone carved out a successful career as Bombay governor 
from 1715, he argued in one letter that ‘had I the opportunityes Madras or Bengal 
affords I should be in easie circumstances, but here is nothing like it’. He eagerly 
petitioned the Company to transfer him to a position further east when a vacancy 
arose.
96
 Robert Adams, another important figure within the British private trading 
sector on the west coast of India during the 1720s, emphasised in his letters from 
India the difficulties he faced operating in the volatile world of the Arabian Seas. 
Many of Adams’s letters to Edward Harrison detailed his ‘heavy complaint of losses 
& Disapointments by Trade’ whereby Adams was obliged to ‘stay longer abroad’.97 
Harrison advised Adams that Company dealings on the west coast had been in a 
deplorable state for many years, with income barely exceeding expenses. He wrote 
that, ‘I should think you would upon this occasion lay down the service and come for 
England, for the trade of India seems in a very declining way.’98 Even as late as 1726, 
there seems to have been much pessimism amongst Company men about the potential 
to make a sizeable personal fortune from trade in India. 
Robert Cowan also longed for a quick return home with a fortune made in the 
East, yet his progress towards this goal was protracted. He wrote several letters to a 
number of correspondents in October 1723 stating that he was ‘now three years in 
India, but have remain’d but a short time in any once place and so have had no great 
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opportunity of bettering my fortune’.99 He would later go on to make a sizeable 
fortune, but by the end of 1725 he had developed his private trade no further. He told 
one correspondent he desired ‘to be in the best position of the Company in their gift 
in India that I may sooner be in a condition to return & enjoy yours and the rest of my 
friends company in Europe’.100 Cowan rose to become Bombay governor in 1728, a 
position with the potential to greatly increase his fortune. Yet, on his ascent to the 
governorship, Cowan described the post as one of ‘more honour, but less profite, than 
the government of Fort St. George, where Mr. Macrae has got a great Estate’.101 As 
late as 1734, when Cowan had established himself as a highly regarded senior factor 
and successful private trader, he remained unsatisfied with his progress. From 
Bombay, Cowan wrote to one correspondent that ‘the unsettled state of the 
Companys affaires under this Presidency at present will not permit me to fix with any 
certainty the time of my return’.102 British merchants continued to regard Bengal as 
‘the finest place in India for trade’ and for the development of private fortunes in later 
decades.
103
 
Despite these assertions, it is hard to ignore the evidence for some expansion 
of British private trade at both Bombay and Surat, especially from around the 1720s. 
There is little evidence of substantial private fortunes being created between the days 
of Oxenden and this period – presumably as a result of the turmoil and uncertainty in 
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the trade of the Arabian Seas and the organisation of Company trade on the west 
coast of India – but it seems clear that senior merchants at Bombay and Surat were 
eventually able to follow in the footsteps of their earlier counterparts. The seeds for 
this more successful private trade can be discerned in the period between 1715 and 
1720, as merchant’s letters, the Company’s correspondence, account books, and the 
observations of other contemporaries all emphasise.  
Firstly, the trading privileges handed down by the Mughals to the British 
merchants of Surat precipitated the growth of private trade at this time. These 
undoubtedly provided benefits for merchants aiming to increase their private wealth, 
particularly those of a high rank in the Company who could access and take 
advantage of the most efficacious opportunities and expertise. For an annual payment 
of several thousand rupees, the Company was granted duty-free trade from the trading 
season 1716-17 through the famous 1717 farman. Although this privilege was 
negotiated to assist Company trade, it also benefitted all British merchants.
104
  
Later contemporary accounts, including The Universal dictionary of trade and 
commerce, similarly highlighted Surat’s thriving private trade. Of the Gujarati port, 
the dictionary read: 
‘There are many young clerks, or apprentices, here to the Company, who 
serve them a term of years, and, according to their behaviour, rise gradually to 
be factors, merchants, and chiefs of factories. These have their diet and 
lodging in the factory, as well as salaries, and some of them have the liberty 
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of trading in India from port to port, and those of good credit, who have not a 
capital, may borrow money to trade with of the Banians, at 25 per cent 
bottomry of which, in some voyages they make cent. per cent. There are also 
here free merchants, to whom the Company grant licenses to carry on a 
coasting trade, many of whom, also, borrow large sums on bottomry of the 
Banians.’105  
Surat merchant William Lowther, in a letter home to Walter Stanhope of Leeds, also 
suggested that large profits could be made from such voyages. Although not quite as 
optimistic as the claims in the Universal dictionary, he recounted in his letter home 
that ‘From 35 to 40 Sale of large English Ships dispose of their cargoes here in a 
season, and in good times they make 30 some 40 & some 50 Pr Ct clear of interest, 
Bottomry and all charges in a Voyage’.106  
Indeed, Lowther painted a rather optimistic picture of the possibilities 
afforded by trade at Surat in the 1730s, extolling the benefits accruing from the 
privileges granted by the Mughal government. He wrote that: 
‘Surat is the largest place of trade in the Moguls dominions, people of all 
Nations residing here. The English and Dutch are the most Considerable of 
the Europeans, the French haveing lost all their Credit … The English enjoy 
here greater priveledges than the Dutch, by reason of a Grant which was given 
them in the year 1716 and were free’d from paying any customs or dutys at 
this port, upon the annuall payment of 1250£ which is not above 1/6 of the 
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customs collected by the Company here, besides it saves the trouble of being 
searched by the country people, which were the case otherways they would 
value the goods at double their price, and take the customs accordingly, which 
is the case with all other Merchants except the English.
’107
 
William’s relative, Henry Lowther, the chief of the Surat factory in the 1730s was 
undoubtedly exposed to numerous lucrative commercial opportunities. By 1732, 
Lowther was ‘about half owner in no less than eight or nine great Ships’. By this time 
it was said that the Company’s chief at Surat could ‘always have the credit of above 
One Hundred Thousand Pounds’.108 Robert Cowan’s congratulatory letter to Lowther 
immediately after his ascent to the chiefship at Surat declared that his new post would 
provide him with ‘unlimited credit’ and ‘great opportunitys’ of improving his ‘privat 
fortune’.109 
Reflecting on his time spent as a Company servant on the west coast in the 
late 1720s and early 1730s, former merchant Thomas Rammell emphasised the 
success of British private trade at Surat. In a letter published in the Gazetteer and 
London Daily Advertiser in the 1750s, Rammell wrote that: ‘as an undeniable proof 
of the flourishing condition the private trade was in when I lived at Surat (and may 
still be so for any thing I know to the contrary) I declare on my own certain 
knowledge, that at that port only, it amounted to about 250,000 l. per annum. This I 
insert to show what a spirit of trade reigns amongst the English in the East Indies’.110  
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Historians who have attempted to discern the general level of British private 
trade on the west coast during the first half of the eighteenth century have also argued 
a case for the growth of the sector from the 1720s. In Indian Merchants and the 
Decline of Surat, Ashin Das Gupta presents the evidence of Jan Schreuder, the head 
of the Dutch factories in Gujarat, whose report in 1740 detailed the levels of trade of 
the various commercial groups of Surat. The Asian merchants’ trade from the port at 
this time was estimated at two million rupees by Schreuder, that of the Portuguese at 
500,000 rupees, the French at 160,000 rupees, and the English as much as 2.43 
million rupees. According to Das Gupta, the English private trade sector was 
practically the only expanding element of mercantile trade in the Arabian Seas during 
the 1720s and 1730s.
111
 Since the Company itself did not engage in intra-Asian trade 
per se but left it in the hands of its servants, in Das Gupta’s view the increasing 
volume of English trade as recorded by officials at Surat could only have been 
accounted for by private commerce.
112
 Prakash argued too that private trade was 
probably even more valuable than the East India Company’s own trade, as the 
average annual value of the Gujarat textiles the Company imported into England 
between 1741 and 1745 was no more than 322,280 rupees.
113
 
The Company’s own customs data similarly suggests the growth of private 
trade over the eighteenth century. The amounts received by the Company’s custom 
house were not insubstantial: Surat customs for one year to 12 September 1727 
amounted to 23,448 rupees, and the same up to September the following year 
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amounted to 27,879 rupees.
114
 Customs collected in 1747 amounted to 37,298 rupees; 
roughly a thirty-four per cent increase on two decades earlier.
115
 These duties 
provided a significant income stream for the Company too: ‘We can from experience 
affirm that the Hon’ble Company are the greatest gainers by the private trade carried 
on by the English in India’ read a letter from Bombay to London.116 This partly 
encouraged the Directors to look favourably on schemes designed to improve the lot 
of all British trade, both Company and private. 
Turning to Bombay, regular conflict and volatile trade aside, the Council 
remained positive throughout the early eighteenth century that the town could become 
a flourishing port and an important part of the Company’s trading portfolio. The 
Bombay Council’s general letter to London in February 1704 talks of the town being 
‘fertile’, capable of being transformed into the pre-eminent centre of trade on its side 
of India. They averred that if it were to be made a free port, for ‘five or seven years 
for all importations’ but taking two or three per cent duty on exports, ‘it would turn to 
the Companys advantage’.117 The Company’s Directors responded by consistently 
encouraging a succession of governors of Bombay to introduce measures to improve 
the trade of the Island. It seemed to many in the Company that Bombay’s potential 
was waiting to be unlocked and senior factors maintained grand ambitions for the 
future of the town. Sir Nicholas Waite, from taking up the Presidency under the New 
Company attempted to alter the fortunes of English trade at Bombay, aiming to make 
it ‘more healthfull’, encouraging important merchants to live there, importing 
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appropriate European goods and increasing the supply of a greater variety of Indian 
goods.
118
 Although Waite’s efforts did not have the impact he desired, he laid 
important foundations for the future success of other governors. 
Charles Boone oversaw a period of general stability, good governance and 
healthy trade from taking over the governorship of Bombay in 1715. Now under a 
united Company, Boone’s tenure was again characterised by attempts to improve the 
condition of the town and its trade. Boone set about modifying numerous practices, 
from improving the method of Company book-keeping to changing the way customs 
were collected. From the beginning of his administration, he took pains to emphasise 
his unending efforts to his employers. Boone commented that he was ‘much surprised 
to find the Company commend the method of keeping their books in this settlement 
… when I arrived the books were several Months behind, as well as the 
Consultations, I have sett them all to work and have myself directed the Accomptnt, 
Ware House Keeper, Paymaster, Customer Collector of the Revenues and Secretary 
… I will not say things are so correct as I could with them but you may perceive by 
our Consultations we begin to mend.’119 
There is much evidence to suggest that he was successful in his various 
endeavours and other company servants were full of praise for his work. Company 
servant Jonah Ingram extolled the virtues of Boone to the Directors in 1717 by stating 
that the ‘Arival of his Honour Boone here has caus’d sutch a turne of Government, so 
much to the interest of the Company that I do not know how to express it, more than 
to Ashure you the place is in a few years likely to be the very best for trade in 
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India’.120 Bombay merchant John Hope similarly expected that in a few years the 
Company would ‘discover that Bombay has been at such a low ebb only for want of 
ingenious minds hands and hearts to carry on good designs & to raise it in equall 
emulation of Trade with Madras’.121 Boone’s achievements were also reported more 
widely at home. An extract of a letter from Bombay that appeared in London’s 
Weekly Journal read, ‘Of all the governors of Bombay’, not one had ‘been receiv’d 
with such universal Applause and Esteem as the Honourable Charles Boone, Esq’. 
The letter emphasised that because of Boone’s success in ‘regulating Abuses, and 
providing for its security’, it could be expected that the island would ‘flourish more 
than ever’.122 
External developments contributed to this renewed positivity. A general letter 
from Bombay in 1715 emphasised the hope that several prolonged conflicts in India 
were easing: ‘The Moguls empire being in Peace Trade begins to revive, the Roads 
now secure, the Governors less extorting, so hope to get a good quantity of Cloth 
when the Caravans arrive in October and January’. 123  In general, the changing 
political context in India, allied with the growing maritime power of the Company, 
allowed it to overcome some of its long-standing adversaries.
124
 Back in Britain, the 
Company benefitted from a general period of stability from 1720.
125
 India stock was 
second only to bank stock in solidity from the 1720s through to the 1740s, and the 
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Company never failed to pay an annual dividend during this time.
126
 The early 
eighteenth century was not only a critical period in the economic life of the western 
Indian Ocean, but saw great changes take place in Britain’s economy. The ‘financial 
revolution’ promoted changes in regulatory institutions. The Bank of England 
developed, marine insurance systems emerged and grew and London became the pre-
eminent financial centre in the world. Commercial information circulated more 
quickly and with greater ease than ever before. These developments, and the 
relatively stable domestic economic and political framework created, led to 
achievement and success in trade abroad.
127
 
The Company’s successes on the west coast were unsurprisingly bolstered by 
growing naval and military strength. Boone also instituted a programme to strengthen 
Bombay’s fortifications almost immediately following his appointment.128 This was 
particularly motivated by the threat of the Dutch and the French, and of course by the 
Company’s long-standing commitment to fortifying their settlements in India.129 The 
continuing campaigns against piracy and the Angrias also provided a justification for 
developing Bombay’s fortifications, and indeed, for levying an extra customs duty to 
defray the cost of the works.
130
 Throughout the century from this point onward, 
Bombay’s defences became more formidable and according to Edwardes, the fort was 
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effectively rendered secure from attack.
131
 After the completion of Bombay Castle in 
1715, a ditch around the fort, new bastions and batteries were added, allowing the 
numbers of soldiers stationed at the port town to increase. Although the development 
of Bombay’s defences was rather haphazard132, it had a positive effect on trade. In 
addition, Boone was even credited with rendering Bombay ‘as healthful as any of the 
settlements on the coast’ by ‘draining the bogs and swamps, which abounded [on the] 
island’.133 
A broader idea behind these developments was to create a secure port, with 
good facilities and tolerant governance, in order to attract merchants of all 
nationalities. The Company Directors stressed to the Bombay Council that trade on 
the west coast could ‘be Improved to our Advantage by making Bombay the Grand 
Mart for your Side of India, which We shall hope to see Effected, by your alluring all 
sorts of People to live under your Protection, by a Mild, Gentle and Just Government, 
and by Opening a Commerce into and through the Moratta Countrey’.134 Similarly, 
other municipal institutions and buildings were created and developed in Bombay as 
part of this policy: the Mayor’s Court was established in 1726 and played a key role 
in handling disputes between both European and Indian merchants.
135
 Moving into 
the 1740s, other governors followed Boone’s lead. William Wake introduced regular 
measures for reducing expenditure and increasing revenue, while his successor 
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Richard Bourchier was also adjudged to have done a great deal to improve the 
position of Bombay. The Company wrote fondly of Wake in 1746 as ‘The 
Considerable Reduction of Our Charges and Encrease of our Revenues since Mr 
Wake came to the Chair afford Us great satisfaction, these are Solid Proofs of a true 
Attachment to our Interest, and We rely on a Continuance thereof with respect to your 
Place and every Subordinate Factory.’136 
Perhaps most significantly for the town’s infrastructural development during 
this period, the Bombay dockyard was extended during the 1730s, with the Wadia 
family assigned to begin a shipbuilding industry in the town during the late 1730s. 
The Bombay Council and the Company’s servants at Surat were instrumental in re-
locating master builder Lowjee Wadia and his family to Bombay.
137
 Indeed, the 
centrality of the Parsi community for the development of Bombay into a commercial 
hub more broadly cannot be understated.
138
 Through their ship-building skills and 
commercial acumen, they contributed to the wealth of the town in numerous 
significant ways. Bombay-built ships came to be regarded as ‘incomparably the best 
in the world for duration’. It was not uncommon for a ship to ‘last a century’ due to 
the ‘solidity of their workmanship, and the nature of the wood [the builders] 
employ’.139 Moreover, Parsi merchants traded with great success, often in partnership 
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with Britons.
140
Along with its dockyard, Bombay’s harbour facilities further 
developed and remained a source of pride, something that was mentioned by many 
contemporary observers. In 1724, one commentator wrote that Bombay was ‘reputed 
one of the most famous Havens of all the Indies, as never being choked up by the 
Storms, or yearly Monsoons, but affords at all Seasons, Reception and Security for 
whole Fleets.’141 
Naval power was also critical to the development of European commercial 
hegemony across the Indian Ocean in this period.
142
 Military and naval force 
undoubtedly played a role in the development of Bombay, the growth of private trade 
and the increasing profitability of the Company’s commerce in the region during the 
eighteenth century. The fleets sheltered by Bombay’s harbour comprised naval as 
well as commercial vessels due to the presence of the Bombay Marine, the 
Company’s naval force. The Marine was typically engaged to respond to the recurrent 
issue of piracy from the beginning of the century.
143
 Indeed, Bombay governor 
Nicholas Waite writing as early as 1704, emphasised his belief that ‘Force only can 
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retrieve the English Reputation’ on the west Coast. 144  The development of the 
Bombay Marine became central to the protection and preservation of British trading 
interests in subsequent decades and was seen as a vital instrument for maintaining 
safe waters for trade. In addition, the Marine came to be seen as a key component of 
the Bombay Council’s plan to improve the situation of Bombay port and attract a 
greater volume of trade from merchants of all nations by using force and the threat of 
force to combat piracy and institute a convoy system. In the face of continuing piracy 
around the coasts of western India, the Bombay government were able to use their 
growing naval force as leverage with the Mughal authorities: the services of the 
Marine were in high demand.
145
 Three grabs had been built to strengthen the marine 
by 1717.
146
 By 1728, the Marine consisted of thirty-two galleys with twelve guns 
each, two grabs each with several guns and six gallevats.
147
 The rapid expansion of 
the Bombay Marine bolstered Bombay’s status as a colony, and the Council 
continued to issue passes to define its jurisdictional authority at sea.
148
 
In the view of contemporaries too, this successfully contributed to the security 
of the waters around Bombay, boosting the city’s commercial profile even further, 
especially from mid-century. It was this naval force that ‘without dispute … secures 
the trade of all this part of India but likeways gives the Company a greater Reputation 
in these parts than any thing else’.149 Requests from the council at Bombay to further 
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increase the settlement’s military and naval strength were frequently 
received.
150
Although the Company was reluctant to increase its expenditure on the 
naval force, the Marine still grew rapidly over the course of the eighteenth century.
151
 
By the 1770s, writer Abraham Parsons simply commented in his Travels that the 
Company’s ‘coasting trade could not be carried on without it’.152  
 
Chart One – Customs Collected at Bombay, 1712-1750 
 
Source: Bombay Presidency Journals and Ledgers, BL, IOR P/419/124-420/31 
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All these developments: continued good governance, infrastructural development and 
naval strength, seem to have had a desirable effect on the level of total customs 
revenue collected at Bombay, at least from 1730. Bombay governor Robert Cowan 
proudly informed one correspondent that ‘Our customs for the last year ending July 
1734 will come little short of a hundred thousand rupees, a sum never before known 
at this port’.153 Echoing this, the authors of the Bombay Gazetteer outlined that the 
figure rose from 89,000 rupees in 1735 to 119,000 in 1744.
154
 The customs data 
compiled from Bombay’s factory journals and ledgers in the IOR provide rather 
different figures, but also indicate there was a general increase in customs revenue 
across the middle decades of the eighteenth century, as shown in the chart above.
155
 
The value of customs quoted in the ledgers increased three-fold in the years between 
1723 and 1734.  
Although the early eighteenth century was in many ways a period of 
stagnation and underdevelopment in trade then, a period of relative success at 
Bombay ensued in the middle decades of the century. Even Percival Spear has argued 
that Bombay had attained a ‘subdued prosperity’ by 1740 and could be considered 
flourishing by the 1750s due to this period of sustained growth and development.
156
 
Governor Cowan estimated the population of the town to be 30,000 in 1728.
157
 The 
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population had apparently risen to around 70,000 by 1744 and rose as migration to 
the city increased apace.
158
 This represented an incredible increase from the estimated 
population of 16,000 in 1715 and 10,000 in the 1670s.
159
 
To a large extent, the development of private trade at Bombay paralleled these 
changes. In 1721, the Directors informed the Bombay Council of their pleasure that 
the condition of the country trade was improving. They wrote that; ‘We are glad to 
find that by what appears your Countrey Trade in general goes on currently We shall 
be pleased to hear it yearly extends as well in value as in the profitable returns to 
encourage the respective Adventurers’.160  The experience of individual merchants 
also substantiates the notion that the situation of private trade had improved by this 
time. Bombay governors Charles Boone in the 1720s and Robert Cowan in the 1730s, 
together with his associate Henry Lowther, Chief at Surat, became immensely 
successful private traders. The governors and Council members at Bombay had 
particularly unique opportunities of developing their fortunes. In the words of one 
nineteenth-century writer, ‘Native merchants were anxious to gain their favour by 
offering them easy bargains; and such as were unscrupulous, could use the 
Company’s cruisers not only to protect their ships, but also to carry their 
merchandise’.161 Perhaps most importantly though, there were numerous perquisites 
attached to senior Company positions, and they had direct access to a vast network of 
servants eager to provide services and assistance in trade. Of the Bombay governors 
during the period under review, Cowan was said to have been the ‘most fortunate or 
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most unscrupulous’. His establishment and retinue were expensive, and it was clear to 
the authors of one article in the Bombay Quarterly Review that he ‘must have had 
abundant opportunities of accumulating a handsome fortune’.162 Chaudhuri estimated 
that he made a sizeable fortune of around £40,000 – not one of the largest ever made 
through trade in the East Indies but certainly not small by contemporary standards. 
He was also reportedly trying to remit 400,000 rupees back home when he died in 
1737.
163
 However, this figure should probably be revised upwards. Towards the end 
of his career, at the end of one of his account books, Cowan recorded total assets of 
738,719 rupees; a huge sum. Moreover, a newspaper account of his death estimated 
his estate to be £80,000 and Watson’s biography of Cowan suggests £100,000 as the 
figure for the total wealth at his death.
164
 Since he came out to India with few assets, 
and indeed, substantial debts, it is reasonable to assume that much of this estate was 
derived from his Indian activities. Cowan was unusual, although not alone, and the 
extent of the private trade network on the west coast during the first half of the 
eighteenth century was undoubtedly greater than existing work has assumed. 
Nevertheless, it remains the case that those who were able to be successful were few 
and far between, and were generally high-ranking Company servants. Just how these 
men came to form successful private trade portfolios through a range of activities in a 
challenging economic environment will be attended to, in detail, in the following 
chapter.  
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Conclusion 
 
 
Pamela Nightingale argued that the development of a significant and powerful agency 
house system by the 1780s played a ‘vital role in the expansion of English power in 
Western India’.165 Importantly for the context of this thesis, she also argued that the 
development of the agency houses at Bombay cannot be understood without taking 
into account the role of the country trade carried on by Company servants and free 
merchants in the three decades before the great expansion of trade in the 1770s and 
1780s.
166
 Building an estate through private trade was eminently possible and the 
networks formed by Company servants in the western Indian Ocean region during the 
pre-colonial period should not be overlooked. Despite this, it is imperative not to read 
back later developments into the first half of the eighteenth century. Cultivating 
successful and profitable private trade was extremely difficult and profoundly 
contingent, relying on the auspicious entanglement of numerous factors. The best laid 
plans of merchants remained liable to be thrown off course, even in times of generally 
buoyant trade, by the demanding nature of private commerce. Adriana Spencer told 
her correspondents in Britain in 1753 that her husband John, senior Company servant 
at Bombay, was ‘full of business as ever’ and that they hoped to soon return home. 
This was an often-repeated claim in Adriana’s correspondence at this time, but little 
progress had been made towards their return several years later due to John’s 
difficulties in trade. John Spencer was eventually posted to Bengal in 1764 and 
continued his quest to develop his fortune in Calcutta having been frustrated on the 
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western coast.
167
 Around the same time, writing home to his father in 1763, Bombay 
merchant William Farmer broadly summarised the possibilities of attaining a fortune 
in the East: he concluded that while ‘industry made it something more certain’, it was 
ultimately all down to ‘Chance’.168 
This chapter has broadly outlined the context within which British trade 
networks in the Arabian Sea operated during the late seventeenth and first half of the 
eighteenth centuries. It has also discussed the development of those networks over the 
same period. As the key nodal points of British commercial activity in the region, the 
factors affecting Company trade at the ports of Bombay and Surat have been looked 
at in detail. During this period, the region surrounding these centres of trade was a 
politically and commercially volatile arena. The East India Company was just one of 
many trading powers in the Arabian Seas, albeit one that came to have great political 
significance. Conflict with the Mughal Empire, the Marathas and other European 
companies and traders checked the growth of British trade at sea and on land. 
Between circa 1680 and at least 1720 in particular, despite the expanding commerce 
of the Company in other parts of Asia, British trade experienced slow and uneven 
development. Private traders carrying out business in the region also had to confront 
volatile economic conditions and an unstable political environment that dramatically 
affected commercial networks. They were able to conduct private trade, sometimes 
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successfully, but the competitive and contested nature of Arabian Seas trade 
diminished opportunities and shaped the nature of business. 
This is an important point to emphasise in light of the fact that the most recent 
work on private trade, by Søren Mentz, argues that ‘metropolitan connections’ should 
be afforded prime importance. He asserted that private networks’ close ties to the 
City of London underpinned their operation and success, by allowing English 
merchants to partly operate independently of the intra-Asian world.
169
 This is a 
hugely problematic conception to maintain for Bombay, Surat and Arabian Seas 
private trade. Although connections to Britain were important for private trade here in 
certain ways – as explored in Chapter Four – the local context critically affected the 
development of this commerce in the western Indian Ocean. Indeed, differing 
regional circumstances had a significant impact on Britain’s early modern 
commercial empire. As Alison Games highlighted with reference to other areas 
within this global network, ‘indigenous economies and disease environments imposed 
important constraints on English behaviour and acquisitiveness, whether in Aleppo, 
Surat, or Jamestown’.170 
Important economic and political changes had taken place on the west coast of 
India by the 1720s. As a result of developments in Bombay, the growing profitability 
of Company trade and a shifting political context, the private trade of British 
merchants grew steadily, despite the continuing challenges of conducting private 
business in the region. Bombay developed into an important regional trade centre 
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during this period of transition. The apparent decline of Indian merchants’ trade from 
Surat, by no means reflective of the broader commercial fortunes of Gujarat, also 
appears to have had a positive effect on British private trade, which thrived at the port 
in the 1730s. The growing jurisdictional authority of the Company also had an 
important impact. The grant of the Mughal farman, and the way in which the 
Company were able to bolster their position in the local economy through negotiating 
protection services to safeguard shipping against ‘piracy’, also furthered British trade 
interests in the waters of the Arabian Seas. 
By this period then, there were more plentiful opportunities for British 
merchants to engage in profitable private commerce, especially for those Company 
men who held a high position within the world if the factory. Senior Company 
servants undoubtedly dominated private trade on the west coast. Personal and 
professional connections were vital for success, and high rank provided access to a 
wide array of commercial opportunities, networks of native knowledge, early 
commercial intelligence and numerous lucrative privileges.
171
 Success was possible 
for those lower down the Company’s hierarchy, but was reliant on connections to 
influential senior merchants and Company figures. Merchant William Lowther 
emphasised that while private success was attainable, it was very much dependent on 
station. ‘A young person must be very frugall, industrious, and well befriended at 
Home to get an estate, in those remote parts’ he wrote from Surat in the 1730s.172 The 
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western Indian Ocean region should undoubtedly not be dismissed as a barren realm 
where British private trade is concerned: it is misplaced and misleading to maintain 
that there was no robust, extensive and successful private trade network operating in 
the region during the first half of the eighteenth century. Nevertheless, the local 
context must be afforded prime importance when explaining the development of 
private trade. 
Successful private trade in the western Indian Ocean depended on the ability 
of the Company and private traders to take advantage of a shifting political and 
economic context in the Arabian Seas. Not only did this place constraints on British 
commerce, it also provided the framework for its expansion. Even then, the extension 
of commercial opportunities remained limited to just a few Company servants. 
During the 1730s and 1740s moreover, seemingly a period in which private trade 
grew, a challenging commercial environment endured. Problems in the internal 
affairs of Surat continued to affect British commerce, and political turmoil in Persia 
had a lingering effect on all trade across the Arabian Seas, as explored in a later 
chapter. Asian merchant networks remained dominant until well into the eighteenth 
century too.  
For a more complete understanding of British private trade, it is imperative to 
establish precisely how merchants worked within and dealt with these regional 
dynamics, to form the complex and multifaceted commercial networks that were an 
important feature the Indian Ocean trading world. The following chapters look more 
closely at the ways in which British merchants based on India’s west coast and 
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throughout the western Indian Ocean developed their private trade in this unique 
segment of maritime Asia. 
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Chapter Two 
Private Trade Portfolios and the Cultivation of Fortunes 
 
 
The previous chapter discussed the numerous constraints on the successful operation 
of British trade in the eighteenth-century Arabian Seas. Seaborne commerce in the 
region was fraught with the multiple risks posed by commercial competition, 
widespread conflict and dull markets. These factors affected private trade just as they 
harmed the growth of the East India Company’s commerce in the western part of the 
Indian Ocean. Yet, despite the challenging nature of this branch of European 
commerce in the East Indies, it is also clear that some Honourable Company servants 
based in the region did manage to cultivate large profits through successful private 
trade. Whilst the Company’s officials in London complained about their ‘losing 
trade’ in the Western Presidency, some servants based there developed fortunes 
comparable to the wealthiest East India merchants of the day.
1
 They achieved this not 
just through operating within the world of the Arabian Seas and plying the trade 
routes westward to the Middle East, but through engaging in a plethora of inter-linked 
ventures. These encompassed voyages to distant Indian Ocean ports, involving 
lucrative partnerships with other Company servants based across Asia, and the 
provision of myriad trade-related services on a commission basis. Profits could 
certainly be derived through private trade if commercial acumen, reasonably 
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extensive capital reserves, reliable knowledge of key markets, and networks of 
trustworthy agents were strategically employed. Cultivating a fortune nevertheless 
remained profoundly contingent. 
This chapter focuses on the formation of successful private trade portfolios 
through discussing the diverse constellation of activities engaged in by Company 
servants. It draws on the evidence of notable individual cases of merchants based on 
the west coast of India. It considers both the importance of long-distance ventures and 
also the centrality of numerous other small-scale activities for the maintenance of 
their private trade. The chapter re-appraises the extent of private trade eastward from 
the west coast, highlights the importance of maintaining a diverse trade for success in 
private business, but also stresses that profits derived from private trade were rarely 
extensive until the second half of the eighteenth century. Ultimately, it seems that 
only a fortunate minority of Company servants based in this region were able to 
operate lucrative private trade concerns in the pre-colonial era. Despite low 
profitability, exploring the networks of these individuals is imperative for 
understanding just how British merchants were able to work within the volatile 
sphere of the Arabian Seas. 
Much existing work has assumed that the orientation of private trade from the 
west coast was almost entirely westward before the 1760s.
2
 Holden Furber suggested 
in the 1940s that a commercial revolution took place in Britain’s East Indian trade 
from the mid-eighteenth century onwards, with the trade to China expanding 
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dramatically from this period, both from Bengal and Bombay.
3
 Connected with this, 
Om Prakash has since argued that only following an ‘eastward turn’ by private traders 
around 1760 did the China trade become a notable destination for west coast-based 
private merchants and Company servants.
4
 Scholars have remained sceptical about 
the geographical extent of the British private trade network on the west coast of India 
before the final third of the eighteenth century. Yet, Company men undoubtedly 
embarked regularly on private trade voyages to destinations east of Cape Comorin 
before this period. Whilst such ventures were not always profitable, it is clear that the 
East India Company’s servants at Bombay and Surat were involved in trade to 
destinations right across the Indian Ocean world. This ‘long-distance’ element of 
British private trade has rarely been explored for the western Indian Ocean region. It 
is important to highlight the wide geographical extent of this private trade network 
during the early eighteenth century, despite the problems that affected trade in the 
region. 
Historians of private commerce have understandably devoted a great deal of 
attention to exploring long-distance port-to-port trade in the Indian Ocean. This has 
been seen as the main element of private trade that led to the development of 
fortunes. Yet, this was just one component of Company servants’ private trade. 
Activities such as lending money, acting as agents and commissioners, and 
undertaking various commercial and legal services on behalf of other merchants were 
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also important. Merchants developed significant income streams just by operating in 
the money market and working for other Company servants. If carried out effectively, 
such services added immeasurably to reputations, and provided opportunities to pay 
court to senior colleagues too. This was important for developing networks that could 
be used to provide future lucrative trading opportunities. As well as looking at long-
distance ventures, this chapter also emphasises that it is necessary to take into account 
the full range of concerns that went towards the formation of Company servants’ 
private trade. Indeed, combining multiple types of business activity should be seen as 
critical for the continuation of private trade. Modest, commission-based agency 
services provided income, aided capital flows and maintained commercial 
associations in between potentially lucrative but high-risk ventures overseas.  
The importance of maintaining a diverse portfolio of activities beyond 
voyaging can be linked to the high risks of doing business in the uncertain climate of 
the Indian Ocean. Even senior Company merchants found it difficult to derive 
extensive returns from their investments in voyages out of Bombay and Surat. Those 
merchants that were successful in their private trade – such as the Bombay governors 
– also relied as much on the various commercial services they engaged in, and the 
privileges they derived from senior Company employment, as trade itself. The 
discussion below makes use of a number of surviving account books compiled by 
Company men stationed on the west coast of India during the eighteenth century, in 
order to draw out particular details of the operation of their private trade.
5
 They each 
                                                     
5
 The documents used for this chapter come predominantly from the Chancery Masters exhibits in the 
National Archives, Kew. They include the following papers: C 103/158 ‘Boone v Nightingale’, C 
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reveal diverse portfolios, both geographically, and also in terms of range of business 
activities undertaken. 
There are some methodological problems associated with deriving the value 
and volume of private trade from account books of course. Historians have 
emphasised that very few documents can provide an indication of either the full scope 
of private trade, or the entire range of ventures carried out by merchants.
6
 
Unsurprisingly, private traders were often disinclined to record details of all their 
undertakings, and missing books are also common. Nevertheless, these shortcomings 
do not preclude the use of such materials to analyse private trade. The papers of 
Company merchants such as William Mildmay, William Gayer, Charles Boone, 
Robert Cowan, Robert Holford and Francis Pym are richly detailed and hugely 
valuable. It is unusual to have records of this type in a reasonable degree of 
completeness for private trade in the western Indian Ocean region. They provide an 
illuminating insight into, if not a complete picture of, the kinds of activities carried 
out by private traders in this area, the geographical and commodity scope of their 
private trade, and some indication of the areas where profit was derived.
7
 Whilst 
much of this thesis concentrates on using correspondence to describe and analyse 
                                                                                                                                                       
106/141 ‘Gayer v Gayer’, C 110/145 ‘Adams v Boone’ and C 104/248 ‘Waterson v Atkyns’, as well as 
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6
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(Copenhagen, 2005), p. 197. 
7
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private trade activities, account books also provide detailed information and, 
importantly, clearly show profits and losses. 
Organised into three parts, beginning with a note on diversification in 
eighteenth-century mercantile commerce, the chapter moves on to look at the country 
trade and in particular at the ventures undertaken by private traders to India’s eastern 
seaboard and China. It then considers other constituent parts of private trade; notably 
money lending and agency work for other merchants. This chapter also briefly 
discusses the place of Indian financing and commercial services for private trade. The 
conclusion stresses the broad scope of the private trade of west coast merchants 
during the pre-colonial era. It highlights the significant diversity of the activities 
engaged in by these men on their private accounts, undertaken chiefly to spread the 
risk of operating in a particularly unpredictable segment of Indian Ocean trade. 
 
I – Diversification and Profit in Private Trade 
 
 
Whilst existing scholarship has emphasised that very few Company servants returned 
home with a large private fortune, historians have remained fairly positive about the 
potential returns from private trade ventures. Many assumed in the eighteenth century 
that a single successful voyage could make a merchant hugely wealthy; a fact which 
continually encouraged Company servants to embark on private trade in the East. 
This potential to make a quick and extensive return on investments was an important 
factor that went some way to overcoming the immense risks Company men absorbed. 
Several later scholars also assumed this: K.N. Chaudhuri wrote that even if long 
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residence in the Indies created hazards to a man’s health and life, the risks were fully 
known and mitigated by the possibility of making fortunes in trade.
8
 P.J. Marshall 
similarly suggested that due to high mortality, merchants took on high-risk private 
trade ventures; they either ‘made a fortune quickly or lost everything’.9  
Recent approaches have, however, foregrounded a rather more nuanced view 
of the profits earned in private trade. Mentz, in his important study of Madras, 
maintained a less stark interpretation of potential returns, writing that ‘English 
participation in country trade produced reasonable dividends, which encouraged 
individuals to continue their investments. Patience as well as luck was essential in 
economic progress and individual prosperity.’ For Mentz, making a substantial 
fortune in private trade was most often achieved through gradual, diligent and patient 
trade that slowly built up numerous small profits into a larger whole.
10
 This was in 
many ways a necessary way of proceeding, rather than a specific choice. Company 
servants early in their career took on numerous small-scale trades and ventures before 
they gained the capital that allowed them to participate in potentially more lucrative 
concerns. George McGilvary has also recently suggested that young Company 
servants’ desire to get rich quick was tempered by the necessity of gradually building 
up a business portfolio, especially if no patronage was available to ‘propel a young 
man into one of the more lucrative positions’ in the Company’s service.11 
                                                     
8
 K.N. Chaudhuri, The Trading World of Asia and the English East India Company, 1660-1760 
(Cambridge, 1978), p. 212. 
9
 P.J. Marshall, East Indian Fortunes: The British in Bengal in the Eighteenth Century (Oxford, 1976), 
p. 50. 
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 Mentz, English Gentleman Merchant, pp. 161-162.  
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 George K. McGilvary, Guardian of the East India Company: The Life of Laurence Sulivan (London, 
2006), p. 10. 
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Connected to this, developing a wide-ranging portfolio was also an 
advantageous strategy when engaging in trades marked by uncertainty. As Mentz 
explains, ‘A sensible merchant placed his investment capital in different enterprises, 
hoping to minimize the risk of devastating losses; if one venture failed, others might 
be successful.’ 12  Through such means then, a fortune was not necessarily made 
quickly, but could be ‘accumulated over the years by dint of systematic work’.13 For 
Company servants on the west coast of India, following this latter path was also a 
common way of maintaining private trade. The archival record reveals few 
substantial fortunes that were created through a limited number of capital-intensive, 
high-risk voyages. Rather, private traders at Bombay, Surat and the subordinate 
factories built up diverse trading portfolios and engaged in multiple business ventures 
alongside the archetypal country trade voyage in order to add to their private coffers. 
Indeed, diversity was arguably the key to the successful mercantile trade 
across the eighteenth-century world. In many contexts, maritime trade was an 
inherently risk-laden activity and the hazards of sea-based commerce posed huge 
problems for merchants. Contemporary guides to trade certainly emphasised that a 
diverse trading portfolio meant effects could be distributed across numerous 
concerns, spreading risk. Wyndham Beawes’ declared in his Lex Mercatoria Rediviva 
that ‘Prudence will direct [the merchant] to disperse his Effects in many Hands, that if 
one or two miscarry, he may be less sensible of his Loss, and better able to support 
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 Mentz, English Gentleman Merchant, p. 162. 
13
 Mentz, ‘European Private Trade in the Indian Ocean, 1500-1800’, in Prakash, Trading World, p. 
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it’.14 As scholars of early modern mercantile trade have also recognised, engaging in 
multiple ventures, across different markets and working with a diverse set of 
commodities was an important strategy to guard against almost inevitable losses and 
low profits.
15
 Like their British counterparts operating in the western hemisphere, 
Company servants attempt to insulate themselves against crippling losses by letting 
out their money across a wide range of schemes. 
Maintaining a diverse portfolio of commercial interests necessitated working 
with a broad range of correspondents, colleagues, family members, and partners. 
Whether through ad hoc ventures or arranged through codified, contractual or semi-
formal associations, Company servants routinely worked together to realise their 
private trade goals. Success often depended on working within and making use of 
networks of reliable individuals. British merchants in Atlantic trade operated in 
partnerships, kin groups, and a variety of associations that were formed and re-
formed for particular voyages and ventures. Operating together meant ‘greater 
chances of success in what was an extremely uncertain environment for international 
business’.16 Merchants pursuing private trade in India similarly relied on partnerships 
and robust, on-going relationships with others, including Company servants, free 
merchants, ship’s captains, and Indian merchants. 
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II – The Country Trade from Western India 
 
The ‘country trade’ was a central element of British private commerce in the East 
Indies. Since the East India Company’s employees in Asia were free to engage in 
intra-Asian trade – as long as it did not infringe the Company’s monopoly – there 
were numerous opportunities for merchants to expand their private wealth. Their 
trade created complex and extensive networks across the Indian Ocean world.
17
 
Emily Erikson and Peter Bearman stressed how private traders built robust channels 
for transmitting information on prices, terms of trade and available commodities 
between multiple markets. They argued that these activities of free merchants and 
captains significantly enhanced region-to-region contact across maritime Asia.
18
 The 
East India Company’s servants stationed in each of the Asian factories were part of 
similarly extensive commercial networks. They freighted their own goods and those 
of other merchants on both Asian and European ships throughout the Indian Ocean; 
indeed, it was customary for servants to charter any excess Company shipping for 
their private trade and pay freight to their employers.
19
 Some senior Company 
servants engaged in shipbuilding too, and developed privately-built fleets over the 
course of the eighteenth century. British merchants engaged in a wide range of trades 
as part of a plural Indian Ocean world, but also forged new commercial circuits and 
built complex webs of exchange. 
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Existing work on the country trade has for the most part discussed the Madras 
and Calcutta private fleets in the period between circa 1680 and 1760. Sinnappah 
Arasaratnam detailed the high level of development of the British private trade fleet 
at Madras as early as the second half of the seventeenth century. The fleet was 
sizeable and plied the trade routes from the Coromandel Coast to Kedah, Perak, 
Johore and other notable ports in Southeast Asia.
20
 P.J. Marshall traced the 
development of the private British fleet operating out of Calcutta between the late 
seventeenth century and the mid-eighteenth century. He detailed an extensive private 
trade between Calcutta and port cities in Persia, the Red Sea and the Malabar Coast, 
that involved two or three Bengal ships every year through the 1720s and 1730s. The 
latter decade was the peak of this trade, with private shipping westward from Bengal 
declining dramatically afterwards in favour of the China trade.
21
 
By contrast, we know comparatively little about the extent of the private 
country trade from the western part of the Indian Ocean during this period. It was less 
extensive than the Madras and Calcutta networks, but was nevertheless a notable part 
of the private trade system. Trade to west Asia was an especially important element 
of this commerce; as explored in greater detail in Chapter Three. It is also evident that 
the connections of Bombay and Surat private trade stretched beyond the waters of the 
Arabian Sea and encompassed ties to a variety of Indian Ocean ports. The first part of 
this chapter looks at this trade eastward from the west coast of India. Existing work 
has mostly assumed that British private trade eastward from this region was virtually 
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non-existent until the last third of the eighteenth century.
22
 In Foundation for Empire, 
Ian Bruce Watson referred to lucrative voyages that took place between Surat and 
Canton during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. He also argued that 
there were good profits to be made from these voyages. Ventures eastward from the 
west coast could make their subscribers as much as one hundred per cent profit.
23
 
Beyond these passing references however, this part of west coast private trade has not 
been explored in any great detail.  
The following discussion examines the papers of notable Company servants 
based on the west coast to flesh out what little is known about this branch of private 
trade. Whilst these records do not necessarily provide accurate shipping numbers, 
they reveal that merchants engaged in regular private ventures from the west coast of 
India to destinations eastward including Madras, Calcutta, Canton, and trading 
centres in Southeast Asia. Despite the challenging and volatile commercial sphere of 
the Arabian Seas, some British merchants resident in this part of Asia, especially the 
Company’s high-ranking servants and governors at Bombay, had the leverage to 
engage in extensive private trade through large stakes in numerous vessels to these 
destinations. As well as participating in the long-standing and vibrant avenues of 
trade between India and west Asia, the Company’s servants at Bombay and her 
subordinate factories regularly sought profits further afield. 
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IIa – Trade to Bengal and the Coromandel Coast 
 
Firstly, merchants’ account books and other papers provide ample evidence of regular 
ventures to Madras and Bengal from the west coast of India. Predictably, there was 
regular contact between the three main centres of British trade on the subcontinent, 
mediated through private trade. By the eighteenth century, British vessels – both 
Company and private – dominated the key trade routes between these settlements. 
Subramanian argued that control over the carrying trade between Bengal and Surat 
grew particularly rapidly; as early as 1738 nine British ships compared to four Asian 
ones plied the route that year.
24
 
Senior Company servants’ involvement in this private trade ranged from 
small-scale conveyances to more elaborate partnerships. Amongst William 
Mildmay’s shipping concerns while chief of the Karwar factory, as well as sundry 
investments on voyages to Persia, China and Siam, he engaged in regular trade with 
Bengal and Madras. His Madras concerns seem to have mostly comprised 
provisioning; he provided numerous commodities on several ships during 1706 and 
1707, including betelnut, several hogsheads of wine, cases of pepper and a case of 
treasure.
25
 Whilst Mildmay only derived very small returns from these concerns, it is 
a good example of regular west- to east-coast trade by a Company servant. Private 
                                                     
24
 Lakshmi Subramanian, Indigenous Capital and Imperial Expansion: Bombay, Surat and the West 
Coast (Delhi, 1996), p. 43.  
25
 TNA, Chancery Masters Exhibits, C 104/248: ‘Waterson v Atkyns: Papers relating to William 
Mildmay’s mercantile activities in India and the administration of his estate after his death; including 
correspondence (mainly addressed to William Mildmay on board the Tavistock at Surat Bar), list of 
goods at Carwar factory delivered by William Mildmay to John Harvey; Bombay warehouse accounts; 
inventory of the goods of William Mildmay sold at auction; muster rolls of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd 
companies, Bombay Castle; and bills of lading concerning Madras (in 4 bundles marked A1-30, B1-
38, C1-22 and D1-99; B16 missing)’ [hereafter, ‘Waterson v Atkyns’]. See the bills of lading dated 15 
April 1706, 30
 
April 1706 and 20
 
July 1707.  
 115 
 
trade to Bengal could also produce reasonable profits for west coast merchants in the 
early years of the eighteenth century. Henry Price’s account book from 1711 details 
profits of 550 rupees on a venture in the Good Hope to Bengal, and 1150 rupees 
profit from selling Bengal cloth. These accounted for around three-quarters of his 
modest total profit from trade that year.
26
 
There were of course much more complex private trade partnerships in the 
eighteenth century that often entailed multiple subscribers in a single voyage, and 
usually involved members of the Bombay and Surat establishments. Supercargo 
Samuel Lock emphasised in an account of Surat trade in 1705 that although private 
stock could be employed to good advantage, it was important to find reliable partners. 
Good securities often had to be provided for a ship’s safe return, the value of which 
could be more easily met by several merchants joining together.
27
 Underwriting only 
a proportion of a ship’s total cargo, moreover, spread a merchant’s risk of incurring 
losses.
28
 Such an arrangement was common practice in early modern maritime trade 
globally.
29
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Joint ventures certainly formed between Company servants on the west coast 
and their colleagues in the east. Mentz draws attention to a venture in 1726 between 
leading merchants at Bombay and Madras, ‘indicating co-operation between 
Englishmen in different parts of India’. The vessel was the Amity, designed to sail 
between Bombay, Madras and Canton, employing John Scattergood as supercargo. 
This was a complex partnership, with some capital and dividends to be paid back 
after each leg of the venture. Stakeholders included former Bombay Council 
members William Aislabie (for 14,500 rupees), Bernard Whyche (23,300) and 
Douglas Burniston (2000), as well as current members, Robert Adams (5000), 
William Phipps (10,000) and John Hill (2000), and several other merchants including 
William Proby (10,000), ‘Captain Parott’ (2000), and Henry Cole (1000).30 The size 
of the investments laid out is striking, but is illustrative of the liquidity amongst the 
Company’s senior merchants at Bombay. Further examples suggest such large-scale 
partnerships were common, at least by the 1720s. 
The papers of Robert Cowan provide important evidence of Bombay-centred 
ventures. Cowan, one of the subscribers in the Amity, was an active participant in 
similarly large-stock country trading ventures across the Indian Ocean world. His 
papers provide a valuable insight into the range and scope of private trade undertaken 
by a high-ranking Company servant in the late 1720s and 1730s.
31
 Ventures outside 
the western Indian Ocean feature prominently amongst his portfolio of activities and 
it is clear that Cowan was broadly successful in business. Whilst heavily involved in 
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shipping to numerous destinations beyond the Arabian Seas from early in his career, 
such activity was much more prominent in his portfolio after 1728, following his 
appointment as Bombay governor. Cowan’s primary method was to lay out various 
sums for stakes in the cargo of voyages collectively financed by members of the 
Bombay Council. He regularly held shares in cargoes to Bengal; investments that 
could produce sizeable profits, as evidenced by his surviving account books. He 
received two dividends from senior Bombay merchant William Phipps in 1729, 
comprising 8943 rupees from a voyage on the William to Bengal, and 4087 rupees 
from the voyage of the Rangarel to Bengal and Persia. Cowan’s shares in the stock of 
his Bengal voyages at this time ranged from one sixteenth to one quarter.
32
 
Frequently, Cowan’s investment in these voyages relied on a close 
relationship with the Company’s broker at Surat, Lolldass Parak. Parak was a key 
player in the private trading partnership that developed between Cowan and Henry 
Lowther, the chief of the Surat factory. The broker provided indispensable capital for 
Cowan to invest in voyages to various destinations, and the correspondence between 
Cowan and Lowther reveals that they worked closely together on a number of 
ventures to Bengal. In 1729, they were engaged in shipping the Resolution eastward, 
a ship in which Cowan had a large stake and Lowther himself held a 
4
/18 share of the 
stock.
33
 They were both heavily invested in Captain Gray’s voyage to Bengal at this 
time too, that employed a vessel with total stock of 30,000 rupees.
34
 Cowan later 
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became more actively involved in ventures to Bengal using his own shipping as well 
as investing in the voyages of others.
35
 Cowan’s correspondence to acquaintances in 
Bengal also emphasised the importance of the region for his private trade. 
References to private ventures to Southeast Asia can also be found in 
Cowan’s correspondence from the 1720s and 1730s. As D.K. Bassett’s study of the 
country trade to the Thai and Malay states between 1680 and 1770 emphasised, the 
region formed an important destination for private trade from eastern India.
36
 
Evidently, west coast traders also engaged in Southeast Asian trade and Cowan 
suggested that on occasion, west coast shipping to Siam could be profitable. Writing 
to John Gould in London, Cowan informed his correspondent that ‘Mr Brandon is 
going Supra Cargo to Siam in a ship of 5500 Stock and has 2 P. Cent
 
Commission
 
which is a verry good introduction considering the dullness of trade and number of 
young gentlemen out of Employ in these parts’.37  One of John Hope’s letters to 
Cowan in 1725 also gave news of Captain D’Abbadie’s return from Siam to Surat, 
ending a voyage he believed would ‘prove successful’. He managed to obtain some 
privileges ‘as those of Madras enjoyed’, customs free, ‘the want of which ruined all 
former attempts to [trade with] that Part [of Asia]’.38 
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IIb – The China Trade 
 
Whilst Bengal and Madras were undoubtedly common destinations for west coast 
private trade during the first half of the eighteenth century, the China trade afforded 
perhaps the greatest potential to cultivate large profits for Company servants. The 
extant historiography suggests that out of all ports, Canton was the single most 
important destination for British private trade. The number of British country ships 
arriving there during the eighteenth century, as well as the level of profit, was 
probably higher than that of any other Indian Ocean port. According to Farrington, by 
mid-century it was estimated that one good voyage as commander of a Company ship 
to China, which brought with it a personal privilege trade allowance of around thirty-
eight tons on the homeward leg, could set up a man for life.
39
 Although Company 
merchants were officially forbidden to trade with Europe in certain articles, they were 
of course allowed to trade Indian produce to China, which could be similarly 
lucrative. Critically, private trade to China was also important for the Company: one 
method of realising a China investment was to pay the proceeds of goods sold into 
the Company’s treasury in Canton and receive bills on the Company to be drawn in 
India or Britain. The influx of private money provided an important source of capital 
for Company operations in Canton and bolstered the continuing operation of private 
trade there.
40
 
Contemporary accounts and the private papers of Bombay and Surat 
merchants trading during the early eighteenth century certainly reveal a significant 
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trade to China. These provide evidence of regular private trade undertaken by high-
ranking Company servants well before the 1760s when the trade was further opened 
up. Unsurprisingly, it was high-ranking Company servants that were important 
figures in conducting this trade.
41
 Merchants were aware of the range of goods from 
China that sold profitably on the west coast during the early eighteenth century. 
These included toothenaque, quicksilver, silk stockings, Chinaware, vermillion, Japan 
copper, sugar candy, and alum. If ready money was offered, moreover, goods good be 
acquired in Canton even more cheaply than if bought using goods and bullion 
together.
42
 At this time though, investing in a Canton-bound vessel remained an 
incredibly high-risk activity. For Company servants in India, the China run was the 
longest and potentially most dangerous of all, even if it was the most profitable. 
Many ‘private trade’ voyages to China from India did not use privately-owned 
vessels therefore, but made use of the spare tonnage of Company ships on their way 
to Canton to freight private goods. The success of these ventures also frequently 
relied on the presence of numerous subscribers in the cargo. As the China trade 
expanded, more capital-intensive voyages became increasingly common: larger 
vessels necessitated multiple merchants subscribing together. Even this approach 
could not guarantee large returns however, and early private voyages between Surat, 
Bombay and China do not appear to have been particularly profitable. 
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Karwar factory chief William Mildmay, as well as regularly shipping goods to 
Madras, participated frequently in the China trade during the first decade of the 
eighteenth century. Mildmay’s books provide some evidence of early China trading 
from the west coast region. He held stakes in several voyages to Canton between 
1706 and 1711. His investments on this run were extremely varied too, ranging from 
just a few hundred rupees to over ten thousand per voyage. Again, Mildmay’s trade 
relied upon a close network of associates who worked together to realise investments. 
He was concerned in a voyage organised by free merchant and former Company 
servant Bernard Whyche, his long-term partner and close friend, in November 1709. 
Mildmay invested two thousand rupees in the venture, in the Success, under the 
command of William Gayer. His accounts also show he was concerned in the stock of 
the Fleet frigate for as much as ten thousand rupees earlier that year.
43
 Mildmay’s 
network did not just take in other British merchants of course, and one of his China 
investments involved the hire of an Asian-owned ship. A letter from William 
Aislabie, the Company’s Surat chief who was also involved in the venture, suggested 
that an Indian ship (‘Ramacius’ ship’) should be hired to send to Canton. He granted 
Mildmay eight thousand rupees worth of the total stock of 62,000 rupees. Aislabie 
suggested that hiring in this way could be extremely economical, allowing the 
subscribers to focus on buying profitable cargo. He stressed his hopes for the safe 
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 Waterson v Atkyns, certificate signed by ‘B. Whyche’ at Surat, 10 November 1709; certificate 
signed by William Aislabie at Bombay Castle, 1 September 1709. This was perhaps a Company ship: 
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arrival of the ship and hoped to ‘make a Very good Voyage, because the [sailing] 
charges will be considerably less than what paid for the last shipps’.44 
Mildmay experienced mixed success from this and other similar ventures 
however. In general, he struggled to derive good returns from his China investments 
and accrued small profits or even none at all. One example, his investment in 
Alexander Hamilton’s ‘bad voyage’ to China and Siam, reveals that he barely made 
back his principal three years after the original investment.
45
 The letter from William 
Aislabie to Mildmay above, almost two years after another investment, states that he 
made just 10,935 rupees from the ten thousand invested in the Fleet frigate too, and 
2597 rupees from the two thousand invested in the Success to China. Aislabie derided 
these sums as a ‘small advance for so long Voyage’.46 
Contemporaneous to Mildmay, captain William Gayer’s papers also provide 
evidence of a vibrant but rather low-profit private trade to China from the west coast. 
Gayer relied heavily on the relationship with his uncle, chief of Surat Sir John Gayer, 
which saw the latter invest heavily in at least two China voyages in the Prosperous 
and Success ships during the early years of the eighteenth century. On both of these, 
although newly brought in to the Company’s orbit, experienced mariner William 
acted as captain. The first voyage appears to have taken place in 1705, with the 
owners of the stock being Sir John, Bernard Whyche and Stephen Colt at Surat, as 
well as Ralph Sheldon and John Russell, merchants at Bengal. Again, the vessel in 
question was actually an Asian-owned ship, at least in part. For the return part of the 
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voyage from Bengal, an agreement with ‘Cosa Murcorra’, one of the co-owners, 
allowed the freighters to apply to an Armenian merchant at Calcutta, ‘Coja Amvid’, 
the vakeel of ‘Murcorra’, for any marine expenses for the journey back to Surat. They 
declared, ‘we had rather have our money invested in goods than laid out on the 
ship’.47 This example once more draws attention to the place of Asian merchants in 
private trade. 
William Gayer was later bound for China from Bombay in April 1709 in 
another vessel ‘with good Stock’. 48  In this voyage he was financially involved 
himself, like many other country captains. Commenting two years later however, he 
revealed the returns were not quite to his liking. After ‘a long troublesome Voiage to 
China I made but 30 P Cent’ he wrote to merchant John Deane.49 Despite selling a 
large amount of China goods through Bernard Whyche at Surat,
50
 and although such 
a profit seems reasonable, Gayer clearly expected more from a venture requiring such 
a large investment of time and money. The fact that Gayer was involved in two other 
loss-making voyages around the same time compounded his disappointment with the 
voyage of the Success.
51
 
In spite of Gayer’s role as mariner rather than Company servant, both the 
above examples highlight that the China trade from the western Indian coast was 
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most often the preserve of those holding a high rank in the Company, particularly 
Bombay and Surat Council members. In the decade following Mildmay and Gayer’s 
time in the East Indies, the activities of Charles Boone, governor of Bombay from 
1715, provide further evidence of this group’s participation in the China trade. 
Information on a sizeable proportion of Boone’s involvement in voyages across the 
Indian Ocean world is revealed through his accounts held with Francis Chamberlain 
and Robert Nightingale in London, between 1716 and 1721. Nightingale and 
Chamberlain held large stakes in at least seventeen voyages using Boone as their 
India-based agent to invest money sent from London. These included several voyages 
to China, as detailed in the table below, and they demonstrate the geographical range 
and tremendous size of the ventures Boone was involved with. Although 
comprehensive information is not available for all voyages, the account conveys 
some indication of the profits of these country trade ventures from the west coast. As 
well as suggesting the importance of capital from Britain, this micro-network of three 
men highlights the intensely unstable nature of country trade profits.
52
 
 
Table Three – Francis Chamberlain and Robert Nightingale’s Completed 
Ventures with Charles Boone, 1716-1721 
 
 
Ship Name Date 
Investment 
(rupees) 
Dividend 
(rupees) 
Profit 
(rupees) 
Profit 
(as %) 
Shawallum July 1716 6,000 6,768 768 12.8 
Stanhope              Co. ship July 1716 8,320 11,318 2,998 37.5 
William July 1716 8,888 9,515 627 7.1 
Nightingale July 1716 7,111 6,976 -135 -1.9 
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 TNA, Chancery Masters Exhibits, C 103/158: ‘Boone v Nightingale: Accounts (one in Portuguese), 
invoices, bonds: India’. Two loose folios, two accounts of Francis Chamberlain’s with Charles Boone. 
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William (‘to China’) July 1717 20,600 22,263 1,663 8.1 
Dolben & Oxford July 1717 2800 - - - 
Shawallum [2] July 1717 3715 5,582 1,867 50.3 
Catherine (‘to Pegu’) July 1717 4,000 3,263 -737 -18.4 
George Aug 1717 7,500 7,635 135 1.8 
Thomas (‘at 
respondentia’) 
Sep 1717 5,000 5,600 600 30.0 
Shawallum [3] July 1718 5,700 - - - 
Thomas (‘to Mangalore’) July 1718 3,000 - - - 
William (‘2nd voyage to 
China’) 
July 1718 10,000 10,442 442 4.4 
Charles July 1718 16,000 15,499 -501 -3.1 
George ( ‘to Juddah’) Sept 1718 20,000 17,605 -2,395 -12.0 
Boone (‘to China’) Apr 1719 30,000 33,189 3,189 10.6 
Boone (‘to Persia, Madras 
and Bengal’) 
Apr 1721 26,974 - - - 
 
Totals (realised 
investments) 
 
 
147,134 155,655 8521 
11.6 % 
Average 
Return 
 
Source: TNA, C 103/158: ‘Boone v Nightingale: Accounts (one in Portuguese), invoices, bonds: 
India’. Two loose folios, two accounts of Francis Chamberlayne’s with Charles Boone. 
     
The table lists the voyages in which Chamberlain and Nightingale invested. The date 
of the investment is given, along with the initial amount laid out and the dividend 
received by Boone. The profit on each voyage has been computed from these 
dividends, as a rupee value but also in terms of the percentage of the original 
investment. Some of the most profitable voyages by this last measure were the ones 
where the original outlay was relatively small. But though profits differed wildly, 
there were few crippling losses, presumably helped by the fact that as Bombay 
governor, Boone was in a prime position to make informed judgements and 
manoeuvre strategically using his status. Disappointingly, there is little indication of 
Boone’s own direct investment in these voyages but it is reasonable to suggest that at 
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least two of the ventures used his own ships: the Boone frigate sailed to China 
numerous times during this period. Boone’s success undoubtedly relied on the fact he 
was the highest ranked Company servant in the region, like Cowan who followed 
him, and also because he was able to maintain close contacts with senior and 
influential merchants in London. 
Robert Cowan took over the Bombay governorship from Boone. An ardently 
ambitious man, he also invested heavily in the China trade. Cowan appears in the list 
of subscribers in the private stock of a 1722 private voyage from Bombay in the 
Company’s vessel King George, under the command of John Houghton.53 The ship 
was about five hundred tons, and hired for the sum of twenty thousand rupees. The 
total stock was designed to be one hundred and twenty thousand rupees, and was to 
be managed by William Phipps, governor of Bombay and Boone’s replacement. This 
use of Company shipping for private ventures by senior factors was extremely 
common in this period. Many other merchants were also concerned in the voyage, 
and their investments ranged from the twenty thousand rupees laid out by John 
Scattergood to smaller sums such as the five thousand invested by Cowan. Robert 
Adams, another prominent Malabar Coast Company servant, was also involved. 
Again though, it was clear that the voyage outcome was not as successful as the 
subscribers expected. Phipps informed Scattergood that ‘Thro’ the badness of the 
market at Surat the King George’s voyage will not come out so well as expected, tho’ 
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 Farrington, Catalogue, p. 363. 
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[it] may be upwards of 20 per cent.’54 Although seemingly a reasonable return, it was 
not enough to satisfy the ambitions of these men considering the length of time and 
expense involved, mirroring William Gayer’s earlier complaints. Cowan was 
involved in another China voyage the following year though, concerned in one of the 
Boone frigate’s later passages to China. William Wake, yet another merchant who 
would go on to be a prominent member of the Bombay Council and later governor of 
the town in the 1740s, was also involved here.
55
 
Considerable ventures comprising investments solely from Company servants 
on the west coast of India emerged more frequently in the late 1720s and 1730s. One 
voyage in which Cowan held a large share, the Balls frigate’s second voyage to 
China, yielded large dividends to the owners of the stock that amounted to 167,215 
rupees. The breakdown of the dividend was as follows: 
 
Table Four – Bombay Investors in the Balls Frigate to China, 1729 
Name Stake 
Dividend (rupees, 
quarters and reas) 
 
John Courtney 
 
2/16 20,901/3/75 
 
Henry Lowther 
 
2/16 20,901/3/75 
 
James Hope 
 
2/16 20,901/3/75 
                                                     
54
 Sir Richard Carnac Temple, Lavinia M. Anstey and Bernard P. Scattergood, The Scattergoods and 
the East India Company: Being a Selection from the Private Letters and Business Correspondence of 
John Scattergood, East India Merchant 1681-1723 (Harpenden, Bombay, 1935), pp. 256-273.  
55
 Cowan Papers, Reel 11606, D 654/B1/1A:  Fragment of Outward Letter Book, April – May 1723, 
Robert Cowan to William Dawsonne, 15
 
April 1723. 
 128 
 
 
Robert Cowan 
 
2/16 20,901/3/75 
 
George Taylor 
 
1/16 10,450/3/86 
 
William Phipps 
 
7/16 73,156/3/09 
  
Source: Cowan Papers, Reel 11631, D 654/B1/8B, Journal of Accounts Letter B, p. 77, 24
 
June 1729. 
 
All the subscribers were prominent members of the Bombay and Surat 
establishments. The amount of Cowan’s original investment was around 15,000 
rupees, again representing a reasonable if not spectacular return of just over thirty per 
cent.
56
 After this venture, Cowan later invested as much as 19,500 rupees in a third 
voyage to China in the same vessel, and again in company with Phipps who invested 
15,600 rupees.
57
 In addition, Cowan’s letter to Henry Cairns reveals that his half-
brother William had gone to China as a supercargo again in the Balls frigate; a three 
hundred ton ship with a total stock of £12,500. Robert Cowan’s stake was 5/16. 
Commenting on the potential profitability of the China voyage, Cowan wrote that his 
brother ‘carrys a pretty considerable private adventure on his own Account, if he 
meets with Ordinary Success a few Voyages will make him easy, but he can make but 
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 Cowan Papers, Reel 11631, D 654/B1/8B, Journal of Accounts Letter B, pp. 1, 23, 27, December 
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June 1729. 
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one a year’.58 He resolved to send his brother to China a second time, in his own 
vessel the Cowan frigate, in 1734.
59
 
As Cowan’s career developed then, so too did his private trading activities. 
His appointment as governor of Bombay in 1728 was critical to his earning potential. 
It is clear from his papers that he was actively and regularly engaged in a wide range 
of ventures involving large sums on numerous vessels from this point until the end of 
his Company career. He wrote to one correspondent that, ‘You will hear that I am 
ingaged in trade much deeper than any of my predecessors ever were so that I can 
imploy my capital more advantageously than letting my money at Interest, until it is 
larger than at present’.60  
In all, information on some twenty-one voyages to Bengal, Madras and 
further afield to China, can be derived from Cowan’s accounts between 1729 and 
1734. These formed a significant proportion of his overall investments: he was also 
involved in twenty-four voyages westward to Mocha and Persia, and fifteen voyages 
to sundry other destinations, including the Malabar Coast ports (see Table Five 
below). Critically, the returns from Cowan’s investments to the east were the most 
lucrative of all his interests in voyages. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 
Three below. The average gains from these voyages were reasonably high, and he 
suffered only a few minor losses. Although his total gains from ventures to Persia and 
the Red Sea produced similar total profits, on a per-voyage basis the eastern 
destinations stand out prominently. 
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Table Five – Robert Cowan’s Ventures (by Destination), 1729-1734. 
 
 
Source: Cowan Papers, Reel 11631, D 654-B1/8B-8G, Foul Journals Letters B – G, December 
1727 – July 1734. 
 
The China trade was therefore particularly important for Cowan, and indeed 
numerous other Company servants working in the same era. Canton formed an 
important destination for private trade, even if it was not always strikingly profitable, 
especially relative to the risks and time commitment involved. 
Despite this successful trade and the fact that Cowan ultimately gained a large 
fortune, much of his profits were derived from what could be described as ‘non-
commercial’ activities, particularly the privileges that came with the governorship of 
Bombay. These included the duty derived from the mint, and a number of additional 
customs duties. The Company had initially allowed Charles Boone to take a duty of 
two per cent on goods imported privately into Bombay in 1717; a scheme that drew 
some opposition from merchants at Bengal. They were reluctant to pay more on top 
of the duties recently levied to offset the cost of developing Bombay’s defences and 
naval force (the ‘grabbage’ duty) and cautioned against ‘overburdening the Trade’ to 
 
Destination 
 
 
1729 
 
 
1730 
 
 
1731 
 
 
1732 
 
 
1733 
 
 
1734 
 
 
The Red Sea and Persia 
 
2 7 5 2 4 4 
 
China, Bengal and Madras 
 
4 3 3 5 5 1 
 
All Other Destinations [the Malabar 
Coast, South East Asia, etc.] 
 
3 5 0 5 0 2 
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the west coast.
61
 The Madras traders quickly accepted the new charge however. This 
privilege was also continued with Boone’s successors, and the chief of the factory at 
Surat was eventually entitled to a similar gratuity.
62
 Governor William Phipps, 
Boone’s immediate predecessor, also instituted the practice of taking a two per cent 
commission on silver coined at the Bombay mint. The Company resolved to reduce 
the duty to one per cent in 1731; but it still would have proved a lucrative privilege.
63
 
The duty to the chief at Surat continued until it provoked further opposition from 
Bengal in 1732, apparently due to the ‘decrease of trade there & its encrease at 
Bombay’.64 On his appointment as governor of Bombay then, Cowan described such 
‘honest perquisits annex’d to [the governorship]’ as ‘sufficient to gratifie the height 
of my ambition’.65 These duties undoubtedly provided a large income stream for 
senior merchants. The breakdown of Cowan’s profit between 1729 and 1734 detailed 
in the chart below demonstrates this clearly. 
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Chart Two – Robert Cowan’s Perquisite Profits Relative to Other Activities, 
1729-1734 
 
Source: Collated from Cowan Papers, Reel 11631, D 654-B1/8B-8G, Foul Journals Letters B – G, 
December 1727 – July 1734. 
 
 
Ultimately then, Bengal, Madras and China were significant, albeit not always 
profitable, destinations for Company servants’ private trade on the west coast of 
India. Trade eastward was already common during the early part of the eighteenth 
century and these initial ventures from Surat and Bombay highlighted above 
undoubtedly developed into a more extensive sector throughout the first half of the 
eighteenth century. Canton remained a particularly popular destination for the private 
trade ventures of the Bombay Council members. Extremely high value voyages 
undoubtedly took place involving the members of this collective as the century 
progressed. Nevertheless, profits could also be low, especially taking into account the 
4.56% 
33.48% 
14.29% 
5.23% 
1.45% 
Mocha and Persia Voyages
Consulage and Other
Privileges
Interest and Proceeds from
Lending
Madras, Bengal and China
Voyages
Voyages to Other Destinations
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high-risk, capital-intensive and lengthy journey eastward. The cases discussed here 
also undoubtedly demonstrate the significance of reliable and robust partnerships. 
Partners, agents and other associates were needed for the hire of vessels, and for 
communal investment in order to spread risk. However, although collective 
ownership of stock and the hiring of vessels in common remained ubiquitous in 
private trade, Company servants also built their own ships and developed private 
fleets. This element of private trade is explored in the following section. 
 
IIc – The Country Trade and Private British Shipping 
 
 
Company servants operated their own ships to avoid hiring costs, and also earned 
from their vessels by letting them out to other merchants. Existing work on Bengal 
and Madras has already delineated the extent of the British private fleet that operated 
out of Calcutta in the eighteenth century.
66
 Company servants stationed on the west 
coast of India were also directly engaged in constructing and commissioning their 
own vessels. Although potentially an extremely profitable way of engaging in private 
trade, this also posed risks. ‘Country ships’ could be extremely expensive to run and 
operate. India-built vessels were famously regarded as some of the highest quality in 
the world, but quality materials, skilled labour and provisioning had to be paid for. 
67
 
Hence, it was generally the most experienced merchants who built and ran their own 
shipping concerns. 
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One such figure was Robert Adams, the Company’s chief at Tellicherry in the 
1720s, formerly a servant at Calicut, and a long-term resident of India. As well as 
holding numerous large stakes in several ventures, Adams built up a large shipping 
interest of his own.
68
 A letter from Charles Boone in March 1724 reveals that Adams 
held a sixteenth stake in one ship belonging to Captain Gilbert and was one investor 
among thirty two in another ship, the Wyndham; a ‘fine ship’ commanded by Captain 
Lyell.
69
 As early as 1707 however, it appears that Adams was involved in 
constructing and managing his own vessels. Adams’s accounts with William Gayer to 
buy masts, timber and various other ship provisions attest to this.
70
 Two of his vessels 
were recorded as having called at Mocha from Calicut in 1721.
71
 The Company’s 
correspondence and factory records also reveal that Adams’s ships operating along 
the Malabar Coast were attacked by both the Dutch and Angre’s fleet in the 1720s.72 
Merchants in Surat, like Benjamin Francia (who was part owner of the Nassau 
and was engaged in building a ship of four hundred tons at the time of his death in the 
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1730s) and Robert Cowan, also ran their own shipping concerns in conjunction with 
other merchants.
73
 Holden Furber claims that Cowan was owner of at least one 
country ship as well as a freighter of others as early as 1723.
74
 By the 1730s, Cowan 
was undoubtedly involved in shipbuilding, predictably in partnership with Henry 
Lowther. The appropriately named Cowan frigate was completed around 1734. The 
merchants were pleased with the quality of the finished vessel, but disappointed by its 
costs: Cowan suggested in one letter that his ship, ‘sails primely well, but cost 
upwards of a Lack of rupees’.75 
Owning vessels, whilst decreasing hiring costs, evidently did not guard 
against other common risks.
76
 Benjamin Francia’s accounts revealed several losses on 
ventures, including a heavy loss on the Nassau’s second voyage. Many other 
prominent merchants were also concerned in it, including Lowther and Cowan.
77
 
Ultimately, there is very little evidence of a widespread and extensive private fleet 
under the control of Company servants that developed in the region over the 
eighteenth century in the same way as in Bengal. Vessels were often jointly owned, 
but co-ordinating the building of private ships seems to have been reserved for 
particularly prominent and experienced Company servants. 
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IId – The Country Trade and the Importance of Indian Financing 
 
Forming partnerships and investing collectively with other Company servants were 
clear necessities in private trade. Another vital element was of course the role of 
Asian merchants. Holden Furber famously referred to the period between 1600 and 
1750 as an ‘age of partnership’ where relationships in trade between European and 
Asian merchants were marked by cooperation.
78
 Ultimately, all European merchants 
were reliant on the ‘cooperation and goodwill of indigenous merchants’, to use 
Kenneth McPherson’s phrase.79 David Washbrook has recently asserted that across 
India, Europeans were, in general, dependent on their ability to connect to internal 
commercial networks.
80
 This also meant networking with local mercantile groups. 
Historians working on the private trade of East India Company servants in 
eighteenth-century India have also emphasised the importance of Asian merchants. 
P.J. Marshall has, for instance, underlined the centrality of Indian merchants for 
private traders, and the significant place of banias in particular.
81
 Just as the 
Company’s trade took place in partnership with Indian commercial elites,82 private 
trade also depended to a great extent on Asian merchants. Over the course of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, private partnerships developed and solidified, 
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and a complex pattern of relations developed through which British and Indian 
traders rendered one another services.
83
 Company employees were able to use the 
contacts arising from their official duties to enter into lucrative arrangements with 
Indian merchants and ship-owners.
84
 At the same time, the effective commercial 
networks and navigation skills of Europeans often meant that there were requests 
from Indian merchants for freighting goods, chartering whole ships and for loaning 
equipment.
85
 The ships of private traders were built through cooperation with Indians, 
sailed by Indian crews with European captains and partly financed by loans from 
Indian merchants.
86
 In everyday business too, European merchants relied on the 
services of sarafs (Anglicized as ‘shroffs’) to weigh and value cash, and to exchange 
money.
87
 Armenian merchants also held a central place within British private trade 
networks. 
Networking with Asian merchants was necessary for participation in the 
Indian Ocean trading world to any significant degree: ‘The Europeans, being alien to 
Asian commercial culture and practices, could conduct trade only through local 
intermediation. A broker thus became the most sought-after person, and assumed in 
due course of time great respectability in commercial dealings.’88 As well as simply 
providing commercial services, connections with Indian merchants were vital in 
terms of knowledge of local markets. In all long-distance trade, another important 
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way to minimise risk was to make use of the direct experience of other merchants. 
For private trade, this frequently meant networking with Asian traders.
89 
In India, 
brokerage was the preserve of Hindu commercial castes, particularly the banias. In 
the context of European trade in the Indian Ocean, a banian was an Indian agent or 
commissioner who performed a number of commercial functions for both the East 
India Company and its servants. The term is somewhat nebulous in European sources, 
and it has been extended to cover practically any merchant group who performed the 
function of intermediaries.
90
 Nevertheless, tracing the term provides a useful way of 
accessing the role of Indian merchants in European trade.
 
Contemporary observers emphasised the importance of this group. John 
Ovington wrote in 1689 that ‘For the buying and more advantageous disposing of the 
Company’s Goods, there are Brokers appointed, who are of the Banian Cast, skilled 
in the Rates and Value of all the Commodities in India.’91 With regard to private 
trade moreover, Thevenot simply wrote that ‘everyone hath his Banian in the 
Indies’.92 There were shared ‘rules of trade’ and mercantile reputations remained 
important for all parties. As Søren Mentz emphasised, Indian merchants did not just 
lend to the British due to their growing commercial dominance, but only to those 
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merchants with a good reputation.
93
 Whilst there was often little alternative than to go 
along with British demands,
94
 the Indian merchants of Madras represented a well-
established, independent and solvent trading group.
95
 
Such relationships and practices were mirrored, unsurprisingly, by private 
trade operating in the western Indian Ocean. Private trade, especially on the west 
coast of India, remained fundamentally wedded to the services and commercial 
acumen of Gujaratis and Armenians in particular. British merchants on the west coast 
frequently depended on Gujarati merchants for the supply of money and brokerage.
96
 
To some extent this was a symbiotic relationship. Surat’s traders in turn depended on 
the composition and volume of traffic to Mocha; in which the British played an 
important role in the eighteenth century.
97
 It is well known that Armenian merchants 
greatly assisted British commerce in India and Persia during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries too, with Armenian capital concentrated at important centres of 
British trade, including Surat and Bombay.
98
  
The most successful British private traders referred to in this chapter 
fundamentally relied on strategic alliances with Indian merchants and brokers. 
Mildmay, Gayer, Boone, Francia, Cowan and Lowther each worked regularly with 
Asian merchants – whether Gujarati or Armenian – directly in trade or in auxiliary 
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commercial services. Throughout the period under review, private trade rarely 
operated independently of the sophisticated financial services provided by Gujarati 
merchants at Surat and, later, Bombay. It is hard to ignore the role of Gujaratis in 
particular, especially at a commercial hub like Surat, for maintaining British private 
trade. Nightingale argued that ‘Without the facilities which enabled money to be 
exchanged and transferred to different parts of the country, bills to be cashed and 
credit given’, English enterprise would have been shackled. 99  Indeed, Gujarati 
merchants were important financiers for all trade. Furber estimated that the country 
trade to and from western India financed by Gujaratis alone amounted to eighty 
million rupees per year as early as the seventeenth century.
100
 
Holding a good reputation nevertheless remained crucial for British merchants 
to successfully do business in India. Sir John Gayer wrote in 1710 that because of 
Samuel Annesley’s poor conduct at Surat, ‘he’s so well known here that neither 
European Moore or Gentue will hold any correspondence with him’. 101  If well 
established though, partnerships with Asian traders often determined the success of 
private trade, particularly for factory chiefs and high-ranking merchants. On 
Lowther’s appointment as chief of the Surat factory, Robert Cowan wrote to him in 
order to advise that his first task should be to ‘gitt acquainted with the principal 
traders amongst the Banians & other casts of people’ to begin to develop his private 
trade.
102
 Lowther forged close partnerships with Surat’s leading traders, and 
especially with Loldas Vithaldas Parak and his family. Parak was the Company’s 
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broker at Surat and also maintained a close financial relationship with Cowan and 
Lowther, as well as with other British merchants.
103
 Parak was arguably critical to the 
success of the two men and their finances were intimately connected. Lowther even 
used Company money to ‘bail out’ the broker to protect his own private interests.104 
The examples outlined above reveal, in numerous ways, the regular place of Asian 
merchants in the commercial and financial service of Company servants’ private 
trade. These relationships are further uncovered through exploring the range of 
activities Company men undertook on their private accounts outside of country trade 
ventures. 
 
III – Private Trade and Company Servants as Agents 
 
 
A merchant’s matrix of associations and correspondents played a vital part in any 
successful private trading venture. Company men also developed more formal 
arrangements with their colleagues whereby they acted as their agents or factors, 
frequently on a commission basis. All eighteenth-century traders needed agents of 
course; to work in different markets, to sell and procure goods and to carry out a 
variety of commercial services, and they were crucial for the general management of 
complex business portfolios. Whether Asian or European, and whether in the Indian 
or Atlantic oceans, maritime merchants used agents to procure insurance and to pay 
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premiums and customs duties, recover debts, handle bills of exchange and lend 
money, amongst a plethora of other services.
105
 
Most Company servants acted as agents to varying degrees, as well as 
principals. Private trade was not just about voyaging therefore, but also encompassed 
a range of auxiliary, commission-based activities. This is especially important to 
consider when exploring this branch of British commerce operating within and from 
the Arabian Seas, a trading arena marked by multiple barriers to successful trade and 
small profits from country voyages. During the first half of the eighteenth century, 
the difficulties inherent in the country trade often meant Company servants explored 
other avenues to add to their private accounts that frequently involved acting on 
behalf of others. The following sections consider the importance and significance of 
this part of private trade. 
One of the key ways in which Company servants initiated their private trade 
was through offering commercial services to other, often more senior, merchants. 
Again, this mirrors other sectors of the early modern economy. David Hancock has 
emphasised that in the Atlantic world, ‘commission merchandising’ served as an easy 
point of entry into trade, as well as providing a continual stream of business 
throughout mercantile careers. It introduced merchants to a wide range of associates 
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and individuals that could be drawn upon for later commercial assistance.
106
 Perhaps 
the most difficult element of this part of trade, however, was choosing the right 
associates to do business with. Contemporary guides to trade emphasised how 
vigilant a merchant must be when choosing a factor or agent, since they bore little 
risk.
107
 They had to be trustworthy and upstanding characters, as well as competent in 
business, to protect the interests of principals. Wyndham Beawes cautioned that:  
‘[A] Trader should not be drawn in to employ a Factor, with whose Character 
he is unacquainted, from any Motive whatsoever, even from that most 
prevailing one, of serving for a less Commission that what others commonly 
do … His first Care, therefore, should be the Choice of such a Correspondent 
as he can depend on, whose Integrity will naturally lead him assiduously to 
sollicit and promote the Interest of his Principal, unbiassed by any sinister 
View of his own.’108  
Yet, all traders had a vested interest in serving each other’s affairs. Experienced 
merchants needed agents in order to engage in multiple business ventures, and those 
new to trade relied on agency posts to further their careers. Problems of trust could 
also partly be overcome through working with family members or individuals who 
came highly recommended by other traders. 
As a good example of this in the East Indian context, William Gayer’s 
developing private trade critically relied on his association with his uncle Sir John 
Gayer. Right from entering the Company’s service, William worked diligently on his 
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uncle’s affairs. His activities in this regard were multifarious, beginning with letting 
out money on Sir John’s behalf at respondentia.109 Rates on these loans could be 
incredibly high depending on the risks involved; the rate for the sums let out on the 
London and Howland vessels in February 1709 was forty-five per cent.
110
 Gayer also 
corresponded with his uncle’s contacts in Bengal, such as John Deane, and 
maintained regular communication concerning their mutual affairs.
111
 
Agency relationships were obviously reciprocal. Whilst Sir John as a senior 
merchant with a wide range of private interests found a reliable individual to look 
after important business, he provided a vital networking opportunity for his young 
nephew. Acting as agent allowed William to demonstrate not only his commercial 
acumen, but also his loyalty, and his desire to maintain a robust working relationship 
with a senior Company official. For all of the Company’s servants, working on 
commission was a fundamental part of private trade. Merchants throughout the 
Company’s hierarchy engaged in services for others on a commission basis. Even 
high-ranking servants such as William Mildmay and Robert Cowan acted as agents at 
various points; although financially, such activities were unlikely to be extremely 
                                                     
109
 Respondentia loans were incredibly common in eighteenth-century East Indian trade. They were 
loans on goods laden on board a ship, where the borrower was liable to pay back the principal, with 
interest, providing the cargo arrived safely at its destination. The lender lost everything should the 
goods be lost. Sir James Allan Park, A system of the law of marine insurances: with three chapters on 
bottomry, on insurances on lives and on insurances against fire (London, 1787), p. 469.  
110
 Gayer v Gayer, William Gayer to Sir John Gayer, 21
 
February 1709. Farrington’s list of EIC ships 
details a voyage of the Howland (under Captain George Cooke) to Madras and Bengal in the 1706/07 
season, that called additionally at Bandar ‘Abbas in April 1708. The London was possibly a private 
ship. The only relevant voyage of the Company ship London was one in the following year, 1710/11, 
to Persia and Bombay. See Farrington, Catalogue, p. 332. 
111
 Gayer v Gayer, William Gayer to John Deane, 29
 
March 1709.  
 145 
 
lucrative. Contacts to influential Company servants and private traders cultivated 
through acting as an agent were invaluable, even for experienced merchants.
112
 
In a later period, Francis Pym’s private trade also illustrates the opportunities 
that agency work could provide. Pym was resident at Surat and Bombay during the 
1740s and 50s, and conducted his own successful ventures alongside acting as an 
agent for an array of other merchants.  In the 1750s, he worked regularly on behalf of 
a ship’s captain, James Fraser, settling the accounts for goods which Fraser brought 
ashore and sold, and engaging in disposing of the commodities to make money 
through commission.
113
 His other principals were high-ranking individuals such as 
Brabazon Ellis, Thomas Hodges, Charles Crommelin and Laurence Sulivan, all 
senior members of the Bombay Council during Pym’s career. It was Sulivan, senior 
merchant in Bombay, who appeared in Pym’s books as a particularly significant 
individual however. The young merchant received numerous sums from a number of 
European and Asian merchants for Sulivan’s account, some of which were extremely 
large: up to 10,000 rupees each time. Pym bought and sold goods on Sulivan’s behalf 
too, and regularly loaned out his money.
114
 Not only do Pym’s books suggest the 
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variety of services undertaken, but also draw attention to the broad range and 
diversity of activity conducted by a senior Bombay merchant at this time.
115
 
Pamela Nightingale, who has considered Pym’s accounts in detail, suggests 
that up to 1750, having spent the first years of his Company career at Surat, Pym’s 
trade had been modest, and generally for his own account. After moving into a 
Company position in the Surat factory however, the connections he formed with other 
merchants changed the character of his private trade. His accounts became much 
more complex after he entered into a more formal partnership with merchant Robert 
Hunt in particular. They jointly invested in a number of ventures from this time.
116
 
Nightingale states that from relatively small beginnings, through using his senior 
contacts alongside this new partnership, Pym’s business expanded rapidly. In 1750 
the sums passing through his hands reached 50,000 rupees and he began to borrow 
substantial amounts from Indian merchants. Remarkably, Pym had gone out in the 
service of the Company around 1741 at the age of fifteen, and had built up a decent 
private trade by his early twenties. Mortality amongst the British population in 
Bombay remained high during the 1750s however and Pym died relatively young, in 
either 1754 or 1755.
117
 
In addition to letting out money on ventures and freighting goods on vessels, a 
host of other commercial activities formed an important part of the business of private 
traders. Investing in country trade voyages was just one element of the multifarious 
private endeavours Company servants engaged in. The later example of Francis Pym 
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was mirrored in the activities of earlier Company servants on the west coast, who 
were able to carve out private trade opportunities by working on behalf of, or in the 
service of, other merchants. Money lending was one particularly important element of 
these activities. 
 
IIIa – Money Lending 
 
 
Operating in the money market was a common practice that kept Company servants’ 
private trade functioning on a day-to-day basis. The interest rates available to British 
merchants in eighteenth-century India, as Ian Bruce Watson and P.J. Marshall have 
pointed out, could be extremely high and cut dramatically into returns from trade. On 
the other hand, Watson suggests, this also meant money could be made by engaging 
in financial services.
118
 For Company servants early in their careers, especially those 
coming out with no capital, borrowing was of course a prerequisite. Indeed, for nearly 
all eighteenth-century merchants, cash flow problems were profound, a situation 
which meant that lending opportunities were widespread.
119
 The need for capital 
stocks to engage in East Indian private trade created the environment for Company 
men with large reserves to lend at interest. Holden Furber believed that Company 
merchants typically moved from borrowers to lenders as their careers progressed. On 
coming out to the East they had limited capital at their disposal, and it took some time 
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to build up large enough reserves to lend to friends and business associates.
120
 Yet, 
this was not a stark dichotomy. Mentz has argued too that since financial services 
were in great demand; persons in possession of the right contacts could earn even 
more on such activity than through directly investing in trading ventures.
121
 On the 
west coast, junior merchants engaged in small-scale lending whilst senior merchants 
also continued to take out large loans regularly. Operating in the money market could 
be a quick and relatively easy way for junior servants to develop their private trading 
portfolio, and to begin to develop a trustworthy reputation before moving on to larger 
investments and higher-risk activities. 
William Mildmay was heavily involved in money lending early in his 
Company career. The Company attempted to restrict its servants from lending money 
to Indians to avoid potential conflicts with local authorities. However, like many 
Company regulations, it had little effect.
122
 Leading merchant ‘Romatee Comattee’ 
(presumably Rama Kamathi, one of the chief Indian merchants engaged with the 
Company at Surat and Bombay in this period) held an obligation of 2600 rupees to 
Mildmay dated in 1702. Mildmay’s lending continued in subsequent years and on one 
occasion he lent as much as ten thousand rupees to Kamathi at nine per cent per 
annum interest in 1709.
123
 Mildmay even lent money to the Company itself, and 
received particularly large interest payments from one loan of six thousand rupees. 
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Mildmay lent numerous other merchants and captains sums of around one thousand 
rupees at respondentia, including Edward Say and Henry Albert for China voyages on 
the Fleet frigate. Mildmay also lent money for voyages to England: Christopher Lyell 
received another thousand rupees in 1705 whilst Richard Micklefield received 1400 
as third mate on the Company ship Tavistock, in February 1710. These loans had 
extremely high advances – of up to forty per cent – the whole payable thirty days 
after the safe arrival of the ship at its destination.
124
 
As well as lending at respondentia, Mildmay also let out his money in 
common with a merchant in London, Christopher Fowler, on ‘bottomry’, loans that 
also provided high rates of interest.
125
 These loans applied to various voyages across 
the Indian Ocean world. Mildmay lent 1800 rupees to John van Luuren on the Rising 
Eagle, under the command of one Captain Tyler, bound to Mocha and back, with a 
twenty-seven per cent advance, which was received in June 1706. Similarly, he 
provided a loan in March 1705 of five hundred rupees with a thirty-five per cent 
advance to Thomas Patten for a China voyage and one thousand to Samuel 
Richardson at thirty-five per cent interest, again to China, which was recorded in
 
July 
1703. Lending on voyages to England at bottomry was also part of Mildmay’s 
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activities: three thousand rupees were lent to Captain John Collet commander of the 
ship Wentworth at forty per cent advance in February 1710. 
Mildmay’s accounts demonstrate effectively the regular and multiple ways of 
letting out money at interest. Lending was profitable for Mildmay, especially relative 
to his other activities. At the end of the trading season 1703-1704, all of his gains for 
the year (albeit amounting to a mediocre 1150 rupees) came from the interest on 
lending to various other merchants. The percentage profits derived by Mildmay could 
be quite large but the amounts loaned never exceeded a few thousand rupees at a 
time.
126
 His interests in the money market were widespread. At the same time, 
particular individuals worked regularly with him. Bernard Whyche, once of the 
Company’s service at Surat but by this time a successful free merchant in the same 
town, appears regularly in Mildmay’s books. Large sums were lent to Whyche 
including payments of over five thousand rupees on several occasions, and the 
balance owed to Mildmay at the end of one of Whyche’s accounts stood at 10,965 
rupees.
127
 Critically too, and perhaps expectedly, there were many small transactions 
with ‘Choorjee’, the Company’s broker. A close financial relationship between Rama 
Kamathi and Mildmay is also revealed through his books. Although it is reasonable to 
expect that a high-ranking Company servant such as Mildmay would cultivate such a 
relationship, the regularity of contact is notable. These critical partnerships oiled the 
wheels of Mildmay’s lending, from which he derived a regular income. Mildmay 
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signed off over 7000 rupees profit to his stock on leaving Karwar in February 
1709.
128
  
Other merchants’ private trade portfolios included similar practices. John 
Hope’s inventory of Benjamin Francia’s estate, signed in 1736, makes clear that he 
provided several loans amounting to thousands of rupees each to numerous senior 
Company merchants. Future Bombay governor Stephen Law was indebted for as 
much as 12,684 rupees following several loans, whilst many other prominent 
merchants had debts totalling thousands of rupees.
129
 Hope himself accounts that he 
owed around thirty thousand rupees to Francia at the time of his death.  
Although a prolific lender himself, the balance brought forward in the books 
of Francis Pym – to return briefly to an earlier example – was just 1944 rupees in 
May 1746, much of which had been lent to him by another merchant, one Mr. 
Fowke.
130
 Yet many of Pym’s early ventures with this capital in turn related to letting 
money out at interest. By October 1748 he had increased his balance to 3793 rupees 
from various small sales and interest on loans.
131
 As outlined above, Pym continued 
to let out his own money at interest to both Asian and European merchants as his 
career developed in new directions; but the beginnings of these enterprises were 
reliant on one initial substantial loan.
132
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The diversity and also high profitability of Bombay merchant Robert 
Holford’s trade was also notable. Holford was a mid-ranked Company servant and the 
last account book before his death in 1762 reveals significant details of his private 
trade. Holford’s list of his outstanding respondentia loans in August 1762 once again 
illustrates how merchants often held multiple investments simultaneously. Holford let 
out as much as 27,000 rupees at respondentia to several different captains between 
August 1761 and May 1762. The interest rates of his loans were extremely reasonable 
and ranged mainly from eighteen to twenty-two per cent, although one bore a rate of 
twenty-eight per cent. Many of these investments were successfully realised, even 
those respondentia loans to destinations in the Middle East. Holford had been a 
Company servant at Mocha in the late 1750s, which presumably provided him with a 
good knowledge of west Asian markets.
133
 Holford’s account books detail that he 
made a total of 6713 rupees from his investments in voyages to Basra and Jeddah 
between 1759 and 1760 totalling 16,000 rupees; a profit of around forty-two per cent. 
Holford also appeared to work especially closely with just a few individuals. John 
Spencer, a senior merchant in the council at Bombay was Holford’s major partner and 
he owed Spencer around 42,000 rupees from various outstanding ventures and 
concerns at the time of his death.
134
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Throughout the eighteenth century, Company servants on the west coast were 
fully integrated into complex and elaborate lending systems. Working in the money 
market was important for their private trade and could provide steady profits. By mid-
century, Bombay’s growing prosperity provided new opportunities for middling and 
lower-ranked Company men to regularly engage in lending. Yet, British merchants 
not only maintained diverse business portfolios to spread investment and to increase 
their profits, but also to maintain efficacious relationships and ties of trust with other 
merchants. 
   
IIIb – The Management of Estates 
 
 
Another significant part of the services rendered by Company servants on behalf of 
others was the management of the estates of deceased merchants. Company servants 
could effectively demonstrate their honest, trustworthy and respectful character 
through acting as executors. Doing so also provided useful income through 
commission charges. The account books of Company servants reveal that estate 
management formed a large and often time-consuming element of private business. 
Such a task was complex not only because Company servants were engaged in 
multiple ventures that required a good degree of business acumen to draw together, 
but also because mortality rates were extremely high. Merchants readily found 
themselves acting as executor frequently, and even worked on multiple merchants’ 
effects simultaneously. Executors were charged with settling outstanding debts, 
realising remaining investments and satisfying creditors. This was not a particularly 
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profitable service; rather, Company servants regularly acted as executors to maintain 
partnerships, reinforce their networks and enhance their reputation as a reliable 
merchant. 
Though some estates required relatively little work to settle outright, others 
were more complex. Due to the geographically widespread nature of the affairs of 
Company servants, accounts could take many months and multiple cycles of 
correspondence to consolidate. William Gayer was involved with managing several 
estates very early in his Company career. In some cases, Gayer’s task was a complex 
one. He looked after the effects of deceased Company surgeon, John Maign, not only 
collecting various debts but distributing the estate to those mentioned in Maign’s will 
in 1708. Gayer spent several months dealing with Maign’s effects, notifying 
individuals who were owed various sums and issuing bonds.
135
 Often, the extremely 
varied portfolio of activities of some individuals could lead to innumerable problems 
for executors. The estate of Benjamin Francia, a free merchant and former East India 
Company servant, who died in July 1732 was managed by John Hope, Company 
servant at Surat. As executor, Hope’s challenge was to draw together the 
multitudinous effects of his colleague. Although he suggested in a letter to Moses 
Francia, Benjamin’s brother that the estate had ‘not great many accounts to settle’, 
Hope’s own account with Benjamin was complex due to the fact that the two men 
‘had very great concerns together’. Hope stressed that he would settle these affairs as 
soon as possible. The inventory of Francia’s estate reveals an extremely varied 
portfolio of activities comprising lending, shipping, and letting out money on various 
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ventures however. It took Hope several years and numerous disputes with Moses 
Francia to settle the estate to the satisfaction of all parties.
136
 Working regularly in 
partnership with other merchants often entailed managing their effects on the event of 
their death. Francis Pym, another merchant featured above, was heavily involved in 
the management of his partner Robert Hunt’s estate in 1752. Pym received sundry 
sums from individuals stationed all over the Indian Ocean world to satisfy debts owed 
to Hunt’s estate.137 
Executors could receive reasonable financial rewards for their services 
through commission, usually a percentage of the total value of an estate. This was 
often, however, not enough to compensate for the time and complications involved. 
The real value of acting as executor was that it also provided an opportunity to work 
with influential Company figures, especially through managing the estate of senior 
colleagues. Again, for Company men at the beginning of their careers, such a role 
could provide an opportunity for merchants to showcase good management skills and 
reliable stewardship. It also helped form connections that could prove influential in 
their future careers. This was known by all parties involved and using agents who had 
much to gain from future business was important as they were, in theory, less likely 
to cheat.
138
 High-ranking servants also regularly engaged in this activity too. Former 
Bombay governor William Wake directed in his will that Richard Bourchier, senior 
merchant at Bombay and the future governor of the town, be appointed one of his 
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executors.
139
 Being selected as an executor in itself was an act that reinforced bonds 
of friendship and commercial association, and was a signal that a merchant was well-
respected and held in high regard. Managing estates was therefore an important part 
of private business that Company servants were eager to include within their 
portfolio. 
Conclusion 
 
 
This chapter has explored the range of ventures that comprised the private trade of 
East India Company servants on the west coast of India during the first half of the 
eighteenth century. It is imperative to emphasise the extent of the private trade 
network based at Bombay and Surat, within which high-ranking Company servants 
were heavily involved. From the 1720s in particular, this network regularly involved 
complex ventures across the Indian Ocean world, and relied on the formation of 
lucrative partnerships between the members of the Bombay and Surat councils. 
Yet, it is also clear that the unique economic and commercial environment of 
the region restricted trade in significant ways. Profits were low, losses were common 
and fortunes were less easily cultivated than was the case for those servants stationed 
in Bengal and Madras. Even investing in Bengal and China ventures could prove 
difficult without readily available capital, other successful merchants to partner with, 
and the knowledge and expertise of those particular markets. Moreover, those 
servants that did manage to cultivate relatively substantial fortunes, such as Robert 
Cowan and Charles Boone, seem to have relied heavily on additional income streams 
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and the privileges associated with prominent Company service. It is certainly not the 
case that Cowan’s papers, as Om Prakash suggested, ‘conclusively’ demonstrate the 
large scale, efficiency and profitability that ‘characterized the English private trading 
network in the Western Indian Ocean in the first half of the eighteenth century’.140 
Most merchants appear to have engaged in a broad range of activities to keep 
their East Indian trade afloat. The commercial networks and multifaceted business of 
Company servants’ private trade encompassed much more than just country voyages.  
For Company employees to spread the risk of engaging in private trade and to carve 
out opportunities in this volatile sphere, a number of different ventures had to be 
engaged in simultaneously. Considering aspects of private trade beyond intra-Asian 
voyaging adds a great deal to what is known about the way in which private trade 
networks actually functioned in an unstable environment such as the Arabian Seas. It 
also serves to connect this East Indian system with British mercantile trade practices 
across the eighteenth-century world. 
Historians of early modern trade beyond the Indian Ocean have established 
that British maritime merchants were impressively adept and flexible individuals. A 
merchant’s portfolio of activities comprised a number of undertakings and 
commercial services. They held together strands which converged to form the central 
‘adventure’ of a shipping expedition. 141  A successful merchant therefore had to 
manage not just voyages but a ‘portfolio of simultaneous operations’, which included 
looking after the commercial and legal affairs of others, and often lending money. 
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Although the functions of a ‘merchant’, who traded on their own account, and a 
‘factor’, an agent who worked on behalf of someone else, appear quite distinct; in 
practice these roles overlapped.
142
 Variety was probably a necessary if not sufficient 
prerequisite for success. The affairs of merchants were wide-ranging and complex, to 
a degree that often makes it difficult for historians to conceptualise the full scope of 
their activities. Scholars have described merchants as ‘ambiguous operators, playing 
historical roles that defy timeless dichotomies and simple schemata’.143 The range of 
a merchant’s commitments necessitated diverse networks of correspondents and other 
associates too, and the ability to liaise with merchants in ports around the globe on a 
frequent basis.
144
 
The private trade of East India Company merchants should be seen as 
similarly complex. Like most traders, Company servants combined multiple strands 
of business. They regularly acted as both agents and principals. Even the distinction 
between engaging in commissioning and borrowing early on in a Company career, as 
opposed to working independently and acting mainly as a lender later, is difficult to 
maintain. The examples highlighted above corroborate Pamela Nightingale’s 
assertion that what characterised the private enterprise of Company merchants was 
their willingness to seize ‘on any opportunity which offered a profit’. 145  Whilst 
important for spreading risk, maintaining various business concerns was also critical 
for building the multifaceted networks necessary for future trade. 
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Ian Bruce Watson emphasised that temporary residence and the ‘belief in 
diversification in the rush to be rich, acted against the establishment of stronger 
partnerships’ during the period between 1659 and 1760. 146  A stark distinction 
between diversification and sophisticated commercial partnerships should not be 
assumed however. Varied trade demanded strong networks and partnerships. Each of 
the Company servants explored above relied heavily on robust and regular contact 
with other merchants in order to maintain a diverse private trade. Partnerships 
involved not only collective investment in voyages, but also handling commodities, 
supervising sales and engaging in a variety of commercial services for merchants 
stationed elsewhere. Networks of correspondence and close financial ties with both 
European and Asian merchants were critical to business in the East Indies, and 
allowed continued participation in trade. At the same time of course, private trade 
was imbricated with the architecture of the East India Company’s operations. 
Company employment provided limited security and some capital, but more 
importantly provided access to a network of privileges, well-developed trading posts 
and other merchants that could be utilised in the service of private trade. Moreover, 
an important element of private trade was the freighting of private goods on Company 
shipping during the intra-Asian legs of voyages. Here, a close connection between 
ships’ commanders and Company factors operating in a private capacity was critical 
for successful trade. All of the merchants referred to above made use not just of 
country shipping, private vessels, and their mariners, but also those belonging to their 
employers. The private trade of Company servants did not, therefore, operate 
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completely independently, and its scope and character was dependent on both local 
and global frameworks. The following chapter also demonstrates this clearly by 
focusing closely on two particularly significant branches of western Indian Ocean 
trade. 
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Chapter Three 
‘Carrying on a Losing Commerce’? British Private Trade in the 
Persian Gulf and the Red Sea 
 
 
 
Any exploration of mercantile commerce on the west coast of India during the 
eighteenth century cannot fail to take into account trade with the Persian Gulf and the 
Red Sea. The commercial corridor between the Middle East and the western part of 
the subcontinent was a hugely significant element of the early modern Indian Ocean 
trading world.
1
 Trade between these areas, that also connected to the Swahili coast of 
East Africa, had been conducted for centuries and formed an important part of the 
unity of the Arabian Seas region.
2
 For hundreds of years preceding the arrival of the 
Europeans, merchants from western India traded regularly with Mocha on the Red 
Sea littoral, Muscat in southern Arabia and Hormuz in the Persian Gulf to exchange 
textiles, sugar, southeast Asian tin and spices, precious stones and steel, in return for 
cotton yarn and specie.
3
 This trade held vital importance for regions on both sides of 
the Arabian Sea. Coarse cotton textiles from the subcontinent were vital for everyday 
life across early modern West Asia. Indian manufactured textiles acted as an essential 
exchange commodity and were therefore in high demand throughout the Gulf and 
Arabian Peninsula. The reciprocal flow of precious commodities to India – whose 
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coinable metals were largely procured from the Middle East – led Mocha and the Red 
Sea to be referred to as ‘the treasure chest of the Mughal Empire’.4 Central Asian 
horses, Persian silk and carpets were other important exports to India from Persia.
5
 
From the seventeenth century, India and the Middle East came to be 
connected in a fundamentally different way following the arrival of the European 
merchants and companies. Trade between these regions was more valuable and of a 
higher volume than ever before, and both private and ‘official’ European enterprise 
based on the subcontinent worked within and built upon extensive commercial 
networks across the Arabian Seas. As Chaudhuri wrote, ‘Surat, western India, 
Malabar, and the Persian Gulf constituted a single unit of operation in the 
organisation of the Companies’. He continued, ‘If the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea 
were the thumb and forefinger of the Arabian Sea, the coast of India was the arm to 
which the hand was attached.’6 European goods found ready markets in Arabian and 
Persian ports, and Indian goods could be used to purchase west Asian commodities. 
Not only were the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf important constituent parts of the 
Indian Ocean trading world, but they were also significant components of rapidly 
developing transnational trade networks. 
In the case of the Honourable East India Company, the ports of Mocha and 
Bandar ‘Abbas (known as Gombroon to the British during the eighteenth century) 
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eventually became critical nodal points for its western Indian Ocean trade. They were 
fully integrated into the Company’s factory system, and were also bound to western 
India through their position as ‘subordinate’ settlements controlled from the 
presidency towns of Surat and later Bombay. During the eighteenth century, British 
demand for products sourced at these centres of trade in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf 
grew rapidly; particularly coffee, silk and high quality woollens. 
The previous chapters of this thesis focused on the East India Company’s 
factories on the west coast of India, and the commercial hubs of Bombay and Surat in 
particular, during the early eighteenth century. They emphasised the degree to which 
British private trade was fundamentally shaped by a particular and peculiar regional 
context, and highlighted the importance of merchants’ diverse business portfolios for 
conducting successful private trade in this context. This chapter develops these ideas 
by moving west, and exploring how private trade networks based in western India 
connected with west Asian arenas of trade. Notwithstanding the fact they were 
involved in voyages right across the Indian Ocean world, this was an important 
branch of commerce for private traders. Yet, although some British merchants 
conducted high-volume commerce to these locales, they also faced unstable, 
unpredictable and challenging markets that affected the shape, extent and profitability 
of their private trade throughout the first half of the eighteenth century. This chapter 
argues for the importance of seeing the Persian Gulf and Red Sea trade as an 
important element within Britain’s Indian Ocean world; not because of the volume 
and profitability of this commerce, but because it draws attention to the uneven nature 
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of private trade across maritime Asia, and the way it was profoundly affected and 
constrained by local realities. 
European trade with the West Asian ports has actually received little scholarly 
attention. In-depth studies of the region in the context of European trade during the 
eighteenth century are rare. This is especially the case for the Honourable East India 
Company, despite extensive research devoted to other branches of British trade in the 
East Indies. The great port cities of Mocha and Bandar ‘Abbas have rarely been seen 
as significant parts of the system of British trade in the Indian Ocean and worthy of 
closer study. Even less is known about private trade networks in the region. Certainly, 
existing work has delineated the growth and success of European commerce after 
1750, but just how trade operated within the Middle Eastern context in the first half 
of the 1700s remains unclear.  
For Persia specifically, Abdul Amin’s British Interests in the Persian Gulf 
provides a detailed overview of British commercial activity in the later eighteenth 
century, and strongly emphasises the extent and significance of private trade.
7
 This 
research, as well as the more recent work of Willem Floor on European commerce in 
Persia, does not concentrate in detail on an earlier period however.
8
 P.J. Marshall 
examined private trade between Bengal and west Asia during the early part of the 
eighteenth century but was less concerned with the western sphere of the Indian 
Ocean than with the Calcutta fleet’s turn from ‘west to east’.9 Key aspects of British 
private trade with the Middle East therefore remain to be investigated, particularly 
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with regard to commerce from the west coast of India. We know little, for instance, 
about how the Company and private traders struggled to overcome the myriad 
difficulties posed by political turmoil and economic decline in the region until a 
change in fortunes from the late 1740s. 
There are some significant reasons for the small amount of research on this 
subject. Firstly, Indian Ocean historians have emphasised the tremendous volatility of 
early modern trade between India and the Middle East. It was subject to intense 
fluctuations during the later seventeenth century.
10
 The maritime trade of early 
eighteenth-century Persia and the Red Sea was also deeply unstable and frequently 
unprofitable for each of the European companies.
11
 The multitude of problems 
created by civil war, revolution and regime change, especially from the beginning of 
the 1720s, adversely shaped and severely hindered commercial relations. The East 
India Company regularly complained about their losses in the region during the first 
half of the eighteenth century. Historians have overlooked the place of west Asia 
within the Company’s Indian Ocean world during this period, concentrating instead 
on the period of stability, colonial power and more regular trade that arose after 1750.  
There are also more practical constraints. Scholars are severely hindered by 
the limited detail, extent and chronological scope of archival material for a study of 
this nature. Many of the East India Company’s factory records pertaining to Mocha, 
Bandar ‘Abbas and Basra (the other significant British establishment in Persia), are 
incomplete or missing. There are few periods in the early eighteenth century when 
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consecutive years of records can be examined. The extant Mocha records for instance 
comprise just three volumes covering 1696 to 1752, replete with large gaps. The fact 
that these locations were minor establishments, in terms of personnel numbers, profit 
and their importance to the Company, partly accounts for the small amount of extant 
material. 
What does remain, however, can be profitably used by historians. The 
Company’s correspondence from Bandar ‘Abbas is more complete than that of 
Mocha, and the numerous gaps in the records in the India Office in London can be 
filled to some extent by material from the Maharashtra State Archives in Mumbai. 
Moreover, financial information and various other details of the Persian and Red Sea 
factories throughout the eighteenth century can be found in the Bombay Presidency 
books. For the reconstruction of private trade networks, private papers are of course 
critical. Extensive bodies of merchants’ papers pertaining to this region are few and 
far between, but there are some important under-utilised collections – such as the 
papers of Robert Cowan.
12
 
These records reveal complex but frequently unprofitable networks of British 
trade in the region. The East India Company’s fortunes in the Middle East during the 
eighteenth century were rarely characterised by progress and profitability. Private 
trade similarly suffered and was affected by political problems and unpredictable 
markets in the region. As well as a large degree of good fortune, merchants relied on 
maintaining a varied trade, exploiting the Company’s infrastructure, and coordinating 
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robust networks of correspondents, associates and agents in order to manage their 
private ventures. 
The chapter focuses in some detail on the organisation and development of 
East India Company trade in the region, through a close look at Company 
correspondence and factory records, to provide the context for the later discussion of 
private trade. It looks initially at Persia, and the port city of Bandar ‘Abbas in 
particular. It then discusses the port town of Mocha and examines the development of 
the East India Company’s trade there over the medium term, before attending to the 
place of private trade within the context of the Red Sea. 
 
I – Bandar ‘Abbas, Persia and British Trade Networks 
 
 
Early modern Persia lay at the heart of multiple inland trade networks that stretched 
across Eurasia. Caravan routes criss-crossed the country, running from ‘Kirman and 
Isfahan to Mashed, Bukhara, and Khiva, from Yazd to Balkh and to Kandahar, to 
Hamadan and Tebriz, and thither to Izmir and the Caucasus and – within the Gulf – to 
Bahrain and Basra’.13 Persia’s ports connected these inland networks with global 
maritime trade, with Bandar ‘Abbas holding a particularly eminent position. Due to 
its practical harbour and close proximity to the caravan routes, the port-city had long 
functioned as a significant entrepôt within the trading world of the Indian Ocean. It 
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also came to act as a nodal point for English trade during the seventeenth century, 
especially following the establishment of a factory there in the 1620s.
14
  
The history of East India Company trade with Persia can be traced back to the 
early years of the seventeenth century but the Company secured concrete trading 
rights in return for helping Shah Abbas expel the Portuguese from Hormuz.
15
 The 
East India Company’s privileges were certified through a farman granted by the Shah 
and a factory was established at the new centre of Persian trade, Bandar ‘Abbas, in 
1623.
16
 English privileges were renewed in 1632, by which time the Dutch had also 
founded a factory at Bandar ‘Abbas and the value of their Persian Gulf trade had 
greatly surpassed that of the English. The Dutch remained the dominant European 
commercial actors in Persia for much of the seventeenth century, and as Willem 
Floor’s work demonstrated, the level of Dutch trade at Bandar ‘Abbas, for much of 
this period, exceeded that of the East India Company.
17
 It was not until the end of the 
1600s that the Honourable Company could be sure of the permanency of their 
position in the Gulf. 
Despite suffering regular difficulties and interruptions to their trade however, 
from the 1680s the situation of English commerce began to improve, and a factory at 
Kerman was established to act as a station for the procurement of ‘Carmenia wool’; a 
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key article of trade for Europeans. By the 1690s, English East India Company trade 
was improving year-on-year and its Persian privileges were renewed in 1697, with the 
Shah even making an official visit to one of the Company’s factories in 1699. The 
Company continued to maintain factories in Isfahan, Shiraz and Kerman as well as 
Bandar ‘Abbas, under the jurisdiction of Bombay.18  A factory at Basra was also 
established in 1723.
19
 Through these establishments, East India Company trade 
successfully intersected with the multiple inland networks of Persia and central 
Asia.
20
 Despite competition from the Dutch, the British largely managed to maintain 
a favoured position in the Safavid realm until the demise of the empire. The 
Company’s preservation of strategic diplomatic ties was critical for the success of its 
trade in the region.
21
 
Changes in the East India Company’s export policy also contributed to the 
growth of its Persian trade. It began to export large numbers of English woollens to 
west Asia from the end of the seventeenth century and the region came to act as 
something of a ‘sink’ for this significant export. They were initially traded through 
Bandar ‘Abbas and subsequently transported to inland markets. Woollen goods were 
usually sold in return for large quantities of silk, shipped home via the Gulf. This 
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trade caused considerable friction with the Levant Company, but proved a profitable 
enterprise for the East India Company nonetheless.
22
 
By the 1700s, Bandar ‘Abbas had undoubtedly become the most important 
establishment in Persia for the British, and contemporary accounts attest to the port’s 
unique status. Despite the fact that Captain Alexander Hamilton in his early 
eighteenth-century account of East Indian trade described the port as ‘ill seated’, 
wanting ‘almost every Thing that contributes to the support of human life, except 
Fish and Mutton’; he also stated that ‘for many Years, it has been well peopled by 
reason of its Trade, which has filled the Pockets of many Merchants who, at their first 
settling there, were very empty’.23 In Wyndham Beawes’ commercial dictionary, Lex 
mercatoria rediviva, Bandar ‘Abbas was described as ‘the Port of all Persia, and 
perhaps of all Asia, where the greatest Trade is transacted’. The city was home to ‘all 
Nations … Persians, Arabians, Indians, Banians, Armenians, Turks, Jews, Tartars, 
Moors, English, French and Dutch.’ Although Persia had other important ports, it was 
‘Bender-Abassi’ that had attracted ‘almost all the Commerce’ of the region.24 
British trade with Persia continued apace throughout the next century. The 
governor of Bombay, Robert Cowan, commented in a letter to John Horne in 1729 
that the ‘sale of the woollen manufacture at Spahaun [Isfahan] is verry Acceptable & 
nothing will be more so to the Company [than] enlarging those sales of the wool 
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investment which is to them the only valuable branch of the Persia trade’.25 With 
regard to imports into Britain, over the course of the century Carmenia wool 
(procured from the province and town of Kerman) grew to rival silk as the mainstay 
of the Company’s Persia trade. An extremely desirable article of trade in Europe, 
Carmenia wool was regarded as some of the best in the world and was extensively 
used in the English millinery industry. It was available in three colours – red, black 
and white – and the red variety was particularly sought-after.26 Bandar ‘Abbas’s links 
overland to Kerman, as well as the Company’s station at Isfahan, were critical for the 
purchase of this luxury commodity. The Company’s developing presence on the other 
side of the Arabian Sea also led to large amounts of Indian goods being traded to 
Persia. By the 1720s, the British were carrying ‘silver, a large Quantity of Cloth, 
Pewter, Steel, Indigo, Silk stuffs, and the finest and most beautiful Indian Cottons’ 
from the subcontinent to exchange for Persian goods.
27
 
Despite the Company’s successful development of Persian trade, European 
commerce operated in an incredibly challenging political and economic landscape 
during the early eighteenth century. Contemporary accounts, the records of the East 
India companies and later scholarship all underscore the extent to which the period 
between 1680 and 1760 was one of great upheaval in the internal affairs of Persia, 
despite occasional evidence of flourishing trade.
28
 The region experienced a 
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remarkable series of crises in the middle of this period in particular: the breakdown of 
central government caused by the Afghan invasion in the 1720s, the ensuing collapse 
of the Safavid regime, civil war in Oman, and a further prolonged period of instability 
following the reassertion of Persian power by Nadir Shah in the late 1730s. European 
accounts of Persia at this time evocatively and dramatically described how the 
political situation led to commercial stagnation and regularly disrupted trade.  
The East India Company’s agent at Bandar ‘Abbas complained to the 
Directors as early as 1717 that, ‘Under the head of Persia trade I can say little, trade is 
dull & money as scarce ... we have more cloth there than our Agent
 
can sell in two 
years’.29 A few years later, the Afghan invasion proved particularly detrimental to 
commercial fortunes. From the 1720s, the decline of key Persian ports, including 
Bandar ‘Abbas, and the general breakdown of law and order throughout the country 
adversely affected European commerce and almost ceased profitable trade for the 
Company entirely.
30
 Indeed, the Afghan occupation damaged the security of trade 
that had endured under the Safavids and affected all commerce, including that of the 
extensive Astrakhan Indian community.
31
 Henry Fowler, a Company servant at 
Bandar ‘Abbas in 1724, pronounced Persia to be ‘one of the most Deplorable 
Opress’d Ruinated places in the known World, here’s those that were slaves turn’d 
Masters & those that were Masters fallen to poor Distressed Objects of Charity’. 
‘Everybody waits in Expectation of a Revolution’, Fowler continued, ‘but when it 
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will come no body can tell’.32 Despite Company factor Hezekiah King’s comment in 
a letter of 1725 that the ‘Opghoons’ in possession of Gombroon were ‘verry civil to 
our Factory’,33 troubles in the country frequently interrupted Company trade. In a 
general letter dated June 1723, the Council at Bandar ‘Abbas declared they ‘heartily 
wished and prayed’ for a ‘sudden a change for the better as we have many in the 
space of the last twelve months for the worse, that we may be able to alter our stile 
and render your Honours the pleasing news of the encrease of Trade, Credit and 
Proffit instead of the melancholly relations of the misfortune we have hitherto 
laboured under in the administration of your affairs’.34 
Further inland, several British merchants lost their lives at Isfahan during the 
troubles, while others claimed they were forced to bribe authorities to safely escape 
the factory. As the British agent Owen Phillips wrote to London in November 1722, 
‘Thank God, we have escaped by a timely Precaution, but by a vast Expence of Cash 
for which we cannot tax our Conduct with Prudence … We hope no one who hears 
our Conduct will want humanity enough to approve the Purchase of our Lives on the 
Terms we have submitted to.’35 Even following the ‘re-emergence’ of Persia ‘as a 
Muslim power of consequence’ under Nadir Shah who seized the Persian throne in 
1736,
36
 there was little discernible effect on the East India Company’s fortunes 
despite the return of authority. The Court of Directors wrote to their servants at 
Bombay in 1739 cautioning them that ‘the bad Administration of the Government 
there renders our Property so Precarious that unless it alters for the better, you must 
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not venture Effects to any considerable amount in those Parts’. This was felt to have 
been occasioned by the aggression of Persian officials.
37
 There were, however, some 
reasons for optimism: Nadir Shah’s expedition to India in 1739 and his return with 
large reserves of treasure led to something of a commercial revival. The Company 
commented that ‘We have some Grounds to believe that Shaw Nadirs March to Dilly 
and return into Persia with great Treasure, has caused a brisk Demand in that 
Kingdom for Goods, and that Trade has revived there after so long a stagnation ...  
which Turn of Affairs must be Improved to our greatest Benefit.’38 Yet, this positivity 
was short-lived. Trade suffered from the effects of further instability caused by 
several revolts against Nadir Shah’s leadership. His eventual death in 1748 led to 
another period of civil war in Persia. As Chaudhuri observed, the precariousness of 
the upcountry markets resulting from unstable government was a constant theme in 
the correspondence of the Persia factory in the 1750s.
39
 
Even more seriously for the trading rights and privileges obtained by the 
Company, contemporaries believed that the Shah had become more oppressive in his 
conduct towards European merchants during the 1740s. Company servants claimed 
he had begun to demand large, arbitrary sums, neglected to give privileges that had 
been previously authorised and threatened violence. The Bandar ‘Abbas factors wrote 
in 1747 that, ‘To avoid paying the large sums his Majesty demands our stay can’t 
possibly be of any advantage to the Hon’ble Company as no sales can be made, and 
we may expect large demands upon us, nothing remaining in the hands of his 
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Subjects to satisfye his Majestys avaritiousness.’40 This conjunction of the Shah’s 
demands, as well as the continuing chaos in Persia’s domestic affairs, led the Bandar 
‘Abbas Council to call for abandoning the port altogether.41 The desire to withdraw 
from Persia was also stimulated by fears over the safety of servants at the other 
factories in the region. ‘The present Distracted State of Affairs in Persia’, the 
Directors told the Bombay Council in 1747, ‘requires our Property to be withdrawn 
from thence in the securest manner, Our Servants must no longer reside at Spahaun 
upon any pretence whatsoever.’42 
By 1750, descriptions of the once great entrepôt of Bandar ‘Abbas had thus 
changed dramatically from those of forty or fifty years previously. In the town there 
was ‘not above one House in ten’ that was not ‘deserted of Inhabitants’, according to 
one observer.
43
 Similarly, Edward Ives wrote in 1754 that Bandar ‘Abbas was ‘At 
present … a place of no kind of consequence, except what it receives from the 
English and Dutch factories’. He believed that the two factory buildings were ‘the 
only remaining buildings of any importance; the whole city besides, is almost one 
entire scene of ruins’. Despite the ‘once flourishing state’ of the city ‘the constant 
wars carried on in this country, and their attendants, confusion and anarchy, have 
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deprived the English of almost all their commercial advantages and the place of 
almost all its inhabitants’, Ives concluded. 44  The Company ultimately drew up 
concrete plans for removal from Bandar ‘Abbas to one of the islands in the Gulf in 
order to boost trade.
45
 This new settlement was to be placed under Company 
protection and control, representing some of the first proposals for territorial 
expansion in the region. Ultimately however, these never evolved into a workable 
scheme and were rejected by the members of the Bombay Council.
46
 It nevertheless 
highlights the gravity of the position of Company trade at Bandar ‘Abbas, and the 
degree to which the British found it difficult to overcome the effects of unrest in the 
region. The Bandar ‘Abbas factory was the only permanent establishment of the East 
India Company in Persia at that time, and even that was abandoned within the decade 
as the city lost its pre-eminent position as the leading port in the Gulf. The Company 
were forced to evacuate following the bombardment of the factory by the French in 
1759 and it was finally abandoned in 1763.
47
 
Not only did external troubles adversely affect trade however, but the Court of 
Directors were of the opinion that the management of the factory at Bandar ‘Abbas 
was proving detrimental to improving the situation of British commerce. They made 
regular complaints about the level of factory expenses throughout the first half of the 
eighteenth century. Despite the tumultuous state of Persian politics and trade in this 
period, the Company constantly raised misgivings about the conduct of its employees 
and regularly blamed them for the dismal state of trade. This was a common 
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complaint emanating from East India House directed at many of its establishments, 
but the emotive language the Company employed when condemning its employees in 
Persia is striking. The Directors frequently expressed concern over missing out on 
customs duties as a result of due obedience not being paid to the collection of 
consulage, a duty levied on privately imported goods sold at both Bandar ‘Abbas and 
Basra.
48 Moreover, they were more generally ‘Greatly concerned for the excessive 
Charges of the Subordinate Settlements’ and they ordered ‘all pomp ... to be laid 
aside in Persia and only absolutely neccesary Charges [made], for management and to 
the government kep’t on foot’ in 1725.49 The Directors ultimately hoped that ‘the 
constant expence in the Gulph’ would be reduced to help it once again become ‘a 
profitable settlement’.50 
By the 1740s however, their frustration over the continuation of myriad 
fraudulent practices was evident. ‘On a Retrospect into the Persian Accounts for 
Twenty years past’ they wrote in 1744, ‘it evidently appears, that We have all along 
been carrying on a losing commerce, by the State, Pomp, Luxury and other bad habits 
of our servants your predecessors, who instead of acting as the Agents and Factors of 
a Trading Society, have addicted themselves to pleasure, and behaved more like 
Courtiers than Merchants, whereof We have made heavy Complaints from time to 
time in our Letters to Bombay’.51 
Despite the exactions, British trade there continued to operate. In his account 
of Persia, Ives spoke highly of the ‘great prudence and sagacity of the English and 
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Dutch factories established at Gombroon who amidst all the shocks and convulsions 
of a civil war among the Persians, have met with little or no interuption in their trade 
from any of the contending parties; it being a maxim with them, to side openly with 
none of the competitors [in the civil war], and yet at the same time to keep well with 
all’. 52  Later historians also emphasised the resilience of British trade. As Amin 
importantly outlined, East India Company trade continued in a more or less profitable 
trajectory following the chaos of 1747 up until the loss of the factory at Bandar 
‘Abbas to the French.53 The export figures Amin provided for Company goods sent to 
Persia are certainly impressive; rising from £17,297 in 1748 to £45,604 in 1751 and 
representing more than one quarter of the total exports of the Company to the East.
54
 
Private trade was also a significant part of the continuation of British 
commerce with Persia over the early eighteenth century. Despite the internal affairs 
of Persia and their effect on British trade at their establishments in the region, 
merchants continued to engage in private trade ventures to Bandar ‘Abbas and Basra. 
Persia held an important place within the private trade networks of senior merchants 
at Bombay, Surat and other west coast factories in particular. Yet, we still have a poor 
understanding of private trade during the eighteenth century. The opportunities 
Bandar ‘Abbas afforded for private trade and how merchants’ attitudes to the Persia 
trade were affected by the volatile political context in which they were operated, are 
explored in greater depth in the following section. 
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II – Private Trade in the Persian Gulf Region 
 
 
From the last quarter of the seventeenth century, the East India Company’s servants 
stationed at Bandar ‘Abbas actively engaged in trade on their own accounts. Charles 
Lockyer, whose famous narrative of Asian trade was based on his experiences in the 
1680s and 1690s, said of Bandar ‘Abbas that ‘All Private Trade, either in Europe, or 
Country Ships, has been so long ingross’d by the Company’s servants, that they 
really think, they have a Right to it at their own Rates … So that there’s scarce an 
English Man in the Place, will give a true Account of the Value of Goods against his 
own Interest.’55 Lockyer also believed that despite the high mortality at Gombroon, 
there was ‘an Opportunity of growing rich sooner than at more healthful places’.56  
Merchants based at other factories traded regularly with the Gulf port and 
competitive customs rates meant that British merchants stationed across the Indian 
Ocean world were able to profitably operate in the Persian market. The privileges 
granted from Persian officials to the East India Company in effect entitled all ships 
with Company passes to take advantage of low customs rates at Bandar ‘Abbas. They 
were subject to two per cent consulage to the Company, one per cent to an agent and 
one per cent more to a broker ‘on the gross sale of goods’. As well as private traders, 
Asian merchants could take advantage of these lower customs rates too by holding 
Company passes and flying British colours.
57
 Indeed, this privilege, combined with 
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the greater security of British shipping, meant that the Company could conduct a 
vigorous freight trade of Gujarati merchants’ goods to the Persian Gulf from the 
seventeenth century.
58
 
Marshall’s research into Calcutta-based private British shipping stressed the 
importance of the Persian market for Bengal traders, especially in the later part of the 
seventeenth and early part of the eighteenth century. Bandar ‘Abbas undoubtedly 
remained a regular destination for private Calcutta ships, with Basra coming to hold 
an equally important role in later years. However, Marshall also highlighted the 
volatility and uncertainty in the markets that ultimately reduced the feasibility of 
Persian trade for the Calcutta fleet.
59
 Later scholarship also demonstrated that vibrant 
private trade from the west coast of India emerged in earnest during the middle 
decades of the seventeenth century. According to Om Prakash, in 1630 the private 
trade to Persia from India was said to be worth £30,000; equivalent to nearly one 
third of the stock of the Company’s own Persian voyage that year.60 High-ranking 
Company servants dominated private trade to Persia from Bombay and Surat from 
this time.
61
 In fact, Holden Furber even suggested that the Bombay Council 
effectively kept the Persian factories running at a loss during the early eighteenth 
century so that servants’ country-trading ventures could become ever more 
successful.
62
 This is an important notion; yet whilst a vigorous private trade to the 
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Persian Gulf was carried on, it seems it was rarely consistently profitable until the 
middle of the eighteenth century. 
Figures for the consulage duty collected at Bandar ‘Abbas and Basra provide 
some evidence of the changing level of private trade at these ports, although specific 
figures only appear in Bombay’s journals and ledgers for the period after 1730. This 
was the year in which the Gombroon Council reported that the amount of consulage 
collected was as much ‘as was ever known in the most flourishing times’.63 The 
numbers alone also unfortunately say nothing about the provenance of vessels trading 
to Persia, and it is frequently unclear what proportion of the figure recorded was 
collected at Bandar ‘Abbas or Basra. They do provide a good general impression of 
the volume of private trade to Persia across a substantial period, however. They 
reveal a steady trade, with some poor years, and a dramatic upturn in fortunes in the 
1750s.
64
 From both the amounts given in the Bombay books as well as the figures 
collated by Amin, it is evident that there was a tremendous increase in the consulage 
duty collected after 1750. Even if the amount overall remained relatively small 
compared to, say, the customs collected on private trade at Bombay, this still points 
to the vigour of British private trade with Persia from this time. 
The role of the port city of Basra was probably more significant than the 
archival record can reveal with any certainty. Due to the volume of available primary 
material, this chapter concentrates on Bandar ‘Abbas, but this other major Gulf port 
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formed an important destination for British private trade too. Especially during times 
of turmoil at Bandar ‘Abbas, private trade was often directed to Basra. The town was 
an important entrepôt throughout the seventeenth century and British private 
merchants were known to have traded there at the turn of the eighteenth century.
65
 As 
well as consulage figures, later qualitative evidence relating to the port, such as the 
many vociferous complaints by merchants over the implementation of the consulage 
duty there by the Bombay Council in 1725, also points to the prominence of Basra 
with regard to private trade in this period.
66
 
For private trade from the west coast specifically, information from the 
consulage figures is difficult to tease out. Yet, since Marshall argued that the general 
unprofitability of the Persian Gulf was evident to Bengal merchants as early as the 
1740s, and Calcutta-based private shipping in fact shifted its focus from ‘west to 
east’, the growth in consulage collected suggests that private trade from the west of 
India steadily began to climb from the 1740s – at least in terms of cargo value and 
tonnage. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
65
 Rudi Matthee, ‘Boom and Bust: The Port of Basra in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries’ in 
Lawrence G. Potter (ed.), The Persian Gulf in History (New York, 2009), p. 119. 
66
 See for instance, BL, IOR G/29/15, p. 160, letter from Messrs. Neville and Petty to Gombroon 
Council, March 1725. 
 183 
 
Chart Three – Consulage Collected at Bandar ‘Abbas recorded in the Bombay 
Journals and Ledgers, 1730-1754 (Selected Years). 
 
 
Source: Bombay Presidency Journals and Ledgers, BL, IOR P/419/124-420/31. 
 
The private papers of merchants stationed in the western Indian Ocean region during 
the eighteenth century provide additional information on the scope and operation of 
private trade to the Persian Gulf from the west coast of India. The following case 
study explores this branch of British commerce in the years preceding the expansion 
of private trade in the 1750s. Private papers suggest this trade was steady, although 
rarely highly profitable, for British merchants at Bombay and Surat; especially when 
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eighteenth century.
67
 Yet, partly because of the challenging circumstances, this was a 
diverse and flexible private trade involving complex networks of Company servants, 
other British merchants, and Asian traders. 
The papers of Robert Cowan, the East India Company servant and governor 
of Bombay during the late 1720s and early 1730s, provide a particularly important 
and detailed insight into this. During his time as governor, Cowan maintained a 
regular trade to west Asia. His private letters unequivocally demonstrate that political 
developments affected trade and routinely disrupted his business in the 1720s. Cowan 
wrote in April 1723 expressing his hope that a ship due from Gombroon would bring 
favourable news as to the state of affairs in Persia, ‘which by the last was in a 
miserable condition’.68  Reports of stagnant trade continued throughout the 1720s 
however. Cowan later informed Henry Lowther of a potential new episode of turmoil 
in Persia in October 1729. Letters from Bandar ‘Abbas and Basra had made clear to 
him that the brother of the late Shah of Persia was marching to Isfahan with a 
‘considerable force’. The Company’s ‘gentlemen at Spahaun’ had deferred renewing 
the British commercial privileges treaty until they were better able to discern the 
potential impact of the troubles in the region.
69
 With regard to his private trade, this 
situation provided ‘little encouragement for sending any goods to Persia, no mony of 
any sort being to be had’.70 
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In a letter to Martin French at Bandar ‘Abbas, Cowan revealed that Basra also 
afforded few opportunities for private trade at this time. He wrote that he was ‘sorry 
to read your … Complaints of the badness of trade & scarcity of money and Bussorah 
from which thers verry little incourigment for being concerned thither or indeed any 
where in the gulph’. Unfortunately for Cowan, he was ‘ingaged to send Mr. 
Fotheringham in to Persia in the William haveing provided a cargo before I received 
these discourageing advices of the troubles that Kingdom is still like to be involv’d 
in’ in 1729. 71  Such complications did not prohibit Cowan’s trade altogether but 
obliged him to change his business plans on an ad hoc basis. His ‘scheme’ for the 
proposed ventures to Persia in the Resolution and William vessels, he told John 
Braddyll in November 1729, had to be modified. Instead of sending them to Persia, 
he planned to consign them to Mocha and Jeddah. He even stated to French that he 
would plan a further voyage to Basra if commercial information ‘provided the least 
encouragement’.72 
Cowan continued to regularly engage in private ventures, including several to 
Persia, in partnership with Henry Lowther at Surat during the 1720s and 1730s.
73
 
Cowan and Lowther’s joint ventures began in earnest in the late 1720s, especially 
with respect to west Asia. The pair were fundamentally reliant on Lowther’s 
connections to Indian merchants and brokers at Surat, to whom they advanced money 
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in order to procure goods for the Persia market. Although the goods that made up 
Lowther and Cowan’s ventures consisted predominantly of Indian-made textiles, they 
developed a diverse portfolio. Lowther advanced Armenian merchant ‘Cosa Meleck 
de Mercora’ four thousand rupees in June 1729 to finance the ‘Investment of goods 
for Persia’, one of many examples of such advances which regularly totalled several 
thousand pounds.
74
 More generally, Cowan’s account books clearly show that Basra 
and Bandar ‘Abbas were significant, and sometimes profitable, destinations for his 
private trading activities. He was confident enough to regularly lay out large sums in 
ventures to the port, although his profits were relatively modest.
75
 On his return to 
Britain, Cowan had several substantial ventures remaining in India, including a half 
share in a voyage in the Peggy grab to Basra that amounted to 7364 rupees, a quarter 
share in a voyage to Basra of 8230 rupees and a 
3
/8 share in a voyage to Mocha and 
Basra of 40,194 rupees total stock.
76
 
Cowan’s papers demonstrate how he was able to carry on his Persia trade with 
some success despite hazardous conditions. Profit was there to be made for private 
traders in the early eighteenth century, especially for high-ranking Company servants 
like Cowan and Lowther. Ventures to the region undoubtedly remained extremely 
high-risk and Cowan was fortunate in suffering few losses. His account books 
nevertheless reveal that the profits derived from his Persia ventures were frequently 
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smaller than the returns derived from trading farther afield.
77
 Moreover, even for the 
most prominent merchants, employing the right associates, maintaining a diverse and 
varied trading portfolio, and having a great deal of good fortune was imperative for 
success in this trade. 
The next section of this chapter considers another significant centre of British 
trade in the west Asian region: the port city of Mocha in the Yemen. Mocha was an 
important destination for the private trade of Company servants on the west coast. 
Indeed, it was an prominent centre for all British private trade in the eighteenth 
century. Yet, the fortunes of both Company trade and private trade at Mocha at this 
time mirrored the Persian establishments. The Company experienced sustained and 
persistent barriers to successful trade in the Red Sea region. Endemic piracy, slow 
moving or wildly fluctuating markets, political upheaval, and what the British saw as 
the unfair conduct of a succession of port officials, all affected the Company and its 
servants’ trade during the first half of the 1700s. Private trade to the region 
nevertheless continued and remained significant for high-ranking Company servants 
based at Bombay and Surat, as well as British merchants stationed at Mocha. The 
way in which merchants were able to operate within and exploit the Company’s 
operational structures was particularly important for this trade. 
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III – Mocha, the Red Sea and British Trade 
 
 
Like Bandar ‘Abbas, by the seventeenth century Mocha had established itself as a 
significant entrepôt within the Indian Ocean trading world.  It was described as the 
‘City of the greatest Commerce in all Arabia-Felix’ and contemporary commentators 
believed that there were ‘hardly any Maritime Nations, either of Europe, Asia, or 
Africa, who do not send their ships to Mocha’.78 Merchants considered it the ‘prime 
Port of Trade in the Red-Sea’ and it harboured ships from ‘Suratte, Cambaya, Diu, 
Malabar, and other Parts of India, and from several Parts of Europe, as England, 
Holland, France, Denmark, and Portugal; as also from the Island of Socotra, and the 
Pots of Caxem and Mascate, on the Coasts of Arabia, and the Gulf of Persia’.79 
Mocha’s significance stemmed from its location at the end of several important 
caravan routes, from ‘Barbary, Egypt, Turkey, Abissinia, and other Parts of Arabia’.80 
Functioning in a similar way to many other port cities, Mocha not only anchored the 
Red Sea’s global trade but acted as a maritime gateway for inland regional 
networks.
81
 Mocha acted chiefly as a mart of transhipment rather than a production 
centre too. It was a key distribution point for several commodities to the rest of 
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Arabia, India and East Africa, particularly as the trade in Mocha’s chief commodity – 
coffee – developed rapidly during the eighteenth century.82 
Mocha was closely connected to India through trade. Ashin Das Gupta 
characterised the Red Sea area as a nexus where overlapping regional and 
transnational markets that existed for Indian goods converged. Demand from local 
Arabian populations, from the hajj and also later European trade, all came together in 
the area. The hajj in particular anchored a vast network of exchange due to the large 
annual market that developed at Mecca ‘as pilgrims from all over the Ottoman 
Empire and the Islamic world assembled at that city’.83 It provided a ready-made 
extensive demand for Indian goods and encouraged trade between India and the Red 
Sea. Alongside Mocha, the port of Jeddah also developed into an important port town 
due to its proximity to Mecca.
84
 
The beginnings of East India Company involvement in the Red Sea can be 
traced back to the early days of English trade in Asia. The Company first explored the 
possibility of establishing a factory at Mocha as early as 1609, and carried on an 
intermittent trade from around 1618. The same year, the Dutch also secured 
permission to establish a factory at the port. Following Yemen’s independence from 
the Ottoman Empire, European traders had to seek permission to trade from the Zaydi 
Imams, who according to Salibi, ‘generally favoured’ foreign commerce. This had a 
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positive effect on the growth of European trade in the region.
85
 Yet, the development 
of English commerce experienced slow progress. Trade remained infrequent and 
vulnerable to regular attacks by ‘pirates’ in the Red Sea. 86  For much of the 
seventeenth century, trade with Mocha was largely unprofitable for the East India 
Company, and it eventually abandoned a regular trade there altogether in 1765.
87
  
The desire to re-establish more permanent commercial links endured however, 
especially as the lucrative potential of the coffee trade became clear. As early as the 
1660s, coffee exports were bringing considerable prosperity to Yemeni seaports and 
the name of Mocha became synonymous with the highest grade coffee in Europe.
88
 
The Yemeni hinterland produced coffee in abundance, and caravans transported the 
crop overland to Mocha to be vended at the port. The beans were conveyed from 
several places, but most notably from Bayt al-Faqih, known as ‘Beetlefuckee’ by the 
British. It was thought of as the ‘greatest Market for Coffee in the World’ in the early 
eighteenth century.
89
 Mocha prospered due to its proximity to coffee-growing centres 
such as Bayt al-Faqih, and it became the major international distribution point for this 
highly lucrative commodity.
90
 Rene Barendse estimated that by 1680, coffee was the 
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major product traded throughout the Arabian Seas region both in terms of quantity 
and level of investment.
91
 
In most years from this point until the end of direct trade, the Company sent at 
least one ship to Mocha from England, the trade being overseen by supercargoes. One 
of these men would go ‘up-country’ to act as the procurement agent for coffee, 
usually purchasing enough to fill up the Company’s vessel. The Directors remained 
sceptical of the idea of a factory at Mocha for some time however, preferring to 
continue the supercargo system or contract with the merchants of Surat for 
consignments of coffee.
92
 The decision to establish a more permanent concern at 
Mocha was taken in 1715. One of the chief attractions of this was that ‘the servants 
would have at least seven months in the cheapest season for buying coffee’, although 
the supercargo system remained in place to operate alongside the factory.
93
 
The factory was established at a critical juncture. According to Tuchscherer, 
the output of Yemeni coffee probably reached its zenith in the first quarter of the 
eighteenth century, at around 12,000 to 15,000 tonnes a year.
94
 K.N. Chaudhuri 
argued that the Red Sea remained almost ‘out of bounds’ for European shipping until 
the end of the seventeenth century due to political problems and piracy, and it was not 
until the beginning of the eighteenth century that both the British and the Dutch 
Companies could safely call regularly at Mocha. He suggested that the port was at the 
height of its importance to Europe between 1720 and 1740.
95
 The number of ships 
calling at Mocha certainly peaked at this time. The East India Company’s shipping 
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records for the port show that thirty EIC ships called at Mocha between 1720 and 
1739 compared to just nine between 1703 and 1719.
96
 The Company’s export of 
coffee from Mocha unsurprisingly grew rapidly during this period too.
97
 The 
purchase price also increased. The general letter from Mocha to Bombay in May 
1725 reported that the price of coffee had not been less than 190 Spanish Dollars per 
Bayt al-Faqih bahar, and had been as high as 215 earlier in the year. The Company’s 
servants believed that it would in fact yield no profit at all in England if bought at 
such unprecedented prices. Just a few years previously, coffee was available for 120 
Spanish Dollars per bahar.
98
 
Largely due to the popularity of coffee, the East India Company factory at 
Mocha, eventually established for the trading season 1718-1719, remained active 
throughout the eighteenth century despite experiencing several periods of stagnant 
trade.
99
 In many ways however, because of its short history, small size and frequent 
closure, Mocha actually remained a rather peripheral part of the Company’s factory 
system. Whilst it was the main British factory in the Red Sea, it fared little better than 
its Persian counterparts over much of the eighteenth century in terms of operating as a 
profitable establishment. The general picture of the state of Company trade at the port 
gleaned from their records is one of commercial disruption and problems posed by 
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high expenses. As with Bombay early in the eighteenth century and Bandar ‘Abbas in 
later decades, the Company found it hard to make the Mocha factory pay. 
One factor that accounted for this was the general decline in the Red Sea trade 
from the 1730s, as highlighted by existing scholarship. This was precipitated both by 
changes in the international coffee trade and crisis in Yemen’s internal affairs. Firstly, 
the spread of coffee cultivation worldwide adversely affected Mocha’s commerce. 
The port’s importance as a centre of the coffee trade suffered as a result of the 
growing importance of Ceylon, Java, the Caribbean and South America as coffee-
producing areas. The rise of these new centres of production was extremely rapid too: 
Macro estimated that as early as 1726, ninety per cent of Dutch coffee exports 
originated in Java, when five years earlier, almost the same percentage came from 
Mocha.
100
 Although a Red Sea trading network centred on coffee largely remained in 
place until the end of the nineteenth century, as Brian Cowan and Michel Tuchscherer 
both indicated, Mocha’s share of world coffee output declined rapidly and 
appreciably. By 1750, the coffee trade by the Company from Mocha had almost 
collapsed due to competition from the other coffee-producing regions.
101
 After 1730, 
the annual import of the East India Company was equivalent to 548,000 kilos and 
accounted for only four to six per cent of total imports, compared to over one million 
kilos and around twenty per cent in the mid-1720s.
102
 The price of coffee purchased 
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by the Company also fell rapidly. It could be bought for 150 Spanish Dollars per 
bahar as early as 1732, around 100 in 1738 and acquired in bulk for as little as 63 
Dollars per bahar in 1741.
103
 
More localised factors also had an impact on British trade at the port. With 
much of the coffee crop grown and distributed away from the coast, especially at 
Bayt al-Faqih, Europeans depended on local agents to source coffee from the 
production centres in the Yemen and transport it to Mocha. Political problems inland 
and out of the control of foreign traders seriously disrupted this supply chain and 
affected trade.
104
 Markets also remained volatile. East India House received regular 
complaints about the general state of trade in the Red Sea region from its employees 
during the early eighteenth century. The Company’s resident at Mocha explained in 
1721 that ‘this markett is very precarious, a very small surplus of any thing before in 
demand immediately falls the price occasioned by there not being above four or five 
substantial merchants in the place that can be trusted to buy a considerable 
bargain’.105 Similarly, Bombay’s general letter to the Company made it clear in 1723 
that the ‘great dearth’ at Mocha had put a ‘great damp on all Trade except 
Provisions’, and the price of coffee had risen dramatically.106  
Not only were the East India Company’s employees concerned about the 
prospects for trade in the region, but they regularly complained about the conduct of 
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the Mocha government and the port’s officials throughout the first half of the century. 
Contemporary British accounts also characterised them as avaricious, unscrupulous 
men. Captain Alexander Hamilton wrote that ‘The Governor of Mocha and the 
Officers of the Town, are Merchants, When they think to get good bargains, and are 
very ready to break their Contracts, both in Payment of their Debts, and in the Time 
of Payment’.107 The relationship between the British and the ruling power holders, 
chief merchants and officials seems to have further deteriorated by the 1720s. When 
reporting into the Company’s situation at Mocha in 1723, Bombay governor William 
Phipps told his employers that the ‘daily enchroachments and many Impositions laid 
on us by the Governments
 
of this place and Beetlefuckee make us despair giveing 
your Honours any hopes of our greviances being addressed by the Imaum’. Phipps 
also indicated this was a problem faced by all the European companies at Mocha. The 
Dutch and French attempted to resolve numerous issues with the governor of the 
town, as well as the British. Though these complaints were ‘never so heavy’ they 
were ‘seldom or ever was attended with success’. Phipps suggested that engaging in a 
‘joint application with the French & Dutch by makeing together a handsome present 
might lighten the burden we labour under’.108 
Additional customs duties exacted arbitrarily by the Mocha government 
especially frustrated the Company. The import fees on a number of Surat goods were 
a major source of revenue for the Mocha governor, who levied a duty of nine per cent 
on them. The Company imported many such goods on Company ships as Surat 
merchants were attracted to freighting cargo to take advantage of the low rates the 
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British enjoyed at Mocha.
109
 The Company also encouraged their servants to exploit 
the discrepancy this freight trade and thereby ‘divert a great part of the Suratters 
Trade into the English Channel’.110 The Mocha governor, who felt his revenues were 
being unfairly reduced through this practice, placed new charges on the Company.
111
 
He demanded more customs duties and more tribute. William Phipps went as far as 
declaring that the factory was of no great benefit to the Company as a result, as 
previously favourable commercial terms had been damaged by the requirement to 
provide the expensive presents now expected by the local officials.
112
 Around the 
same time, Robert Cowan also wrote to the Company in 1725 with a similar 
complaint. He stressed that ‘at Mocha I am humbly of opinion nothing is to be done 
by fair means, the insatiable avarice of the Emaum makes him Connive at all the 
Extortions of his ministers, or rather approve them, since according to their gains they 
always contribute to his cofferrs’.113 Again, as at Bombay and Surat, British notions 
of the permanency of trading rights and privileges were challenged. 
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Company officials did regularly attempt to air such grievances with Yemen’s 
political elite, outlining what they saw as the litany of exactions the British had been 
forced to bear. A letter sent on behalf of the Company to ‘Sheike Amir’ in 1727 
complained that he had ‘trifled with them over answers’ to their demands. This 
frustrated the British further following the ‘ill treatment … received [at Mocha] in 
recent years’. The Company waited to see how Francis Dickinson, the agent in charge 
of the Mocha factory in 1728, would be treated by Mocha’s governor so they would 
be ‘better able to judge whether friendship is deserved’ and trade would be 
continued.
114
 The Company’s factors at Bombay again considered withdrawing the 
Mocha factory altogether due to these perceived exactions. 
The British also felt that Mocha’s leading merchants had a negative impact on 
the smooth operation of trade. The conduct of Qasim al-Turbati, a prominent 
merchant of the town, routinely vexed Company officials and private traders alike 
during the early years of the factory’s life. A common contemporary narrative, 
echoed by Nancy Um in her recent book on Mocha, focused on the fact that ‘Cofsin 
Turbatty’ was de facto ruler of the port, despite never holding official high office, and 
that he had ignored the long-standing privileges of the British. A ship-owner and very 
wealthy individual, he developed strategic relations with European merchants but also 
held a large degree of control of British trade at Mocha, particularly in the 1720s.
115
 
A report compiled at this time argued that: 
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‘When the English Nation and Honble English Company was first encouraged 
to settle a Factory in Mocha the Emaum was pleased to grant their then chief a 
Phirmaund wherein besides six hundred Bales of Coffee annually custom free 
he promised them the Free Trade of the port and Country upon paying three P. 
Cent & no more for all goods bought & sold by them, the protection of their 
servants & justice when ever demanded, with severall other priviledges which 
for some years after they enjoyed, and the Company drove a considerable 
trade investing yearly large sums of money in Coffee to the great Increase of 
the royall revenues.’ 
However, when ‘Cofsin Turbatty came to have the sole authority in Mocha’, the 
Company’s trade was ‘so loaded with new impost & exhorbitant charges one year 
after another and debts constructed by him the said Turbatty … that they found 
themselves obliged to withdraw their settlement last year’.116 Al-Turbati’s position 
did not align with British views of the management of commerce, and their criticisms 
of his conduct reflected the Company’s notions of the legitimacy of officials. This 
again illustrates the extent to which the Company were unable to entrench their 
position in the Red Sea trade despite attempts to discuss trade through diplomatic 
petitioning. 
As well as the role played by Mocha’s officials however, as with Bandar 
‘Abbas, the issue of the factory expenses at Mocha also intersected with the East 
India Company’s trade. Since it appeared that the Company was routinely losing 
money on the settlement throughout the 1720s, but wanted to maintain the coffee 
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trade nonetheless, the Directors placed great pressure on their servants to reduce the 
level of the factory’s expenses. They advised the Mocha merchants to be vigilant with 
the factory’s accounts and put them under constant pressure to provide explanations 
for their outgoings. The Company’s servants offered a number of justifications for the 
expenses of the factory. Even in 1719, when the trading season was relatively brisk in 
commercial terms, they argued that high provisioning costs were unavoidable. ‘There 
have been at Mocha this Season 2 large Dutch ships, a French ship and the Ostender 
[vessel] Empress’ yet keeping expenses down was difficult due to the fact that 
‘everything is more expensive in Mocha than India’.117 On visiting the factory in 
1721 having been charged to inspect all aspects of the Company’s activities by the 
Directors, William Phipps blamed the high expenses on the cost of keeping the large, 
grand house the Company used as its factory building. Phipps nevertheless 
emphasised that renting such premises was the customary way of conducting trade, 
arguing that ‘it may be necessary that such a publick way of living be maintained to 
preserve respect from these country people, which I find practiced by other European 
nations’.118  
Later commentators stressed the poor management of trade by Mocha factory 
chiefs. The Court of Directors charged Robert Cowan, who served as chief at Mocha 
in the 1720s, with the task of reviving the fortunes of British trade there on his 
appointment in 1723. Significantly, Cowan felt that the Company’s affairs and the 
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‘nation’s creditt’ had suffered from the mismanagement of former chiefs.119 When 
Phipps returned to Mocha in the same year as Cowan’s appointment moreover, he 
found everything ‘in the greatest disorder & confusion imaginable occasioned by Mr. 
Albert’s [the former chief factor] dilatoryness; who had not so much endeavoured to 
ballance the books which were sent to Bombay nor kept any regular account
 
of the 
receipts and issues of the cash’.120 
The Company’s factory ceased to operate for two seasons, as early as 1726, as 
both the Directors and the Bombay Council had already abandoned the idea of 
operating a factory all year round to save money. Coinciding with political crisis in 
the Yemen, the factory was wound up by order of the Company 1726 and it was not 
until 1728 that the merchant Francis Dickinson returned to negotiate the terms of the 
reestablishment of trade there. During these years, a merchant was sent out for the 
coffee ‘season’ to supervise purchases, while for the rest of the year a banian 
representative was employed to maintain the Company’s presence.121 By 1727, the 
Company tentatively proposed to renew the factory at Mocha. They verbosely 
reminded the Government ‘what benefit the English Factory was to the town of 
Mocha’ and stressed that when it had been withdrawn ‘the price of Coffee at 
Beetlefuckee is but at seventy dollars the Bahar which two years ago was at Two 
hundred & Twenty’. They stressed that the Company annually imported in ready 
money three to four ‘lacks’ worth of Spanish dollars to lay out in coffee and that ‘a 
vast number of the poor subjects of his Majesty [the Mocha governor] gaind their 
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daily bread by working in & about the Factory, which now they are deprived of’.122 
Trade was resurrected in 1728 and seems to have continued without dramatic 
upheaval, although regular complaints about the state of Mocha’s commerce 
persisted. 
The East India Company’s employees at Mocha continued to provide negative 
reports during the 1740s. Merchant Charles Crommelin informed the Bombay 
Council in August 1741 that the government at Mocha was ‘entirely changed’ from 
the previous year. This did provide some boost to trade, and he told the Council that 
‘the Freight ... this Year [from Surat is] considerably more than it was the last’. Yet, it 
‘would have been still larger’, he wrote, ‘had the Inland Trade been open, but that 
being in a great measure stop’d by the Wars up Country it occasioned the Merchants 
meeting with a very indifferent Market this season for their Goods’.123 By the 1750s, 
after a period of fluctuating fortunes but general decline, there was a further period of 
stagnation in the Red Sea markets. ‘The Markets both here, & at Juddah have been 
very Indifferent this Year, where, the Merchants have not sold half the Goods they 
carried’ complained the Mocha factors to the Court of Directors in August 1752.124 
Surat goods were ‘in no demand, nor Bengall, except the Coarse sorts, so that most of 
the ships this season will be obliged to Leave a large part of their Cargoes unsold, or 
bring them back’.125 Traders from Surat were particularly affected by such a volatile 
market as Mocha had long acted as a key locale for Surat-based merchants. It was 
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reported that traders from the west coast port had ‘got Large Quantities of goods 
unsold, and a Great deal of money outstanding’ in 1752, damaging Surat’s trade.126 
That year, the factory was again given up by the East India Company. 
Existing scholarship has infrequently explored how these constraints on 
profitable trade at Mocha affected British private commerce with the Red Sea region. 
British notions of how trade should be conducted clashed with the realities of the 
organisation of commerce at Mocha. As with Bandar ‘Abbas and the Persian Gulf, 
although the problematic context adversely affected both Company and private trade 
in the region, private ventures and trading schemes from India continued throughout 
the period. Mocha remained an important destination for the private trade of 
Company servants based at Bombay and Surat in particular. Based close to the 
region, British merchants on the west coast of India were able to trade with some 
success despite the tumultuous and fluctuating commercial environment. In fact, for 
much of its short-lived life as a permanent Company establishment, the affairs of the 
Mocha factory were deeply intertwined with the private activities of Company 
servants. Although maintaining a settlement in the Red Sea was critical for the 
Company’s hold on the coffee trade, it also supported British private trade in the 
western Presidency and provided numerous opportunities for senior servants or those 
connected to high-ranking individuals. The following section attends to this branch of 
commerce in more detail. 
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IV – Private Trade in the Red Sea Region 
 
 
The correspondence and papers of the East India Company and its employees reveal 
sophisticated networks of private trade to Mocha, and also Jeddah, during the early 
eighteenth century. A range of luxury goods from the Red Sea region were in high 
demand globally. Mocha’s connection with British trade did not just involve coffee 
for instance, but a whole range of luxury and semi-luxury items as shown by the lists 
of private trade on Company vessels operating between Europe and Mocha. Private 
trade on board several ships from the port as part of the mariners’ privilege – the King 
William, the Heathcote, the Streatham and the Morice in the 1720s and 30s – as well 
as an account of goods registered as private in August 1752, are recorded in the 
Mocha factory records. They comprise a diverse range of commodities. Although 
coffee forms a large part of the cargo listed, aloes, myrrh, shellac, cardamoms, ostrich 
feathers and gum Arabic also appear.
127
 The Company’s hold on the coffee trade 
allied with the willingness of private traders to deal in low-volume goods meant a 
broad range of commodities was common in private trade.
128
 
As the work of P.J. Marshall has made clear, these two locations were also the 
principal ports of call in the Red Sea for British private country shipping. They 
received at least one ship per year from Calcutta until the 1760s for instance, and as 
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many as three per year during the 1730s. However, this was also seen as an uncertain 
trade and there were regular poor seasons, even in years when the trade appeared to 
be ‘generally buoyant’ for Bengal merchants. The difficulties for British merchants at 
Calcutta eventually became more and more acute until the Red Sea was dismissed as 
an unprofitable market.
129
 Its proximity to the west coast of India meant that the Red 
Sea remained an important locale for private trade networks emanating from Bombay 
and Surat during the first decades of the eighteenth century too.
130
 Although Asian 
merchants continued to dominate this trade across the Arabian Seas, there is plenty of 
evidence to suggest the early and regular involvement of British merchants on the 
west coast with this commercial avenue. Again however, this was a precarious, 
uncertain and often unprofitable trade. 
William Mildmay, a high-ranking Company servant at Karwar on the Malabar 
Coast was involved in numerous ventures to the region in the early eighteenth 
century. However, his own investments and dividends were small. Mildmay lost one 
ship bound to Jeddah at Calicut in 1706, although he lost just a few hundred rupees. 
Mildmay regularly lent money at bottomry for Arabian voyages, including another 
venture to Jeddah in April 1704, and again on the ‘Rising Eagle to Moco and back’ in 
March 1705.
131
 These investments were undoubtedly smaller than those Mildmay laid 
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out on voyages to China and London, but did provide some small returns.
132
 Profit 
did not come easily on the Red Sea run, although for traders who had robust finances 
and were prepared to be courageous, creative and unscrupulous there were ways of 
turning a profit in the uncertain Mocha market. In 1704 the Company were informed 
of the ‘Great complaints against Mr. Proby and Bonnell in freighting the Ships to 
Mocha and Persia, no other Europeans going thither, and in purchasing Goods which 
are cheaper than in twenty years past’.133 
The establishment of the Company’s factory at Mocha provided further 
private trade opportunities for its servants, especially in the coffee trade.  Right from 
the initial establishment of the factory, the Company was acutely concerned about the 
ways in which private trade could affect operations there. With Mocha under the 
jurisdiction of Bombay, the Directors were reluctant to hand over control of the 
coffee trade to the Presidency town. They mistrusted their servants and feared they 
would manipulate the trade in this significant luxury good. Coffee was a ‘rising 
commodity’ and a major source of revenue in the eighteenth century, but if Bombay 
was put in sole charge of its supply, the Directors believed, servants could buy up 
coffee privately and re-sell to the Company at an inflated price.
134
 This fear was 
ultimately well-founded: the factory in the Red Sea not only facilitated regular access 
to the coffee market, but also provided greater opportunity for servants, especially the 
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senior merchants and chiefs of the factory, to enhance their private trade.
135
 The 
Company’s employees stationed at the Red Sea port relied on connections with 
Bombay and Surat for the support of their own business. The papers of two East India 
Company servants resident at Mocha during the 1710s and 1720s, John Hill and 
Robert Cowan, convey the complexity of this private commercial activity between 
Bombay and the Red Sea. Hill and Cowan’s activities point to the diversity of goods 
dealt with by private traders and highlight the importance of widespread networks of 
correspondents and agents for private trade. 
Hill’s role as an agent for the governor of Bombay, Charles Boone, allowed 
him to develop a significant private trade during the early part of his Company career. 
Boone was the chief merchant behind several large voyages to Mocha in the second 
decade of the eighteenth century, and regularly relied on using Hill’s services as an 
agent. Their joint activities were taking place just as the Company was establishing a 
more permanent presence at Mocha, between 1717 and 1721. Despite the coffee trade 
of the Company apparently reaching its peak, seasonal fluctuations still affected 
trade.  Boone described himself as ‘sensibly mortifyed, to find your Markett so dull’ 
in one letter to Hill at Mocha in October 1718. Nevertheless, Boone consigned a ship 
with a stock of around 133,000 rupees to Mocha, allowing Hill one per cent 
commission for his ‘Assistance’ if the goods could be sold there. If not, the 
supercargoes had instructions to proceed to Jeddah, and Boone implored Hill to let 
                                                     
135
 Indeed, Mocha could be a profitable posting for all European merchants. Commodore Roggewin, 
who sailed round the world from 1721 to 1723, wrote that the Dutch were in a secure position in 
Mocha that was eminently profitable for its servants. He believed that whoever was chief of the factory 
had the opportunity to make a vast fortune in a short time. Cited in Arthur W. Stiffe, ‘Ancient Trading 
Centres of the Persian Gulf: VI Bandar ‘Abbas’, Geographical Journal, 16/2 (1900), p. 214. 
 207 
 
them have ‘what necessary Instructions, and Recommendatory letters, you think 
proper’.136 
Months later however, on assessing the foregoing trading season, Hill wrote 
to Boone at Bombay to express his sorrow that ‘this year has been the dullest for 
trade’, even for Bengal goods. Although he still hoped that ‘Times will mend’ there, 
Hill believed the markets at Jeddah were in even greater disorder. This, he claimed, 
was of ‘very great concern’ to him, knowing how much Boone was concerned in that 
market.
137
 At the same time, Hill did not of course neglect his own interest. He 
naturally received commission from all his agency work. Boone occasionally returned 
the favour and sold Hill’s goods in Bombay and Surat.138 He also regularly sent 
money to Bayt al-Faqih to procure coffee on his own account. In August 1719, one 
such consignment totalled 16,000 Spanish Dollars.
139
 In fact, in 1720, Hill was 
suspended from his post at Mocha ordered to Bombay to answer for improper 
conduct in his management of Company affairs. He was accused of providing coffee 
to the Ostenders, and ‘Captain Pearson’, whilst a Company ship’s order remained 
unfulfilled.
140
 
A particularly significant element of private business between west India and 
Mocha was the trade in Indian textiles. This appears to have endured even in years of 
generally poor trade. Most of Mocha’s demand for Indian goods in the eighteenth 
century was satisfied by the flow of goods from western India, particularly from 
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Surat.
141
 British Company servants and private traders based at Bombay and Surat 
became heavily involved in this branch of Arabian Sea trade. Throughout the 
partnership between Hill and Boone, the merchants conveyed several consignments 
of various types of textiles, including ‘gurrahs’ (plain, coarse muslin), ‘mullmulls’ 
(fine, soft muslin) and ‘soosies’ (a type of silk cloth for which Surat was renowned). 
Their accounts detail the value of these goods amounted to several thousand Spanish 
Dollars each time. One account summary dated 3
 
September 1722 lists the following 
goods: two consignments of gurrahs amounting to 4000 and 2900 Spanish Dollars in 
1719, goods from the Morice totalling 1710 Spanish Dollars, one bale of soosies for 
708 Spanish Dollars and thirty-three bales of brown gurrahs worth 2925 Spanish 
Dollars.
142
 The largest consignment was eighty-seven bales of gurrahs sent by Boone 
on the George from Bombay to the value of 14,474 rupees amongst a total stock of 
133,000 rupees.
143
 
Although the George was bound for Jeddah, it called at Mocha on both the 
outward and homeward legs. Indeed, private traders often used Mocha not as a final 
destination for their ships but as a port of call on the way to Basra or Jeddah.
144
 
Boone consigned the gurrahs to Hill and Henry Albert at Mocha, asking them to sell 
them on and to remit the proceeds with the vessel on its return to India.
145
 The bill of 
lading for these goods show they belonged to several different merchants, many of 
whom were Company factors at Bombay, including the custom master, Thomas 
Waters. Throughout 1718 Hill made several sales of gurrahs, from this consignment 
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and others, to a senior merchant at Mocha, Mahommed Jasseen, and broker 
‘Turbetty’ on behalf of several other individuals including a Mr Parker (seven bales), 
Richard Waters (two bales), Bernard Whyche (ten bales) and John Clapham (ten 
bales). He also sold ten bales on his own account.
146
 
Hill also acted as the agent for a collection of other merchants, Company 
servants and mariners, independently of his association with Boone. He seems to 
have primarily dealt with Company servants based on the west coast of India and sent 
goods back there at various junctures. These included a bale of coffee to Bernard 
Whyche at Surat, a parcel of opium, a bag of silver and one of gold to Robert Adams 
at Cochin, and reeds, alloes and an anchor to Thomas Wilshere at Bombay.
147
 
Naturally too, he also provided an important service in remitting funds to Bombay. In 
just one month – August 1719 – 3963 Spanish Dollars were sent to Laurence Parker, 
339 to John Clapham, 1009 to Bernard Whyche and 4000 to Charles Boone via bills 
of exchange.
148
 Importantly too, many of Hill’s sales were to Mohammed Jasseen, 
who appeared regularly in his accounts and acted as a vital node in the private trade 
network.
149
 
However, even this was not always a smoothly functioning or profitable trade. 
Members of Hill and Boone’s network regularly encountered difficulties in their 
private business. Henry Albert, John Sedgwick and a Mr Browne wrote to Boone 
from Jeddah in March 1719 to update him on the progress of the cargo of the George. 
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They wrote that ‘We are very sorry to acquaint your Honour that the Markett of this 
place is so bad that We do not expect to see prime Cost on the whole, we have 
disposed of about half of the Cargo, and believe may see for that about 10 P Cent 
[profit], but for what remains We dont expect Prime Cost’. They also complained that 
various charges levied by the Mocha officials were ‘so extravagant that they will 
Amount upwards of 5 P Ct besides the presents which are in a manner taken away by 
force, having already given near 3000 dollars; besides what they may impose on us 
… on our going away’. Ultimately, they warned they were likely to make a 
‘miserable hand’ from the proceeds.150 
For all private traders then, not only were market conditions problematic but 
the conduct of the Mocha administration could adversely affect trade. As another 
example, the levy of higher customs on Surat goods imported by the British during 
the 1730s was met with widespread disaffection. Merchants were naturally concerned 
about the financial impact of charging more on these goods. According to the Mocha 
factory records, not only were British traders at Surat inconvenienced by having to 
pay the same export duty on goods from the Gujarati port as the ‘Suratters’, they were 
even more displeased that their private trade was effectively labelled as ‘Moorish’, as 
it was subject to the same conditions as the Indian merchants.
151
 
Robert Cowan’s activities at Mocha provide a further and more detailed 
example of various aspects of private trade in the Red Sea region. A recent article by 
Om Prakash explored Cowan’s private trade with Mocha and in so doing provided a 
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useful perspective on British private trade between Bombay, Surat and the Red 
Sea.
152
 However, there are still several elements of his activities that remain under-
explored; particularly as regards the significance of Red Sea ventures relative to his 
private trade as a whole and some of the detail of the range of his private concerns. 
There is also more than can be said about what Cowan’s trade reveals about the 
British private trade system as a whole. 
Cowan was installed as chief of the Company’s Mocha factory in 1723 and 
his extensive letters reveal a great deal about the attitude of British merchants towards 
Mocha. Ultimately, Cowan came to loathe the Red Sea port despite initially 
describing his station there as one more of ‘proffite than pleasure’ and expressing 
confidence that in a few years he could ‘acquire such a competency as may enable me 
to Returne & enjoy my friends in Europe’. That was unless, he emphasised, ‘ambition 
prompts me to attempt something higher’.153 His tenure clearly did not work out as 
auspiciously as he hoped. Cowan’s letters from Mocha to numerous correspondents 
continually emphasised both the low level of trade at the port as well as the 
pernicious nature of the environment which he believed had adversely affected his 
well-being. 
By 1725, his initial optimism had ebbed away and Cowan was increasingly 
concerned about his own health and vigour, as well as his commercial fortunes. 
Writing to the Court of Directors, Cowan opined: ‘I have been seized by the same 
indisposition this year was I was the last, and only the hopes of getting quickly to 
Bombay keeps up my spirits, I beg your Honours will dispence with my not returning 
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any more after next season to this place, which has already very much impaired my 
health and would in a little time render me incapable of serving your Honours in any 
respect.’154  In a series of letters before he departed Mocha, Cowan declared his 
pleasure at having been directed to wind up the factory by the Company. He again 
declared that his health was ‘very much impaired’ and that as a result, he had no 
opportunity of serving his honourable masters to a respectable level.
155
 Privately, 
Cowan expressed his frustration that he had not made the most of a station in which 
his predecessors had ostensibly achieved grand estates through private trade.
156
 
Ultimately, Cowan stated that leaving Mocha thereby put an end to a time during 
which he had ‘suffered more Plague and disquiet both in Body & Mind these three 
last years than in all the different circumstances of Life before’.157 
Despite this, Cowan continued to develop his private trade during his time at 
Mocha. There are innumerable references in Cowan’s papers to his dealings in a 
variety of commodities while stationed at the Red Sea port. Firstly, he engaged 
regularly in the coffee trade despite the Company’s wish that their servants be 
excluded from dealing in the commodity. Cowan’s private trade was eventually 
investigated by the Company and he was accused of procuring coffee at cheap rates 
and selling it to the Company at an inflated price. The Company reported that Cowan 
regularly supplied his agent Mr Gerrard at Bayt al-Faqih with several thousand 
Spanish Dollars to procure as much coffee as possible. Gerrard informed Cowan on 
one occasion that one thousand bales could be bought and arranged for them to be 
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transported down to Mocha. This compared impressively to the Company’s own 
purchases of coffee from Mocha at this time which were regularly as few as two to 
three thousand bales.
158
 Ultimately, Cowan was cleared of taking his private trade 
further than his covenant allowed in the purchase of coffee. 
Beyond the coffee trade, Cowan, like Hill, acted as the agent for a number of 
other British merchants during his time at Mocha. He sold goods on behalf of others 
and recovered overdue debts, all at appropriate commission.
159
 The sheer variety of 
items that Cowan dealt with at Mocha, moreover, both on his own account and that of 
others’ illustrates the diversity of the goods that formed part of private trade cargoes 
from India. Cowan sold a number of different types of textiles from the west of India, 
including ‘allajars’ (silk piece-goods), blue and black ‘baftas’ (coarse cotton cloth) 
and ‘gurrahs’. As well as this, agala wood and pepper were common items imported, 
as revealed by his Mocha papers of 1724.
160
 He also engaged in direct trade with the 
Persian Gulf. He handled a large shipment of dates from Bandar ‘Abbas on behalf of 
Messrs Smith, French and Cordeux on one occasion and a very large consignment of 
rose water some years later.
161
 
Certain goods from the east of the subcontinent were also in high demand. 
Cowan referred several times in his letters to highly sought-after blue textiles that 
yielded good profits. In 1729, now resident at Bombay, he advised Captain Robert 
Bailie at Madras about potential trading opportunities at Mocha: ‘Two Days since 
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Arrived the Prince Frederick fro[m] Mocho which place is in perfect tranquility & the 
trade settled. Fort St. Davids blew Cloth & long Cloth is in good demand if you come 
hither from Madrass directly & have Room I would have you fill up with those 
species which Answer at Mocha better than any thing’. 162  Cowan’s posting at 
Bombay allowed him to continue his Mocha trade, especially in Indian goods. 
On being appointed to the Bombay governorship in the late 1720s, Cowan 
began to trade with Mocha directly, building on his knowledge of the market and his 
network of connections. His investments here, particularly in company with Henry 
Lowther at Surat, were clearly very large. Cowan established a crucial partnership 
with Lowther, who joined with Cowan in several voyages to destinations across the 
Indian Ocean and to the Far East. They were particularly active on the Surat-Mocha 
run however, and Om Prakash has even argued that the merchants became the 
undisputed masters of this trade route  in the 1730s.
163
 The overwhelming majority of 
the goods handled by Cowan and Lowther in this trade were Gujarati textiles. 
Lowther’s chief aide, the broker Loldas Parak, arranged the procurement of a range of 
textiles for the private traders and Lowther claimed they had over one thousand 
weavers working for them in a letter of 1731.
164
 
In terms of financing this trade, Prakash has argued that the work undertaken 
by Cowan and Lowther to raise money for their cargos through respondentia loans, 
was considerable. Such loans regularly held an interest rate of sixteen per cent, rising 
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to as much as twenty per cent in some cases.
165
 Cowan’s correspondence also shows 
that Lowther took out loans through Parak and other brokers at Surat in order to 
purchase the commodities involved in this trade.
166
 Having raised funds, a typical 
Cowan-Lowther voyage was packed full of cargo and freight vendible in Middle East 
markets. One of their voyages to Mocha in 1731 contained 53,000 rupees worth of 
stock, with Cowan himself being concerned for as much as 37,120 rupees.
167
 
Despite these large investments though, of which there were several during 
the duration of their partnership, dividends were relatively small, especially compared 
to the profits Cowan derived from voyages to other destinations.
168
 Referring to one 
voyage of the ship Greenwich to Mocha, he wrote to Lowther in 1729 saying that ‘I 
am sorry that voyage did not Answer our Expectations it was the verry worst I have 
been concerned in since my being in India and I was a great sufferer by it’. 169 
Ultimately, Cowan’s private business with the Red Sea and Persia was a significant 
but unpredictable branch of his trade. Taking all the voyages he invested in between 
1729 and 1734 as a whole, Cowan made large gains, totalling over 77,000 rupees 
across the period. This was a fraction of the amount he recorded in his profit and loss 
accounts as a whole during his tenure as governor of Bombay, with a large majority 
of his profits coming from lending activities and his privileges as governor. 
Out of his private trade portfolio, Cowan’s Mocha and Persia investments 
initially appear to compare favourably to his ventures to other destinations in terms of 
                                                     
165
 Ibid., p. 229.  
166
 Cowan Papers, Reel 11607, D 654/B1/1D, Robert Cowan to Henry Lowther, 23 July 1729. 
167
 Cowan Papers, Reel 11631, D 654/B1/8B, Journal of Accounts Letter B, p. 85, 31
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the amount added to his coffers, as demonstrated in Chart Four below. Delving 
further into his figures however, it is clear that the profit derived from his west Asian 
ventures did not match up with those gained on voyages eastward. Importantly, 
Cowan derived a higher gain per voyage on his ventures east than he did from his 
Persia and Mocha ventures, as Chart Five suggests. He made several losses on the 
westward run too, especially towards the end of his time in the East Indies – 1734 
was the final season Cowan spent in India in its entirety. Cowan regularly engaged in 
west Asian voyages but the dangers posed by the sheer volatility of the Red Sea 
market and the restrictions that could be imposed at Mocha meant this trade was 
particularly precarious. 
 
Chart Four – Robert Cowan’s Recorded Gains on Ventures (by Destination), 
1729-1734 
 
Source: Collated from Cowan Papers, Reel 11631, D 654-B1/8B-8G, Foul Journals Letters B – G, 
December 1727 – July 1734. 
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What Cowan’s trade undoubtedly highlights is the absolute centrality of operating 
within a robust and reliable network of contacts, agents and procurement 
mechanisms. Cowan was fortunate that his senior position and his connection with 
Lowther, another high-ranking merchant, provided indispensable support that eased 
the risk of  trading to the Red Sea and Persia. Successive Bombay governors and 
merchants of high standing also owed their success to the insulating effect of status 
and earlier achievement. Finance and marketable goods were easily available to 
someone like Cowan, whilst it is also clear he demonstrated a high degree of 
flexibility, diversity, resilience and commercial acumen. His past experience in the 
Mocha market was also key to developing his private trade. 
 
Chart Five – Robert Cowan’s Average Gains on Ventures (by Destination), 
1729-1734 
 
 
Source: Collated from Cowan Papers, Reel 11631, D 654-B1/8B-8G, Foul Journals Letters B – G, 
December 1727 – July 1734. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
With the series of case studies outlined above, in addition to a detailed exploration of 
the East India Company’s correspondence, this chapter has outlined the changing 
contours of British trade in the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea regions over the first 
half of the eighteenth century. It has highlighted the volatile and challenging political 
and commercial landscape within which the Company and its servants operated 
during this period. Trade to west Asia was precarious as seemingly constant political 
turmoil and subsequent market upheaval adversely affected trade and the very 
survival of British commerce in the region. The Company’s jurisdictional authority 
was also constantly challenged in both Persian ports and at Mocha. Financial losses at 
the factories there had a notable effect on the Bombay accounts. 
Exploring this region does provide a novel insight into how Company and 
private trade were intertwined. The East India Company’s establishments did 
continue to operate during the first half of the eighteenth century. This was partly due 
to the fact that the British relied on both Mocha and Bandar ‘Abbas for the 
procurement of specific commodities; especially coffee and Carmenia wool. Indeed, 
despite complaints of stagnant trade throughout the eighteenth century, in the case of 
the Gulf, Amin stated that ‘the British were able to hold their position … for some 
one hundred and fifty years, despite the tremendous difficulties which they had to 
face from Portuguese and Dutch competition and from Persian, Ottoman and Arab 
oppression’.170 
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The reasons for the continuing commercial presence in the region can also be 
found in the realm of private trade. West Asian commerce formed an appreciable, 
although problematic, part of British merchants’ private trade from Surat and 
Bombay. They took advantage of ready markets for Indian goods, and engaged in the 
trade of luxury goods from Persia and the Arabian Peninsula. Indian textiles were a 
crucial commodity in this trade and they were handled in substantial quantities by 
Company servants operating out of western India. Private traders were also involved 
in the trade of a broad range of goods that not only comprised bulk, low value 
commodities, but significant amounts of low volume, luxury products too. 
Historians have rarely seen this part of the western Indian Ocean world as an 
important locale for British East Indian trade. Existing scholarship has also 
overlooked the networks of private commerce that linked the key port cities of 
Bandar ‘Abbas and Mocha with Bombay and Surat. Focusing on this element of 
private trade reveals how senior Company merchants operated within a hazardously 
unpredictable commercial sphere. It draws attention to how successful traders 
fundamentally relied on strategically using the Company’s framework and 
infrastructure, maintaining robust alliances with local merchants on both sides of the 
Arabian Seas, and preserving complex, international commercial relationships to 
maintain their private trade. 
This chapter again emphasises the importance of viewing the development 
and operation of private trade across the Indian Ocean world during the early 
eighteenth century in light of particular regional configurations. British merchants 
were reliant upon working within existing commercial structures in the Arabian Seas. 
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Private trade here remained extremely challenging for the merchants involved, 
notwithstanding the change in fortunes from the 1720s, because of political and 
economic circumstances peculiar to this part of maritime Asia. Trade with one of the 
major markets for Bombay and Surat merchants remained exceptionally risky and 
few Company servants were able to insulate themselves from these exigencies and 
turn a profit through private trade.  
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Chapter Four 
Private Trade in the Western Indian Ocean and Metropolitan 
Connections 
 
 
 
Moving beyond the intra-Asian world, this chapter focuses on the ways in which East 
India Company employees relied upon global networks for the maintenance of their 
private trade. For all eighteenth-century maritime merchants, establishing reliable and 
robust connections with a multitude of correspondents formed the key to successful 
commerce. Conducting business across vast distances in the age of sail fundamentally 
depended on personal ties that were vital for procuring capital, for trading by proxy in 
distant markets, and for carrying out a plethora of related legal and commercial 
services. All merchants were therefore dependent on the strength of their network of 
associates; whether these were based on loose acquaintance, friendship or kinship, or 
those upheld through correspondence, contracts and financial mechanisms.
1
 
Recent work on early modern merchant networks across Eurasia has 
emphasised the importance of far-reaching personal ties for a multitude of different 
commercial groups.
2
 The connections of British merchants working in the Indian 
Ocean world during the eighteenth century were similarly extensive. While acting as 
part of a global trading empire, they were also individuals that lay at the heart of 
                                                     
1
 Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron, Trading Cultures: The Worlds of Western Merchants: Essays on 
Authority, Objectivity and Evidence (Turnhout, 2001), p. 2. 
2
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Networks in Port Cities, c.1640-1940 (St. John’s, 2008), pp. 1-14; Bhaswati Bhattacharya, Gita 
Dharampal-Frick and Jos Gommans, ‘Spatial and Temporal Continuities of Merchant Networks in 
South Asia and the Indian Ocean (1500-2000)’, JESHO, 50/2-3 (2007) and Perry Gauci, The Politics 
of Trade: The Overseas Merchant in State and Society, 1660-1720 (Oxford, 2001). 
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complex networks of mutual associations, the dimensions of which stretched across 
continents and could reach far beyond the mercantile profession.
3
 British traders in 
Asia did not just operate within the confines of a bounded ‘Indian Ocean world’, 
therefore, but were also part of a wider empire of trade.
4
 
The three previous chapters of this thesis have focused predominantly on 
intra-Asian trade and specific elements of private commerce in and around the 
western Indian Ocean. This chapter attends to what can be termed the ‘metropolitan’ 
dimension of this private trade: it explores the connections formed by East India 
Company servants between western India and Britain, and discusses their impact and 
importance. Although much existing work on British private trade has concentrated 
on Asian waters and on the ‘country trade’, research has also established that the 
private networks of free merchants and East India Company servants comprised 
connections back to Britain that were critical for the development and maintenance of 
private trade. Holden Furber over four decades ago emphasised the significance of 
connections to ‘home’, particularly through the diamond trade used to remit private 
fortunes in the later eighteenth century.
5
 Ian Bruce Watson also emphasised that ties 
to family members, friends and other associates in London remained a major factor in 
Anglo-Indian private trade, particularly as a source of finance.
6
 
                                                     
3
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4
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Creation of a Global Maritime Empire’, in H.V. Bowen, Elizabeth Mancke and John G. Reid (eds), 
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 See, in particular, Holden Furber, John Company at Work: A Study of European Expansion in India 
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6
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Indeed, in the most recent in-depth study of this branch of European 
commerce, Søren Mentz argued for the pre-eminence of ties between India and 
London for the success of private trade. From the late seventeenth century, English 
merchants in Madras cultivated networks of commissioners who were able to readily 
access home markets. These merchants in London, who received goods or bills of 
exchange from Company servants, in turn despatched capital to India. Critically, this 
capital was hugely significant for funding private ventures in the Indian Ocean. The 
system was therefore a reciprocal one: Company servants looked after the economic 
interests of City merchants in Asia, and received much needed capital in return. 
Mentz ascribed a great deal of importance to this connection for the operation of 
English private trade in Madras, and indeed made the case that this domestic 
dimension should be afforded much greater significance in explorations of this 
commerce. He argued too that the preoccupation with the ‘Empire debate’ in existing 
studies of the subject obscured an appreciation of the private trade system as a global, 
independent merchant network.
7
 
Two articles on private trade published around the same time as Mentz’s 
work; one by sociologists Emily Erikson and Peter Bearman, and the other by Om 
Prakash, also characterised private trade as a ‘global’ phenomenon. Erikson and 
Bearman argue that not only were English private traders located and embedded 
within inter-continental networks of trade and finance, but that they also played a 
critical role in connecting the various regional markets in the Indian Ocean world to 
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an emerging global economy.
8
 Historians have increasingly characterised English 
East India merchants in the eighteenth century as part of the extensive process that 
saw the trade of the Indian Ocean world become ever more closely intertwined with 
currents and systems of global trade.
9
 They have considered private commerce to be a 
complex system that created and cultivated well-developed transnational ties between 
Company employees, the servants of other European companies, Indian merchants, 
and financiers in the City of London.
10
 
This chapter investigates just how such linkages played out in the particular 
commercial and political context of the Arabian Seas. Mobilising the services of 
numerous correspondents and agents was obviously crucial for Company servants to 
manage multiple ventures simultaneously. This was one of the keys to success in 
private trade, as the previous chapters emphasised. These networks of agents 
naturally included ties with Britain. The work of Mentz and others on the centrality of 
transcontinental connections is persuasive, and has introduced an important 
metropolitan dimension to the study of private trade. Critically, however, it is also 
based on a limited understanding of the regional diversity of private trade. Mentz’s 
claims cannot be readily applied to the system across maritime Asia as a whole. They 
are based on one particular locale; and one that was uniquely connected with global 
                                                     
8
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financial networks thanks to its position at the centre of the diamond trade with 
Europe. This chapter argues that British merchants based in other areas – in this case, 
Bombay, Surat and the west coast – undoubtedly formed and used metropolitan 
connections, but did so in a different manner to Company servants stationed 
elsewhere. Importantly, the provision of capital and credit, or the remittance of 
money home, did not comprise the full range of private trade’s metropolitan 
connections. Domestic-based correspondents and associates supported private 
commerce beyond directly investing in it. They provided valuable information and 
useful knowledge about trade to Company servants, mediated patronage systems, and 
attempted to safeguard merchants’ reputations at East India House. This chapter 
therefore explores the significance of metropolitan connections, but again speaks to 
the importance of differentiating the ways in which the private trade system operated 
across the Indian Ocean world. Investigating the broader associations of private 
traders sheds light on the interaction between local configurations of commerce in the 
Arabian Seas, and global mercantile networks. 
The following discussion is divided into five parts, each of which explores the 
various ways in which connections with Britain supported the private trade of 
Company employees stationed at Bombay, Surat and elsewhere in the region. 
Financial mechanisms and bills of exchange were, of course, extremely important and 
the chapter will consider the role of home correspondents in providing capital for 
private trade and handling remittances from India. It is also imperative to look at 
other forms of connection between Britain and the western Indian Ocean. The chapter 
focuses on inter-personal ties, concentrating especially on correspondence and 
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merchants’ letters as the architecture that upheld private trade. Social as well as 
financial connections between Europe and Asia were vital for this commerce. 
 
I – The Centrality of Correspondence 
 
 
Transnational networks formed by Company merchants in the eighteenth century 
understandably relied heavily on circulations of correspondence. Letters formed the 
key vehicle through which servants maintained widespread connections that were 
vital for their private trade. Yet, historians working specifically on private trade have 
rarely addressed the central role of these texts directly. 
In the eighteenth century, mercantile letters criss-crossed the globe and were, 
in many ways, the cornerstone of commerce. Being able to manage correspondence 
networks effectively was critical for all merchants. Widely available guides and 
handbooks for young men entering the world of trade emphasised the importance of 
competent letter-writing. Defoe’s hugely popular Compleat English Tradesman 
emphasised that clarity, simplicity and a personal tone were crucial for business 
letters. A merchant’s letters must be ‘plain, concise and to the purpose’ Defoe wrote, 
to avoid complications in commerce arising from unclear writing. He emphasised that 
‘these things belong to, and are part of, the language of trade’. 11  Ultimately, 
possessing good communication skills and an effective writing style was widely seen 
as imperative for commercial success.
12
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Many scholars of Atlantic commerce now appreciate the central functioning 
of letters in the context of global trade, and have emphasised their importance as 
sources for analysing the operation of merchant networks. They draw attention to 
particularly significant relationships maintained by merchants amongst their cache of 
contacts, and reveal the ways in which trade networks were constructed. Toby Ditz’s 
work has characterised mercantile correspondence in the Atlantic world as a 
‘dynamic site’, where on-going negotiations and arguments had the power to produce 
and alter commercial custom, manipulate the market and ‘disseminate modes and 
meanings of understanding’ that would orient the future conduct of merchants.13 
Atlantic scholars have made good use of the letter books of merchants to explore 
British trade. David Hancock has emphasised that correspondence is vital for 
revealing details of the nature, scale and conduct of business, as well as something of 
the ‘personality’ of men of trade. 14  The tension, detail and candour of 
correspondence, as Jacob Price also wrote, adds immensely to the wealth of 
                                                                                                                                                       
fanatical concern amongst merchants for transparency. Naturally, writing was crucial for this. ‘The 
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information it provides on mercantile trade and the workings of the British trading 
community in the eighteenth century.
15
  
More recently, scholars working on Eurasian trade have also heralded texts 
and writing as essential ‘technologies’ that were imperative for long-distance and 
trans-continental commerce in the eighteenth century. Gagan Sood stressed the 
importance of correspondence and its structures of language and distribution 
mechanisms that united ‘Eighteenth Century Eurasia’.16 Miles Ogborn also argued 
that letters and other textual material shaped the very nature of Anglo-Indian trade as 
much as the flow of goods and capital. They provided ‘a key technology in 
conducting long-distance trade’ and ‘a means to shape its nature and functioning’.17 
For the East India Company specifically, Philip Stern has recently emphasised how 
writing was ‘the backbone of a global network, crucial for imagining a geographically 
dispersed political system as coherent and to supervising and governing it’.18  
Related to this, scholars connected with the New Imperial History have also 
seen letters as instrumental in forming ‘colonial connections’.19 Texts were powerful 
constructive tools, for both commerce, colonialism and for the lives of merchants and 
other imperial letter-writers. ‘Colonial lives’ were often ‘textual lives’, constructed by 
contemporaries through texts. As David Lambert and Alan Lester wrote, formal and 
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informal communication networks ‘provided channels that connected the subjects to 
other individuals and institutions and through which instructions, requests, petitions 
and intelligence moved, transmitting past successes and failures, and shaping political 
ideologies and personal sensibilities’. 20  Natasha Glaisyer’s work on networking, 
moreover, argued letters provide the single most useful and tangible body of evidence 
for revealing the ‘interconnectedness’ of empire.21 
Trans-continental correspondence networks also constructed the commercial 
and personal lives of East India Company servants and private traders.  By the early 
eighteenth century, the abundant official correspondence between East India House 
and the Company’s settlements in the East Indies was shadowed by an extensive 
network of private communication between India and Britain. This often used the 
same modes of conveyance, but sidestepped and disrupted official channels to 
organise private trade and patronage systems.
22
 The expanding commercial world of 
the eighteenth century also resulted in ever-widening correspondence networks 
among merchants. In the case of the East India Company, as Holden Furber has 
suggested, in the 1720s, 30s and 40s, the young writers serving the Company at all its 
factories in Asia were in contact with a wider circle of correspondents than ever 
before. These included other Europeans as well as Indian brokers, British merchants, 
and country captains. Company men maintained their correspondence networks daily 
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as a critical part of their private business, often attending to their own letters before 
turning to Company matters.
23
 
Private letters to the East therefore reveal some of the ways in which 
Company servants were embedded within a global network. They discussed 
commercial developments both at home and further afield, and provided an important 
source of news for Company men. Since so many East India merchants also had 
interests in other commercial spheres worldwide and in other chartered companies, 
general commercial information could be extremely valuable. News of ‘market 
conditions, war, exchange rates, bankruptcies and anything else of interest was 
routinely shared’ in merchant letters.24 During the period of the ‘South Sea Bubble’ 
for instance, Company merchant John Scattergood received news from friends in 
London of other associates affected by the South Sea crisis. A letter from a Mr. 
Nightingale in London communicated key details of the bubble and declared his 
pleasure that Scattergood was safely stationed in India and thereby not directly 
affected by the event that caused many men to lose their fortunes.
25
 In a similar vein, 
on ascending to the directorship of the South Sea Company, merchant John Fullerton 
did not hesitate to remind all his correspondents in India that should he ‘be 
serviceable to them in any way’ by providing South Sea-related information, he 
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would oblige without hesitation.
26
 In addition to his more personally-oriented 
correspondence, Robert Adams used almost all his letters both to inform 
correspondents of incidents in parts of the world with which they might not be 
familiar, as well as updating them on trade-related developments closer to home.
27
 At 
various times in his correspondence, Adams offered vignettes on the state of trade in 
Persia, commented on the political state of the Malabar Coast and bitterly complained 
about the low price of diamonds in London following rumours of the discovery of a 
new mine in Brazil. His letter book neatly demonstrates the interconnectedness of the 
eighteenth-century economy.
28
 
Dynamic communication networks conducted by Company servants in the 
eighteenth century were difficult to control, frustrating the Court of Directors. They 
regularly expressed concern over the fact that ‘Private Advices from India’ 
anticipated Company letters from the East, meaning they might not receive ‘the most 
early Intelligence’ if private letters were more quickly conveyed.29  In 1739 they 
complained that ‘Private Advices [have] come to hand from Surat Dated the 5th April 
… notwithstanding our frequent Injunctions’.30 The following year ‘Private Advices 
[from] several Turkey Merchants and others from Aleppo … giving an Account of 
                                                     
26
 BL, Mss Eur D602: ‘Three letter books of John Fullerton, purser of the “Prince George” trading 
from Bengal to Jidda 1723-27, Director of South Sea Company, containing copies of his letters 
concerning the affairs of the East India and South Sea Companies, trading and financial matters, and 
family and social life, 1732-1742’ [hereafter, ‘Fullerton Papers’], pp. 6-11.  
27
 One interesting example comes from Adams’ letter to Rawson Hart. He says he is ‘sorry to heare 
from every one the dullness of trade. I thinke it is from all parts the same & I thinke England is filled 
with nothing but luxury & Complaints; & as is all Europe, & people are of opinion that to make trade 
flourish & complaints ease a war is very necessary’. BL, IOR H/37: ‘Robert and Mrs Adams’ Letter 
Book’ [hereafter ‘Adams Letter Book’], p. 51, Robert Adams to Rawson Hart, 30 November 1730. 
28
 Ibid., pp. 47; 186, Robert Adams to Samuel Greenhill, 30 November 1730 and William Gibbs, 20 
February 1734. 
29
 Watson, Foundation for Empire, p. 174.  
30
 BL, IOR E/3/108, p. 12, Bombay general letter, 19 December 1739. 
 232 
 
Sundry occurrences in India … being forwarded from Aleppo to Constantinople and 
Vienna’ reached London at the beginning of June 1740, well before an anticipated 
packet from Bombay. The Company ultimately wanted to put a stop to private letters 
being sent any other way than through the Company’s mail packets, in order to 
‘prevent Private Persons having thus the Earliest Intelligence’. The Directors also 
urged that regular official communications should be sent ‘every three Months or 
oftner as any thing occurs worthy our notice’ to go some way to counteracting the 
frequency with which private letters arrived in London.
31
 
For these merchants and their correspondents, the security of letters during 
their lengthy journeys was paramount. This often meant that private letters were sent 
in the Company’s mail packets. Although private letters travelled via other routes too, 
this was frequently the most secure and regular conveyance to Europe. In 1757, the 
London merchants Gammon & Chaloner were gravely concerned to learn that 
Charles Waters, Company merchant and their agent in India, had sent some of his 
correspondence to them via ‘private hands’. Recognising his error, Waters responded 
by stating, ‘It gave me great concern to find my trusting my advices to Private Hands 
was attended with so Great a Disappointment. You may be assured Gentlemen this 
Accident will induce Me in future always to Put them in the Company’s Packet.’32 
Since private correspondence used the same system as the Company, in theory 
perfidious communication could be easily monitored. But even this caused 
complications. The Company’s letters to the East complained about the cost of 
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private correspondence in Company packets numerous times throughout the early 
eighteenth century. They wrote to Bombay with reference to Bandar ‘Abbas in 1733 
that ‘We cant help taking notice that a great number of Private Letters are put under 
our cover, which swells the Postage very much, and some of them are more bulky 
than ours’.33 
These letters travelling within and alongside the Company’s official 
correspondence functioned as a critical organising framework for private trade. 
Whether for coordinating financial transactions, receiving personal and commercial 
information or for maintaining links with influential Company figures, letters home 
were imperative for various activities Company servants conducted on their own 
accounts. Recipients were often relatives as well as professional associates, agents 
and commissioners. Family members were important nodal points within the 
correspondence networks of Company men, and were often critical to sustaining their 
homeward connections. They were also, of course, often fundamentally important for 
private business in a number of ways. The following section attends to the centrality 
of kinship in private trade. 
 
II – Kinship, Patronage and Private Trade 
 
 
Kin networks formed an important structure that upheld the business of all 
eighteenth-century merchants. As Atlantic historians have demonstrated in some 
detail, they were an important resource for merchants as ‘bonds of mutual 
confidence’ that could be used to provide a number of services throughout mercantile 
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careers.
34
 Similarly, in East Indian trade, personal and familial connections were 
maintained by Company servants to support their business and aid private trade 
networks. These connections were vital to securing a position in one of the 
Company’s Asian factories in the first instance. 
Being appointed into the Company’s service at any level was largely 
dependent on having one or more influential patrons. Becoming a Company servant 
was dependent on the permission of the Directors, which could be more easily gained 
through recommendations from friends and often relatives; especially those who were 
active shareholders, or otherwise connected to the Court of Directors or London’s 
‘shipping interest’.35 Without an effective and active patron, procuring a Company 
post was unlikely if not impossible. Potential servants had to be nominated by one of 
the Directors and give two securities in Britain who would make good any claims the 
Company might have against the servant. This ‘entry by nomination’ ultimately 
meant that many sons or close relatives of the Directors were appointed.
36
 Company 
servants in the East therefore often had multiple family members connected in some 
way to the Company or the wider London mercantile community.
37
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Once successfully granted permission to go out to the East, merchants 
frequently found themselves in the service of family members already in a prominent 
post in the Company’s Indian establishments. Letters of introduction from relatives 
brought by merchants on their arrival could also prove vital to securing a good 
position within the Company’s factory system and, more significantly for private 
trade, for establishing lucrative associations with other merchants.
38
 Kin networks 
could therefore function as critically important structures that aided the development 
of private trade.
39
 
Merchant William Gayer, who arrived at Bombay in 1703 as a Company 
servant, was able to use the patronage of his uncle Sir John Gayer, then chief of the 
‘Old’ Company’s factory at Surat. He wrote back to England on arriving in India of 
his uncle’s assurance that he would be assisted in all ways during his employment. 
Gayer appeared grateful for this connection that ensured his place at Surat; although 
he was keenly aware of the other prospective advantages accruing from building a 
good relationship with Sir John. He wrote that, ‘I am now with my uncle Sr. John 
Gayer who I have received a Great Deal of Kindness from … and I hope to have 
more, for he has no Children’.40 As detailed in a previous chapter, William relied on 
his uncle for securing his involvement in several voyages to China. 
Other merchants’ relatives in Britain offered assistance using their ‘friends on 
the spot’ in India. Senior Company merchant Robert Adams’s correspondence from 
London following his return from the East in the 1730s charts his on-going efforts to 
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procure good positions for his relatives. Two of Adams’s sisters were married to East 
India Company servants resident on the west coast; Hannah to Hezekiah King and 
Eleanor to Alexander Orme, ensuring he maintained regular contact with prominent 
merchants in the region. Both Adams’ sons, Robert and Benjamin, were also in the 
East Indies forging careers in commerce. From London, Adams provided a crucial 
source of support to Robert and Benjamin in particular. He offered advice, expertise 
and frequent promises that he would try to secure profitable promotions for them. He 
endeavoured to ensure they were known to influential Company figures on the west 
coast, such as William Wake, Stephen Law and Robert Cowan; each of whom 
eventually became governor of Bombay during the 1720s and 1740s.
41
 Adams 
attempted to effectively exploit his vast experience as a Company merchant on the 
west coast and the multitude of connections he had built up. Like Adams, other 
former servants attempted to procure lucrative positions within the Company’s 
factory system, such as those with additional responsibilities, for their relatives. One 
Company merchant received a letter from his father that declared ‘I shall use my 
interest with my friends on the spot with you, to get you fix’d in the accomptant’s 
office for the first two or three years, because in that office you will be initiated not 
only into the method of accompts and book-keeping, but also into the whole scene of 
the company’s affairs in the seat of the presidency, as well as subordinate factories’.42 
Letters from relatives could have more quotidian and advisory functions too, 
which were no less important for successful private trade. Since Company 
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employment frequently ran in the family, merchants’ relatives often possessed a great 
deal of accumulated knowledge of East Indian trade they were eager to impart. They 
knew what was required to succeed and appreciated the value of respectable 
behaviour, in both business and social relationships. Robert Adams often requested 
his chief correspondents to keep watch over his friends, relatives and acquaintances 
who remained in India.
43
 There are numerous instances of the former Company 
servant using his connections to monitor the activities of his son Benjamin in 
particular, both in the realms of social behaviour, decorum and commerce. On his son 
entering the service of the Company, Adams asked Stephen Law to regularly advise 
him ‘how my son Benjamin behaves himselfe and lives’, keen to be the first to know 
about any indiscretions or ‘any loose or Extravagant behaviour of his’.44 
Moreover, the elder merchant offered a large amount of advice on the ways of 
private trading in the western Indian Ocean world, drawing on his own extensive 
experience of trade in the region. Giving his opinion on a potential move to Bengal, 
he commented that, ‘I hope you have no design to live there[,] if you do it will cause 
me a great deale of uneasiness for I well know you have a great many idle 
Companions there who will use all ways & means to lead you astray, destroy your 
Constitution and impoverish your pockett’.45 Adams also believed that time spent 
diligently at sea, working as a supercargo, would ‘be more benefit … than staying 
Ashoare’ in any region. He felt this was a useful way to build the wide range of 
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connections needed to establish a respectable private trade portfolio.
46
 Moreover, 
Benjamin was encouraged by his father – like any good merchant – to be a diverse 
and varied trader, to hold more than one investment at the same time and to 
endeavour to be an amiable, friendly and well-grounded individual in order engage in 
successful business.
47
 Although he wrote to Benjamin that ‘as I am at this distance, 
[I] cannot afford you that assistance & reliefe as formerly therefore you must depend 
on friends’, Adams repeatedly attempted to guide his son in the ways of Company 
life in his frequent letters to India.
48
 His correspondence mirrors the letters of other 
fathers to their sons stationed in the East in the service of the Company during the 
eighteenth century.
49
 Indeed, the advice proffered is similar to that detailed in 
commercial manuals of the period that advised on the ways of trade and mercantile 
behaviour, as well as giving guidance on book-keeping and information about useful 
commercial vocabulary.
50
  
Since kin networks could be extremely important resources for Company 
merchants, they were assiduously maintained. Regular letters to and from family 
members ensured a steady stream of news and advice that was a vital element of the 
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preservation of family bonds.
51
 Merchants understandably received news of relatives 
with alacrity, and routinely expressed their delight on its delivery. Enduring 
connections back to Britain in this way were replete with references to a nostalgic 
homeland and ‘happier’ times with friends and family. To Benjamin Adams, 
merchant William Gayer wrote in 1706, for example, that notwithstanding ‘The 
distance we are a parte, I am hartely glad to here of my relations and friends that they 
are well … tis no small joy to me’.52 Other merchants stressed regularly how they 
wished they would ‘heare oftener from … friends’.53 Similarly, Company servants 
provided regular updates to family on their business and careers.
54
 Whilst these 
aspects reflect the sensibilities of young men stationed far from their families, and the 
epistolary conventions of politely enquiring after relatives, asking about domestic 
developments and providing news on career progression; such rhetoric was also a 
strategy that helped kin networks to endure. Merchants could not afford to risk the 
breakdown of important connections through perceived inattentiveness or disinterest 
in the affairs of their correspondents. 
Maintaining family ties was also important as they were often essential for 
supporting Company servants financially. Of the numerous functions of kin networks, 
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the provision of capital on initial entry into the service could be particularly 
significant. As Watson emphasised, it was only the fortunate few who had relatives 
who were able to send out capital. Even this was strictly regulated and policed by the 
Company.
55
 It was generally considered unusual, however, for a new Company 
servant and budding private trader to make any money without some preliminary 
funds. Or, to use Governor Benyon’s neat phrase, impossible to ‘make bricks without 
straw’.56 Capital for ventures could certainly be procured from Indian lenders and 
money could be built up gradually through Company employment and the provision 
of services for other merchants. Yet any capital brought out or transferred on entering 
the Company’s service, could also prove vital in building a firm foundation for 
private business. Thomas Pitt believed that £1000 was the minimum amount that new 
merchants needed to kick-start private trade in Madras.
57
 Mentz has similarly 
emphasised in his study of Madras traders that familial connections remained a major 
factor as a source of finance, both on initial entry into the service and throughout 
Company careers.
58
  
Similar examples can be found for Bombay and Surat-based merchants too. 
William Mildmay brought out £400 to India in 1696 from his father and an additional 
£347 ‘to be employed by me [in] all my adventures during my stay in India’.59 This 
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was a modest amount considering some of the sums with which Company servants 
carried to India, but it probably provided the necessary stimulus to begin his trading 
activities. As late as 1763, William Farmer, who went out to Bombay in the service of 
the Company, told his father in a letter home that he was ‘very right in letting me 
have £110’, as ‘less would not suffice’.60 Silver was frequently sent out to the west 
coast from London too, consigned to sons and other relatives in the service of the 
Company. These consignments were regularly equivalent to one or two hundred 
pounds sterling. Larger consignments of up to 15,000 ounces and as much as £1500 
were sent in the 1720s and 1730s for Bombay governors Charles Boone and Robert 
Cowan, however.
61
 In addition to start-up capital then, domestic connections could 
provide a useful income stream throughout a Company merchant’s career. 
In numerous ways, the connection between East India Company servants and 
their relatives was a powerful constructive element in private trade. Kin networks 
were vital for securing a reasonable position in the Company in the first instance. 
Corporate employment was naturally the first step towards a private fortune. 
Moreover, connections with family members aided private trade through the supply 
of capital, information and providing merchants with a network that could be drawn 
upon for numerous services when needed. 
As Company careers progressed, connections to family members and other 
associates based in Britain could also form the basis of new private trade ventures. 
The next part of this chapter considers perhaps one of the more recognisable elements 
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of ties with the metropole: the exchange of goods. European goods were traded via 
private hands between Britain and India in large quantities, and the private trade of 
Company servants involved the exchange of commodities from Asia to Europe as 
well as intra-Asian commerce. Despite the Company’s monopoly, private merchants 
regularly formed trading connections between Britain and India. The next section will 
look at this aspect of British private trade as it pertains to East India Company 
servants in the western Indian Ocean world, concluding with an extended case study 
of a private venture organised by London-based principals and a Bombay-based 
agent. Here, despite the prevalence of formal, regulated partnerships, kin networks 
also remained significant. 
 
 
III – Private Trade Between Europe and Asia 
 
 
While Company servants were permitted to engage in port-to-port trade in Asian 
waters as part of their covenants, trade between the East Indies and London was, in 
theory, reserved strictly for the Company. From the beginning of the ‘de-regulation’ 
of private trade in the seventeenth century, the Company provided a permitted list of 
certain commodities that were not part of the Company’s concerns, but could legally 
form part of private trade cargoes both outward and homeward.
62
 With regard to 
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exports, as suggested earlier, a small amount of bullion could be conveyed to India 
via private hands. This did not amount to much relative to overall levels of bullion 
transported by the Company of course; but a ship of five to six hundred tons was 
allowed to carry gold and silver up to the value of between £600 and £1000 for the 
owners, and £800 for the captain and officers.
63
 The range of other goods shipped 
privately from England was extremely varied however, much more so than what was 
conveyed on the Company’s account. Mildred Wretts-Smith detailed that in the 
season 1680-81, the principal exports for private trade were beer, spirits, glassware, 
ironware and various items of wearing apparel including hats, woollen goods, silks, 
and leather goods.
64
 These are characteristic of goods sent out for consumption by 
relatives and close friends; the perceived necessaries and necessities of life in Britain 
that were difficult to access overseas.
65
 
The India Office Records series E/1 also includes many details of private 
exports as part of the requests submitted to the Company to send out goods to 
servants in the East, during the first half of the eighteenth century. Merchants at 
Bombay received a wide variety of goods shipped privately. Firstly, a great deal of 
foreign silver was sent out to servants of all ranks, as mentioned above. These records 
also indicate that certain commodities – especially silver and coral – were sent out in 
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order to purchase diamonds.
66
 The diamond trade was a significant element of the 
private connections between India and Britain. However, as well as these expected 
commodities, a wide range of other goods are listed. Many of these were everyday 
items and ‘wearing apparel’. Stockings, hats, shoes, cutleryware, glassware, looking 
glasses, musical instruments and toys are frequently mentioned. As well as this, 
luxury goods including clocks, sword blades, amber and ivory (generally referred to 
as ‘Elephant’s Teeth’) are featured, in addition to main trade items such as iron and 
copper. 
In the case of private imports, again the diversity of goods is startling. As 
Wretts-Smith suggested, the Directors did realise that some private trade must be 
countenanced in order to keep it above ground and subject to control. It was better to 
allow import on the Company’s ships, they thought, than to drive the traders into the 
arms of interlopers.
67
 Ian Bruce Watson similarly argued that the Company’s 
acquiescence to private trade removed some of the necessity of smuggling goods in 
Company shipping.
68
 At the same time of course, interlopers, clandestine traders and 
Company servants still conducted a high-volume trade between Britain and India 
throughout the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. The Court of Directors 
encouraged each of its factories to remain vigilant and record fully the details of any 
private trade goods on board Company vessels.
69
 The extent and volume of both 
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imports and exports remains, in many ways, difficult to calculate however. Some 
significant attempts at quantifying private trade between India and Britain have been 
made for the later eighteenth century. Huw Bowen’s research is particularly 
important in this regard.
70
 Bowen’s ‘East India Company Trade and Domestic 
Financial Statistics’ database aims in part to quantify not just main commodity 
imports but a range of ‘Miscellaneous’ goods too. It also details the duties paid on 
private goods between 1756 and 1784.
71
 Yet it remains the case that the volume of 
private trade goods imported was much higher than can ever be properly discerned 
due to difficulties in assessing clandestine trade levels. Smuggled goods were 
understandably a constant irritation to the Directors and even the Company could not 
keep watch over private trade goods sent out from the East Indies even under their 
cover. There were ultimately, at all times, important commodity flows not under 
Company control.
72
 Of relevance to this study, only fragmentary evidence survives of 
private trade goods sent from western India in the eighteenth century. 
However, a high-volume ‘sanctioned’ private trade undoubtedly took place 
regularly and a wide range of ‘unprohibited’ and ‘permission’ goods were carried on 
Company shipping back to Britain on private accounts.
73
 Company servants took full 
advantage of the opportunity to trade in permitted articles and to send goods or 
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money between London and the East Indies via Company shipping. Throughout a 
Company career, on-going connections to home could actually create new private 
trading opportunities for merchants in this way. Often using home-provided finance 
and commercial information conveyed from Britain, Company merchants used their 
European correspondents to organise private ventures in Asian waters, and then to 
send home goods or remit profits. This frequently dovetailed with or supported their 
intra-Asian commerce. As channels of communication and flows of information 
became more reliable and viable as the eighteenth century progressed, such ventures 
grew in complexity. 
The activities of Charles Boone, the governor of Bombay between 1715 and 
1722, provide us with a useful example of this type of trade. A proportion of Boone’s 
activities organising ventures across the Indian Ocean world can be discerned through 
examining his accounts held with Francis Chamberlain and Robert Nightingale in 
London, between 1716 and 1721.
74
 Nightingale and Chamberlain held large stakes in 
at least seventeen voyages using Boone as their India-based agent to invest money 
sent from London. They provided an important source of capital for Boone’s 
involvement in the country trade. As discussed in an earlier chapter, this included 
several voyages to China, and took in numerous other Indian Ocean destinations. The 
size of some of the investments is notable: on four occasions, Boone invested over 
twenty thousand rupees of the London merchants’ money in voyages that called at 
Persia, Madras, Bengal and China. Whilst profits from these ventures differed, losses 
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were generally small, presumably helped by the fact that as Bombay governor, Boone 
was in a prime position to make informed judgements, manoeuvre strategically using 
his status, and to efficaciously remit the proceeds of the ventures. Whilst many of the 
vessels employed were private ships, for Nightingale and Chamberlain the 
commanders of Company ships (such as the Stanhope) would also have been critical 
for allowing them to invest in Boone’s country trade network. Boone’s successful 
participation in this intra-Asian trade was also reliant upon the direct link provided by 
these men to sources of capital at home.
75
 The papers related to this micro-network of 
the three men again highlight the importance that capital remitted from Britain could 
have for private trade. Boone returned home in the 1720s as a successful and very 
rich merchant. He had ‘got a very good Estate’ and ‘acquir’d a handsome Fortune’ 
thanks to his time in the East Indies.
76
 
Principally London-directed as well as metropolitan-financed private trade 
also took place. As a vividly illustrative example of this element of private trade, the 
case of Charles Waters is explored in detail in the following paragraphs. Waters was a 
Bombay Company servant who was charged by a London-based wholesaler with 
procuring a number of Asian goods to be shipped back to Britain during the 1750s. In 
addition to his private commerce in India, Charles Waters acted as an agent for the 
London drug merchants, Messrs Gammon & Chaloner. What was formed between 
these men after 1754 could be described as a transnational procurement network. This 
was directed by the druggists in London, using Waters and his associates to acquire a 
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number of Asian goods that were then conveyed using the privilege trade of Captain 
Thomas Best.
77
 This case illuminates key details of the machinations of private trade 
between Britain and western India. The diversity of goods dealt with is particularly 
evident, whilst the venture also highlights the complex and multifaceted 
correspondence networks that allowed private trade to operate. The partnership 
between Gammon & Chaloner, Waters and Best was based on long-standing 
commercial associations, sophisticated information exchange and also familial 
networks. Each of these was important to the underlying structure of many Anglo-
Indian private trade ventures. 
Situated in Laurence Pountney Lane in the City of London, adjacent to 
present-day Cannon Street, the premises of druggists Gammon & Chaloner lay close 
to the location of East India House in Leadenhall Street.
78
 Their association with the 
produce of the Indian Ocean world began when the druggists contacted Captain Best 
eager to acquire a number of goods from India following his voyage in the ship the 
Prince Henry in 1754.
79
 In the realm of Company-sanctioned goods in private trade, 
drugs and medicinal commodities were particularly significant. Many articles the 
Company permitted to be privately traded were classed as drugs, and many of these 
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could be relatively easily procured in the western Indian Ocean region. Gammon & 
Chaloner provided Best with an extensive list of articles available in the markets of 
the Indian Ocean, with orders to apply to Charles Waters at Bombay for assistance in 
the purchase of those goods listed that could be readily bought in the town. 
Interestingly, Waters was recommended to Gammon & Chaloner by his father 
Thomas; their friend, director of the East India Company and former Company 
employee at Bombay and Mocha, who corresponded regularly with both the druggists 
and his son on matters relating to the venture.
80
 
The range of items requested by the druggists was extensive and included 
cubebs (all-spice), ‘worm seeds’, sandalwood, goat bezoars, turmeric, various kinds 
of lac, myrrh, camphor, cardamom seeds, gum Arabic, opoponax, sago and cassia 
lignea (cinnamon bark); all highly sought-after trade goods in eighteenth-century 
India and all permitted articles of private trade.
81
 The provenance of the goods was 
actually extremely diverse, but Bombay’s regular connections not just to the Indian 
hinterland but to the Malabar Coast, the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, facilitated 
their acquisition.
82
 Even based in such an important trading centre, the task for 
Waters and Best was to profitably purchase this array of goods for the London market 
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in a regional commercial milieu beset with wildly fluctuating prices and 
unpredictable supply patterns.
83
 
Like any agent, it was in Waters’ personal interest as well as in the interests of 
the partnership, to keep a close eye on the most opportune time and place to purchase, 
taking into account prevailing market conditions. Gaining access to accurate 
particulars about different types of commodities was therefore particularly 
important.
84
 Such a context also necessitated both commercial astuteness on the part 
of the agent, and the assistance of friends, colleagues and associates. Waters relied 
upon a widespread network of India-based contacts for accessing the items Gammon 
& Chaloner required. Like other merchants, he successfully used a small collection of 
correspondents in various places, forged through mutual associations with the East 
India Company, to service his role as agent.
85
 In fact, Waters stressed to his 
commissioners (after they questioned his celerity) that the time he was taking to 
procure goods was due to the lengthy but necessary process of having multiple agents 
in place. They were needed in order to gather together the diverse set of commodities 
required.
86
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Even with this network, the necessary commercial information available for 
Best and Waters was imperfect and often inadequate. Misinformation about the 
variety, provenance, quality and price of many commodities abounded. Goods were 
far from standardised and there was little information on many of them. In this latter 
case, regarding the medicinal herb opoponax, Waters admitted that he was 
‘unacquainted with its true value’ due to its general scarcity at Bombay at the time he 
purchased the commodity. There having been no amount of the good to buy or sell 
for some time, the agent complained that ‘Even the Merchants of whom I have made 
the strictest enquiry can give me no Insight or even tell me its Country name’. 
Furthermore, he continued that, ‘Capt. Best likewise does not know its value in 
England’.87 Informational asymmetries like these were common in eighteenth-century 
mercantile trade and had the potential to cause significant problems for agents 
entrusted with the considerable responsibility of purchasing a whole order on time 
and as cheaply as possible.
88
 
On-going communication with London was therefore vital for Waters to 
receive valuable commercial information. He insisted he had the most up-to-date and 
reliable details of the usual sale price in London of the goods he was charged to buy. 
Using this, he could make informed decisions about the purchase price of items. He 
emphasised that although he would do his utmost to complete Gammon & Chaloner’s 
requests, it was ‘absolutely necessary’ that he should be furnished yearly with a 
‘General Price Current of Druggs in England’ or ‘what they will fetch in England free 
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of Duties’. This, he stressed, ‘will be of infinite service and Advantage to me in my 
Purchases’.89 Waters was subsequently provided by his partners with a current price 
list and received regularly updated advice about purchasing, remittances and finance. 
In his role as agent, Waters attempted to use these mechanisms to predict the market 
and avoid the potential problems produced by changes in supply. Unusually high 
prices or scarcity could call for delaying the purchase of a particular commodity for 
instance.
90
 On the other hand, it could be detrimental to delay and risk missing the 
most opportune time to acquire goods. Waters therefore had to anticipate future 
inports into Bombay. He urged Gammon & Chaloner when requesting goods at 
particular prices to ‘have Regard to what may be sent out’ to Bombay on future ships 
from London as this would necessarily affect prices. Waters even provided 
calculations in order to forecast the price that goods would sell for at Bombay 
allowing for the changes accruing from the arrival of goods on expected shipping.
91
 
Waters regularly communicated various market changes which he felt affected his 
ability to carry out Gammon & Chaloner’s requests to their satisfaction. 
From the evidence available, the venture seems to have been financially 
successful. On Best’s return journey in October 1755, the accounts of Waters detail 
that over forty-six thousand rupees worth of goods were shipped with Best to 
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London, amounting to over five thousand pounds. Despite significant gaps in 
knowledge, the requested amount of opoponax was obtained with Waters claiming it 
was an ‘Extremely good’ sort. 92  In general, Waters was of the belief that his 
purchases would be commercially successful. Although some purchases exceeded the 
quantity Gammon & Chaloner ordered, Waters emphasised his belief there would be 
a ‘very handsome Profit accruing’, perhaps as much as twenty per cent ‘clear of all 
charges’.93 Although the archival record provides no detail of subsequent sales in 
London, it is probable this would have been a lucrative venture for Waters. Despite 
bearing the considerable risk of damaging his reputation as an agent, much of the 
finance for the purchase of the items was provided by Gammon & Chaloner, with the 
agent taking commission of between five and ten per cent of the value of the goods 
for his role in procurement. He was due a proportion of the sale price from some of 
the items too. Waters’ conduct seemed to satisfy his commissioners: correspondence 
between the druggists and Waters continued for some time after Best’s original return 
voyage, as the agent continued to fulfil subsequent orders as well as respond to 
Gammon & Chaloner’s request to provide news of other opportunities to further 
invest in East Indian trade.
 94
 
Although this is just one example, it is reasonable to assume there were other 
similar networks operating at Bombay, Surat, Mocha and the other centres of 
Company trade in the western Indian Ocean. This case demonstrates effectively that 
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trading with Europe could be a lucrative element of west coast private trade. It also 
highlights that these commercial relationships were reciprocal: the London 
wholesalers relied on their global connections for obtaining certain commodities, 
whilst agents depended on connections back to Britain, for patronage, profit and the 
further development of private trading portfolios. It also speaks to the centrality of 
correspondence, social ties and kin networks. It is important to consider the role of 
outward capital from Britain and the significance of bills of exchange, but private 
trade could not be conducted without complex circulations of correspondence that 
transmitted information and helped to manage merchants’ reputations. 
Of course, cultivating profits through private trade could be futile unless the 
proceeds could be effectively realised. Since the goal of most Company servants was 
to develop a fortune quickly and, as one merchant put it, reap ‘that benefit whereby to 
goe home to happily enjoy the fruits of your labour’, having the means to remit 
money home was imperative.
95
 This aspect of private trade required reliable ties to 
associates in Britain. The next section of this chapter considers this aspect of the 
connections between India and Europe in the realm of private trade. Working out how 
to remit money home was a significant preoccupation of Company servants. The 
issues inherent in transferring vast sums over long distances exercised the minds of 
successful traders more than any other issue. Ensuring the assistance of robust 
networks and a cache of contacts based at home was vital. 
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IV – The Remittance of Private Fortunes 
 
 
As P.J. Marshall discussed, not only was surviving long enough in India to make a 
fortune difficult in itself, but once a decent competency had been developed, there 
were significant barriers to safe remittance.
96
 Private traders had several options 
available to them however; all of which relied on the services of agents and 
correspondents based in Europe. Naturally, the Company aimed to exercise control 
over this element of their servants’ private trade. As well as attempting to funnel legal 
trade to Britain, they offered a variety of services to enable servants to repatriate their 
estates.
97
 Merchants placed money in the hands of the Company by paying into one 
of the factory treasuries in India and then later recovered the same amount in London 
through bills. Alternatively, they used the privilege cargo space of mariners; although 
many contemporaries saw this as a relatively insecure method. Foreign ships or 
foreign bills provided yet another remittance avenue for Company men, but one that 
ran the risk of punishment. Commonly, servants used the diamond trade to remit 
money home.
98
 
With the first of these methods, allowing factories in India to receive money 
from servants in return for bills payable in London actually provided a useful source 
of finance for the Company. The Court of Directors encouraged their servants to use 
Company bills whenever they remitted money home. For merchants too, Company 
bills offered security and a high degree of confidence that they would be honoured on 
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time.
99
 Historians have used remittance levels as a relatively reliable indicator of the 
volume and value of private trade because of this. Marshall used remittances from 
Calcutta, as suggested by the figures from bills drawn on the Company, to 
demonstrate the increasing prosperity of the community of private traders in Bengal 
during the eighteenth century. The amounts in these bills increased from just a few 
thousand rupees annually during the second decade of the century, to as much as sixty 
or eighty thousand in the last years of the 1720s. Marshall demonstrated that the 
British community as a whole continued to remit money via the East India Company 
at approximately the level of the late 1720s until 1752, when a marked increase 
began.
100
 Nicholas Dirks’ figures similarly suggest that formal remittance levels 
increased, from £50,000 to £120,000 a year between 1731 and 1756.
101
 Diamond 
purchases should also be added to this, as well as allowances made for foreign bills, 
making the total remittance level much higher than Company bills alone suggest.
102
 
These alternative methods for remitting money were somewhat riskier. The 
other European companies active in the Indian Ocean offered another avenue by 
which to transfer funds: both the Dutch and the Portuguese, realising the 
opportunities afforded by the fortunes created by British merchants, offered 
favourable rates of exchange for Company men looking to remit their money home 
via Amsterdam or Lisbon.
103
 Such a method was problematic, however, as the 
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Honourable Company prohibited any goods or money being transferred back to 
Europe by their own servants using ships bound for continental ports. British private 
trade to Europe was permitted only if it was directed through London.
104
 Marshall 
wrote that there is little evidence to suggest that British subjects in Bengal felt 
obliged to resort to this channel to remit large sums, although he also provided 
evidence of Portuguese, Ostend and even Prussian Company ships handling bills 
from merchants in Bengal.
105
As an example from the west coast, Bombay governor 
Robert Cowan’s Company career ended partly as a result of accusations that he 
attempted to remit part of his estate home via Lisbon on the Portuguese ship 
Europa.
106
 Cowan was dismissed for explicitly going beyond the terms of his 
covenant and incurred the wrath of the Company. Although he strenuously denied the 
charge, and blamed the fact of his departure on his ‘enemies in London’, his long-
standing connections to Lisbon, and fluency in Portuguese, in all likelihood gave him 
some basis for engaging in the venture.
107
 This practice was probably more 
widespread than the surviving archival material can reveal. 
A common way of transferring money to Britain was to use diamonds. Again, 
existing scholarship has emphasised the important role played by the diamond trade 
for the remittance of private wealth from Madras and Calcutta. Company employees 
on the west coast certainly took part in this trade too. Diamonds were one of the most 
significant private imports from India during the first half of the eighteenth century, 
                                                     
104
 Watson, Foundation for Empire, p. 149. 
105
 Marshall, East Indian Fortunes, p. 225.  
106
 BL, IOR Neg 11606-36: The Papers of Sir Robert Cowan: Correspondence and account books of 
Sir Robert Cowan, free merchant at Bombay 1719, Chief of the Factory at Goa 1720, Chief at Mocha 
1724, Governor of Bombay 1729-34 [hereafter, ‘Cowan Papers’], Reel 11610, D 654/B1/2D, Robert 
Cowan to John Gould Junior, 31 August 1734.  
107
 Ibid. 
 258 
 
partly due to this relationship with remittance. The Company permitted diamonds as 
one of the articles that could be traded to Europe privately and by paying the requisite 
duties, the precious stones could be conveyed by its employees.
108
 This meant that 
private fortunes could be invested in diamonds to be sent home, with the proceeds 
realised following their sale in London. Merchants considered this to be a relatively 
secure, low-risk form of remittance as the value of diamonds was reasonably stable 
and they were a low-volume but extremely high value commodity. Indeed, Company 
servants considered that transferring private fortunes in this manner was a safer (and 
potentially more profitable) form of conveyance than the other principal mechanisms. 
As Søren Mentz demonstrated, one of the key ways in which private wealth could be 
remitted home from Madras was through this trade in diamonds. With Jewish 
merchants acting as crucial intermediaries in the trade, stones from the fabled mines 
of Golconda were traded back to Britain in large numbers.
109
 Even Company men 
resident elsewhere relied on Madras diamonds as a remittance tool.
110
 As early as 
1680, the value of private trade in the precious stones was extremely large, estimated 
to be worth about £80,000.
111
 
Company men based on the west coast also engaged in this trade as a way of 
remitting money in the early eighteenth century. This activity was certainly less 
widespread than within the network at Madras however. Nevertheless, Golconda 
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diamonds were readily available at Surat.
112
 Private papers reveal that merchants on 
the west coast were regularly involved in the diamond trade. On returning to Britain, 
William Mildmay, chief of the East India Company factory at Karwar, was entrusted 
with two thousand rupees worth of the great Surat merchant Samuel Annesley’s 
diamonds, to consign to Sir Stephen Evance, who was one of the richest and most 
prominent bankers in the City.
113
 Junior merchants and free merchants were also 
involved in sending diamonds home. A list of private trade bound for England on the 
ship Susanah from Surat in 1704 included a ‘Bulce of Diamonds & Diamond Broach’ 
consigned to Mr. Samuel Lock Junior by merchant John Lock.
114
 In 1717, Surat 
merchant John Hope converted Captain James Hanmer’s remaining effects in India to 
diamonds, and conveyed a bulce to England on the Company ship Stanhope. He 
emphasised his belief that this particular voyage was the ‘safest conveyance’ for the 
precious cargo.
115
 For a later period, the accounts of Benjamin Francia, a prominent 
west coast merchant who died in the 1730s, also reveal his involvement in consigning 
diamonds to London on at least two occasions. He dispatched consignments 
amounting to 3899 rupees and 1334 rupees to his brother Moses Francia.
116
 
However, there could also be difficulties procuring diamonds at Surat. Letters 
between Sir John Gayer and Evance between 1696 and 1710 attest to the widespread 
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use of diamonds by senior Company servants at Surat to remit their estates at home. 
Yet, Gayer also mentioned in this correspondence that it was at times impossible to 
purchase diamonds at Surat at reasonable rates. Diamonds were ‘so extreame scarce 
& dear, there is none to be got in Surat but what is very bad & at extravagant rates’ he 
told Evance in 1699.
117
 Similarly in 1710, Gayer declared that there were no 
diamonds in the town and believed that ‘if a man should pick and choose amongst all 
in towne five Thousand rupees-worth could be procured good; none having come 
downe from Gulcondah this last year’.118 
Correspondents also informed Company men on the west coast of the relative 
risks and security of these forms of remittance. As Edward Harrison advised Robert 
Adams in 1721, diamonds still provided the most efficacious way to remit money 
back to England. He told Adams that ‘you must find some safer and better way of 
remitting your Mony home than with the Captains
 
or in their priviledge, for the 
hazard is more than the Proffit will ever answer’. Few Company servants were 
willing to take the risk of using the privilege trade of returning ships’ captains to 
remit bills or cash, as it required them to build uniquely trusting relationships. 
Harrison suggested that diamonds provided the best way to remit money home as 
they could be bought from Surat so as to eventually yield a sizeable profit, as well as 
acting as the most reliable remittance tool. Even though some captains could be 
trusted, ‘the best men don’t want to take up the Mony’.119 Agents and commissioners 
at home were, therefore, necessary for the remittance of private fortunes. Company 
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servants not only used them to glean essential information about remittance 
procedures; employing someone based in London to handle the transaction, cash bills 
or handle goods was also essential.
120
  
Just like their counterparts in Madras and Calcutta, it is important to 
emphasise that Company servants on the west coast of India relied on these 
metropolitan connections throughout their time in the East. Although more research is 
needed to explore the remittance networks operating from the region in more detail, it 
seems that senior Company merchants were well integrated into global financial 
circuits linking Britain and India. A problematic issue here is that extensive and 
reliable figures for remittances from Bombay or Surat are not available for this 
period, making generalisations about remittance levels difficult.
121
 It may also be the 
case that fortunes were simply made less often in this region in relation to Calcutta 
and Madras for an extensive remittance network to develop in the early eighteenth 
century. It is therefore also imperative to take into account other significant aspects of 
the private connections of west coast Company servants to Britain. 
The final section of this chapter will focus on the vital role of home 
correspondents and epistolary connections for merchants’ reputations. For Company 
men as well as most other eighteenth-century merchants, reputation was considered 
‘dearer than life it self’.122 They relied on their network of contacts to ensure that 
their image and standing as a reliable, trustworthy and hard-working employee or 
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private trader was upheld. This was, in many ways, just as critical a function of the 
domestic-based agency system as its role in managing transactions and remittances. 
 
V – Reputations 
 
 
On-going connections with London undoubtedly acted as an important instrument for 
Company employees in terms of career advancement and the building of a 
respectable reputation. Correspondents could effectively uphold merchants’ interests 
with the Court of Directors, and attempt to ensure they were favourably represented 
when future promotion opportunities arose. Cultivating connections with prominent 
Company figures at home, particularly former servants, was critical. For all East India 
Company employees, networking with merchants in prominent positions was 
invaluable for regular promotions and therefore to develop their private trade. As 
Pamela Nightingale succinctly states, in the East India Company from the newest 
recruit to the most powerful director, ‘Individuals collected round themselves men of 
like concerns and through family connexions, wealth or political alliances, sought to 
build up a following which might procure them further places and patronage.’123 
Promotion to higher ranking, which brought with it the potential to develop private 
trade, naturally relied on the whims of the Directors. Company servants were 
constantly apprehensive, in an organisation where career progression was resolutely 
image-dependent, about the status they held with their superiors in London. They 
therefore sought to cultivate positive relationships through correspondence with 
associates at home. 
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Letters sent directly to the Company provided one way for servants to pay 
court to their employers. For the west coast, this is particularly evident in the 
collection of letters to Thomas Woolley, the East India Company’s secretary, detailed 
in the ‘Papers concerning Bombay’ volume H/332 in the IOR.124 These letters mostly 
contain various pleas for assistance, for the Company to look into private 
disagreements and to consider the writer for promotion. As Ian Bruce Watson 
highlighted however, a perennial problem of private merchants was that by 
representing themselves and even complaining to the Company about the realm of 
private trade, they often had to provide details of the activities they engaged in on 
their own account and therefore risked raising suspicions of improper conduct.
125
  
A far more efficacious way of fostering and maintaining a good reputation 
was indirect lobbying through a London-based contact with close connections to the 
Company’s hierarchy. Such an individual, frequently a returned servant, could play 
an invaluable role in allowing current servants a direct route via which to uphold their 
interests with the Directors. The goal of such connections was manifold; ranging 
from attempting to gain promotion, to maintaining private trade in the face of 
competition, and defying local discipline.
126
 More specifically related to servants’ 
ambitions, Company employees continually requested information on both their own 
standing and that of others with their superiors in London. Robert Cowan wrote in 
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one letter that he eagerly awaited the arrival of a ship from Britain so he could ‘know 
how affaires stand at the East India house’. He hoped that his behaviour in the 
Company’s Service would entitle him to ‘their favours’.127 
The news, intelligence and gossip provided to Company servants by their 
correspondents in London was diverse. Company men eagerly received any useful 
information they believed their home correspondents could provide: on the Directors’ 
future recruitment, their plans for factories and news of markets. Home 
correspondents were often simply urged by those in India to  ‘write… every year by 
the ships design’d for this port such news as you know will be most acceptable’.128 
For Company employees stationed across the Indian Ocean world, a London 
correspondent was well-placed to provide news of the deaths of important merchants, 
new appointments of Company servants and the various goings-on in East India 
House; all of which could have an impact on trade. This relationship was reciprocal, 
and Company servants serviced correspondents at home by providing information 
about the state of the country trade, settling the outstanding investments of former 
employees and looking after the affairs of friends and family in the East. 
Company director William Betts’ letters to India during the first decade of the 
eighteenth century apprised his correspondents Joseph Goodshaw and Richard Hill of 
numerous intrigues at East India House. In 1707, Betts informed Goodshaw, a 
merchant at Bombay, that he believed he stood a good chance of being awarded the 
chiefship of Gombroon since it had recently become available, and reassured him that 
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he ‘stood faire upon the Next Change’ of East Indian personnel.129 Betts acted overtly 
in his desire to secure a promotion for his correspondent. In a later letter to Hill, Betts 
described his ‘hard strugle for a Weeke past to get Goodshaw Made Dept. Governor 
of Bombay’ that was ultimately unsuccessful. Neatly illustrating the connections 
between the three men, Betts expressed his disappointment about the outcome to Hill, 
telling him that success would have meant Goodshaw could have ‘assisted you in a 
better manner than I fear he can now.’130 
Robert Adams’ correspondence also provides a particularly good example of 
this aspect of private association. As a budding Director, Adams’s connections 
extended to the summit of the Company’s hierarchy. He possessed an elevated 
position within the Company’s London circle and retained close contact with senior 
commercial figures. Yet, despite apparently maintaining good relations with this 
prominent group, throughout his letters he constantly assured his India 
correspondents that he was pressuring the Directors to look favourably on private 
trade. Indeed, he presented himself as a kind of champion of private interests. In 
response to complaints by John Braddyl, senior merchant at Bombay, about the 
impositions of Company restrictions on private trade, Adams assured him that since 
Braddyl’s brother was a Director, he would ‘not faile of supporting you and laying … 
[private trading interests] before the Court’. He emphasised that he would go as far as 
he felt appropriate in representing the views of senior merchants without driving the 
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Directors to further regulate private trade.
131
 Adams also remained critical of the 
actions of the Directors, even declaring in 1733 that the way business was being 
conducted at East India House was so bad that the names of the Directors had ‘almost 
become a reproach’. He claimed if it was not for doing good towards his friends in 
India he would avoid even visiting the seat of his erstwhile employers altogether. In a 
damning assessment of the Directors’ attitudes to private trade, he stated that they 
have ‘limitted all their servts trade’ so much that ‘they will not be able to gitt a 
livelihood honestly’.132  
When writing to his numerous correspondents in India, Adams also proffered 
all kinds of information on the Directors’ attitude to various Company servants, never 
afraid to share gossip to support the interests of his friends. In the case of accusations 
against the former governor of Bombay, William Phipps, Adams wrote with acerbic 
sarcasm to Alexander Christie in 1731 that it was Phipps’ ‘great and mighty actions 
in Curtailing the Expence of the Company’ that were the ‘only occasion of all the 
good will he receives from them’. ‘Till they are convinced of all his other Rogueries 
and Cheats they esteem these of very great Services to them’, Adams continued. He 
emphasised that even though ‘Complaints are not wanting and daily made against his 
proceedings in India he is still supported [by the Directors]’. 133 Apprising 
correspondents in India of such intrigues provided valuable inside information on 
where vacancies were likely to arise, and assisted merchants in India in thinking 
strategically about which individuals to cultivate good relationships with.  
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Adams’s letter book consistently reveals his eagerness to uphold the views, 
concerns and reputations of his friends and acquaintances with influential members of 
the Company at East India House. This was especially the case with those letters to 
recipients stationed on the Malabar Coast, the region where most of his Company 
career was spent, but also an area where limited commercial opportunities could 
smother ambition. As previous chapters have highlighted, Company servants 
certainly felt that a Malabar Coast posting would not be to the best advantage for their 
private trade. Adams continually responded to Malabar correspondents assuring them 
he would do all in his power to recommend them for another posting, usually at 
Bombay; the next logical promotion and a position holding greater opportunities for 
career advancement and developing a personal fortune.
134
 
Most senior Company men aimed to ensure their interests and virtues were 
upheld with the Directors as frequently as possible in order to ensure continued 
employment and future promotion. In the 1720s and 1730s, the governor of Bombay 
Robert Cowan regularly instructed his correspondents whom he believed held great 
influence in Leadenhall Street to emphasise to the Court his extensive qualities and 
remind them of the successes he had overseen in his Company role. In 1730 Cowan 
wrote to William Phipps, a former governor who had since returned to London, 
instructing him to ‘quickly find the temper of the gentlemen in Leadenhall Street & 
how my interest stands amongst them which I must desire youl support & strengthen 
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by such measures as you see proper which I shall not only approve of but gratefully 
acknowledge’.135 This was a continual and complex enterprise for Cowan who rarely 
neglected the task of bolstering his image. Since ascending to the governor’s seat at 
Bombay, Cowan wrote that he had taken the liberty of writing ‘constantly to the 
following Gentlemen in the Direction, Sr Matthew Decker, Mr Harrison, Mr Henry 
Lyell, Mr Heathcoat, Mr Wordsworth Senr and Mr Drummond & Secretary 
Woolley’. Each time he assured them he would ‘never have cause to repent any good 
offices’ they did for him.136 Ultimately, of the Directors, Cowan believed it was 
‘always good to have them reminded’ of good behaviour and diligent service.137 
These examples are all illustrative of what Toby Ditz labelled the eighteenth-
century merchant’s unrelenting concern with the ‘management of impressions’. 
Atlantic scholars and historians of British early modern trade have long stressed the 
close correlation between merchants’ reputations and successful business in the 
eighteenth century. Peter Mathias, in reference to Atlantic trade, stated that, ‘A man’s 
personal reputation in business was all – published homilies abounded about 
trustworthiness and personal character bringing their due reward, accompanied by 
downside scare stories that a rake’s progress of personal extravagance, the pursuit of 
pleasure, vice and irresponsible behaviour would surely lead to nemesis for the 
person and his business conjoined.’138 Not just financial ‘credit’ then but ‘credit in the 
sense of belief, confidence, faith, trust, the estimate in which a character is held … 
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was the elusive but fundamental key to success in early modern commerce’. 139 
Indeed, ‘credit’ was the very essence of the early modern English economy, as 
Muldrew famously argued, as it acted as a ‘cultural currency’ of trust used to transact 
most business.
140
 More recently, Natasha Glaisyer delineated the multiple meanings 
of the term ‘credit’ in this context, underlining that it was used not just in a monetary 
sense but to refer to merchants’ reputations regarding their ability to settle debts. ‘It is 
important not to separate these meanings’, Glaisyer argued, ‘because an individual’s 
reputation, to a large extent, determined whether others were prepared to trust him, or 
her, to pay later’.141 For merchants, a good reputation meant they was more likely to 
be trusted to take part in business and was therefore critical to the preservation of 
their livelihood. 
Letters were imperative for merchants to emphasise their trustworthiness and 
good credit. Eighteenth-century letter books and other similar sources, as John Smail 
argued, show again and again that merchants and manufacturers stressed either their 
own honourable intentions towards others, or their expectation that others should act 
in an honourable fashion towards them.
142
 Toby Ditz demonstrates that merchants 
effectively used ‘pledges of mutual confidence’ to identify a realm of shared values. 
Merchants also used letters as sites within which to create ‘plausible selves’ through 
carefully constructed narratives designed to present an outward persona that was 
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trustworthy and creditable.
143
 These conversations were an important element of 
successful trade, in the world of the East India Company just as much as in other 
spheres of eighteenth-century commerce. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
British merchants in eighteenth-century India worked within multiple, overlapping 
spheres of trade. Indeed, like all merchants in the early modern period, they were men 
‘between worlds’, whose correspondence and trade networks formed complex 
structures that extended across countries and continents, and took in multiple 
ventures.
144
 While private trade on a day-to-day basis operated largely within the 
Indian Ocean world, connections to the metropole were also critical for the support 
and functioning of their commerce. Whether acting as a source of finance, or working 
as an on-going mechanism to enhance the reputations of merchants with the Court of 
Directors, the links formed by private traders to correspondents back in Britain were 
immensely significant. 
For Company servants in the western Indian Ocean world, metropolitan 
connections played a crucial role in the management of private business. This chapter 
has sought to emphasise that as well as financial mechanisms and commodity 
exchanges, private correspondence between Company employees, their friends, 
relations and former colleagues, and the advice and information it contained, was 
central. Capital and financial services provided by associates in Britain were of 
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course significant for kick-starting private trade. Throughout their careers, merchants 
also relied on robust and complex circulations of correspondence between Britain and 
Asia that enabled effective trade in often unstable markets. 
This chapter has placed the focus on merchant letters as forming the key 
architecture of commerce. Historians of Atlantic trade have more readily appreciated 
the ways in which letters embodied complex ‘conversations’ between merchants than 
scholars of British East Indian trade. Letters were tools through which categories of 
quality were set, goods defined, prices debated and production and transportation 
processes refined and improved.
145
 In such ways, written communication, in which 
commercial information and knowledge was exchanged, was a crucial mechanism 
through which merchants attempted to overcome the demands of eighteenth-century 
trade.
146
 They were also instruments that mediated trust and sociability; no less 
important facets of trade and commercial relationships in this period. 
In the East India Company, success in private trade as well as Company 
employment relied on maintaining and cultivating effective relations with senior 
officials. Epistolary exchanges were not only important for instituting profitable 
ventures and keeping private trade going, but also as a device through which 
character traits such as reliability, honesty and conscientiousness could be 
emphasised and constructed. For Company men, letters were therefore a mechanism 
through which to maintain trustworthy relationships, whether with their employers or 
private associates. Decisions made by employees in their private trade were shaped 
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not only by ‘rational’ calculations of potential profit and anticipated risk, but also had 
to take into account the entangled personal relationships which were an ineluctable 
feature of private trade.
147
 
By contrast, existing scholarship on British private trade has most often 
focused on institutional and overtly structural phenomena when it comes to the links 
formed by Company servants’ private trade between India and Britain. Too 
frequently, there has been little sense of the inter-personal and everyday interactions 
between merchants in India and correspondents at home. The machinery of the 
Company’s remittance system and the exchange of commodities are of course 
significant, but so too are the personal and social connections built through 
correspondence that underpinned commercial structures and arrangements.
148
 
Exploring British private trade in Asia through highlighting the centrality of circuits 
of correspondence draws attention to these neglected social connections. The focus of 
this chapter is designed to complement, rather than challenge, the emphasis on the 
importance of the intra-Asian context foregrounded in the previous chapters of this 
study. Like other long-distance traders in the eighteenth century, Company servants 
in the western Indian Ocean world should be seen as individuals who, as well as 
being rooted in a distinct local commercial, political and cultural setting, also 
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functioned as part of a global system. Conditions in the regional milieu shaped the 
way in which merchants interacted with wider circuits. 
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Chapter Five 
Principals, Agents and Private Trade: The East India Company and 
Employee Malfeasance 
 
 
 
The history of British private trade in the Indian Ocean world is intimately bound up 
with the issue of malfeasance amongst the East India Company’s servants. For 
Company men stationed in the East Indies, low salaries meant private activities were 
vital for the development of personal fortunes. Private trade was sanctioned by the 
Company through a series of carefully bounded ‘indulgences’, set out during the later 
seventeenth century. Although partly restrictive, this permission to trade privately, as 
well as the difficulties inherent in monitoring employees abroad, gave Company 
servants a large degree of autonomy. Private trading activities and other business 
dealings could, therefore, easily be carried on to a degree beyond that sanctioned by 
the Company’s central directives and enshrined in the covenants signed by merchants 
when entering the service. This chapter looks at specific episodes of malfeasance on 
the west coast and at Bombay’s subordinate factories to add a further dimension to 
the exploration of private trade in that region. It also offers a fresh perspective on the 
relationship between private trade and the Company’s regulations. Malfeasance 
should be seen as an important dimension of private trade. It again draws attention to 
the ways in which Company servants were able to strategically manoeuvre within a 
corporate structure, and highlights the importance of correspondence networks for 
reputation management and private trade. 
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In the eighteenth century, the Company’s covenants detailed the names, 
position, the length of time to be employed and yearly salary of employees. All new 
recruits promised to ‘faithfully, honestly, diligently and carefully observe the 
Company’s orders’. By signing their covenant, a Company servant was permitted 
‘freely to Trade and Traffick for his own Account only, from Port to Port in India’ 
under certain regulations. They were of course forbidden from trading between 
Europe and the East Indies, apart from on the Company’s account, and could not 
engage in any ‘Trade or Traffick’ other than what was expressly allowed by their 
employers. Covenants barred servants from wasting or making use of the Company’s 
Treasure, ‘[to] become indebted to the said Company, or … in any wise make default 
in Performance of Covenants’ too. If servants were found guilty of such conduct, they 
would be barred from accepting any ‘Payments, Advantages or Benefits’ they were 
entitled to receive. They pledged to ‘resist and withstand all and every such Person or 
Persons, as shall break, or endeavour to break the said Orders, Instructions or 
Directions’, and not to wittingly or willingly permit any other merchants to do 
anything that might injure or defraud the Company. They vowed to try and ‘prevent 
and defeat the same’ by giving ‘Notice and Intelligence, with all convenient Speed’ 
of any ‘Deceits, Wrongs, Abuses, Breach of orders Incoveniencies and Hindrances’ 
they uncovered. Covenants also stipulated servants should behave ‘lovingly and 
peaceably towards his Consorts’ and forbade them from ‘assaulting’ anyone in the 
Company’s dominions. The Company were allowed to seize the goods and personal 
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effects of merchants and resort to court proceedings if needed in order to redress any 
private action.
1
 
Yet, the covenants were not straightforward and unproblematic documents 
and the employer-employee relationship in the East India Company was imbued with 
tension. The Directors had to balance the benefits of allowing private trade with the 
potential consequences arising from employee misconduct. Similarly, its servants 
constantly had to deal with the conflict between the desire to quickly cultivate a 
fortune at the same time as upholding their responsibilities to the Company.  
Undoubtedly, in serving their private affairs, servants regularly went beyond 
the boundaries of what was enshrined in their contracts as acceptable practice. 
Company merchants stationed in factories across Asia competed directly with their 
employers in certain trades. This caused the Directors much consternation and it was 
felt that if private merchants ‘overtraded’, it could form a threat to the Company’s 
own commerce. More seriously, employees also directly flouted their covenants in 
the management of Company affairs in East Indian establishments. Misconduct in all 
its forms, bribery, fraud and the embezzlement of funds, were widespread in the 
Company’s Asian factories. Although many servants relied on diligent attention to 
their professional roles and in legal participation in private trade to develop their 
fortunes; ‘illicit’ practices also provided a route to building a competency.2 In the 
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world of the factory, separated from the direct control of the Court of Directors, 
malfeasance was routine.
3
 
Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, opponents of the 
Company’s monopoly characterised the firm as riven with corruption and 
malfeasance from the top down. Contemporary accounts, such as the ‘Brief account 
of the great oppressions and injuries which the managers of the East-India Company 
have acted on the lives, liberties, and estates of their fellow subjects’ claimed that the 
Company had become a dishonour to the nation. Its managers were said to have a 
propensity to indulge in private contracts and take frivolous legal action against their 
own subjects.
4
 Junior servants were also part of the problem however. In later 
decades, Adam Smith, who famously deplored restrictions on international trade and 
cautioned against the ‘spirit of monopoly’, believed that the East India Company’s 
rigid structure and practically unenforceable regulations encouraged private 
corruption. For Smith, certain corporate frameworks made corruption acceptable and 
even necessary.
5
 Indeed, between the 1760s and 1780s, critics of the Company 
seemed preoccupied with the misrule, corruption and extravagance ascribed to the 
vigorous pursuit of private interest by Company servants in Asia.
6
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Notwithstanding the source of these critiques, the history of the Company is 
clearly and indelibly marked by numerous episodes of employee misconduct. 
Existing scholarship has clearly demonstrated the widespread nature of malfeasance 
amongst all levels of Company servants in the eighteenth century, and its connection 
to private trade. According to Philip Lawson, wherever private interests overlapped 
with those of the Company, whole networks of credit, debt and deceit evolved.
7
 
Officials of all ranks engaged in associations with free merchants, interlopers and 
other employees operating in a private capacity.
8
 British merchants ran their own 
accounts with Indian traders, took kickbacks on contracts and engaged in smuggling 
to boost their private coffers.
9
 It was the ‘hunger for perquisites’, Nick Robins 
suggested, that ‘drove Company servants to this sort of adventurism when 
opportunity allowed’. Moreover, this had the potential to threaten the very fabric of 
the Company as it created a ‘second tier of divided loyalties’ that ultimately spawned 
‘an army of cuckoo businesses operating in the heart of the corporate machine’.10 
Although permitted by the Company itself, expanding private trade opportunities in 
the eighteenth century undoubtedly provided new openings for servants to engage in 
un-sanctioned practices. This can be seen, as Philip Stern argues, not just as a 
problem of ‘monopoly enforcement’, but as a much wider issue, that challenged the 
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primacy of the ‘Company’s political authority and jurisdiction’ over Britons in 
Asia.
11
 
Despite all of this, scholars have still paid relatively little attention to the 
specific ways in which malfeasance by merchants stationed at the Company’s 
factories in Asia intersected with private trade in the pre-colonial era. Indeed, some 
historians have downplayed its significance. Philip Lawson argued that in the first 
half of the eighteenth century ‘it would be true to say that these [private] networks 
proved nothing more than a minor irritant to the smooth operation of the Company’s 
trade in the East’.12 To some extent, malfeasant practices within the Company were a 
widespread but accepted part of Company business, seen by the Directors as 
something that should not always be concretely controlled. Since the Company 
hierarchy deemed private trade a necessary part of operations in Asia and myriad 
personal alliances cut across corporate hierarchies too, there was a large gap between 
the rhetoric of central directives and the realities of employees’ activities in the East 
Indies. Apart from a general emphasis on the frequency of corrupt activity, scholars 
have not analysed the undoubted significance of the entangled relationship between 
private trade, the Company’s management systems and the inter-personal networks 
that gave rise to and sustained episodes of supposed malfeasance. For merchants 
based across the Indian Ocean world, both their private trade and their management 
of Company resources frequently went well beyond what the Company publicly 
declared was appropriate conduct. Investigating these episodes serves to add another 
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dimension to the exploration of British private trade in the Arabian Seas region, and 
reveals a great deal about the operation of private networks.  
Indeed, the particular situation of the region in the eighteenth century 
undoubtedly provided a unique context for monitoring employee conduct, and the 
Company’s operations in the Bombay Presidency were acutely affected by the 
conduct of its servants there. The organisation of trade in key commodities 
(especially coffee and pepper) also afforded exceptional opportunities for Company 
servants to exploit the resources and infrastructure of their employers. This chapter 
therefore sees malfeasant activity as an integral part of private trade in this region, 
and reveals how servants were able to take advantage of particular local 
circumstances to override Company authority. At the same time, it again draws 
attention to the importance of private networks and personal alliances in this context, 
as these were often crucial for overcoming Company restrictions and maintaining a 
merchant’s reputation even in spite of serious allegations. Following an extended 
overview of existing work on the subject of malfeasance in the Company, the chapter 
looks at the Directors’ response to the conduct of its employees on the west coast of 
India. It then goes on to explore particular practices engaged in by employees that 
went explicitly beyond their covenants. 
The term malfeasance is employed throughout this chapter, rather than 
corruption. A great deal of existing work focused on the issue of corruption in the 
East India Company, and indeed the history of multinational corporations, provides 
an important context for this discussion. Yet the term is somewhat problematic and is 
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fraught with definitional complexity.
13
 It encompasses multiple different processes 
and practices dependent on the structure of the organisation or body in which it takes 
place. Moreover, there are different types and dimensions of corruption across time 
and space: recent understandings of corruption understandably deviate a great deal 
from the conception of the term related to general moral health – of society or the 
body politic – which was pervasive during the eighteenth century.14 Certainly, the 
term appears to have been rarely used outside of this more ‘public’ context by the 
East India Company when referring to employee conduct in this period. Mark Philp’s 
recent work on defining corruption has also emphasised some of the difficulties 
inherent in coming up with a model that can be applied to multiple cases.
15
 To 
assuage these complications, this chapter employs the terms malfeasance and 
misconduct. These were used frequently by the Company Directors in their 
correspondence when referring to practices deemed contrary to their interests. The 
term corruption is here reserved to refer largely to secondary work. 
 
 
                                                     
13
 Recent understandings of the term revolve around individual or collective behaviour of officials in 
public life. It can be defined as engagement in activities that deviate from the ‘formal duties of a public 
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637. 
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prevailing mores, legal rules, institutional norms, or publicly endorsed standards?’ For Philp, 
‘corruption’ is really about the relationship between a public official and an abuse of public office. 
Mark Philp, Defining Political Corruption, Political Studies, 45 (1997), p. 439. 
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I – The Principal-Agent Problem and Malfeasance in Chartered Companies 
 
 
Because of perceived similarities between early modern chartered trading companies 
and modern corporations, scholars have been intrigued by the possibilities of 
applying modern business theory to historical firms. Business and economic 
historians have often sought the roots of the multinational corporation in Europe’s 
East India companies in particular.
16
 Much of this work has involved looking at the 
‘principal-agent problem’ the companies faced. For any company, the capacity of 
employees to operate based on their own self-interest rather than in the best interests 
of the firm can pose extreme difficulties for management, especially when centres of 
operation are widely dispersed.
17
 They also face the problem of ‘moral hazard’ which 
arises in situations where employees do not bear the full consequences of their actions 
or, conversely, do not enjoy the full benefits of their work. To limit the potential 
damage of both, and to avoid malfeasant or corrupt practices, firms need to ensure 
robust control of employees.
18
 Although several factors can affect the level and extent 
of malfeasance in this context, ineffective or incomplete managerial strategies to deal 
with the problems of employee agency and moral hazard are significant. Absent or 
imperfect management can lead to widespread malfeasant activity, and it is therefore 
down to firms to design adequate contracts with its employees that incorporate these 
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 283 
 
critical aspects of control.
19
 Strong mechanisms to enforce corporate contracts and 
effective reward structures that reinforce good behaviour lessen the incentives for 
employees to act against the wishes of central management.
20
 
Each of Britain’s early modern trading companies faced significant 
complications with employee control. The distance between principals and agents 
coupled with the exigencies of international communication in the eighteenth century 
greatly affected employer-employee relationships. Merchants carrying out business 
several months’ sail from company headquarters were often impossible to monitor 
thanks to information delays and the freedom given by devolved management 
structures. The absence of robust central control frequently gave rise to malfeasant 
conduct amongst employees and the privileging of private interests over corporate 
prerogatives. S.P. Ville and S.R.H. Jones argued that in this context ‘managerial 
opportunism’ was a major problem for the chartered companies that was never 
effectively resolved.
21
 
The East India Company was not unconcerned about the conduct of its 
servants in Asia despite these often insurmountable logistical difficulties. The Court 
of Directors was chronically suspicious of the actions of employees and they 
attempted to take a robust stance towards any conduct that went against the 
                                                     
19
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Company’s covenants, contracts and central regulations. Their correspondence to the 
East during the first half of the 1700s reveals practices ranging from ‘ignorance in 
Imployment’ and ‘infamous connivance’ in undue activities, to more serious 
‘scandalls’ and accounts of affairs run in a ‘clandestine manner’. 22  Company 
admonitions extended from warnings against lavish living to the dismissal of servants 
for misconduct after lengthy court proceedings. The Directors regularly attacked the 
lavishness of the private lives of its servants in the Asian factories with a ‘puritanical 
zeal’.23 The Company’s hierarchy also relied on a network of information to root out 
wrongdoing, and even offered substantial rewards to their employees for information 
and diligent service.
24
 Merchants often responded well and wrote eagerly back to 
their superiors in London notifying them of suspected ‘frauds’ and ‘abuses’.25 
A great deal of existing scholarship on the history of the Company has also 
focused on the Directors’ inability to control its employees and has emphasised the 
structural difficulties they faced when monitoring servants abroad. Centres of 
operation in India were thousands of miles and many months from central authority 
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in London. Information flows between Europe and Asia could suffer from delays 
while incentives for good performance or punishments for poor conduct could take 
years to implement.
26
 The Company’s authority in India during the eighteenth century 
was therefore dependent on day-to-day control at the local level and the 
implementation of directives by the Councils at Calcutta, Madras and Bombay.
27
 
Such a system did not always function successfully throughout this period. Despite 
attempts at control, the Company’s agents stationed in the East Indies acted with a 
high degree of autonomy.
28
This encouraged widespread misconduct, and 
embezzlement and misuse of capital were a great temptation for many servants.
29
 
They promoted their private commercial interests ‘to the detriment of the Company in 
its corporate character’ in numerous ways.30 Unsanctioned private trade could also 
operate unrestricted for a substantial period of time without being discovered. Ian 
Bruce Watson argued that the Company’s lack of control over its employees 
constituted a key factor that contributed to the extensive growth of East Indian private 
trade in the period up to 1760.
31
 Indeed, some scholars have suggested that the 
entanglement between private trade and corruption could be serious enough to ‘form 
a significant threat to both the internal operations and the viability’ of the Company 
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both at home and abroad.
32
 There was a close relationship, therefore, between the 
East India Company’s management mechanisms, the frequency with which servants 
engaged in conduct that flouted the terms of their covenants, and the growth of 
private trade. 
Recent work by Santhi Hejeebu has outlined a much more positive assessment 
of the Company’s employment structure and control of its servants however. 
Hejeebu’s approach to the East India Company’s employment strategy characterised 
private trade not simply as phenomenon resulting from poor central control but, 
conversely, as part of an actively instituted strategy to ensure a robust relationship 
between the Company and its merchants. Hejeebu’s work is based on an earlier body 
of literature focused on the management structure and initiatives of two other 
companies – the Hudson’s Bay Company and the Royal African Company – by Ann 
Carlos and Stephen Nicholas.
33
 According to Carlos and Nicholas, some early 
modern chartered companies did manage to deal effectively with employee conduct. 
They argued that managerial initiatives in the Hudson’s Bay Company largely 
controlled agent behaviour. When agents acted contrary to orders, the directors took 
the matter seriously: employees were dismissed, demoted and fined, reducing 
opportunism.
34
  
Similarly, Hejeebu has also viewed the East India Company’s control of its 
employees as largely successful, especially considering the constraints on effective 
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management. Referring to literature on contract enforcement, she argued that the 
private trade privilege can be best seen as a mechanism put in place by the Company 
in part to solve the problem of managing agents abroad. It also helped to alleviate the 
problems associated with corrupt practices. Private trade acted as an important 
incentive for employees, not only to recruit people into the Company with the hope of 
making a fortune, but also to encourage adherence to central directives. Staying with 
the Company and abiding by its rules meant commercial protection and exposure to 
personal and commercial networks that could be of private benefit in the future.
35
 By 
effectively allowing servants to use Company resources in the pursuit of private trade 
(factory facilities and customs privileges for instance) in the Asian market, moreover, 
the Company aimed to encourage its employees to stay loyal and to cultivate the 
skills required to fulfil their orders.
36
 Private trade ensured loyalty as it made 
continued employment attractive, and at the same time limited the Company’s outlay 
on salaries. 
Alongside this privilege lay the constant threat of dismissal. Those merchants 
who failed to devote sufficient effort to the Company’s business were expelled from 
the service and ‘thereby cut off from the avenues that could lead to private fortune’. 
Hejeebu argues that this coupling of private trade with the threat of dismissal ‘proved 
a masterful strategy’ and helped the East India Company’s contractual relationships 
withstand the problems of managing over long distances in the eighteenth century.
37
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This conception contrasts strongly with other approaches to the issue of private 
activity in a corporate structure that argue the permission to engage in private activity 
acts as a disincentive to behave well, and can in fact reduce principals’ control 
through limiting agents’ attention to principal-directed activities.38 
It is hard to deny that the potential to cultivate a fortune must have acted as an 
important incentive for East Indian agents to adhere to the wishes of the Company.  
However, just as merely focusing on the Company’s poor ‘control’ over its servants 
over-simplifies the relationship between employer and employee, Hejeebu’s approach 
fails to adequately explore the complex ways in which individual malfeasance and 
employee conduct seriously threatened the interests of the Company. It does not 
address the fact that the relationship with its servants frequently broke down, despite 
and often as a result of, growing private trade. Even when successfully engaging in 
commercial activities on their own account, Company servants routinely exploited the 
resources of their employers and their position within the factory system. What 
Hejeebu views as the Company’s ‘masterful strategy’ of private trade privileges 
combined with the threat of dismissal did not guard against the excesses of 
opportunistic employees. Moreover, there was no clear distinction between the 
Company’s management hierarchy and its servants in the eighteenth century. The 
Directors were former servants themselves, and remained closely connected 
personally to many of the Company’s merchants based in Asia. Whilst they 
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condemned private trade officially, they were often an important part of private trade 
networks. 
The system of private trade then, although directly sanctioned by the 
Company, was itself a companion to malfeasance. The activities of merchants acting 
for private gain could adversely affect Company operations in significant ways. The 
following discussion directly explores the relationship between issues of employee 
control, malfeasance and private trade on the west coast of India before 1760. Just as 
Company trade and private commerce differed depending on the sphere of Britain’s 
Indian Ocean world concerned, episodes of malfeasance amongst servants were 
strongly connected to particular regional and temporal circumstances. In the western 
Indian Ocean, the conduct of servants added greatly to the complications faced by the 
Company’s trade in the region. 
 
II – Malfeasance and Company Servants on the West Coast of India 
 
 
Over the course of the eighteenth century, the East India Company’s establishments 
at Bombay and Surat were the sites of frequent investigations into malfeasant 
practices by Company servants. Contemporaries regularly commented on what was 
seen to be a widespread problem. In 1736, merchant William Draper described the 
‘strange Spirit of feud and animosities’ at Bombay, which was ‘more than in any of 
the Company’s settlements besides in India’. ‘In almost a thousand instances the 
Company’s interest has been manifestly prejudiced & infringed’ he continued.39 The 
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Directors were concerned not to let malfeasance further affect their trade considering 
the precarious and volatile situation of the western Indian Ocean world. The chronic 
economic and political problems, rising factory expenses and unprofitability of the 
Bombay, Surat, Malabar Coast and west Asian factories meant the Company could 
not afford servant misconduct, and so investigated and attempted to punish its 
servants regularly. The Company’s correspondence related to the issue at these 
settlements during the early eighteenth century attests to this, and reveals numerous 
instances of the collision between private interests and Company demands. Although 
it is difficult to quantify whether the west coast settlements really were more ill-
disciplined than elsewhere, moments of misconduct provide important insights into 
private trade in the Arabian Sea region. 
There was a wide range of complaints from London in this period. Firstly, the 
Company was aware that employees acting in their capacities as factors and senior 
merchants in the establishments of the East could financially injure the Company. 
This could be deliberate, but also a result of careless accounting and lavish living. 
With remarkable regularity, complaints about high factory expenses, poor financial 
management and sloppy book-keeping poured in to Bombay from the Court of 
Directors. These were often seemingly minor concerns but neat and accurate records 
were vital for East India House to keep abreast of operations in India. As time went 
on, the Company aimed to formulate potential strategies to combat such minor errors.  
‘On perceiving our servants deviating from the right path’, the Court of Directors 
wrote to Bombay, ‘We have from time to time made sundry rules and Orders for the 
right Management of our Affairs, and directed them to be collected into a Book of 
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Standing Orders, and continued from Year to Year, which having been done 
accordingly, we expect that upon all occasions, You have recourse and pay a due 
regard thereto, and to that End the said Book must always lye upon the Council 
Table, and each Member must abstract and frequently peruse the same.’40  
Beyond factory business, private ventures in specific commodities and on 
particular trade routes caused serious concerns for the Directors. Company 
correspondence suggests this was especially the case from the 1730s as private trade 
networks in the region continued to expand. As in Bengal, growth brought more 
pressing problems for the control of employees.
41
 The Directors faced a constant 
battle to guard against the danger of overtrading by their servants whilst maintaining 
a productive relationship with their factories. Of course, there was some ambiguity in 
the Company’s attitude: private trade could have a positive effect through the levy of 
various duties.
42
 Moreover, the Company realised that granting liberty to trade 
privately would also provide them with a modicum of control over an important 
branch of trade.
43
 
The Company was certainly reluctant to discourage private trade when it was 
thought to be for the overall benefit of British commerce in the western Indian Ocean. 
‘We are very willing to authorise & encourage our Covenanted servants and all 
within our Jurisdiction to carry on the Trade from Port to Port within the Limits of 
our Charter so as they don’ thereby prejudice our affairs or Trade’ the Directors wrote 
in one general letter to Bombay. Whilst they stressed that ‘We give all our Covenant 
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Servants free liberty of Trading under our General Rules’ they would of course not 
allow ‘the whole [to be] Engrost by any one’ individual.44 
The fortunes of other settlements were also invoked by the Company to 
encourage loyalty to a regulated private trade system. It emphasised ‘how rich & 
populous Madras hath grown by the freedom of Trade there’ and they hoped that 
‘Bombay is so situated that it might by the like freedom and an active Genius become 
equal unto if not in some particulars exceed it considering it is a safe harbour which 
Madras is not and lies so convenient for Persia the Red Sea and all other parts of that 
side of India.’ The Directors concluded that ‘We hope the time [for Bombay’s 
success] is not far off now’.45 The Directors’ instructions to the three presidencies in 
1733 again suggested their eagerness to encourage the country trade for the benefit of 
all. They stressed that Bombay had the potential to emulate the success of Madras and 
Calcutta a second time, writing:  
‘There is nothing We can think of that will more effectually conduce to the 
benefit of Trade in general, than the cultivating an entire Union and Harmony 
between the three head settlements, and therefore We have reccommended it 
to Fort St George and Bengall, as We hereby do to you, to frame an equitable 
scheme for carrying on the Trade to the several Ports in India in shipping, 
jointly settling the Number of ships between you, and allotting to each 
settlement a proper share of the Trade carry’d on to China, Persia, Surat, 
Mocha, Manilha and elsewhere … And that our servants and the Free 
Merchants may not be discouraged or debarr’d the liberty of raising their 
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Fortunes, We direct that every Person who has an Inclination to be concern’d, 
and can find ready Money for his Proportion towards the Buying and Fitting 
out those ships to Sea, be concern’d accordingly, and that if they have any 
Goods proper for those Markets they must be taken in according to their 
Value free of Commission.’46 
This seemed an extraordinary acceptance of agent freedom and although the Directors 
admitted that ‘it may seem difficult at first to reconcile so many different Interests’ 
they were fully persuaded that if the new proposals were ‘heartily set about, and 
every one concern’d is willing to forgoe a little Private Gain for the public 
Emolument, this matter [the growth of Bombay] may be brought about, and the 
Advantage arising from such an Union will be very conspicuous in a few years’.47 
Although the Directors were aware that relaxing private trading regulations 
had the potential to improve the commercial fortunes of British trade in the region, 
they also aimed to ensure their servants carried out Company business to an 
appropriate standard. Company rhetoric regularly blamed poor conduct for the 
commercial stagnation of Bombay and they saw the improvement of employee 
loyalty as crucial to improving the lot of the settlement. When the Company felt 
commercial privileges were being flouted to a widespread degree and their ‘own 
concerns’ damaged by excessive private trade, they cautioned their servants in the 
strongest terms. The Directors scrutinised certain practices and routinely condemned 
factors’ conduct in particular areas of trade. In the western presidency they saw the 
trade route between Surat and Mocha as particularly problematic. A financially 
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lucrative element of British trade at Surat was selling cargo space for freight goods on 
Company ships. This was attractive to merchants of all nationalities due to the 
relative security of shipping and the low customs dues for the British at Mocha.
48
 
Numerous times however, the Company felt that adequate freights had not been 
found for its vessels. They blamed the servants at Surat for neglecting the Company’s 
shipping in favour of securing freight for private ships. The Company wrote in 1711 
that ‘By what at present appears to us We have reason to conclude that Mr Aislaby 
&ca at Bombay have acted on a Principall of honesty in our affairs and don tollerably 
well but those at Surat so far as wee can understand the Language of their actions 
have made their own private advantage their principall scope and design’. They 
believed that several ships ‘must according to the usuall course of things have made 
much better freights’.49 
A further problem in this regard was that Asian goods were frequently 
clandestinely freighted on board Company shipping under British names. Although 
this did not affect Company finances directly, it threatened to damage the hard-won 
customs concessions at Surat and Mocha. Since East India Company and private 
British shipping was subject to lower duties, merchants were keen to ship goods 
labelled as ‘English’ to pay less. Mahmud Ally, a particularly prominent Surat trader 
had relayed these concerns to the Mughal Court. The Company subsequently 
complained in 1732 that ‘We have too much reason to apprehend that a Clandestine 
and Collusive Trade has been carryed on by some of our servants between Mocha & 
Surat and by covering Black Merchants Goods under their own Names, those 
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Governments have been exasperated’. ‘Such an abuse of the Royal Phirmaund, very 
much endangers Our Dear bought Priviledges’ they concluded.50 
At Mocha, the Directors were worried that goods imported under the cover of 
private shipping had not been properly taxed, causing friction with the Mocha 
government. They wrote that ‘It is not at all reasonable that Our Affairs should be 
embarrass’d, and the dispatch of our ships retarded on any such account, and 
therefore We strictly enjoyn you not to concern your selves therein to Our prejudice’. 
They emphasised that it was expected that if Company servants ‘indulg’d trading to 
Mocha and elsewhere, they must not create, or foment any Differences or Disputes, 
that in the consequences may be prejudicial to our own concerns.’ 51  Via the 
management of the Bombay Council, the Directors naturally attempted to deal 
ruthlessly with any individuals clearly connected with such practices. Even high-
ranking servants with previously good records of service with the Company could be 
at risk when evidence of indiscretions, however minor, came to light.
52
 
In general then, the Directors were sympathetic to their servants attempting to 
make their fortunes in the country trade so long as it was not seen to be interfering 
with the Company’s commerce.53 One senior Company figure told a correspondent in 
1730 that ‘private interests are not minded, nor worth the notice of the Court of 
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Directors’, if conducted within the guidelines laid down by the Company.54 More 
serious problems nevertheless arose when the Directors believed their commercial 
interests were being harmed through private trade.  
 
III – ‘Overtrading’ and Private Trade in Company Commodities 
 
 
In the early eighteenth century, one further cause for the Directors’ concern was 
private trade in the key commodities of the western Indian Ocean region, especially 
coffee and pepper. On both the west coast of India and in the Red Sea, high-ranking 
servants were effectively placed in charge of the procedure involved in trading these 
articles, leading to private interests to become deeply embroiled with Company 
affairs. The rather unusual circumstances of the Company’s coffee trade at Mocha is 
a significant example of this entanglement of the corporate and the private. From the 
establishment of the Mocha factory in the second decade of the eighteenth century, 
the Company found it difficult to procure the finest quality coffee for its own trade. 
According to K.N. Chaudhuri, the Company was constantly fearful that ‘devolving’ 
control of the coffee trade to an active factory, rather than permitting trade managed 
only through supercargoes, would result in servants buying up the best coffee at a 
good price and selling it back to the Company at an inflated rate.
55
 Even when the 
factory was founded, the Company still maintained regular shipping to Mocha, 
leaving supercargoes to liaise with the factory employees for coffee purchases but 
ensuring London had a direct link to this important market.  
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Nevertheless, the Directors remained removed from the realities of the market 
and relied a great deal on their servants on the ground. Although direct trading from 
London with supercargoes continued, the Company failed to ensure that coffee 
privately traded – especially by servants stationed at the factory – was of no better 
quality or price than that procured for the Company’s shipping. Guaranteeing bales 
were the correct weight was also a source of irritation for the Company as short 
consignments were regularly imported into London. The Directors’ instructions to 
supercargoes visiting Mocha impressed upon them strongly the need to ensure bales 
were actually of the specified weight.
56
 Indeed, there were a series of wider problems 
with servant conduct that affected the Company’s trade at Mocha. On receiving 
regular intelligence detailing the poor management of the Mocha factory, the 
Company sent senior servants to ‘inspect into and regulate’ affairs at Mocha on 
multiple occasions.
57
 William Phipps was despatched there in 1721 where he found 
everything in the ‘greatest disorder & confusion imaginable’ due to the bad 
management of Henry Albert, the chief of the Mocha factory at that time. Phipps 
declared he ‘had not the least regard to his duty acting only with a private view to his 
own Interest’. Moreover, the inspector and his entourage were infuriated that ‘his 
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carrage to us has been very disrespectfull, rude and unmannerly’, and marked by ‘ill 
language’.58 
In response to any claims of private buying and re-selling however, the 
Company’s factors at Mocha understandably attempted to defend themselves. They 
emphasised that quick and early purchases at good prices often necessitated using a 
private account. Moreover, the myriad different types of coffee available commanded 
dramatically different prices; something the Company seemingly failed to appreciate 
when simply asking for a full cargo of the commodity at a specified price.
59
 On 
ascending to the chiefship at Mocha, Robert Cowan argued that previous incumbents 
had failed to perform their duties properly. Yet he also told the Company somewhat 
brazenly that ‘at present thers little advantage to be made by a Chief who dos your 
Honours Justice, and takes care that others imploy’d in your service under him dos 
the like’.60 It was too easy, Cowan felt, for Company employees stationed at the Red 
Sea port to get away with overt practices that added to their private assets. It was 
misplaced to expect that under the Mocha system in the climate of the 1720s that 
Company orders would always be followed. 
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Cowan’s comment can be seen as his attempt to go some way to legitimising 
the practices that characterised his own time as chief. His Mocha career was marked 
by allegations of buying up coffee to be sold to the Company at an inflated rate. This 
episode has already been partly described in existing work; Holden Furber was one of 
the first historians to bring attention to Cowan’s conduct during his tenure at the Red 
Sea port from 1724.
61
 Cowan’s case, detailed in the Company’s factory records (IOR 
G/17/2) provides detailed evidence for analysing malfeasance and misconduct in this 
particular setting. Ultimately, Cowan was cleared of wrong-doing and it is somewhat 
unclear whether the activities he participated in really did contravene any regulations 
placed upon him. The case therefore illustrates the complexities faced by the 
Company when dealing with suspected malfeasance and how private trade benefitted 
thereby. 
The document ‘A Relation of the Manner of Mr. Cowan’s abusing the 
Company in their Investment of Coffee at Mocha in the Year 1726’ described the 
charges against Cowan.
62
 It was said that in that year, he had sent John Gerrard, one 
of his associates and another Company servant, up to Bayt al-Faqih to purchase 
coffee on his private account. 8500 Spanish Dollars in bills were remitted initially, 
then another five thousand some days later. At this time, the Company’s ship Drake 
was in the road at Mocha. A number of other ships were also expected, as a result of 
which Cowan predicted that the price of coffee would rise considerably. A thousand 
bales were procured for Cowan’s account while at the same time ‘but a trifle of coffee 
[was] bought for the Honourable Company’s Account’. Cowan’s coffee was packed 
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up in bales of the same size as the Company used and left without a distinguishing 
mark. It was ultimately bought on the Company’s account at 141 Spanish dollars per 
bahar. However, the price of coffee actually continued to fall rather than rise. The 
Company claimed thereby that Cowan had used his privilege as chief to foist his own 
coffee on to the Company’s books, making a profit for himself and effectively losing 
the Company money. They felt that Cowan’s eagerness to get several bales purchased 
quickly proved he was always going to inflate the price of his coffee to sell it to the 
Company. In this way the Directors believed they had ‘been abused and made 
property of by their own servants’ and that their own investment in coffee ‘had been 
postponed to give others an opportunity of purchasing their coffee the cheaper’. The 
report into his conduct concluded by declaring that Cowan had regularly sacrificed 
the Company’s interests ‘when ever he had an opportunity thereby to serve his own 
Interest’.63 
To some extent, this episode mirrored the situation of the Malabar Coast 
pepper trade. The Directors worried about the freedom that all Malabar Coast chiefs 
and merchants had when engaging in this trade; arguably the only commercial reason 
for keeping establishments on the Malabar Coast at all. Indeed, numerous times in the 
early eighteenth century, this privileging of private interests in pepper over those of 
the Company caused much consternation. The main complaint was that the 
Company’s orders went unfulfilled while the servants of the factories at Anjengo, 
Calicut and Tellicherry serviced their private trade.
64
 Leena More’s study of the 
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Malabar pepper trade also highlighted the problems faced by the Company because of 
the practices of John Kyffin and William Gyfford, two Anjengo factory chiefs in the 
1710s. They acted more as middlemen than Company agents; buying up pepper 
privately, reserving the best of the crop for their own trade and attempting to sell the 
rest to the Company at inflated prices.
65
 Senior merchants on the Malabar Coast in 
later years also engaged in similar practices.  
Company merchant Robert Adams’ career stands as a particularly pertinent 
example of malfeasance amongst East India Company servants in this part of India. 
His practices whilst resident on the Malabar Coast threatened to have hugely serious 
repercussions for the Company’s trade there. Adams was a vastly experienced 
merchant by the time he became chief of the factory at Tellicherry in the 1720s. He 
built his own private vessels, engaged in extensive private trade and invested heavily 
in joint ventures with Charles Boone (his close friend and governor of Bombay) at 
this time. Throughout the decade, Adams’ Company career was overshadowed by 
allegations of serious financial mismanagement at Tellicherry however, culminating 
in him leaving the service in 1729. Before the Company began to question his 
conduct, Adams was regarded highly enough for a recommendation to replace 
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William Phipps as governor of Bombay.
66
 The post was never taken up however, and 
he remained at Tellicherry for the coming years, engaging in increasingly 
questionable conduct. The Malabar factory’s position as a subordinate and relatively 
remote settlement perhaps played a part in allowing Adams’ corrupt practices to 
continue without interference. The list of complaints levelled at Adams during his 
time as factory chief was extensive and comprised a litany of practices the Company 
believed were prejudicial to its interests.
67
 
Initially though, the main objections to Adams’ behaviour rested on the fact 
that Company ships were being detained longer at Tellicherry than stipulated, 
meaning they were threatened with missing the most opportune sailing time for 
subsequent ports of call. In addition, and more seriously, the Company further 
contended that despite the length of time the ships were detained at the port they were 
still not adequately provided with pepper – the Company’s main commodity concern 
on the Malabar Coast. Considering the large amount of money Adams was drawing 
from Bombay to carry on the Company’s investment in this hugely significant 
commodity, his superiors viewed this dilatory provision of cargo with concern. 
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Moreover, it was clear to them that ‘private ships … did not at the same time go 
unprovided’ with the spice, while Company ships were sent home short.68 
 By 1724, the Directors had received numerous notices that Adams had 
privileged his own pepper trade over supplying Company ships. Further dubious 
practices came to light over the coming years. Adams was said to have laden pepper 
on board private ships, his own vessels included, without paying the requisite 
customs: ‘We understand there was a Quantity of Private Pepper Laden on the 
[private vessel] Boone at your Port, but We do not find that the Duty We Directed to 
be Levy’d on all such is Collected thereon, which is far from being observant to our 
Orders, that in other Instances We have had but too much reason to Complain’ wrote 
the Bombay Council in 1727.
69
 In addition, Adams was thought to have lent 
considerable sums of money to a number of Indian princes ‘without his Superiour’s 
Leave’. 70  Continued allegations of Adams’ role in embroiling the Company in 
expensive conflicts with the French as well as various Indian powers 
71
, the lack of 
pepper despite much ‘bustle and expence’ and the general unprofitable way in which 
he was running the factory had also reached London; making the Court of Directors 
‘so uneasy’.72 
By 1726, ‘quite inflam’d’ with all the evidence they had received about 
Adams’ conduct, the Directors eventually resolved to order him to Bombay to 
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account for his actions and ultimately ‘to put the pepper trade under a new 
regulation’. Having been ‘once and again’ informed of Adams’ actions, although they 
were justified on the basis of strengthening the East India Company’s hold on the 
pepper trade, the Directors believed they served merely to ‘secure the Pepper’ and 
enable Adams ‘to furnish the [private] Shipping that came on that Coast with what 
they wanted & at his own price’.73 The Council at Bombay was similarly infuriated 
by Adams, forced to take responsibility for controlling and reprimanding him. 
Tellicherry was a subordinate factory to Bombay and the senior merchants in 
Bombay Castle were ultimately responsible for the conduct of all the factors under 
their control. The Company resolved to put a stop to Adams’s practices and informed 
the Council at Bombay that ‘if your Subordinates will not Obey your Orders … suffer 
them to eat our Bread no longer’. They also ordered that Bombay should endeavour 
to make Adams pay the duty still owing for various private ships he granted pepper to 
customs free, and to ‘refund in proportion’ any sums lent by him without authority 
that were not paid back.
74
 
 Thus, the particular configurations of Company trade in certain goods in the 
western Indian Ocean had a profound effect on private trade and the misconduct of 
servants. Freedom to engage in buying up goods, lack of monitoring from the centre 
and poor control from Bombay meant numerous opportunities were available to 
Company servants to boost their private coffers. The Bombay Council, formed of 
active private traders with close connections to subordinate factory chiefs, often had 
little incentive to closely monitor and potentially challenge private trading practices 
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elsewhere. The Company faced constant problems in obtaining redress for any private 
trade that went beyond employment covenants, despite the risks it posed. 
 
IV – Reputations 
 
The myriad inter-personal ties that cut across the East India Company’s corporate 
hierarchy had a negative impact on detecting and punishing misconduct. Most high-
ranking Company servants stationed in the East Indies worked regularly to cultivate 
valuable relations with the Court of Directors and other senior figures. This was a 
pre-requisite of success in the Asian factory system. Maintaining a good reputation 
was central to merchants’ fortunes, as explored in the previous chapter. These 
reputations were built not just on previous behaviour however, but relied on an often 
nebulous collective judgement.
75
 When allegations of misconduct arose, merchants 
could often rely on personal alliances to protect them, and were able to work against 
Company charges by making use of private associations. Ties of correspondence 
were not only significant for developing good reputations, but also for protecting 
those reputations even when threatened by Company allegations or private opinions. 
Robert Cowan’s correspondence reveals his regular attempts to maintain good 
relations with his employers in London throughout the period before he was accused 
of damaging the Company’s affairs. Unsurprisingly, when corresponding with the 
Company directly, Cowan argued that he always tried to be a diligent and faithful 
servant. He even emphasised he was ‘convinced that in your Honours service there 
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are opportunitys of getting money honestly’ and that he preferred ‘a moderate 
competency acquired with reputation, to a larger fortune gaind with infamy’.76 
Cowan’s outward loyalty to the Company, as with most other merchants, was 
extremely important for the progression of his career. An unsullied reputation as a 
dedicated and honest merchant was critical to ensuring promotion within the 
Company’s factory system. Just as significantly, merchants relied on maintaining a 
good reputation amongst their peers to support their private trade. When allegations 
of misconduct threatened merchants, their partners, associates and friends became 
wary of the repercussions of being connected directly with malfeasant activity. It 
could irreparably damage years of work forging an impeccable image of reliability 
and trustworthiness. Cowan was certainly quick to distance himself from the conduct 
of others holding positions of responsibility in the Company, whose behaviour 
contrasted with what he deemed acceptable practice. When malfeasant practices by a 
colleague who shared a close personal relationship came to light, the ruthless and 
image-conscious Cowan also offered little support. In an exchange of letters with 
John Hope at Surat, with whom he corresponded regularly, he passed on news of his 
colleague’s demotion following allegations that Hope had privileged private business 
with the Company brokers over that of his employers. Cowan wrote in 1723 that ‘I 
am sorry to write you this on so disagreable subject as to acqaint you of your 
suspension occasion’d by your conduct in relation to Mr. Whych and suspected 
attachment to the interest of the Brokers.’ Emphasising that he had done as much as 
possible to help his ‘sincerest friend’, he conceded that ultimately, he must look after 
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his own interests. ‘There was no room left for me to oppose the torrent without 
rendering myself noxious to my superiours, which I flatter myself you would not 
desire of me’ Cowan wrote.77 At all times Cowan was conscious of how the conduct 
of his associates would appear to both the Company or to other influential merchants. 
Similarly, Cowan’s letters often commented on the latest news and gossip 
about fellow servants, forming an important part of the management of his reputation. 
Alexander Orme, another associate Cowan regularly corresponded with, was one 
such individual who came under the spotlight after being appointed chief of Anjengo 
on the Malabar Coast. ‘Mr Orme is far from giving that satisfaction in the 
management of the Company’s affairs at Anjengo as might have reasonably been 
expected from him’ read one letter from Cowan. There was a ‘very heavy charge laid 
against him by [Mr] Wallis which if he is able to prove [, it] must displace him’. It 
was clear to Cowan that Orme had not acted according to his covenant, preferring ‘his 
private Interest to that of the Companys’. He had made ‘a great many fair and lusty 
promises to comply with [Bombay’s] orders, many of which he has neglected to 
Execute and others … wilfully broken, besides he has increased the Expenses instead 
of decreasing reducing them according to his own Proposall’.78 
 It is not therefore surprising that when the Company’s charges against 
Cowan’s conduct in the coffee trade emerged, the sagacious merchant did not let the 
allegations pass without strongly defending himself. Firstly, he claimed that it was 
reasonable to expect, from previous years’ experience that the price of coffee would 
rise, not fall. His early purchases aimed to make the most of the market situation and 
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he emphasised that he was prepared to let the Company have what they wanted from 
his private purchase, if needed, to fulfil their order, for a reasonable price. Further, he 
highlighted his previous good management at Mocha and how this had been praised, 
both by the Council Bombay, the Court of Directors and even Thomas Rammell, one 
of his accusers and one of the men behind the report into this conduct in the coffee 
market.
79
 
Very little concrete evidence that could be used to dismiss Cowan actually 
emerged from the investigation, illustrating the difficulty the Company Directors had 
in proving wrongdoing in such a complex case. It seems clear that Cowan went too 
far in privileging his own private affairs. Yet he also went on to have great success as 
a Company factor and became governor of Bombay. He even continued to profess his 
adherence to the maxims and rules of his employers, complaining of those ‘who are 
too much influenced by privat Interest preferring that to the Company’s Authority & 
Reputation and supporting their Agents too readily in the practice of those maxims’.80 
Cowan continued to bend the Company’s rules however. His East Indian 
career ended when he once again flouted the Directors’ guidelines, by permitting a 
Portuguese ship to trade at Bombay custom free.
81
 Even more seriously, the 
supercargo of the ship was said to have been an Englishman, and therefore an 
interloper. Despite the fact that the Company wrote to Bombay that ‘Mr Cowan’s 
conduct and Management of our affairs on your side of India, both in reducing the 
Expences and timely dispatch of our ships was greatly to our satisfaction’, the 
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Directors decided to dismiss him from the Company’s service in 1733. John Horne 
was appointed the new governor with immediate effect, although the Directors 
permitted Cowan to stay in India for several months afterwards to settle his affairs 
and directed that he should be shown ‘a respect suitable to the station he has had in 
our service’.82 
Cowan’s career demonstrates the flexibility senior merchants enjoyed with 
their private trade, despite the Company’s regulations. The case shows the ways in 
which agents could successfully manipulate central directives ‘on the ground’ and 
how merchants stationed in the East could creatively and opportunistically add to 
their private coffers, especially in volatile and unpredictable markets. Although his 
indiscretions were relatively minor in terms of their impact on the Company’s 
finances, Cowan was able to effectively manoeuvre within an institutional structure to 
advance his own private trade. Moreover, strong connections to influential 
individuals and his ability to ensure his management was favourably represented at 
the Court of Directors throughout his career, ensured the Company did not dismiss 
him without some acknowledgement of his standing. Cowan’s case further 
demonstrates the importance of correspondence networks for reputation management. 
The significance of personal ties is also illustrated by other cases of servant 
misconduct in the Company’s western Indian establishments. 
Perhaps the most notable part of Tellicherry factory chief Robert Adams’ 
story is the close correspondence he maintained with East India Company director 
Edward Harrison. Despite a high-profile Company role, Harrison was well aware of 
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his friend’s predilection for pushing the remit of his official role to breaking point. 
The many letters from Harrison to Adams not only reveal details of a dispute over the 
pepper trade and other aspects of his management, but also again highlight how 
private connections distorted managerial and corporate hierarchies. The two men 
regularly corresponded throughout the 1720s. In one private letter, Harrison notified 
Adams that allegations of mismanagement had made ‘deep impressions, and are very 
difficult to be warded off’, advising him that it would be prudent to pay more 
attention to his Company role.
83
 Although in his private letters Harrison did not 
roundly condemn Adams’ conduct, he advised him to change his ways. The Director 
indicated that influential friends – including Harrison himself and Charles Boone – 
would continue to support Adams but only if he continued to ‘do his own part well’.84 
By 1726, Harrison was exasperated by his friend’s reluctance to heed his 
warnings against disrupting the pepper trade. He again counselled Adams that the 
complaints received in London and ‘the confus’d narratives you send us of all your 
transactions’ had ‘raised such a storm’ that he feared they could not be warded off 
despite his best efforts to the contrary. The Director’s remarkable loyalty and 
assistance to his friend continued despite the fact that, as he admitted, ‘as a Directour 
in strictness I ought not to know that you carry on a trade directly in breach of your 
covenant’.85 He eventually suggested that Adams should ‘have had the prudence to 
withdraw in time and shun the approaching tempest.’ Although his support 
throughout the affair had been valuable and though he declared, ‘I never grudge any 
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reasonable trouble to serve a friend’, Harrison had lost patience; especially following 
a closer examination of some of Adams’ other private affairs which were of a ‘very 
troublesome sort, in ill hands some, and others of an odd nature’.86 
Adams eventually departed from Tellicherry in 1728 with Company trade 
there in disarray. Even Harrison ultimately concluded that the Directors could not 
continue to justify ‘laying out the Company’s mony for the benefit only of the private 
trade’.87 Unable to prove any corrupt conduct apart from his recorded debts to the 
Company at that juncture however, the Bombay Council was obliged to submit to 
Adams’ request to leave the Malabar Coast. They did attempt to make him aware of 
his financial responsibilities, and wrote that ‘We are willing to Gratifie Mr Adams in 
his request for leaving the shore … so far as in our power’, but not without ‘Charging 
him with what we think at least he is responsible for’.88 Predictably, Adams managed 
to evade all his obligations and responded by assuring his superiors that although he 
would eventually pay back his debts to the Company, he could not yet fulfil their 
request due to the imminent departure of his ship to Madras. He admitted that the 
loans he authorised to various Indian princes were his responsibility, and reiterated 
his confidence that the money would be paid back promptly. Adams remained 
unrepentant to the end, emphasising he did not believe his behaviour was ‘unfaithful’ 
and was always in the interests of the Company.
89
 
Although only fragmentary evidence is available, it seems Adams moved on 
to Madras and thence to London without complication. By 1730, he was comfortably 
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settled in the capital after a remarkable forty-two year service abroad, writing 
regularly to friends, family and colleagues who remained in India and attempting to 
settle his many remaining private ventures there. Seemingly unfettered by the 
allegations of misconduct, Robert Adams died in 1738 as an ‘immensely rich’ 
Company Director with an estate reportedly worth £100,000.
90
 This case is a 
tremendously important example of malfeasance within the Company’s factories on 
the west coast of India. It is clear that Adams was engaged in improper conduct in 
order to develop his private trade and connections. His case again highlights the 
Company’s ineffective punishment of misconduct too. Adams undoubtedly went 
against wishes of his employees in the service of his own private concerns, either 
financial or reputational. With little on the official record to prove he did anything 
wrong however, his conduct was never effectively followed up by the Company. 
Both the cases of Adams and Cowan also emphasise that a rigid distinction 
between the corporate interests of the Company and the private affairs of its servants 
cannot be pre-supposed. In reality, the two spheres were entangled, and despite the 
Company’s vociferous statements against disobeying directives, prominent Company 
Directors frequently combined their personal business with directorship. Indeed, their 
ambiguous attitude to private trade, and their inability to ‘control’ employees, can be 
attributed to the fact that most Directors were former servants who were well aware 
of the significance of business conducted on personal accounts. 
Despite this, there were other instances of malfeasance that threatened to have 
serious repercussions for the Company’s trade in India. Factory chiefs and governors 
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were uniquely placed to develop their private interests, not only through legally 
making use of their privilege and status, but also by exploiting it. For the Court of 
Directors, seeking redress even to serious injuries to Company business and finances 
proved problematic. 
 
V – Factory ‘Fiefdoms’, Fraud and Embezzlement 
 
In addition to high-ranking Company servants going beyond the terms of their 
employment covenant in the trade of specific commodities, the early eighteenth 
century witnessed more serious instances of misconduct. The Company’s interests 
could be seriously threatened by the activities and management of senior factors and 
factory chiefs in particular. Frequently, merchants’ practices that took advantage of 
Company resources or exploited prominent factory positions were intertwined with 
complex private networks. Exploring specific cases of senior merchants subject to 
charges of misconduct from the Company can therefore shed further light on 
connections between private trade practices in the western Indian Ocean region and 
malfeasant behaviour. Anchored by case studies of notable individuals, this section 
details several significant examples of senior merchants who were investigated and 
charged by the Company; illustrating the intricate relationship between private trade, 
malfeasance and Company control. 
 Firstly, Bombay’s subordinate factories provided major difficulties for the 
Directors in this regard. Company historian John Keay persuasively argued that in the 
Company’s ‘remoter’ settlements, freedom from central authority and private trading 
opportunities bred contempt for the Company’s ‘cumbrous and moralizing ways’ and 
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a devotion to ‘ruthless opportunism.91 The situation at the factories on the Malabar 
Coast and in Persia, it was reported to the Directors several times in the early 
eighteenth century, was almost anarchic. The Bombay Council had to deal with 
several instances of malpractice and poor management amongst servants in the 
Persian settlements in particular. In 1729 they summoned Thomas Waters, chief of 
the Bandar ‘Abbas factory, to Bombay to answer for numerous fraudulent practices 
they had uncovered.
92
 One letter from William H. Draper in the 1730s similarly 
suggested that the servants at Gombroon were damaging Company business. ‘Those 
Gentlemen may pretend what they please of the scarcity and dearness of provisions’ 
Draper wrote, but declared that ‘without any infringement upon Truth … the true 
cause of their Expences running so high, has been Entirely owing to their own ill 
Ceremony, Extravagant, and very profuse living, which has been practiced to such a 
degree, and formerly such shamefull abuses and Corruptions in the management of 
them, that I believe no set of men, in any part of the known world can parallel’.93 The 
Company’s Bombay books and Persia factory records reveal numerous other 
instances of servant misconduct at Bandar ‘Abbas and subordinate factories in the 
1730s and 40s.
94
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 The Company’s factories at Surat and Bombay also suffered several times 
during the early eighteenth century from factory chiefs attempting to exploit their 
position and manipulate British trade for private gain however. Although the 
Directors attempted to guard against the ‘Monopolizing of Commoditys or Trade[,] or 
Persons directly or indirectly intimidated in buying, selling or other parts of their 
Traffick under our aforesaid Liberty’, they stressed in a 1715 letter that this had ‘been 
too much the case at Bombay’. 95  Merchant John Hillar in a 1713 letter to the 
Company’s secretary Thomas Woolley described how he felt obliged to lay before 
the Company ‘the daily depredations [that] are made on the Company’s Estate on this 
Island’ .‘’Twould amaze’ the Directors, he continued, ‘to see with so easie concern 
and with what insensibility’ the Company’s servants operated. This was the reason 
for the ‘continued complaints for so many years past from home’.96 The following 
discussion details some of these episodes in the early eighteenth century, again 
emphasising the extent to which private trade was intertwined with misconduct.
 
 The Company career of Sir Nicholas Waite provides one early example of a 
controversial Company figure at Surat and Bombay in the early eighteenth century.  
On coming out to India, he played a key role in imprisoning the Old Company’s 
governor of Bombay, Sir John Gayer.
97
 Towards the end of his own time as governor 
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too, Waite’s conduct became increasingly aggressive and monopolistic, leading 
ultimately to his suspension and arrest by members of the Bombay Council.
98
 On 
numerous occasions, Waite was alleged to have flouted the Company’s regulations or 
acted without proper jurisdiction. His ‘Tyrannicull government’ and ‘monopolizing 
the Companys estate’ had English trade at Surat to ‘inevitable ruin’ according to 
Captain James Hanmer in a letter of 1708.
99
 The governor had failed to consult 
Council members on several crucial occasions, locking the consultation room in the 
factory and ultimately attempting to control English trade at the port for his own 
purposes. Waite was said to have ‘contrived all the ways and means to bring his 
council in discredit with every one that could come into his presence. Thereby he 
made himself absolute’.100 He was also said to have constantly overvalued goods 
belonging to his favoured broker ‘Sarobjee’, who was believed to be bribing Waite to 
carry on the practice.
101
 Waite continually insisted, according to merchant Joseph 
Goodshaw who attempted to ‘unmask his wicked designs’, that he had the ‘Queen’s 
Commission by which he was Chief Governor and sole Judge of all matters that 
should be transacted on this Her Majestys Island, independent from the Company’s 
Orders or his Council’. 102  During the Company’s investigation into his conduct, 
several merchants came forward to declare their experience of Waite claiming to have 
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the ‘Queen’s commission’ and acting without the authority of his Council.103 This 
was significant as, in theory, any factory document was considered invalid unless it 
was signed by a whole Council.
104
  
 Convinced that he was going to seize control of the island and the Old 
Company’s estates, the Bombay Council headed by William Aislabie set out to seize 
the governor. They communicated details of his conduct to London and received a 
warrant to confine him.
105
 Waite remained unrepentant in the face of these serious 
allegations. The later declaration of John Symonds detailed that Waite was convinced 
a ‘gang’ had conspired against him led by Aislabie, who was ‘as false as the Devil’. 
He refused to accept his dismissal although he was ultimately transported home.
106
 
Although there is not an explicit connection between Waite’s private trade and his 
conduct, his story illustrates the leverage possessed by factory chiefs to exploit the 
Company’s infrastructure and resources, particularly at a time of dissention between 
the Old and New companies. Like most senior merchants however, Waite was 
certainly engaged in extensive private trade.
107
  
The conduct of the Company’s council at Surat was also the object of 
numerous complaints to the Court of Directors in subsequent years. Charles Boone 
characterised the factory as uniquely mismanaged, and emphasised the poor conduct 
of many of the Company’s servants there. He wrote to London in 1716 warning that 
‘if the Company don’t make a severe example of these Gentlemen [at Surat]; An 
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honest man has but small encouragement to serve[,] for their is no acting with men of 
such voracious appetites.’ Boone also stated that there was ‘a great want of 
regulation’ at the settlement, in contrast to Madras and Bengal where ‘such 
enormities would have been taken notice of’, but were I to do all this at once they 
would load me with curses and backbitings’.108 
A remarkably similar example emerged again at Surat in the 1730s. The case 
of Henry Lowther features a subordinate factory chief who successfully exploited 
Company resources for private gain. Lowther was the Company’s chief at Surat, 
dismissed from the service in 1736. Similarly to his private trading partner Robert 
Cowan, his exploits have fascinated scholars. Kirti Chaudhuri, Holden Furber, Ian 
Bruce Watson and Om Prakash all referred to Lowther’s opportunistic time on the 
west coast and the Company’s impotence in dealing with him. Lowther’s 
management of the Surat factory in the 1730s has been vividly described by Ashin 
Das Gupta as a ‘virtual reign of terror’. He monopolised all trade which had any 
connection with the factory, ousting anyone who went against his authority. Through 
his activities, Das Gupta estimated he defrauded the Company out of more than 
£120,000 before he was eventually disciplined.
109
  
The Lowther story has never been considered in any great detail however. The 
actual accounts of abuses he was alleged to have committed and the language in 
which the exchanges between the defendant, witnesses and the Company were 
communicated add a great deal to understandings of malfeasance on the west coast. 
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The circumstances surrounding Lowther’s conduct as Surat chief, which were 
intimately bound up with his private trading activities, are the most interesting aspect 
of his Company career. Lowther provides another example of a high-ranking 
Company servant using his position to further own private advancement. As with his 
private trade portfolio, his attempt to defraud the Company and the subsequent 
attempts to delay prosecution relied critically on a network of friends and associates. 
In 1736 Lowther was suspended and his conduct at Surat over the foregoing years 
investigated by the Bombay Council and the Directors. 
Allegations of the inadequate way in which the Surat factory was being 
managed had surfaced in 1735. The following year, the ‘apparent breaches of trust in 
Mr. Lowther’s private & publick dealings’ and numerous episodes of ‘Scandall’ and 
‘infamous connivance’ were brought more ardently to light by John Braddyl, another 
Company merchant. Communicating his findings first to the Bombay Council, he 
argued that such episodes had threatened the ‘total and imminent ruin of [the 
Company’s] Estate Credit & interest in Surat’ and believed Lowther’s conduct 
deserved nothing less that dismissal. One of Braddyl’s letters to Bombay importantly 
emphasised that he was not raising these issues only because of ‘pique and 
resentment’, a charge that ‘Mr. Lowther & his adherents … throw at the head of 
every honest man that presumes to censure his conduct’.110 
Braddyl’s claims were backed by strong evidence too although there were 
other matters that he stressed needed further investigation.
111
 Subsequent inquiries by 
the Company resulted in several charges detailing each part of Lowther’s corrupt 
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activities; these are outlined in Appendix Two below. In brief, they comprise actions 
falling under three distinct headings. Firstly, abusing his senior Company position to 
gain privileged access to goods; secondly, intimidating other merchants and forging 
private contracts with the Company’s brokers despite their crumbling finances; and 
lastly, directly embezzling Company funds coupled with entering erroneous 
information in the factory’s books to cover up this financial mismanagement. These 
were each unforgiveable sins in the eyes of the Company of course, who were clearly 
infuriated by Lowther’s management at Surat. His colleagues did not escape the 
Company’s punishment either, and factors James Hope, John Robinson, Daniel Innes, 
Daniel Taudin and James Ramsden were all dismissed along with Lowther.
112
 
The specific practices through which Lowther was said to have ‘defrauded’ 
the Company were extremely complex however. With the first charge, it was said that 
large purchases of Company goods were made by Lowther on his private account, 
though he knew he was virtually bankrupt. In order to satisfy other private debts on 
his own books, he was said to have engrossed vast amounts of Company goods using 
his privileges as chief and easy access to credit, to then sell for a profit. This was a 
‘Crutch to support a failing credit at the expence of his Masters Estate, as well as a 
poor & shallow artifice to get continued in his Chiefship’. The purchases were said to 
have exceeded ‘all measure of unjustice & infidelity’.113  
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The Company’s brokers at Surat, Lolldas Parak and his own family, were 
intimately bound up with this and other schemes. They were a crucial part of Lowther 
and Robert Cowan’s private trade, but the brokers faced dire financial difficulties in 
the 1730s. Lowther’s finances suffered through the entanglement of his personal 
affairs with the business of the Paraks. The family owed a great deal of money to 
Lowther and also to the Company, yet Lowther proceeded to try to shore up their 
crumbling financial foundations for the sake of ensuring their debt to him was paid 
off. He procured goods at favourable rates directly from the brokers, even using part 
of the Company’s investment sent up to Surat, thereby partly satisfying their debts to 
himself, but allowing the brokers’ debt to the Company to mount. Moreover, Braddyl 
believed that what was owed to the Company could never be recovered thanks to the 
poor financial state of the Paraks, despite Lowther’s assurances to the contrary.114 
Braddyl was also infuriated that Lowther appeared to have offered guarantees of the 
brokers’ solvency to the Company and other merchants, knowing this to be false. 
‘Did he not constantly amuse the Board with his assurances that the Brokers wou’d 
have a creditable capitall after the Clearance of all their debts?’ he asked. Rather, ‘all 
the world knew … in 1731 that Lolldass’s Affairs were entirely declining’. Lowther 
even attempted to pay off some of Lolldass’s sons’ creditors through a loan of six 
lakh rupees of Company money and failed to recover the amount.
115
 
Lastly, it was abundantly clear to Braddyl and the Company that Lowther had 
covered up the insidious aspects of his conduct by manipulating the Surat books over 
several years. Braddyl stated that, ‘There is further reason to think that the Surat 
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Books are loaded with a heap of fictitious Collusive transfers betwixt the brokers & 
himself [Lowther] & that particularly the Balance of Cash in July 1734 was of that 
imaginary nature & serv’d Mr. Lowther’s private conveniency.’ The blame for the 
generally poor state of British trade and credit at Surat at this time was laid squarely 
at Lowther’s door.116  Like Nicholas Waite two decades before, Braddyl believed 
Lowther had attempted to clandestinely and violently control the trade of Surat for his 
own ends and agreed with ‘The Clamour of the Bengall Gentlemen & Supra Cargoes’ 
who had already emphasised Lowther’s ‘arbitrary monopoly & destruction of the 
English trade at Surat by indirect measures & intimidating the Merchants’.117 For a 
Company keen not only on maintaining a robust and profitable trade at Surat but also 
on extolling the collective benefits of regulated private trade, as highlighted earlier, 
Lowther’s conduct was unforgiveable. He had manipulated with great success the 
loopholes inherent in the Company’s management structure for his private gain. Due 
to the ‘devolution’ of power first to Bombay and then subsequently to Surat, Lowther 
was able to effectively maintain his personal rule without direct interference for some 
years. 
Critical private alliances also assisted him. In particular, his relationship with 
the Paraks was central. Without them and the capital they provided he would not have 
been able to operate for so long with great freedom. Moreover, his partnership forged 
in earlier years with Robert Cowan undoubtedly gave him the capital, influence and 
network of contacts to support his activities. Although Lowther’s position seemed 
untenable following Braddyl’s intervention, the Company was obliged to consider 
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both sides of the case. Despite the serious nature of the allegations, allies of the Surat 
chief came forward. William Henry Draper was a close friend of both Lowther and 
Robert Cowan, evidenced perhaps most of all by the fact Draper’s son was named 
Cowan Henry Draper, after the Bombay governor. When it came to the investigation 
of Lowther’s conduct too, Draper ardently defended his friend and colleague. Other 
examples of misconduct amongst Company factors suggest the testament of 
colleagues could provide critical insulation against potential Company 
punishments.
118
 Draper wrote an appeal to the Bombay Council against Braddyl’s 
accusations. He stressed Lowther’s good conduct in past times and argued that he had 
recently been successful in reducing the amount of his debt to the Company.
119
  
Despite the fact the Company had arranged for an official investigation to 
delve further, they controversially appointed Braddyl himself to conduct the enquiry, 
also demanding that Lowther hand over control of the factory to Braddyll. Draper 
was rightly displeased about such an appointment and wrote to the Company that:  
‘Because I cannot but conceive it (supposing Mr. Lowther really Guilty of all 
the Facts laid to his Charge) a very extraordinary & irregular method of 
proceeding to lay him under a suspension from his post before he has seen the 
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Charge that is delivered against him & had a reasonable time given him to 
make his defence & I am the more surprized at this when I consider that the 
very Gentlemen who gives in the Charge (Mr. Braddyll) is the person 
appointed to make it good which is the investing him to Act in a double 
Capacity, as accuser & judge; A manner almost unheard of!’ 
Lowther, he then argued further, was ‘beloved by all ranks & Conditions of men’ and 
with trade at Surat at such a low ebb due to external factors, it made little sense to 
make dramatic changes to the management of the factory. Draper emphasised that if 
he was found guilty, the whole state of British trade at Surat could be thrown further 
into jeopardy.
120
 Draper defended Lowther’s character strongly and emphasised the 
‘very signal services that by undeniable proofs he has performed for the publick good 
in Surat’. He continued that Lowther’s ‘generosity & publick spiritedness to mankind 
in general’ was ‘numberless’, and argued for his diligence in dealing with the 
commercial and political problems faced by the British at Surat.
121
 
Despite Draper’s impassioned pleas, senior Company colleagues would not 
protect his friend. The arguments in defence of Lowther appeared ‘very ill grounded 
to all men of Candour & common understanding’. Draper had apparently incorrectly 
calculated the balance of the Surat chief’s debt too, which according to verified 
figures stood at 112,280 rupees, ‘besides the amount of what money belonging to the 
Hon. Company which it shall appear he has applied to his own use’. For the 
Company, questions remained over how exactly Lowther would clear his debt 
following the next year’s investment at Surat. John Horne, governor of Bombay, also 
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emphasised that it was simply usual practice to have the individual bringing charges 
to also look into the matter further.
122
 
In fact, Draper himself was chastised and summarily suspended: ‘The 
transactions of Mr. Lowther appear so fraudulent and scandalous that We cannot 
forbear taking notice of Mr. William Henry Draper’s endeavouring to Palliate and 
vindicate them in his Objections and Dissent … therefore We hereby suspend the said 
Mr. Draper from our service till our further Orders’.123 Although they dismissed him 
from the service, the Directors also emphasised they were loath to discourage whistle-
blowing when it was in the Company interest. It is a measure of how seriously the 
Company took Lowther’s conduct, and perhaps an indication of the weight of reliable 
evidence, that they were not willing to tolerate Draper’s appeals. ‘We do not mean to 
discourage any Dissents excepting in fundamental cases relating to our Interest, and 
contrary to our Establish’d Rules’ they wrote.124 
Furthermore, Lowther’s other associates were eager not to defend him, but 
rather more conscious about protecting themselves against any implication they were 
involved in his dealings. John Horne strongly emphasised his disassociation with 
Lowther’s affairs. Horne explained that he believed Lowther had the best of 
intentions to pay his debt to the Company, as he several times demanded money from 
the brokers, but stressed that Lowther’s ultimate aim was to reduce the brokers’ debt 
to himself at the Company’s expense, while making use of the ready cash they could 
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still provide.
125
 Unsurprisingly, although merchants worked hard to protect their 
friends and business partners, in some cases the utility of close personal ties was 
limited. Company men were obliged to make strategic decisions about how far 
personal alliances would cut across their professional sensibilities and career 
ambitions. 
This episode undoubtedly damaged the Company but also put an end to 
Lowther’s chances of obtaining a competency. It took several years for the Company 
to recover its debts too: as soon as Lowther returned to England following his 
dismissal, he fled for France without presenting himself to East India House. Despite 
Lowther’s absence, the Company was nevertheless eager to ‘make effectual 
Measures’ to recover what it was owed. Lowther himself was due several sums from 
various creditors in India, and it was thought that William Draper had possession of 
some of Lowther’s effects.126 In later years Lowther filed for bankruptcy still owing 
the Company £16,488; two thirds of the total amount he owed to all his creditors in 
India. The Company remained unconvinced they would recover anything at all from 
him, especially ‘As the greatest part of Mr Lowther’s Estate consists in Debts owing 
to him in the East Indies and particularly a very large Demand upon Loldass’s 
Family’. They expected ‘little Satisfaction … from a Judicious and proper settling 
[of] Mr Lowther’s Debts in India’.127 
Robert Adams, by this time settled back in London with his family, 
commented on the case in his letters to India. Adams believed Lowther had fled to 
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‘shelter himself from justice’ but that if Robert Cowan had still been alive, he would 
not have disappeared so hastily. Lowther’s relationship with his friend and partner 
was strong and he might reasonably have hoped for assistance from Cowan, who 
remained an influential Company figure. Cowan died in February 1737 however, just 
a few months before Lowther’s return. Adams remarked that, ‘how true all his 
[Lowther’s] accusations are I shall not take it on me to say but sure I am that 
iniquitous schemes & frauds have for some years been practiced & carryed on at 
Bombay and Surat to the prejudice & abuse of the Company’.128 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
Almost every major study of the Honourable East India Company refers to corruption 
as a day-to-day part of the firm’s operations. Yet, relatively little is known about the 
phenomenon amongst its servants in the pre-colonial era, and especially how it 
intersected with private trade. The desire to develop wealth, status and power for 
merchants stationed in the East, especially considering the low level of Company 
salaries and the relative difficulty of developing a private fortune in trade, encouraged 
merchants to go against their covenants in myriad ways. The difficulties in 
monitoring the activities of employees stationed far from London also provided a 
great deal of room for servants to engage in malfeasant activity. This chapter has 
addressed these linkages between malfeasance and private trade networks. 
Concentrating on the scope of this phenomenon in a particular region – the western 
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Indian Ocean – allows for a close look at the particular factors and networks behind 
episodes of malfeasance and reveals much about private trade. The context of the 
western Indian Ocean world, just as it affected private fortunes, also affected levels of 
misconduct amongst Company servants.  
 The Company could always be expected to place the blame for the poor state of 
trade at Bombay and its subordinate factories on its servants. However, the sheer 
regularity with which investigations were launched into the conduct of Company 
merchants in the region is remarkable. This can partly be explained by the fact that 
the Directors kept a close eye on the western Presidency and assiduously sought to 
protect its interests there. Yet, since private fortunes were difficult to accumulate in 
the volatile context of the Arabian Seas, any activity that provided opportunities for 
financial advancement was eagerly seized by Company servants; especially by senior 
merchants who could make use of their position in the factory system. There was a 
sense amongst contemporaries too that the degree to which the Directors devolved 
managerial decisions to the Bombay Council presented further opportunities for 
merchants there and at the subordinate factories. An extra layer of management 
diluted the power of central directives and Surat, Mocha and the Malabar Coast 
factories were in reality, if not in theory, subject to weaker direct control. This had a 
corresponding effect on levels of malfeasance. 
 It should also be emphasised that episodes of malfeasance amongst East India 
Company servants are, to some degree, difficult to tease out from the archival record. 
As the cases above suggest, several factors made it problematic to discern whether 
merchants were acting contrary to orders at all. Private trade was not necessarily 
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‘malfeasant’ until it infringed in some way on Company interests; whether these were 
financial, related to access to particular markets, or involving the transit of specific 
commodities. Also, the structure of Company trade posed difficulties for maintaining 
employee conduct. Company trade and investment had to be carried out by Company 
employees working in Asian markets where it was necessary to make quick 
decisions, using imperfect information and incomplete instructions from London. 
Simple mistakes were as common as ardent disobedience. Company allegations of 
merchant misconduct were also built on imperfect advice and were frequently 
dropped as contrary evidence appeared.  
 Moreover, a recent theoretical perspective on the Company’s relationship with 
its employees has argued for the effectiveness of employment contracts. This view 
holds that the Company relied on the private trade system to sustain employee loyalty 
and guard against malfeasance whilst relieving the need for employees to be properly 
remunerated. The Company certainly felt that the allowances given to its servants to 
trade privately in Asia were a fair reward for the uncertainties of employment in the 
‘East Indies’ and hoped this would help to deter wrongdoing. The Directors wrote in 
1726 that, ‘An Honest Man that has a Conscience ought & should be Content with the 
large allowance we give of the Generall Trade to & fro in India to all our Servants 
whereby they may get mony honestly & sufficient (if they have success) to satisfie 
any moderate desires; if he is not Content with this Liberty it is his fault’.129 
 Nevertheless, despite the privilege of private trade, it is clear that merchants 
were fervently opportunistic and prepared to go against the wishes of their employees 
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 Letters to Tellicherry, p. 12, Court of Directors to Bombay, 13 April 1726.  
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in the search of private advancement. Many merchants did not just harbour ‘moderate 
desires’ as the case studies in this chapter have highlighted. Opportunism often led to 
rampant private trade and more illicit practices that went beyond the boundaries of 
what the Company considered acceptable. This was particularly the case not just in 
‘overtrading’ but through the unscrupulous practices of high-ranking Company 
servants, especially factory chiefs. Salaries were relatively low, even for these men, 
considering the risks of East Indian life and trade. Although private trade was an 
important way in which this shortcoming was overcome, merchants still sought out 
other channels to increase their wealth. Often, participating in activities that were 
considered by the Company to be acts of ‘misconduct’ was one route towards this, 
particularly for high-ranking servants who had power, influence and freedom from 
authority. The Company was undoubtedly weak when it came to guarding against and 
punishing such conduct and had to leave the day-to-day running of factories in the 
hands of its servants. This led to a great many opportunities for malfeasant acts, 
which can be detected through Company and private correspondence. 
 Going further, this relationship was complicated by the fact that the rhetoric of 
the Company over guarding against the improper conduct of its servants and warning 
against misconduct was unrealistic. Inter-personal relationships cut across corporate 
ones as merchants stationed in Asia retained important ties to influential Company 
figures at home. Private-regarding activity was frequently aided and abetted by the 
Directors themselves despite official admonitions, and there was even the sense 
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amongst some senior merchants that illicit practices were being ignored altogether.
130
 
Such a situation arose because the private and the corporate were frequently 
intertwined, and personal ties often took primacy over professional hierarchies. In 
fact, for the eighteenth-century Company, especially where private trading activity is 
concerned, it is difficult to see a rigid distinction between the ‘principal’ and ‘agent’, 
or the ‘employer’ and ‘employee’. The boundaries between corporate directives about 
appropriate private trade on the one hand, and the reality of servant conduct on the 
other, were extremely fluid. Where malfeasance in the Company is concerned, 
merchants acting in the service of their own private interests first and foremost relied 
on mobilising their inter-personal ties, forming alliances and utilising their ‘friends in 
high places’. As some historians have suggested, the Company was an organisation 
with little formal structure, and merely acted as an ‘umbrella’ under which myriad 
dynamic private trade networks could operate.
131
  
Any discussion of malfeasance amongst Company servants cannot just take 
into account the employer-employee relationship but must account for these inter-
personal networks. The episodes of individual malfeasance detailed above complicate 
any model of clear and robust contractual relations between the principal and agents 
in the context of the Company. Moving beyond ‘corporate’ relationships and rigid 
                                                     
130
 One particularly illustrative passage from one of Robert Cowan’s letters to a Company friend in 
Bengal argued that, ‘Altho the Honble Company hav frequently signified to their several Presidencys 
in India that they respect their servants and all … who trade Under their protection who shall conform 
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 See Søren Mentz’s book The English Gentleman Merchant at Work: Madras and the City of 
London, 1660-1740 (Copenhagen, 2005) for an example of this approach. Holden Furber in earlier 
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structures of employment towards focusing on inter-personal connections and private 
correspondence provides a useful way of approaching this topic that highlights these 
dynamics and nuances within the principal-agent relationship.
132
  
At the same time, as Huw Bowen persuasively argued, seeing the Company as 
primarily a loose collection of private alliances greatly exaggerates the position and 
role of private interests and ‘entirely overlooks the fact that the Company always 
retained a strong corporate identity and pursued aims that overrode sectional 
concerns’. There is clearly a need, Bowen suggested, ‘to strike a balance between 
interpretations of the Company as an efficient, well-organised firm, and those that 
view it as little more than a loose collection of private interest groups’. 133  The 
perspectives and individual case studies detailed here dovetail well with this idea. 
Whilst it is vital to emphasise the inter-personal connections at play when it comes to 
private trade, Company servants relied on working within and exploiting an 
institutional framework. This framework did not just restrict private trade, but also 
opened up avenues for its successful operation. 
 The worlds of East Indian private trade and employee malfeasance in the 
Company were intimately connected. Any discussion of British private trade in the 
eighteenth century must take into account episodes of malfeasance amongst Company 
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servants and the context and networks that underpinned them.  In the period of private 
trade expansion up to 1760, there were many instances when employees pushed the 
limits of their professional roles to breaking point. As with looking at private 
commerce itself, such moments provide another view of the significance and 
dynamism of private networks within the corporate whole. They also provide 
windows onto how these networks were constructed through complex chains of 
correspondence and social ties. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
This thesis represents the first in-depth study of British private trade in the Arabian 
Seas during the first half of the eighteenth century. The development of private trade 
across the Indian Ocean in this period is a critically important part of Eurasian and 
global history, intimately connected to questions of European economic hegemony 
and Empire in the early modern era. The growth of British private trade has been seen 
as a truly integrative process that linked European and even Atlantic trade with Indian 
Ocean commerce.
1
 Focusing in detail on one important segment of the Indian Ocean 
world refines our understanding of private trade across maritime Asia by emphasising 
its regional specificity and complexity. This thesis has shown how local context and 
regional circumstance could shape the character and operation of this significant 
branch of early modern global trade.  
The western Indian Ocean region’s volatile political and economic 
environment gravely affected the progress and growth of all British trade over much 
of the early eighteenth century. While in other areas of the Indian Ocean world the 
conditions for successful trade were by no means consistent, commerce in the 
Arabian Seas suffered particularly acutely in this period. Private trade in the region 
did eventually develop into a successful sector, but this arose much later than 
                                                     
1
 See, for instance, Ashin Das Gupta, ‘India and the Indian Ocean in the Eighteenth Century’, in Uma 
Das Gupta (ed.), The World of the Indian Ocean Merchant, 1500-1800: Collected Essays of Ashin Das 
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Elizabeth Mancke and John G. Reid (eds), Britain’s Oceanic Empire: Atlantic and Indian Ocean 
Worlds, c.1550-1850 (Cambridge, 2012), pp. 64-65. 
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elsewhere in the Indian Ocean, and was again largely dependent on the changing 
dynamics of the economy of the Arabian Seas. Focusing on the western Indian Ocean 
in light of what we already know about India’s eastern seaboard and Bengal, 
therefore highlights the unevenness of the character and organisation of British 
private trade in the East Indies. Emphasising this resolutely challenges existing work 
that has presented a far too homogenous picture of private trade by over-emphasising 
its place within a uniform ‘early British Empire’.2 
The years between 1680 and 1760 were marked by political turmoil and 
economic change across maritime Asia that had a significant impact on European 
trade in the East Indies. This period was as a critical episode in the history of the 
Arabian Seas, and indeed, the broader Indian Ocean region. Each chapter of this 
thesis has explored a specific element of British private trade across this timeframe, 
looking at how it functioned and developed within a volatile and fluctuating context. 
The first three chapters discussed how the political and commercial milieu of the 
western Indian Ocean world impacted on the trade of the East India Company and its 
servants. The country trade was risk-laden even in times of general commercial 
buoyancy of course; but the cocktail of political turmoil, endemic piracy, and 
widespread competition from other commercial groups placed additional constraints 
on Company servants’ private trade in the Arabian Seas – as explored in Chapter 
One.  
By the second quarter of the eighteenth century however, commercial 
conditions had improved, especially for merchants based in the Bombay and Surat 
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 Søren Mentz, The English Gentleman Merchant at Work: Madras and the City of London, 1660-1740 
(Copenhagen, 2005), p. 38.  
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factories. Chapter Two discussed some of the ways in which British merchants were 
able to develop successful intra-Asian trades despite a challenging context, 
particularly through adopting diverse business portfolios and tapping into the broader 
British commercial network via the architecture of the East India Company. Senior 
merchants in the Company’s factory system were the most successful: they were 
frequently able to take advantage of their elevated position and were entitled to a 
range of lucrative commercial privileges. As senior merchants, they were the 
individuals most likely to have robust and durable metropolitan connections. Chapter 
Four demonstrated that these long-distance connections were used to uphold private 
trade through information exchange and the maintenance of reputations. Other 
merchants benefitted from more localised changes such as the Company’s growing 
governmental and jurisdictional authority in India. Their private trade was furthered 
by advantages afforded by customs concessions, won through diplomacy and the 
threat of force over preceding decades. Private vessels and cargoes also profited from 
the security of newly fortified trading posts, protected by the Bombay Marine. The 
changes that took place within the British private trade network in the western Indian 
Ocean cannot be fully understood without taking into account the entanglements 
between individual merchants’ global connections and local political and economic 
realities ‘on the ground’ in India and the Middle East. Two important findings of this 
thesis are that financial ties to ‘home’ were less significant than Indian capital, and 
that metropolitan correspondents were important chiefly for moulding merchants’ 
reputations to secure career advancement within the Company’s Asian hierarchy. 
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Progressing to the summit of the factory system was vital for successful private trade 
in this part of the Indian Ocean world. 
Cultivating a private fortune in the first half of the eighteenth century 
unsurprisingly remained profoundly contingent. Merchants needed to be extremely 
fortunate to survive long enough to build up their business portfolios, whilst also 
maintaining a diverse range of business interests to spread risk. Notwithstanding the 
increasing success of private traders at Bombay and Surat from the second quarter of 
the eighteenth century, the markets that were intimately connected to western India 
remained problematic – notably the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. Chapter Three 
discussed how British commerce with West Asia developed over the course of the 
century, and emphasised that despite the continuation of private trade to the region 
from the west coast, most merchants made only small, if any, profits until the end of 
the period under review. British trade privileges were challenged and business 
suffered from on-going political conflict. Ultimately then, while some traders were 
able to operate successful private trade concerns despite volatile conditions – and it is 
important to look at the practices and structures that enabled them to do this – British 
trade was fundamentally limited by political and economic circumstances particular 
to the Arabian Seas region. 
The findings of this study also have important implications for broader global 
and imperial histories, especially with regard to the shape and functioning of 
merchant networks. Although building on the wide range of recent literature taking a 
network approach to mercantile trade, the picture of a merchant network presented 
above is not simply a monocentric structure, with its major agents of exchange 
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flowing through a particular centre. It is this type of organisation that been the focus 
of most recent studies of Eurasian merchant networks, such as those of Markovits and 
Aslanian.
3
 The model of private trade developed by Mentz in his study of Madras, 
rooted in a centralised view of Empire, with the agenda and interests of the centre in 
London radiated outwards, adopts a similar conception of a merchant network.
4
 
London was the pre-eminent centre for the British private trade network discussed in 
this study, yet Bombay and Surat also acted as crucial second tier sub-nodes. These 
too were important centres of private trade in their own right, with connections to 
their own ‘peripheral’ ports in the region mediated through the commerce of 
Company servants. The day-to-day experience of the trade of these men was 
connected to the workings of this secondary structure and conditions at these Asian 
hubs of trade just as much as it was to the broader London-centred network. Recent 
research on early modern British merchant networks has been working towards much 
more nuanced conceptions of what such structures actually are, and what they look 
like.
5
 It has also underlined the extent to which merchants were embedded not only in 
‘the global’, but in geographically and culturally specific contexts.6 The kind of de-
centred, multifarious model of a private trade network described in this thesis 
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 Claude Markovits, The Global World of Indian Merchants, 1750-1947: Traders of Sind from 
Bukhara to Panama (Cambridge, 2008), esp. p. 25, Sebouh David Aslanian, From the Indian Ocean to 
the Mediterranean: The Global Trade Networks of Armenian Merchants from New Julfa (Berkeley, 
2011), esp. p. 15. 
4
 Mentz, English Gentleman Merchant. 
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People, Goods and Capital in the British World, c. 1850-1914 (Cambridge, 2010), esp. p. 45; John and 
Sheryllynne Haggerty, ‘Visual Analytics of an Eighteenth-Century Business Network’, Enterprise and 
Society, 11/1 (2010), pp. 1-25. 
6
 On this, see Tijl Vanneste, Global Trade and Merchant Networks: Eighteenth-Century Diamond 
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similarly offers a more nuanced and complex view of the operation and structure of 
early modern merchant networks than much existing work.   
Just how did merchant networks operate? As Smith-Doerr and Powell rightly 
suggest, network literature has tended to say a lot more about the general effects of 
networks than about the factors that generate, sustain and reproduce them.
7
 Another 
significant aspect of this thesis is the attention placed on how inter-personal networks 
built and maintained this mercantile system. Investigating specifically how Company 
men built their private networks and engaged in trade entails not only looking at 
capital flows, bills of exchange, shipping movements and respondentia bonds. It 
requires close attention to the mediation of social and inter-personal relationships that 
upheld business affairs and the role of the exchange of letters in particular. This thesis 
approaches private trade in a way that closely attends to these aspects, emphasising 
the social dimensions of this merchant network. This approach was partly borne out 
of necessity: data for private trade in the western Indian Ocean world is simply not as 
extensive as that for other regions where the private trade sector was well-developed.  
It is nevertheless important to emphasise that successful business in this 
context remained reliant on building robust and effective networks of associates: 
agents based at other ports were used to transmit information about particular 
markets, and multiple subscribers had to be engaged to spread risk. Even though the 
most prosperous merchants in the period under review were invariably high-ranking 
servants, all relied on widespread and effective inter-personal ties that were often 
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intertwined with, but also cut across, Company hierarchies. Existing research on 
private trade has shown, to a limited degree, that East India Company servants and 
free-merchants, stationed across the Indian Ocean region, continuously served each 
other’s private affairs. Ian Bruce Watson suggested, however, that private 
partnerships in the period up to 1760 were rather informal, temporary associations.
8
 
By contrast, this study has celebrated the importance of networking and of robust, 
reciprocal inter-personal relationships in private trade; affording them prime 
importance as a critical element upholding the business of Company servants. 
Drawing attention to the social reveals not just the types of connections that 
allowed private trade to function, but also the ways in which British trading 
arrangements mediated through inter-personal ties continued to operate actively 
alongside formal economic institutions in the Indian Ocean world. The distinction 
between ‘pre-modern’ inter-personal commercial associations, and more ‘modern’, 
institutional ones is seen to be increasingly problematic.
9
 Private trade during the 
eighteenth century was reliant on management through more informal, social 
constellations. These worked alongside, and were intertwined with, the corporate, 
legal and institutional processes that emerged in this period. This finding is important 
as it works against the overtly institutional characterisation of merchant networks 
propounded by the New Institutional Economics; an approach which fails to 
convincingly capture the complexity and character of early modern trade.
10
 Placing 
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the focus on inter-personal ties helps to move beyond overly structural approaches to 
global merchant networks, and as Miles Ogborn suggests, avoids seeing the 
development of commercial operations in this period as part of a ‘profit-seeking logic 
of mercantile capitalism’ which is both impersonal and inexorable.11 
Allied with such a perspective, this thesis has drawn attention to the 
individuals that comprised, and were at the heart of, complex networks of eighteenth-
century Eurasian trade and an ever-developing British commercial empire. This 
allows for a focus on the specifics and details of private trade, often determined by 
local context, whilst at the same time revealing how British merchants were part of 
much broader economic structures. Looking at the social is a useful prism through 
which to examine how merchants cultivated and negotiated their position within the 
shifting networks of European trade in the Indian Ocean, and dealt with changing 
patterns of global commerce. The individuals who actually formed long-distance 
connections are often overlooked in histories of Eurasian trade; merchants’ diverse 
constellations of correspondents brought them into interactive contact with the 
continents of Europe, South America, Africa and the Atlantic Ocean world.
12
 In turn, 
their lives were affected by these connections and developing global configurations. 
Exploring individual lives to shed light on macro processes and developments helps 
to overcome totalising, overly-homogenising, or simply impassive and faceless 
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accounts of the global, that are as ‘aggressively impersonal as globalization … itself’, 
to use Linda Colley’s phrase.13 
This thesis also fills an important historiographical void. Although it feeds 
into an extensive body of literature on the private trade of East India Company 
servants in the early modern Indian Ocean world, this existing work has focused 
almost exclusively on the Bay of Bengal and Coromandel Coast regions. In addition, 
scholars that have explored British trade on the west coast of India have concentrated 
only on the second half of the eighteenth century.
14
 As a result, what we know about 
private trade in the pre-colonial era is largely based on the experiences of traders in 
Madras and Calcutta. Again, historians have generally emphasised the independent 
and robust nature of private trade networks in these areas, and have frequently linked 
them with the development of British hegemony in India, viewing private traders as 
‘imperialists’ and describing how they contributed to the ‘launching of a British 
territorial empire’.15 This obscures the way in which, until the end of the period under 
review, all British commerce relied on and was fundamentally shaped by, the 
framework of the Indian Ocean trading world within which it operated. By examining 
British private trade in the context of the Arabian Seas, this thesis challenges a 
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prevailing view of private trade as commerce solely rooted within a narrowly defined 
‘imperial’ structure.  
Two areas addressed by this thesis offer particularly important avenues for 
future research. Firstly, the connections between private trade in the Arabian Seas and 
other segments of the Indian Ocean need to be explored in greater detail in future 
work. This thesis is not a resolutely comparative study, but has suggested how private 
trade in this region differed from that operating elsewhere. Later research needs to 
look much more closely at correspondence-based social networks and private trade in 
Bengal and on the Coromandel Coast, to further elucidate the similarities and 
contrasts between different parts of Britain’s Indian Ocean world. How British 
merchants in eighteenth-century Asia, through personal relationships and their East 
India Company roles, were embedded in complex commercial and epistolary 
structures that allowed them to develop private trade portfolios should be afforded 
greater significance. The ways in which merchants constructed trustworthy ‘selves’ 
and managed their reputations through correspondence, and the importance this held 
for East Indian private trade, remains to be considered in more depth. 
Secondly, this thesis has generally concentrated on those merchants who 
experienced success in their private trade careers; a necessary approach due to the 
nature of the available source material. Historians of private trade have emphasised 
the necessity of using the private papers of merchants. Yet the material that survives 
tends to be related to those individuals who returned home having had ample 
opportunity of developing a fortune in the East Indies. This does offer important 
insights into just how Company servants were able to carve out a place in the trading 
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world of the Indian Ocean, and within a particularly volatile region of that maritime 
space too. However, later research could attend much more closely to commercial 
failure in East Indian private trade, especially considering the volatility of intra-Asian 
commerce. For every success there were numerous failures. Even broadly successful 
merchants faced losses and frequent disappointments in trade, and few returned home 
with a ‘competency’. Recent scholarship in attendant areas has begun to move in this 
direction: business historians are becoming increasingly interested in looking at 
failure and bankruptcy as well as success and large fortunes.
16
 Exploring the records 
of the Company’s Mayor’s Courts in India and other under-utilised collections of 
East India merchants’ papers in the National Archives would be a useful entry point 
into this subject. 
 
The correspondence of merchants provides a window onto just how 
transoceanic trade and imperial connections were interwoven with interpersonal 
relationships and local realities. Like many long-distance traders in the eighteenth 
century, British merchants in the Indian Ocean world were individuals who were 
embedded in local commercial, political and cultural settings, and also functioned as 
part of an emerging global economy.
17
 This thesis has emphasised that success and 
profit were not always common features of early eighteenth-century British private 
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trade when the Indian Ocean is viewed as a whole. Moreover, the sector did not grow 
and develop in all locales in the same ways, or at the same time. Focusing closely on 
the Arabian Seas and the west coast of India reveals how the complex commercial 
networks of Britain’s empire of trade could be ardently affected by differing regional 
dynamics even within the Indian Ocean. This challenges existing approaches to 
private trade, and sheds further light on the complexities of commerce across 
different spheres of maritime Asia. This study has also addressed the broader issues 
of the place of European trade in transforming the eighteenth-century Indian Ocean 
economy, and on the operation of merchant networks across the early modern world. 
The networked character of mercantile trade in this period is a significant theme in 
global history; yet most studies of merchant networks focus on the importance of 
network centres and the goods, credit, capital and men that flowed through them. This 
study has shown that individual merchants relied not just on maintaining reciprocal 
connections with the centre of their network, but also with more localised commercial 
hubs, or secondary centres, for successful trade: localised conditions in these areas 
had just as great an effect on trade as what was happening at the network centre. It is 
imperative to appreciate how merchants worked within both transnational structures 
and more localised political and economic settings to fully understand mercantile 
trade in the early modern period. As this thesis has demonstrated, paying close 
attention to correspondence, and thereby reconstructing the diverse inter-personal 
connections of early modern traders, reveals these complex interrelationships 
between the local and the global. 
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Appendix One 
 
Bombay Covenanted Servants Listed in the East India Company’s Personnel 
Lists, 1712-1752 
 
 
NB: The table below lists each of the names appearing in the East India Company’s 
Bombay personnel lists, between 1712 (when the series begins) and 1752. For each 
name, it shows the years when that individual appears in the lists, and also details 
their position in the factory system, where such information is provided. Many of the 
merchants discussed throughout this study appear in the table; entries in bold 
indicate those individuals mentioned in the text. 
 
 
 
Key to Abbreviations Denoting Position 
 
Acc  Accomptant 
AM  Assay Master 
Ass Acc  Assistant Accomptant 
Acc Gen Accomptant General 
Ass Sec Assistant Secretary 
[Number] C Bombay Council 
Member – number 
denotes rank 
Ch  Chaplain 
CJ  Chief Justice 
Dep Acc Deputy Accomptant 
Dep Gov Deputy Governor 
Dep Sec Deputy Secretary 
E  Engineer 
F  Factor  
JF  Junior Factor 
JM  Junior Merchant 
Ma  Mayor 
Mat  Master Attendant 
Mi  Minister 
Pres  President 
RDS Reader of Divine 
Service 
S  Surgeon 
St  Storekeeper 
SF  Senior Factor 
SM  Senior Merchant 
Sub Acc Sub-Accomptant 
W  Writer 
Wa  Warehousekeeper
 
 
 
 
Name 
 
Dates Appearing and Positions Held 
 
First 
Appearance 
 
Last 
Appearance 
Acton, Richard 1715, 1716, 1717, 1718 - JF; 1719 - JF and 
Dep Sec 
1715 1719 
Addison, John 1715 - JF/8th C, 1716 - 7th C, 1717 - 6th C, 
1718 JM/6th C; 1719 - SM 
1715 1719 
Aislabie, William 1712, 1713, 1715 - General 1712 1715 
Aldersey, Robert 1712, 1713 - JF 1712 1713 
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Andrew, Allen 1712, 1713 - JF 1712 1713 
Archer, George  1712, 1713 - JF 1712 1713 
Ashby, John 1724, 1725 - Surgeon 1724 1725 
Aynsworth, Rowland 1712, 1713 - W 1712 1713 
Baker, Euclid 
(Euclad) 
1713, 1715 - E 1713 1715 
Bankes, Edward 1726, 1727, 1728 - W 1726 1728 
Bannister, James 1719 - W; 1722 - W/Ass Sec; 1726 - F; 1727 - 
F/JM; 1728 - JM 
1719 1728 
Barrowby, Thomas 1737, 1738 - Surgeon 1737 1738 
Bartlett, William 1719 - W 1719 1719 
Bennett, William 1742, 1743 - W/Ass Acc 1742 1743 
Benton, Thomas 1743, 1746, 1747 - W; 1745 - W/Ass Sec; 1748 
- W/F 
1743 1745 
Bertie, Henry 1733, 1734, 1735, 1736, 1737 - W; 1738 - 
W/F; 1739, 1740 - F; 1741 - F/JM; 1742, 1743, 
1744 - JM; 
1733 1744 
Bidwell, Hugh (Jnr) 1738, 1739, 1740, 1741, 1742 - W 1738 1742 
Bidwell, Hugh (Snr) 1731, 1732, 1733, 1734, 1735 - F; 1738 - JM; 
1739 - JM/SM 
1731 1739 
Blandy, John  1735 - W 1735 1735 
Boddam, Rawson 
Hart 
1752 - W 1752 1752 
Boone, Charles 1717, 1718, 1719, 1721, 1722 - Pres 1717 1722 
Bouchier, George 1751, 1752 - W 1751 1752 
Bourchier, Richard 1751 - 2nd C/Accompt, 1752 - Pres 1751 1752 
Bowyer, Cecil 1751 - W; 1752 - W/Ass Acc 1751 1752 
Braddyll, John 1718 - 8th C; 1719 - 6th C; 1721 - 2nd 
C/Acc/CJ; 1724, 1725, 1726, 1727, 1728, 
1736, 1737 - 3rd C; 1734, 1735 - 4th C 
1718 1735 
Brandling, John 
Lemon  
1735, 1736, 1737, 1738, 1739 - W; 1740 - 
W/F; 1741, 1742 - F 
1735 1742 
Brazier, George 1712, 1713, 1715, 1716 - W; 1717, 1718 - 
JF/Ass Acc 
1712 1718 
Breton, George 1728, 1729 - W 1728 1729 
Brewer, William 1723, 1724 - F; 1725 - F/Ass Acc 1723 1725 
Bronsdon, Edward 1742, 1743 - W; 1744 - W/F/Ass Sec 1742 1744 
Brown, John 1747, 1748 - W 1747 1748 
Brown, Steward 1719 - W 1719 1719 
Brown, Walter 1718 - 9th C; 1719 - 7th C; 1721 - 3rd C 1718 1721 
Bryant, William 1719 - JF 1719 1719 
Burchall, John 1735, 1736, 1737 - W; 1738 - W/Ass Acc; 
1739 - W; 1740 - W/F 
1735 1740 
Burniston, Douglas 1712, 1713 - In C, 1715 - 3rd C  1712 1715 
Burton, Ceasar 1712 - JF 1712 1712 
Byfield, Thomas 1738 - W; 1739 - W/Ass Acc; 1746, 1747 - 
JM/Sub Acc/RDS; 1748 - JM/RDS/M; 1749 - 
1738 1746 
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Ma 
Carmichael, Charles 1731, 1732, 1733, 1734 - W 1731 1734 
Carter, William 1718, 1719 - JF; 1721 - F/Ass Sec; 1722 - F; 
1723 - F/JM 
1718 1723 
Carus, Thomas 1717, 1718 - JF  1717 1718 
Chambre, Alan 
(Allen) 
1713, 1715, 1716, 1717 - W; 1718 - W/JF; 
1719 - JF; 1721 - JM; 1733 - Ma 
1713 1721 
Chaplyn, Benjamin 1715 - JF 1715 1715 
Chapman, James 
(Rev) 
1729, 1730, 1731, 1732, 1733, 1734, 1735, 
1736, 1737, 1738, 1739, 1740, 1741, 1742, 
1743, 1744, 1745 - Mi 
1729 1745 
Chappell, William 1712, 1713 - W 1712 1713 
Chester, Anthony 1751 - W 1751 1751 
Clapham, James 1721, 1722 - F 1721 1722 
Clapham, John 1717, 1718 - 4th C; 1719 - 5th C 1717 1719 
Cleland, John 1733, 1734 - W; 1735 - W/F; 1736, 1737 - F; 
1738 - F/JM; 1739, 1740, 1741 - JM 
1733 1741 
Clift, Edward 1723, 1724, 1725, 1726, 1727 - W; 1728 - F 1723 1728 
Clitherow, Henry 1733, 1734 - F 1733 1734 
Cobb(e(s)), Richard 1715, 1716, 1717, 1718, 1719, 1721 - Mi 1715 1721 
Cockell, William 1718, 1719 - JF; 1721 - F; 1738 - 4th C 1718 1721 
Cole, William 1712, 1713 - JF 1714 - JF/C, 1715 - 7thC, 1716 
- SF/3rd and 4th C 
1712 1716 
Compton, Henry 1732, 1733, 1734, 1735, 1736, 1737, 1738 - 
Surgeon 
1732 1738 
Cookson, Daw. 1713 - W 1713 1713 
Courtney, John 1712 - Wa, 1713 - In C; 1718, 1719 - SF; 
1721 - 4th C; 1723, 1724; 1730, 1731 - 2nd 
C/Acc/CJ 
1712 1731 
Courtney, Richard 1721, 1722, 1724 - W; 1730, 1731 - JM; 1732 - 
SM 
1721 1732 
Cowan, Robert 1722 - 9th C; 1723, 1724 - 3rd C; 1727 - 4th 
C; 1728, 1729 - 2nd C/Acc/CJ; 1730, 1731, 
1732, 1733, 1734, 1735 - Pres 
1722 1735 
Cox, James 1745, 1748 - W; 1746 - W/Ass Sec; 1747 - 
W/Ass Sec 
1745 1747 
Crawford/Crafford, 
James 
1721, 1722, 1723, 1724, 1725, 1726, 1727, 
1728, 1729, 1730, 1731, 1732 - S  
1721 1732 
Crisp, Phesaunt 1738, 1739, 1740, 1741 - W/Ass Acc; 1742 - 
W/F/Ass Acc; 1743 - F/Dep Acc 
1738 1743 
Crom(m)elin, 
Charles  
1733, 1734, 1735, 1736, 1737 - W; 1738 - 
W/F; 1739, 1740 - F; 1741 - F/JM; 1742, 
1743 - JM; 1745 - SM; 1750 - 4th C; 1751 - 
5th/6th/7th C; 1752 - 6/7/8 C 
1733 1745 
Cromelin, Mark 
Anthony 
1712, 1713 - JF; 1715 - JF/9thC; 1716 - Acc; 
1717, 1718 - SF 
1712 1718 
Cuddon, Warner 1717 - 7th C 1717 1717 
Cumming, Obadiah 1743, 1744, 1745 - W; 1746, 1747 - W/Dep 
Sec; 1748 - W/F/Dep Sec; 1749 - F/Dep 
1743 1750 
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Sec/RDS; 1750 - F 
Cuthbertson, Francis 1724 - W 1724 1724 
Dacres, John 1728, 1729, 1730 - W; 1731, 1732 - W/Dep 
Sec; 1733, 1734, 1735 - F/Dep Sec; 1736, 
1737, 1738 - JM; 1739 - SM 
1728 1739 
Dalrymple, James 1745, 1746, 1747, 1748, 1749 - W; 1745 1749 
Davis, William 1738, 1739, 1740, 1741, 1742 - F/Assay 
Master; 1743 - F/JM/AM; 1744, 1745 - 
JM/AM 
1738 1745 
De Champs, 
Augustine 
1721 - S 1721 1721 
De La Garde 
(D'Lagarde), William 
1743, 1744 - W; 1749, 1750 - F/Ass Acc; 1751 
- F/JM 
1743 1752 
Deeplow (Deplow), 
William 
1717, 1718 - W; 1719 - W/Ass Acc; 1721 - 
W/F 
1717 1721 
Devaux, Caesar 1718 - W 1718 1718 
Dickinson, Francis 1727, 1728, 1729 - JM; 1730, 1731 - SM; 
1732 - 6th-8th C; 1733 - 7th/8th C; 1734, 
1735 - 9th C 
1727 1735 
Disbrowe, Cromwell 1726, 1727, 1728 - W 1726 1728 
Disney, Matthew 1713 - W 1713 1713 
Dix, Christopher 1712, 1713, 1715, 1716, 1717 - JF 1712 1717 
Dixie, Richard 1752 - Mi 1752 1752 
Dorrill, Thomas 1733 - W; 1748 - 8th C; 1750 - 3rd C 1733 1748 
Doubleau, Peter 1721, 1722 - S 1721 1722 
Douglas, Alexander 1739 - W; 1740, 1741, 1742 - W/Ass Acc; 
1743 - W; 1744, 1745 - F; 1752 - SM/8/9/10 C 
1739 1752 
Draper, Cowan 
Henry 
1744, 1745, 1746, 1747, 1748 - W; 1749 - 
W/F 
1744 1749 
Draper, Daniel 1750, 1752 - W; 1751 - W/Ass Acc; 1752 - Ma 1750 1752 
Draper, William 
Henry 
1717, 1718, 1719 - W; 1721, 1722, 1723 - F; 
1724 - F/JM; 1725, 1726, 1727 - JM; 1729 - 
SM; 1730 - SM/Ma, 1731 - M/7th C; 1732 - 
3rd C; 1733 - 4th/5th C; 1734, 1735 - 6th C; 
1736, 1737 - 5th C 
1717 1737 
Dudley, George 1729, 1730, 1731, 1732, 1733 - F; 1734 - 
F/JM; 1735, 1736 - JM; 1737 - JM/SM; 1738, 
1739, 1740 - SM; 1741 - 7th C; 1742, 1743, 
1745 - 5th C; 1744 - 4th C 
1729 1744 
Edlyne, Edmund 1718, 1721 - W; 1719 - W/Ass Acc; 1724 - F 1718 1724 
Edwards, Daniel 1723 - W; 1724, 1726 - W/Ass Acc; 1725 - 
W/Ass Acc/Ass Sec; 1727 - W/Dep Acc; 1728, 
1729 - F/Dep Acc 
1723 1729 
Elliot, Gavin 1733, 1734, 1735 - W 1733 1735 
Ellis, Brabazon 1743, 1744 - W; 1746 - W/F; 1747, 1748, 
1749 - F; 1750, 1751 - JM 
1743 1746 
Elliston, Richard 1718, 1719 - W  1718 1719 
Erskine, Robert  1751 - W; 1752 - W/Ass Acc 1751 1752 
Evans, George 1723, 1724 - W 1723 1724 
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Evans, Scarlett 1747, 1748, 1749 - W; 1750 - W/Dep Sec; 
1751 - W/RDS; 1752 - W/F/RDS 
1747 1752 
Fleming, Thomas 
Winstow 
1742 - W; 1743 - W/Ass Acc 1742 1743 
Forbes, William 1721 - F; 1722, 1723, 1724, 1725 - F/Ass Acc; 
1726 - JM/Dep Acc 
1721 1726 
Forth, Joseph 1712 - Junior Factor 1712 1712 
Fowke, Francis 1744, 1745 - F/Dep Sec; 1746 - F 1744 1746 
Fowler, Henry 1721, 1722 - F 1721 1722 
Francis, Benjamin 1713 - JF 1713 1713 
Freemoult 
(Freemoutt), Robert 
1743, 1744, 1745, 1746, 1747 - W; 1748 - 
W/F; 1750 - F; 1751 - F/JM; 1752 - JM 
1743 1752 
Geekie, John 1729 - JM 1729 1729 
Geekie, John (2) 1740 - 4th C; 1741 - 3rd C/Acc; 1742, 1743 - 
2nd C/Acc 
1740 1743 
Geekie, Owann 1750, 1751, 1752 - W 1750 1752 
Goodere, John 1735 - W 1735 1735 
Goodwin, Nicholas 1723, 1727 - W; 1736, 1737, 1738, 1739 - SM 1723 1739 
Gos(e)lin, Styleman 1721 - F 1721 1721 
Grendon, Thomas 1738, 1739, 1743, 1745 - F; 1749 - JM 1738 1745 
Grose, John 1751 - W; 1752 - W/Ass Sec 1751 1752 
Gyfford (Gifford), 
William 
1712, 1713 - JF, 1715 - 8thC, 1716 - SF/4th 
and 5th C, 1717 - SF 
1712 1717 
Hamilton, Charles 1723 - S 1723 1723 
Hamilton, George 1731, 1732, 1735 - W 1731 1735 
Hanmer, James 1713, July 1713, 1715 - St 1713 1715 
Harcourt, Lee 1719 - W; 1725 - F  1719 1725 
Harnett, Thomas 1722 - W; 1723 - W/Ass Sec, 1724 - W/F/Dep 
Sec; 1725 - F/Dep Sec 
1722 1725 
Harris, Thomas 1728, 1729 - W 1728 1729 
Hatton, William 1741, 1742, 1743, 1744, 1745 - W; 1746 - F 1741 1746 
Hawys, John 1728, 1729, 1730, 1731, 1732 - W; 1733, 1734 
- F 
1728 1734 
Hay, Thomas 1718, 1719 - JF; 1721, 1722, 1723 - F 1718 1723 
Hayne, Joseph 1719 - JF 1719 1719 
Heming, James  1712, 1713 - W 1712 1713 
Heming, Thomas 
Winstow 
1744 - W/Ass Acc 1744 1744 
Henshaw, Edgerton 1742, 1743 - W 1742 1743 
Herman, John 
Christian 
1743, 1745 - F; 1744 - F/Ass Sec 1743 1744 
Higden, Henry 1723, 1724, 1726, 1727 - W; 1725 - W/Ass 
Sec; 1728, 1729, 1730 - F; 1731 - JM 
1723 1731 
Hill, John 1713 - JF/In C, 1715 - JF/6th C , 1716 - 
JF/2nd and 3rd C 
1713 1716 
Hill, John 1718 - W 1718 1718 
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Hill, Samuel 1712 - JF 1712 1712 
Hillar, John 1712, 1713 - 4th C 1712 1713 
Hodges, Thomas 1738, 1739, 1740 - W; 1741 - W/Ass Sec; 1742 
- W/Dep Sec; 1743 F/Dep Sec; 1746, 1747, 
1748 - JM; 1749 - SM; 1750 - 7th/8th C; 1751 
- 7th/8th/9th C 
1738 1751 
Hogg, John 1712, 1713 - JF 1712 1713 
Holford, Robert 1744, 1745, 1747, 1748 - W; 1746 - W/Ass 
Acc; 1749 - W/F; 1750 - F; 1751 - F then Ma 
1744 1751 
Holmes, John 1751 - W 1751 1751 
Hooke, William 
Henry 
1713, - W 1713 1713 
Hope, Edward 1744 - F 1744 1744 
Hope, James 1739 - SM 1739 1739 
Hope, John 1712, 1713, 1715 - JF, 1716 - JF/9th C, 1717 - 
8th C, 1718 - 7th C; 1724, 1725, 1726, 1727 - 
2nd C/Acc/CJ 
1712 1727 
Hope, John (2) 1750, 1751 - JM; 1752 - SM 1750 1752 
Hornby, William 1742, 1743, 1744 - W; 1748 - F; 1750 - JM 1742 1744 
Horne, John  1715, 1716, 1717, 1718, 1719 - JF; 1721 - 
JM/7th C; 1734 - Dep Gov/Acc; 1735 - Dep 
Gov/Acc/Pres; 1736, 1737, 1738, 1739 - Pres 
1715 1739 
Horner, George 1722, 1723, 1724, 1725; 1726 - F 1722 1726 
Hough, Samuel 1750, 1752 - Ma 1750 1752 
Howard, Hugh 1744 - 6th C; 1745 - 7th C; 1746, 1747 - 4th C 1744 1747 
Hunt, Charles 1712, 1713, July 1713, 1715, 1716 - W; 1717 - 
W/JF 
1712 1717 
Hunt, Robert 1743, 1747 - W; 1744, 1745 - W/Ass Acc; 
1748 - W/F/Ass Acc; 1749 - F/Ass Acc 
1743 1749 
Ingram, Jonah 1713, July 1713 - MAt; 1728, 1729, 1730, 
1731, 1732 - JM; 1733 - SM 
1713 1733 
Innes, Daniel 1722, 1723, 1724 - F; 1737 - SM 1722 1737 
Jenkins, George 1751 - Ma 1751 1752 
Jeynson, William 1723, 1724, 1725, 1726 - W; 1731 - JM 1723 1731 
Johnson, Henry 1751 - W 1751 1751 
Johnson, William 1751 - SM; 1752 - SM/Acc Gen 1751 1752 
Jones, Augustus 
Frederick 
1744 - W 1744 1744 
Kellett, Henry 1721, 1723, 1724, 1725 - F; 1726 - F/JM; 
1727, 1728 - JM; 1729 - 7th C; 1730, 1731 - 
6th C; 1732 - 4th C; 1733 - 6th/7th C; 1734, 
1735 - 8th C; 1736 - 7th C 
1721 1736 
Kerritt, William 1719 - W 1719 1719 
King, Arthur 1752 - W 1752 1752 
King, Hezekiah 1712, 1713 - W, 1715 - JF; 1722 - 5th C; 
1723, 1724, 1725, 1726, 1727, 1728 - 4th C 
1712 1728 
Kyffin/Kiffin, Henry 1722 - SM; 1723 - JM 1722 1723 
Lambe, James Henry 1750 - 6th/7th C 1750 1750 
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Lambert, Robert 1750, 1751 - W; 1752 - W/Ass Sec 1750 1752 
Lambton, John 1719, 1721 - W; 1722 - W/Dep Sec; 1723, 
1724, 1725 - F; 1726, 1727, 1728 - JM; 1732 - 
6th C, 1733 - 5th/6th C; 1734, 1735 - 7th C; 
1736, 1737 - 6th C; 1740, 1741, 1742, 1743, 
1744, 1745, 1746, 1747, 1748, 1749 - SM 
1719 1746 
Lane, Thomas 1733 - W 1733 1733 
Lane, Thomas (2) 1747, 1748 - SM; 1749 - SM/3/4 C, 1750, 1751 
- 3rd C; 1752 - 5/6/7 C 
1747 1752 
Law, Stephen 1731 - 7th C; 1732 - 5th C; 1740, 1741, 1742, 
1743 - Pres 
1731 1743 
Lowther, Henry 1719 - JF; 1721, 1722, 1723 - F; 1724 - F/JM; 
1726, 1728 - 7th C; 1727 - 8th C; 1729 - 4th 
C 
1719 1729 
Lowther, William 1744 - SM; 1745 - SM/Dep Acc 1744 1745 
Lushington, Rev 
Stephen 
1749, 1750 - Mi 1749 1750 
Lynch, Richard 1734 - W; 1739 - F/JM 1734 1739 
Mackenzie, William 1749 - W; 1751, 1752 - 3rd C 1749 1752 
Mann, John 1727, 1728, 1729, 1730, 1731 - S 1727 1731 
Manningham, Charles 1738, 1739, 1740, 1741 - W; 1742 - W/Ass 
Sec; 1743 - W/F/Ass Sec 
1738 1743 
Marsh, Thomas 1728 - W; 1729, 1730, 1731, 1732 - W/Ass 
Sec; 1733, 1734, 1735 - F/Ass Sec; 1736, 1737, 
1738 - JM/Dep Sec; 1739, 1740 - SM; 1741 - 
8th C; 1742, 1743, 1745 - 6th C; 1744 - 5th C; 
1746, 1747, 1748 - 3rd C 
1728 1748 
Massey, Edward 1719 - JF; 1721, 1722, 1723 - F; 1724 - F/JM; 
1725, 1726 - JM; 1727 - JM/SM; 1728, 1729 - 
SM 
1719 1729 
Mathison, Gilbert 1746, 1747, 1748, 1749, 1750, 1751, 1752 - S 1746 1752 
Maynard, John 1726, 1727, 1728 - W; 1729, 1730 - W/Dep 
Sec; 1731 - W/F/Dep Sec 
1726 1731 
Middleton, Charles  1712, 1713 - JF 1712 1713 
Midford, Blakett 1712, 1713, July 1713, 1715, 1716 - JF/SF; 
1717, 1718 - SF; 1719 - SF/SM; 1721 - 5th C; 
1722 - 4th C 
1712 1722 
Mildmay, Richard 1718 - JF; 1719 JF and Ass Sec 1718 1719 
Milles, John 1721 - F 1721 1721 
Mingay, Roger 1712, 1713 - JF 1712 1712 
Mitley, George 1712, 1713 - JF 1712 1713 
Moffat, Robert 1751 - W 1751 1751 
Moore, Henry 1752 - W 1752 1752 
Moore, Thomas 1712, 1713 - 3rd C 1712 1713 
Moore, Thomas (2) 1732, 1733, 1734, 1735, 1736 - S 1732 1736 
Morley, John 1726, 1727 - F; 1728, 1729, 1730 - F/Ass Acc; 
1731 - F/JM; 1732, 1733 - JM; 1734 - JM/SM; 
1735, 1736, 1737, 1738, 1739 - SM; 1740 - 6th 
C; 1741 - 4th C; 1742, 1743, 1745 - 3rd C; 
1726 1744 
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1744 - 2nd C/Acc 
Mouse, Randolph 1717, 1718 - W 1717 1718 
Munro, John 1731, 1732, 1733, 1734 - W; 1735 - W/F; 
1736, 1737 - F; 1743 - SM; 1744 - 8th C; 1745 
- 9th C; 1746, 1747 - 5th C; 1748 - 3/4 C 
1731 1748 
Munroe, Andrew 1712, 1713 - JF 1712 1713 
Myngs, John 1724 - W 1724 1724 
Nesbitt, Robert 1741 - Ma 1741 1741 
Newlin, Robert 1713, July 1713, 1715, 1716 - W; 1717 - 
W/Ass Acc; 1718, 1719 - JF/Ass Acc; 1721 - 
JM/Ass Acc/8th C; 1722 - 5th C; 1723 - 4th C, 
1724 - 5th C/CJ 
1713 1724 
Nicholls, William 1738, 1739, 1740 - W 1738 1740 
Nielson, John 1734, 1735, 1736, 1737, 1738, 1739, 1740, 
1741, 1742, 1743, 1744, 1745, 1746 - S 
1734 1746 
Orfur, Edward 1712 - 3rd C 1712 1712 
Overton, Fairfax 1717 - W 1717 1717 
Owen, Edward 1731, 1732, 1733 - W/Ass Acc; 1734 - 
W/F/Ass Acc; 1735 - F/Ass Acc; 1736 - F; 
1737 - F/JM; 1738, 1739 - JM; 1740 - JM/SM; 
1741, 1742 - SM/Dep Acc; 1743, 1744 - 7th C; 
1745 - 8th C 
1731 1745 
Paauw, Arnoldus 1723, 1724 - F/Ass Acc; 1725, 1726, 1727 - F; 
1728, 1729 - JM; 1730, 1731 - 7th C 
1723 1731 
Pack, John 1712 - JF 1712 1712 
Pack, St. George 1729 - W; 1736, 1737 - F/JM 1729 1737 
Page, Edward 1723 - W; 1724, 1725 - W/Ass Sec; 1726, 1727 
- W/Dep Sec; 1728 - F/Dep Sec; 1729, 1730 - 
F; 1731 - JM/Ma 
1723 1731 
Parker, 
Lawrence/Laurence 
1717 - 2ndC, 1718 - Dep Gov/Acc; 1719 - Dep 
Gov/Acc/CJ 
1717 1719 
Parker, Micajah 1743, 1744 - W 1743 1744 
Parkyn(s), Charles July 1713, 1715 - JF 1713 1715 
Parsons, John 1750, 1752 - W/Ass Acc; 1751 - W 1750 1752 
Pattishall, Thomas 1712, 1713, 1715 - JF 1712 1715 
Pattle, Thomas 1721 - W; 1734, 1735, 1736, 1737, 1738 - SM 1734 1738 
Paxton, Nathaniel 1747, 1748 - W 1747 1748 
Peers, John 1747, 1748 - W; 1752 - W/F/Dep Sec 1747 1752 
Peirson, John 1735, 1736, 1738 - W 1735 1738 
Pelly, Ralph 1713, July 1713 - JF 1713 1713 
Percival(l), George 1713 - W; 1722, 1723, 1724, 1727 - 6th C; 
1725, 1726, 1728 - 5th C; 1729, 1730, 1731, 
1732, 1733, 1738, 1739 - 3rd C; 1734, 1735 - 
5th C; 1736, 1737 - 4th C; 1740 - SM 
1713 1740 
Percival, William 1752 - W 1752 1752 
Pevison, John 1750 - SM 1750 1750 
Phillipps, Owen  1715, 1716, 1717 - JF; 1718, 1719 - SF; 1721 - 1715 1721 
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6th C 
Phipps, William 1712 - Wa; 1713 - 'Merchant'; 1722 - 2nd C; 
1723, 1724, 1725, 1726, 1727, 1728, 1729 - 
Pres 
1712 1729 
Pomfrett, Nathaniel 1747 - W; 1752 - W/F 1747 1752 
Poole, Robert 1725 - F; 1726, 1727, 1728 - F/Ass Sec 1725 1728 
Price, Samuel 1732, 1733, 1734, 1735 - W; 1736 - W/Ass 
Acc; 1737 - W/F/Ass Sec; 1738 - F/Ass Sec; 
1739 - F/Dep Sec; 1740 - F/JM/Dep Sec; 1741 
- JM/Dep Sec; 1742 - JM; 1743 - JM/SM; 
1744, 1745 - SM 
1732 1745 
Price, William 
Andrews 
1742, 1743 - W; 1752 - JM 1742 1743 
Pym, Francis 1743 - W; 1744, 1745, 1746 - W/Ass Acc; 
1747 - W/F/Dep Acc; 1748, 1749, 1750 - 
F/Dep Acc 
1743 1750 
Rammell, Thomas 1716, 1717, 1718 - W; 1727, 1728 - SM; 1729 
- 5th C; 1730, 1731 - 4th C 
1716 1731 
Ramsden, James 1726, 1727, 1728, 1729 - F 1726 1729 
Rawdon, Robert 1733, 1734, 1735, 1736, 1737 - F; 1738 - 
F/JM; 1739 - JM; 1740 - JM/Ma; 1742, 1744 - 
SM; 1746 - SM/7th C; 1747 - 5th C; 1748 - 4/5 
C 
1733 1748 
Ray, Walter 1739 - JM/SM; 1740, 1741 - SM 1739 1741 
Redshaw, Thomas 1722; 1725 - W; 1727, 1728, 1729 - F; 1730, 
1731, 1732 - JM; 1733, 1734, 1736, 1737 - 
SM; 1735 - SM/Ma 
1722 1735 
Rich, Charles  1712 - JF 1712 1712 
Rigby, Charles 1740 - 2nd C 1740 1740 
Robinson, John 1726, 1727, 1728, 1729 - F 1726 1729 
Robinson, John (2) 1742, 1743 - W 1742 1743 
Robinson, William 1727, 1728 - W 1727 1728 
Ross, Andrew 1744, 1745 - W; 1746, 1747 - W/Ass Acc 1744 1747 
Ryley, James 1751 - W 1751 1751 
Sadleir, George 1735, 1736, 1737, 1738, 1739 - W; 1740 - 
W/F; 1741, 1742 - F; 1743 - F/JM; 1744, 1745 
- JM 
1735 1745 
Salisbury, James 1717, 1718 - W; 1719 - W/Ass Acc; 1721, 
1722 - F/Ass Acc 
1717 1722 
Salter, Thomas 1713 - JF 1713 1713 
Sanders, Richard 1733, 1734 - W; 1740, 1741 - JM; 1742 - 
JM/SM; 1743, 1744, 1745 - SM; 1746 - 
SM/7th C; 1747 - 6th C; 1748 - 5/6 C 
1733 1748 
Sandford, William 1723, 1724 - W 1723 1724 
Sarson, John  July 1713, 1715, 1716, 1717 - W; 1718 - 
W/JF; 1719 - JF/Ass Acc; 1721 - JM/Ass 
Acc; 1722 - 8th C/Acc; 1723 - 7th C 
1713 1723 
Sarson, John (2) 1725 - ?, 1726, 1727 - 'On a Factors Salary' 1725 1727 
Satchwell, Thomas 1747, 1748, 1749, 1751 - W; 1750 - W/Ass 1747 1750 
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Acc 
Saunders, John 1717 - W 1717 1717 
Savage, Henry 1752 - 5th/6th C 1752 1752 
Sawbridge, Thomas 1722 - Ch; 1723, 1724, 1725 - Mi 1722 1725 
Say, Edward 1712, 1713 - W; 1715, 1716 - JF; 1722 - SM 1712 1722 
Science, Charles 1744 - W 1744 1744 
Sclater, May 1738, 1739 - W 1738 1739 
Scott, George 1731, 1732, 1733, 1734, 1735 - W; 1736 - 
W/F/Ass Acc; 1737 - F/Ass Acc; 1738 - F; 
1739 - F/JM; 1740, 1741 - JM; 1742 - JM/SM; 
1743, 1744 - SM; 1745 - SM/Ma; 1746 - 
SM/8th C; 1747 - 7th C; 1748 - 6/7 C; 1749, 
1751, 1752 - 2nd C/Accompt 
1731 1752 
Scott, Titus 1745, 1746 - W 1745 1746 
Scroggs, John 1712, 1713 - W 1712 1713 
Seckor (Secker), 
Richard 
1744, 1745 - W; 1746, 1747, 1748 - W/Ass 
Acc 
1744 1748 
Sedgewick(e), 
William 
1726, 1727, 1728, 1729, 1730 - W; 1731 - 
W/F; 1732, 1733 - F; 1734 - F/JM; 1735, 1736 
- JM; 1737 - JM/SM; 1738 - SM; 1739 - 
SM/Mayor; 1740 - 7th C; 1741 - 5th C; 1742, 
1743, 1745 - 4th C; 1744 - 3rd C; 1746, 1747 - 
2nd C/Acc; 1748, 1749 - SM; 1750 - SM/4th 
C; 1751 - 4th C 
1726 1752 
Sedgewick(e), 
William (2) 
1744, 1745, 1746, 1747 - W; 1748 - W/Ass 
Sec; 1749 - W/F 
1744 1749 
Sewell, John 1731 - W; 1732, 1733, 1734, 1735 - W/Ass 
Acc; 1736 - W/F/Ass Acc; 1737 - F/Ass Acc; 
1738 - F/Dep Acc; 1739 - F/JM/Dep Acc; 
1740, 1741 - JM/Dep Acc; 1742 - JM; 1744 - 
SM/Dep Acc; 1745 - SM; 1748 - 7th C; 1749 - 
3rd C; 1752 - 4th/5th C 
1731 1752 
Shaw, William 1745, 1746, 1747, 1748, 1749 - W; 1750 - 
W/F; 1751 - F 
1745 1751 
Shelton, George 1717, 1718 - W; 1723 - F 1717 1723 
Sherman, John 1743, 1744 - F/Ass Acc 1743 1744 
Sidney, Charles 1731, 1732 - W 1731 1732 
Skynner, Augustus 1712, 1713 - W 1712 1713 
Slaney, Edward 1712, 1713 - JF 1712 1713 
Smith, William 1733 - Surveyor 1733 1733 
Soddington, Cornelius 1715 - E 1715 1715 
Spencer, John 1742 - W; 1743 - W/Ass Acc; 1744, 1745, 
1746 - W; 1747 - W/F; 1748, 1749 - F/Acc 
General; 1750 - F/JM; 1751, 1752 - JM 
1742 1752 
Spinkes, Robert 1713, July 1713, 1715, 1716 - W 1713 1716 
Starr, Joseph 1712 -  JF 1712 1712 
Stoneham, Thomas 1742 - Ma 1742 1742 
Stonestreet, Nicholas 1743 - F 1743 1743 
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Stonestreet, Thomas 1723 - W; 1724 - W/Ass Acc; 1730 - F/Dep 
Acc; 1731, 1732, 1733 - JM/Dep Acc; 1734 - 
SM/Dep Acc/Ma; 1735, 1736, 1737 - SM/Dep 
Acc; 1738 - SM/6th C/7th C; 1739 - 6th C; 
1740 - 5th C 
1723 1740 
Strudwick(e), Francis 1718 - SF; 1719 - SF/SM; 1721, 1722, 1723, 
1724, 1725, 1726, 1727, 1728, 1729, 1730, 
1731, 1732, 1733, 1734, 1735, 1736, 1737, 
1738, 1739, 1740, 1741 - SM 
1718 1741 
Strutt, Stephen 1712 - Acc/SM, 1713 - Acc/In C, 1715 - 
Acc/Dep Gov, 1716 - Chief/Dep Gov, 1717, 
1718, 1719 - 3rd C 
1712 1719 
Stuart, James 1731, 1732, 1733, 1734, 1735 - F; 1736 - 
F/JM; 1737, 1738 - JM; 1739 - JM/SM; 1740, 
1741, 1742, 1743, 1744 - SM 
1731 1744 
Stuart, James (2) 1750 - W/Ass Acc; 1751, 1752 - W/Dep Acc 1750 1752 
Styles, John 1718, 1719, 1722 - W; 1721 - W/Ass Acc 1718 1721 
Sudman, Francis 1744 - F/Ass Sec 1744 1744 
Sulivan, Laurence 1742, 1743, 1744, 1745, 1746 - F; 1747 - 
F/JM; 1748, 1749 - JM; 1750 - JM/SM/Dep 
Acc; 1751 - SM/Dep Acc; 1752 - SM/9th C 
1742 1752 
Sutton, Robert  1718, 1719 - JF; 1721 - F; 1723 - 8th C 1718 1723 
Symmon(d)s, 
Hugo/Hugh 
1735, 1736, 1737, 1738 - W; 1739 - W/Ass 
Sec; 1740 - W/F/Ass Sec; 1741 - F/Ass Sec; 
1742 - F; 1743 - F/JM; 1744, 1745 - JM; 1746 - 
SM; 1749 - SM/5th C; 1750 - 5th C; 1751 - 
6th/7th/8th C; 1752 - 7/8/9 C 
1735 1752 
Taylor, George 1712, 1713 - JF; 1722 - SM/CJ/3rd C; 1731 - 
SM; 1732, 1733, 1736, 1737, 1738, 1739 - 
2nd/Acc; 1734, 1735 3rd C 
1722 1735 
Thomas, Alexander 1712 - JF 1712 1712 
Thompson, 
Humfrey/Henry 
1747, 1748, 1749, 1750, 1751, 1752 - S 1747 1752 
Tracey, Robert 
Packington/Parkingto
n 
1745, 1746, 1747, 1748 - W; 1749 - W/Ass Sec 1745 1749 
Trimble, James 1743 - W 1743 1743 
Upton, Anthony 1743, 1746, 1747 - Ma 1743 1747 
Upton, Arthur 1721, 1722, 1723, 1724, 1725 - F; 1726, 1727, 
1728 - JM; 1729 - 6th C; 1730, 1731 - 5th C 
1721 1731 
Upton, Nicholas 1719 - JF 1719 1719 
Vander Amiden, 
William 
1712 - JF 1712 1712 
Verelst, James 1728, 1729 - W; 1730, 1731 - W/Ass Acc ; 
1732 - W; 1733 - F; 1737, 1738 - JM; 1741, 
1742 - SM 
1728 1742 
Wake, William 1733 - 8th/9th C; 1743 - Chief of Tellicherry; 
1744, 1745, 1746, 1747, 1748, 1749, 1750, 
1751 - Pres  
1733 1751 
Wallis, John 1719, 1721, 1722 - W; 1723 - W/F/Dep Sec; 
1727 - F/JM; 1730 - JM/SM; 1731 - SM/Ass 
Acc; 1732, 1734, 1735, 1737 - SM; 1736 - 
1719 1736 
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SM/Mayor 
Waters, Charles 1743, 1745 - W 1743 1745 
Waters, Richard 1717, 1718 - JF; 1719 - JF/SF; 1721 - F 1717 1721 
Waters, Thomas 1722 - F/Ass Acc; 1726, 1728 - 6th C, 1727 - 
7th C; 1734, 1737 - SM; 1738 - 5th C/6th C; 
1739 - 5th C; 1740 - 3rd C; 1741 - 2nd C 
1722 1741 
Watson, John 1752 - W/Ass Acc 1752 1752 
Went, Robert 1747, 1748 - W; 1749, 1750, 1751 - W/Ass Sec 1747 1751 
West, William 1732, 1733, 1734, 1735 - W; 1736 - W/F; 
1737, 1738 - F 
1732 1738 
West, William (2) 1750 - 2nd C/Acc; 1751, 1752 - SM 1750 1752 
Weston, Michael 1739, 1740, 1741, 1742, 1743, 1745 - S; 1744 - 
S/Ma 
1739 1744 
Whit(e)hill, Charles 1717, 1718, 1719 - W; 1735, 1736, 1737 - SM; 
1738 - 4th C/5th C; 1739 - 4th C; 1740 - 3rd 
C/4th C; 1745 - 2nd C 
1717 1745 
Whitehill, Charles (2) 1751, 1752 - W 1751 1752 
Whitehill, Thomas 1749 - F; 1750 - F/JM; 1751, 1752 - JM 1749 1752 
Whitwell, Nathaniel 1726, 1727 - W; 1732 - F; 1747, 1748 - 
2ndC/Acc 
1726 1732 
Whyche, Bernard 1713, 1715 - Dep Gov 1713 1715 
Willis, Pugh 1740, 1741, 1742, 1743 - W 1740 1743 
Wood, Francis 1745 - W 1745 1745 
Woodhouse, John 1718 - JF 1718 1718 
Woodward, Thomas 1721 - F 1721 1721 
Wrench, Peter 
Elw/vin 
1744, 1745, 1746, 1747, 1748 - W; 1749 - 
W/F; 1750, 1751 - F/Acc in Mayor's Court 
1744 1751 
Wyard, Charles 1718, 1719 - JF; 1723 - F/JM; 1724, 1725 - JM 1718 1725 
Yaldwin (Yaldwyn), 
Henry 
1733, 1734, 1735, 1736, 1737 - W 1733 1737 
Yeomans, George 1718, 1719 - JF 1718 1719 
Yeomans, Thomas 1721, 1722, 1723, 1724, 1725, 1726 - AM 1721 1726 
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Appendix Two 
 
Extracts from the List of Charges Brought by the East India Company Against 
Henry Lowther, September 1736. Taken from MSA, Bombay Public Journal 9C, 
pp. 500-531. 
 
 
It was alleged that: 
1
st
: A consignment of woollen goods and Elephants teeth was bought by Lowther in 
1734 for 227,544 rupees on credit for one year, despite fully knowing he was 
bankrupt, in order to use the goods or their proceeds to pay of his other debt. He had 
no visible means to satisfy this new debt to the Company. His attorneys (William 
Lowther and Jeremiah Bonnell) possessed only a few of his effects and his Bombay 
attorney knew of no other assets he had. 
 
2
nd: Ready cash ‘to the amount of forty six thousand rupees, the produce of some raw 
silk belonging to the Company’ was embezzled. The money was applied to Lowther’s 
‘own proper use and conveniency. by & with the consent, privity & concurrence of 
Messrs. John Robinson His Book keeper & James Ramsden who kept the Companys 
Books’. This charge based on testimony of Ramsden and Robinson, also of 
Jaggernaut Lolldas and also Jamboodass Narsingsdass (the Company’s shroff). 
 
3
rd
: This latter transaction was deliberately concealed by the entering of erroneous 
factory book information which accounted for it as a debt from the Paraks, the 
brokers, ‘thereby visibly encreasing their debt for the sole benefit and advantage [of 
himself, and] to the loss and detriment of his Hon. Employers’.  
 
4
th
: Some lead belonging to the Company (worth 4585 Rs) was sold to merchant 
Vendravan Lolljee, but the goods were never produced. Instead they were kept by 
Lowther for some months before being sold to the Paraks. Lowther designed to cover 
this up by urging what was sold to the brokers belonged to James Hope, with 
Vendravan’s remaining in the factory. The latter did not match the amount and type 
sold originally however. The books of the factory were full of such ‘false & fictitious 
entrys adapted to his private convenience’…  
 
7
th: Lowther’s own cash was advanced as part of the Company’s investment in 1735 
up to the value of 170000 Rs. The Company’s accounts were chanrged for this but 
with the amount being less than the investment total it was alleged that not all the 
amount was paid to the merchants of Surat to carry on the investment and Lowther 
had embezzled the difference. 
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8
th
: The sons of Lolldass Parak were loaned several thousand rupees of Company 
money by Lowther to help pay off their debts. He failed to recover the amount.  
 
9
th
: Lowther deceived the Governor and Council at Bombay by claiming that the 
brokers would have a ‘handsome capitall’ remaining after all their debts had been 
discharged, when in fact they were on the verge of ruin. This prevented ‘effectual 
measures for the satisfaction of the [brokers’] great debt to the Company’ which was 
‘now render’d entirely desperate’. 
 
10
th: Lowther used the Company’s cash for his own private use and employed the 
Company’s shroff to ‘set down large ballances of Cash tho. there was little or none in 
the Treasury’…  
 
12
th
, 13
th
 and 14
th
: Lowther used his power and influence as chief to obstruct the 
‘Bengall Gentlemen’ and other traders at Surat by intimidating the merchants, brokers 
and others from purchasing their goods without his prior consent. Procured a ‘Junte 
of Brokers to be at his own disposal’ without any authority and levied an 
unsanctioned duty of two per cent on all purchases by English merchants, payable to 
himself. Threats of violence and imprisonment were used by Lowther to extort sums 
of money from merchants. The testimony of George Williamson (presumably a 
Bengal bloke) and two Surat revealed the even apparent torture of a Surat merchant 
(‘Naugar Cottah’) and the pillaging of his belongings merely because he did not lend 
some money to Lowther when demanded. 
 
15
th
: A large sum of money (amounting £3000 in jewels and valuable goods) was 
disposed of by Lowther despite his insolvent condition and in spite of his creditors in 
India, by sending it home with his wife 1734/35. Mrs. Lowther embarked with Robert 
Cowan in January 1735 with bills to that amount…  
 
19
th
: Lowther engaged his employers in a civil war against Sorab Caun, Governor of 
Surat without sufficient grounds or motives to justify such a ‘hazardous and 
dangerous step’, both for the wellbeing of servants there but also for English 
privileges. 
 
20
th: ‘[B]eing moved by private & personal views without any regard to the interest 
of his employers or common humanity & justice’, Lowther imprisoned Mahmud 
Ally, a prominent Surat merchant. He then formed an alliance with the present 
Governor Teg Beg Caun, who afterwards had ‘Mahmud Allee murder’d in prison’. 
He had joined ‘basely with him in signing a writing with other Merchants (which the 
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Dutch refused) agst. the said Mahmud Ally which with the frequent invectives & 
other severitys Mr. Lowther used to that family, has brought upon the English the 
scandalous Aspersion of being the Cause of that familys misfortune & ruin And it is 
likely one day to being great trouble and damage to the said Company’ 
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